Speaker A
Hello to all poker and tournament poker fans. Here is another tutorial video for you. This time, we are going to look at post-flop play, specifically what a probe bet is and how to use it. Enjoy your meal. So, let's start by figuring
Learn what a probe bet is in poker, how to use it post-flop, and why calling weak hands on the flop can be profitable.
Key Takeaways
- A probe bet is a bet made out of position into an aggressor who skipped their continuation bet.
- Calling weak hands on the flop can be profitable due to implied odds and bluffing opportunities on later streets.
- Raw pot odds do not account for equity realization and future betting dynamics.
- Probe bets are effective tools to seize initiative and apply pressure on opponents who miss continuation bets.
- Proper bet sizing and understanding opponent tendencies enhance the success of probe bets.
What the video covers
- The video explains the concept of a probe bet, a bet made into an aggressor who skipped their continuation bet, specifically when out of position.
- A probe bet occurs when the aggressor checks instead of betting, and the out-of-position player bets on the turn or river.
- The video differentiates probe bets from donk bets and continuation bets with clear examples.
- It highlights common beginner mistakes related to pot odds and explains why raw pot odds often fail to capture implied odds and equity realization.
- The importance of calling flop bets with weak hands like gutshots and backdoors is emphasized to leverage future bluffing opportunities.
- Examples are given where calling with weak hands can lead to winning pots on later streets through bluffing or hitting a hand.
- The video discusses strategic betting on the river to fold out stronger hands and maximize value.
- It stresses that probe bets are mostly played from the small blind or big blind positions when the aggressor misses a continuation bet.
- The content also covers opponent tendencies and how to adapt betting sizes and strategies accordingly.
- Overall, the video offers practical advice for improving post-flop play and exploiting missed continuation bets.
Chapters
- 00:00Introduction to Probe Bets
- 02:36Examples of Probe Bets on Turn and River
- 05:32Common Mistakes with Pot Odds on the Flop
- 07:59Calling Weak Hands and Implied Odds
- 10:20Strategic River Betting and Bluffing
- 12:20Advanced Probe Bet Concepts and Opponent Reads
- 14:48Bet Sizing and Exploitative Play
- 18:24Summary and Final Advice on Probe Bets
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
Speaker A
out what a probe bet actually is. A probe bet is a bet made into an aggressor who skipped their continuation bet. I think many of you already know what a C-bet, or continuation bet, is; they are the same
Speaker A
thing. It is the aggressor's follow-up bet. For example, suppose a player opens from MP, someone calls, and they bet on the flop. That is a C-bet or a continuation bet. It's all the same thing. But when this player doesn't bet
Speaker A
and checks instead, and we bet on the turn while out of position, that is a turn probe bet. Let's visualize this so it’s not just words, to make it a bit clearer, and see how it works at the
Speaker A
table. Suppose player A opens from MP. We are in the big blind and we call. A flop comes, it doesn't matter what, say Queen-7-2. We, in the big blind, check.
Speaker A
Yes, if we bet now, it's called a donk bet. We always check here. Player A makes a continuation bet. In this case, his continuation bet is called a C-bet.
Speaker A
We called it, and we go to the turn. On the turn, we both check. So we both checked, and now it's our turn on the river. And now, if we bet, this bet is called a probe bet, or more
Speaker A
specifically, a river probe bet. Let's look at another situation. Player A opens from MP again, and we, being on the button, call. The same Queen-7-2 flop comes out. The player, let's say, checks, meaning he didn't C-bet. And it
Speaker A
would seem that in this case we can make a probe bet, but no. A probe bet is a bet made when we are out of position. In this case, we are on the button, meaning we are in position
Speaker A
relative to that player. Therefore, it is not a probe bet. If anyone is curious, this is called a bet into a missed C-bet. So, it is a bet into an aggressor who missed their continuation bet. Yes, for a probe bet, there must
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be a condition. We must be out of position. Let's just finally visualize this moment. Let the player open not from MP, but this time from the cutoff.
Speaker A
Yes, and we call from the big blind. The flop came out Ace-7-2. Our player checked. That is, well, we checked by default; yes, we always check here. And player A checked. In this case, on the turn, if we bet now, it will also be
Speaker A
called a probe bet. To be more specific, it would be a turn probe bet. To repeat, a probe bet is a bet into a skipped continuation bet when we are out of position. Basically, we can only play a probe bet while in two positions
Speaker A
: the small blind and the big blind, right? And for this, the aggressor must check on one of the streets. And in that case, a probe bet will be possible for us. And now that we've figured out what a probe bet is, let's step back a
Speaker A
bit and look at the play on the flop. After all, to get to a river probe bet, we need to call the flop. And this is where a rather common mistake for a large number of beginners actually lies
Speaker A
. Consuming information on the internet, they see some old articles, some old videos that talk about pot odds and how to make decisions on flops. That is, when they face, say, a bet of two big blinds into a pot of six, that's 30%.
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They calculate the pot odds, yes, the pot odds equal 2 divided by 10. Well, two divided by 10 is 20% pot odds. So it turns out that in this case, if my hand doesn't have direct outs, as these articles describe, 20%, then I need to
Speaker A
fold, even if I don't have, say, a flush draw. That is, yes, it has so-called gutshot odds, but nonetheless, I should always fold 8-7 here. I only have a bottom gutshot. Is this correct or not? Well, let's figure it out. Look
Speaker A
, when we call on the flop, we take implied pot odds into account here, for example. That is, we don't just count on winning the hand when we hit our gutshot. Sometimes we plan to win the hand when we hit an eight. Let's assume
Speaker A
our opponent has a hand like Ace-5. And against Ace-5, hitting an eight, we win the hand. Or, let's say, they have two fives. Against those hands, if we hit an eight or a seven, we also take down the pot. And what happens if neither we
Speaker A
nor our opponent hits, and we make it to a river probe bet? Let's take a look. So, in this case, I didn't hit, I bet the river, and I took down the pot. So, essentially, I just called the flop
Speaker A
with a gutshot, missed, and took down the pot. Yes, I likely folded out a weaker hand, but it shows that raw pot odds, which are often discussed in older articles and videos, don't work because they ignore equity realization.
Speaker A
Look, if our rule here is that I call a flop bet and then both my opponent and I just check-check, check-check,
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meaning we go to showdown with the hands we currently hold. Of course, in that case, you must fold 8-7 on this flop, but if we factor in the chance of hitting an eight or seven and taking the pot with a bluff, then I should be
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calling the flop. So, let's draw our first conclusion. The conclusion is as follows. We call the flop with weak hands, gutshots, backdoors plus overcards, and similar types of hand ranges. Not necessarily to hit a strong combination, but to either hit a strong
Speaker A
hand, reach a showdown with a weak-mid pair, or just take the pot as a bluff.
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So, the math behind raw pot odds just doesn't work. It doesn't account for realization, meaning it ignores the probability that one player might bluff the other. Therefore, to reach profitability, the first thing we must learn is not to fold weak hands on the
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flop. This doesn't mean it's profitable to call any two cards on the flop, regardless of the board or our hand, and then bluff the river. Yes, we might sometimes win the pot without looking at our cards, but in the long run, that
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won't be profitable. We still have to consider that our hand needs to win occasionally by hitting, because we can't bluff every single time. Sooner or later, our opponents will figure us out. And, well, sometimes they will just hit a strong hand themselves and
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call our bluff. However, folding weak hands—like gutshots and such—to small flop bets is not the right move.
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And to reinforce our conclusion, let's look at the next hand. I have Ace-Ten in the big blind. I defend against middle position. The flop comes 4-King-3. Here on the flop, I call, again, with the expectation of hitting
Speaker A
something. Plus, it's very important to realize that if I hit an Ace, my opponent will often perceive that card —say, an Ace on the turn—as their own. Indeed, this card hits his range more, so he will be bluffing into it
Speaker A
very actively. Therefore, when I hit an ace on the turn, I’ll call the turn and the river, often taking down the pot because my opponent will be bluffing. So, this ace is quite strong; yes, it’s a very good card in my hand,
Speaker A
but unfortunately, I don’t improve to a pair of aces or tens. My opponent checks. A five comes on the river. And here is my decision. See, it might seem like my hand has some showdown value here, right? Let’s assume my opponent
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had something like 8-7, right? I mean, I beat those, right? Say the opponent had something like ace-two; I beat those. Yes, the opponent could have had hands like, say, Queen-Nine, and suddenly decided not to bluff a gutshot. I beat that one too. Accordingly, I
Speaker A
should check and try my luck, hoping that my opponent checks as well so I can win these hands at showdown.
Speaker A
However, if I bet, what can I fold out that is stronger than my hand? Well, hypothetically, I can fold out some stronger hands. I can sometimes fold out Ace-Queen. I can sometimes fold out Ace-Three or other small aces; maybe he
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isn't comfortable calling with a pair of sevens anymore. It’s not guaranteed that he folds, but my bet is still a good play. Why is that?
Speaker A
There’s an important point here. Look, if my opponent had 8-7, he didn't bet the turn for some reason of his own. Is there a probability he’ll bet it on the river? If I check now—well, I’m not betting, I’m checking—yes,
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there is. And it’s not s
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bluffing you—because playing check-call against a bet here in the hope they have 8-7 is optimistic.
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Because he will still have Jack-Ten, Queen-Jack, or two nines; he might bet those into my check because my check will look very weak. That’s why I’m bluffing here, hoping to fold out weaker hands. Well, maybe sometimes stronger hands, but I’m doing it to
Speaker A
prevent myself from being bluffed. It’s a very important psychological point that many people don't take into account. In other words, to paraphrase in plain language, you need to seize the initiative whenever you are given the chance. Often, when two players—
Speaker A
even those not very experienced—clash in a post-flop battle, the one who is better at seizing the initiative wins.
Speaker A
So, seize the initiative and you will find success, just like in this example . Now, let's look at one last quick hand on this topic, just to solidify the concept of a probe bet in your mind . Once again, the opponent placed a bet
Speaker A
, we called, and the check-check condition was met. And then we place a probe bet as a bluff. Yes, you see, I called a gutshot on the flop. I didn't even have a backdoor flush draw. I wasn't just calling to hit my gutshot;
Speaker A
I was planning to bluff at times and take down the pot that way. And in this case, I managed to do exactly that. So, the next point I would like to touch on is the so-called psychology of bluffing
Speaker A
. I don't know if this term exists, but in the context of using it for a river probe bet, I just came up with it, so to speak. I used to work as a poker coach. And I would find that students I
Speaker A
was teaching would sometimes come back after a session saying, "Oh, it's great , everything works, thank you so much for the strategies." And sometimes they would say, "What's going on, why isn't it working?" And they would send me a
Speaker A
bunch of hands, let's say. So look, let's take a look at this hand here. I called pre-flop and called the flop.
Speaker A
They even bet half the pot against me. We likely know how to handle a recreational player. Although, on a board like this, anyone might bet half the pot. A good river card came out for me to bluff here. I want to try and
Speaker A
fold out some Ace-four, some Ace-something, or Ace-King. There we go . So, I made a bet; I didn't go super big. I got a call from a pair of fives.
Speaker A
Ah, well yes, that is definitely a recreational player. I was picking these out—I won't cut this part, by the way—because I was selecting a hand where I got called down with a weak hand, but I didn't notice he had a
Speaker A
straight. Let this remain in the recording. I somehow thought I got called down on fourth or fifth pair, but he just clicked call. That's perfect. Let this actually stay in the recording. We won't cut this hand out.
Speaker A
Just watch and enjoy how opponents sometimes play. And this is a tournament, mind you—clearly more expensive than a fifty, at least fifty dollars or more. So, well, you see, even things like this happen. Yeah, of course he doesn't have the nuts, he has
Speaker A
something like jack-nine or just a nine , but he was still afraid to raise. A fun hand, but let me find one that's more suitable for my thesis. So, let's look at the next hand, a more appropriate one. I defended jack-ten
Speaker A
suited here, flopped an open-ended straight draw; I could have raised or called, I called, then we checked it down. I bet the river, choosing a size of pot or even a bit more, and I got called, failing to fold out an ace-high
Speaker A
. What can we say in this case? First of all, very often, when players end up in this situation, they start blaming themselves and saying they played poorly. I suggest looking at these situations differently from a psychological perspective: don't say
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you played poorly, say your opponent played well. That is, I played well, but my opponent played even better.
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This way, it will be easier for you to handle situations like this, and there will actually be quite a few of them.
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And most importantly, can we say that the bluffing strategy doesn't work when we see such calls? Actually, no, because we don't see the folds. This is a very important point. The thing is, very often when bluffing the river in
Speaker A
such a spot, we just see an opponent fold, and we don't see what they threw away. And let's assume we faced, say, ten different opponents. Some of them folded pocket sixes, pocket sevens, or pocket eights. Ace-king, ace-ten, ace-jack. And we got a lot of folds,
Speaker A
much more than we were supposed to. We'll talk about that in a moment, by the way. But at the same time, one of them called us down with ace-high. And it can sometimes happen that in one session, or one tournament, three of
Speaker A
our bluffs don't succeed. Meaning we get called, and by some ace-high, too. And every time we get called by a weak hand we expected to fold out, the thought might creep in that our strategy isn't working. But you can
Speaker A
only test the effectiveness of our strategy by playing a large enough sample size. And when we build up that sample, upload our hands somewhere, and look at the total fold frequency of our bluffs, only then can we judge whether
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our strategy is correct or if it requires some adjustments. It is also important to understand that when we, for example, get a wide call from our opponent, it doesn't mean we played poorly in the long run, because we
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won't always have a bluff, right? That is, we might have value; we make a bet, say, on a very dangerous board and get called by a third pair, perhaps with some blocker. But nevertheless, in this case, if I were bluffing here, my bet
Speaker A
would not have been successful. But on the other hand, in another situation, when I bet for value, he, figuratively speaking, overpaid me, which I am glad about. So how do we even understand roughly how many folds we should be
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getting and how effective it is to bluff in a given situation? Well, for this, we use the simplest formula for calculating the Fold Equity required for our bluff. It looks like this.
Speaker A
Let's build the pot. We have nine big blinds in the pot, and we bet seven into it. In this case, the total pot becomes 16.2 at the moment. And to understand the fold equity formula, we must take the bet we risked, seven big
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blinds, and divide it by the resulting pot of 16.2, and we get 43%, right, multiplying by 100%. That is, if in this case the opponent folds more often than 43 times out of 100, then we start making money. We get a profitable bluff
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. But what do these numbers actually give us? Well, honestly, unfortunately, they won't give you much right away.
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Because to calculate fold equity, or at least estimate it, you need to work a little bit on your game away from the tables and learn to understand ranges well. But you can just take my word for it for now that any of your bluff bets
Speaker A
on the river after a check-check on the turn will, as a rule, be profitable because the field plays unbalanced.
Speaker A
That is, the field overplays quite a few hands on the flop, betting more often than they should, sometimes opening too wide preflop, and checking in an unbalanced way. A check on the turn often contains a lot of empty
Speaker A
hands, a lot of quite weak, like third or fourth pairs, with which opponents are ready to part on certain rivers.
Speaker A
Yes, not always—sometimes you will be called, but that's not scary. Yes, it's scary when you are always absolutely called, but that never happens. Take my word for it. The lower the limit, the higher the success rate for your bluffs
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. That is, the lower the limit, the more often your opponents will fold to a probe bet on the river. on the river.
Speaker A
In the game, let's just quickly estimate here; our opponent opened from the Lowjack position. He opened, for example, 24%of hands. Among those 24%of hands, there are, of course, many very strong ones. But the thing is, first of all, on the flop he bet quite large,
Speaker A
meaning he narrowed his range immediately. Then on the turn, he checked on a bad card for himself. And now our bet on the river. Our bet on the river, let's assume, forces our opponent to fold hands like Queen-Jack.
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It forces folds from hands like some nine-x, meaning Ace-nine, King-nine, Queen-nine. We won't get a fold from Jack-nine, but he doesn't have Jack-nine there. They would most likely have bet the turn, yes. And even if they checked sometimes, it's not a big
Speaker A
deal. Let's suppose he also sometimes wanted to bluff with low pocket pairs. Meaning pocket threes, pocket fours. If he opened pocket fives, he bet them, and, strictly speaking, he will fold them. He won't fold pocket sixes either . That's already a full house. Thus, if
Speaker A
we assume that among our opponent's value hands there are some strong ones, say tens that feared the seven pairing up and checked, and some, let's say, pocket Jacks, and among the weak hands are Ace-nine offsuit. King-nine suited, Queen-nine suited, some pocket fives,
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maybe pocket fours. And if we calculate these hands using combinatorics, we'll find that the total fold percentage in this case will be 60%or even more. At the same time, when we make a pot-sized bet, you can, again, avoid calculating
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this fold equity every single time. First, we'll make a little table now regarding folds. We already have one for pot odds and fold equity, but let's make one specifically for folds. You can simply remember that for a pot bet,
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meaning when you bet the size of the pot, you need 50%folds. So, if your opponent folds to a pot bet more often than 51 times out of 100, you are already making money. However, beginners always face difficulties in
Speaker A
choosing bet sizes on the river. They get to that point, yes. Okay, a person understood, watched the video, that we don't fold overcards with a backdoor draw on the flop, we call the turn, and everything, it's the river, we want to
Speaker A
bluff, but how much should we bet? Well , first of all, there's a very simple life hack. Imagine that your hand is not your hand, but your foot. No, imagine that your hand, let's say, is not Ace-six black, but Ace-four green.
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How much would you like to bet? Well, let me just jump into your line of thinking here. If you want to bet three big blinds here, that's not good. Your hand is Ace-six green, it's a flush, it's worth a lot. Meaning it's always
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worth more than half the pot. So the desired sizing choice here should start from 60%of the pot and up, all the way to two pots. That is, two pots would be 18 big blinds in this case. I don't
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recommend betting more than two pots. There are, well, some mathematical nuances there. We won't get into those right now. Just take my word for it.
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Betting more than two pots is almost never worth it. I mean, only at some high level, let's say, can you use such super polarized sizings, but to start, you'll use two pots extremely rarely.
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At the same time, would betting two pots here be bad? Actually, no. But it's not entirely necessary. The SPR is quite low, we won't want to use it very often. But betting 12 or, well, 15 big blinds like I did, looks quite decent
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to scare our opponent, to get those folds. Although in this case, of course , leaving 14 behind is what's called an exploit. And we can smoothly move on to that topic. We have, roughly speaking, two main strategies. One is a balanced
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strategy, sort of a human GTO, so to speak. It implies, for example, that if I bet 15.5 as a bluff here, I would play my flush the same way, for 15.5 as well. So that's the first main type of
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strategy. The second type of strategy is exploit. It roughly consists of the following. I calculate that a bet of 15.5 is scary enough to frighten my opponent and force out a huge number of hands. But at the same time, I’m not
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thinking that I need to have value here as well. I would bet a flush for seven big blinds, but bet the bluff for 15.5.
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This is exploit; I’m exploiting my opponent, assuming they won't figure out these strategies, since they're unknown and I'll likely never face them again, so I play this way. The lower the limit, the more often you should play exploit. Meaning you should play
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unbalanced more often. You can completely forget about that, yes, just think about what would be most frightening for your opponent, and put out a big bet here to represent that flush. But if you actually have the flush, play it for 6-7 blinds. You
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still shouldn't do three. Three is too little, but 6-7 is perfectly fine. Let's look at an ideal adaptation of what I was talking about today. So, look, on the flop, they bet half the pot into us. Pot odds dictate that I
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should never call with 9-8 here, since it's just a gutshot and I need 25% equity. I supposedly don't have that, but I'm not calling here to hit the gutshot, so I definitely call. I hit a good scenario. Check-check on the turn.
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The river comes out. It’s a bad card for me in the sense that it’s a high card. Yes, Queen, King, Ace are cards that absolutely favor my opponent, which he has more of and which are generally stronger for him. I mean, he
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has hands like Ace-Queen or King-Queen. I might not even have those hands at all. Right. Because I sometimes three-bet those pre-flop. Right. But with all that, I supposedly got a flush here. So, I imagined I didn't have off-suit 9-8, but suited 9-8. In that
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case, how much do I want to bet? The depth is great here to use an overbet, to bet more than the pot. And that's exactly what I do. I use a bet of one and a half pots and get the fold. I am
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very satisfied. But how many folds do I need to get from my opponent here for such a bet? Total pot is 29.7, bet is 17.5. 17.5 divided by 29.7 gives us, well, let's round to 59. So, if my
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opponent folds more than 59%of the time , then my bet is profitable. And so, while in the game, what can I roughly estimate here? I can estimate that with my bet, I definitely knock out hands like Ace-King or Ace-Ten. I definitely
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knock out some pairs of fives, sixes, Ace-Four, Ace-Seven, 7-6, 7-5, 7-8— well, maybe he doesn't open 7-5, so to speak. Maybe some Ace-Deuce, if he stuck around until the turn and checked . And sometimes, against a particularly impressionable opponent, I can even
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force a fold from a hand like Jack-Nine . Because, yes, Jack-Nine might look like a strong hand on the flop, but by the river, it's just second pair with a weak kicker against a 1.5 x pot bet. In
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this case, what hands can call me down? Okay, hands that hit a queen can call me, because they hit it and it's very painful to fold—like ace-queen or king-queen. I could also be called by just some random hands, sometimes with
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a flush blocker. For example, ace-jack with a red ace, or maybe some flushes like ace-2 of hearts, which he could have checked rather than betting the turn. So, I obviously won't fold those hands out. Actually, they will likely
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raise me, in general. But if we compare the hands we fold out to those that call us, and translate them into combos —that is, combinatorics. It's not very difficult, actually, because, well , how many ace-king combinations are there? 16. How many offsuit ones total?
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12 of them, right? There are three suited ones here without the flush. One is a red flush, but he most likely bet the turn, so it's usually not in his range here. At this depth, people very rarely check a flush draw on the turn.
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Thus, we'll find that in terms of the number of combinations we fold out relative to those that call or raise us , it's not 60%, but rather 65, 70, or 75%. And if we get even 1%more than 59,
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our bet is already profitable. There you go. And if you try playing, then collect your hands and review them, you will see that your fold equity percentage is much higher than what is required. Yes, this is due to your
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opponents being unbalanced. However, I play slightly higher limits, so I do balance some of my bets against certain opponents, and that's why I might use an overbet in situations like this. But if you play micro-stakes and face an
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unknown opponent, you can fully use an exploitative strategy, meaning you shouldn't really bet these sizes for value, because they are generally very scary to your opponents. And especially if the opponent doesn't know you, it's much easier for him to just fold than
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to go and check, because the average player in the field will use such bets specifically to greedily extract value.
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There is a very large segment of greedy players, and they use these bets precisely for value. Therefore, when you bet like that, the average unknown opponent will simply fold. Say he has something like two eights or two nines,
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he'll fold. And even if he calls you— let's say he's some crazy player who made an A8 call here—he thinks, "Okay , I've got a seven-five, some kind of flush draw, I beat those hands, I'll call with my Ace-high and see," and
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indeed he does call and sees your bluff . That doesn't mean you played poorly, because every time he folded here— well, not him, but some other opponent folded an Ace-ten, two nines, two eights, an Ace-six, an Ace-four, or
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maybe even an Ace-jack—you wouldn't see it, because you almost never get to see folds. I mean, yes, it happens that an opponent might show you what they folded, but that is extremely rare.
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Basically, you don't see the folds. I'm reminding you of this again, so don't get upset when some clever players or calling stations simply call you down with some extremely weak hand. It doesn't mean you played poorly. Just imagine that they simply played
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slightly better. Let's draw another verbal conclusion. So, to bet on the river, we can choose either a balanced strategy, which involves using both value bets and bluffs in specific bet sizes. Meaning, if we made a bluff representing a flush, then when we have
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an actual flush in that situation, we bet the same amount. And the second type. The second type of strategy is exploitative, where we might bet our bluffs larger to look scarier, and bet our value hands slightly smaller to
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make it easier for our opponent to pay us off. The lower the stakes you play and the less you know about your opponent, the more you should aim to play the second strategy—the exploitative one—which doesn't require using the same sizing for
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different hand categories; for example, you can always use 1.5 x pot for bluffs and 80%of the pot for value. So what should we do if, let's say, we hit our hand or just have a second, third, or fourth pair, and so on? Well, most
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often, the most optimal play with such hand categories is to bet the river yourself for a small size. In this case , for instance, I have a second pair, but with a weak kicker, and the board is quite scary for my opponent. I'm not
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exactly planning to get a call from worse hands here. I mean, because I can get a call from worse hands, yes. Some opponents here might not fold an ace-king. Sometimes they might call me down with hands like ace-four, or maybe
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some pair of fives they opened, but there are very few of those hands, roughly speaking, that I actually beat.
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Yeah. But at the same time, if I check here, they might bluff me. So that is why I am betting myself now. Sometimes I will get a fold, sometimes a call from worse, and sometimes a call from better hands. But optimally, if you
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dive into the complex math that accounts for various outcomes, it factors in what I said: sometimes a fold, sometimes a call from worse, sometimes from better. It’s actually not that hard to calculate, but for the scope of this video, I don't think we
Speaker A
need to get too hung up on it. Again, just take my word for it. Yeah. So I need to use this kind of bet. And so I used it, got a fold, and I'm not upset at all. I mean, this scenario suits me
Speaker A
more than well. Let's take another look at a similar hand. We have second pair, a medium kicker, we called, made a small bet on the river, got a fold, and again, weren't upset. But here, of course, against the Button, we could
Speaker A
indeed quite often get a call from weaker hands, because he has very few stronger hands in his turn-check range.
Speaker A
Sometimes it could be some weak king, checked for balance. Sometimes it could be a rivered set, like some pocket jacks or two eights turning into a set of eights, but that doesn't scare us at all. So, in this case, you could
Speaker A
consider checking the river in an attempt to catch bluffs, but as a rule, if a player on this flop structure— what kind of structure is it? It's two broadway cards, connected to each other —obviously, broadway cards are always
Speaker A
connected—and a blank. And when he checks the turn, he usually has some kind of ace-high, or a third pair, or a weak second pair. Because natural, so-called bluffs, like queen-nine, for example, players will often bet the turn here much more frequently. So,
Speaker A
waiting, checking rivers, and waiting for bluffs from them isn't worth it, because most of the time when we check, we'll get a check-behind and see something like, uh, a hand like two sixes, or maybe an ace-five at showdown
Speaker A
. That's why if you bet here, you have hope that he might decide to call, thinking maybe you cleverly bluffed like that, right? Since you do have hands like ten-nine for a bluff here, he might look you up. But if you check,
Speaker A
he is extremely rarely motivated to bluff in this spot. Yeah, most likely he has some sort of medium or weak showdown value, right, some kind of marginal showdown hand. He will, for all intents and purposes, check with it
Speaker A
. Well, let's look at one more. We defended with nine-seven. Second pair, medium kicker, we called. Everything by the book. River. Op, a small bet. Op, we got a call from queen-eight. And, frankly speaking, you'll see this kind
Speaker A
of scenario quite often as well. With that said, what do you do against a raise here? Let's suppose I bet on the river for 3, and I get a raise to something like 10 big blinds. Well, almost always you should just fold,
Speaker A
right? You might try to imagine his bluffs. Again, just look at this easy lifehack. If you can't come up with many bluffs for your opponent in the first 5 seconds, then on the river, you should fold to a raise. For example,
Speaker A
look, you bet and got a raise to 10. Try to think of his bluffs in 5 seconds . If you just came up with, say, a missed flush draw, that's a mistake, because a flush draw at this depth—
Speaker A
and note that the depth here is 169- plus big blinds—will almost always be bet by people. Meaning, with such a strong drawing hand, people are very inclined to bet the turn often.
Speaker A
Therefore, a missed flush draw will be extremely rare for him, right? What other hands could you have come up with there? Some Broadway cards that just checked here. Well, yeah, they could exist, but the trick is that even if
Speaker A
they do, they won't necessarily raise. Most often, they'll just fold. Especially since this is an early stage , judging by the blinds of some tournament. The player, as a rule, is likely multi-tabling as well. He just didn't hit anything with his king-ten
Speaker A
and just faced a bet. He'll fold without even thinking. And even if he did bluff you, well, if the guy managed to pull off a nice bluff, pay your respects with a nice fold, don't worry about it. Over the long run, everything
Speaker A
will still work out just fine for you, right? So, you shouldn't really be calling on the river here. If you faced a small bet and got raised, it's usually better to just fold. Especially since an opponent prone to
Speaker A
bluff-raising the river wide usually tends to bet the turn wide too, right? So, when they check the turn instead of betting, they likely have some showdown value they’ll consider calling or folding with, but definitely not raising. Let’s visualize what I’m
Speaker A
saying. I defended with queen-six and faced a small bet. Of course, I call here on the river. Everything’s fine.
Speaker A
I’m going to make a small bet. I’m counting on folding out some weaker hands so I don’t get bluffed.
Speaker A
Sometimes, say with a ten, if they hit, or maybe two eights might make a crazy call, thinking I’m just bluffing a missed flush draw. Then I get a massive raise, representing a very narrow range . Yeah. But I don't tilt, I don't worry
Speaker A
. Okay. If you decided to pull off a nice bluff, well done, you earned it. I just fold. And one more. Let’s look at this hand. I defended with a great hand, called a quarter-pot bet, and made a small bet. My hand could
Speaker A
actually be worth more here, but okay. I bet small, got a call, and saw king-seven. The question is, did my opponent play well or poorly? To be fair, their hand is worth more than that, wouldn't you agree? They
Speaker A
basically earned value with it on the flop. I mean, the pot was already at six by the flop, right? They extracted 1.5 BBs. And three more. So they earned 4.5 blinds by hitting top pair with a weak kicker. When you see this,
Speaker A
honestly, you really shouldn't get upset. We played very well. Our opponent played it tricky and checked —well, fine, we gave them those 4.5 blinds in the end, right? Even though they hypothetically could have gotten more, because if they had bet the turn,
Speaker A
we might have considered calling. Or if they had raised the river, we could have at least thought about calling. So , these hands shouldn't upset you, scare you, or anything like that. It happened, so be it. Moving on. Let’s
Speaker A
look at another hand. We have a pair of fours. We received four big blinds here , yes, a hefty bet on the flop. The card that came out was as negative as possible for our opponent, because we have many more fives potentially, yes,
Speaker A
we have 2-5, 3-5, while he only has, well, two fives with an ace, and even then, he uses such sizing quite rarely.
Speaker A
And look, here he placed a large bet on the flop for us, yes, on an ace-three-two flop. Well, it's most likely that our opponent's large bet might sometimes be a pure bluff just trying to take the pot, say, with a
Speaker A
random hand like jack-ten, yes? Okay. Can we somehow get more value from it here by checking, for instance? I don't think so. Most likely, he has already given up. Especially since the river clearly doesn't motivate him to bluff.
Speaker A
Uh, also, he could have had a good range of draw hands, that is, a flush draw, for instance, yes. But flush draws, as I said, are quite often bet on the turn when deep-stacked. Well, on such a board, they might check. Okay,
Speaker A
let's say they checked there sometimes, yes, hypothetically, well, like, they could bluff us, but also not often.
Speaker A
Right. And also our opponent has value, that is, he has some good, usually strong, ace. And in this case, yes, we are most likely dealing with a more or less polarized range from the flop, which implies, yes, either some draw or
Speaker A
a pure bluff hand that didn't complete, or some strong ace, for example. In such a case, I realize that even if I want to play an exploitative style, the correct play here is a bet, well, a large one, yes, like a pot bet or
Speaker A
overbet, depending on what I want to represent. In this case, I wanted to represent a straight or better. Right.
Speaker A
And in the end, I got a call even from three-of-a-kind. By the way, yes, on the flop his hand really was very strong. On the river, of course, it was no longer that strong, but nevertheless , he called me down. So, reading into
Speaker A
flop sizing is quite good, yes, it will often be. So pay attention to this, because when you encounter something like a 30%flop bet, it usually carries, well, very little information. As a rule, this suggests that the person might have bet their entire range that
Speaker A
way. But when they use certain large sizings, yes, you'll think on the river about what you're dealing with, because in such cases, you sometimes really need to play non-standardly on the river: that is, sometimes you can bet your value hand very large, or you can
Speaker A
even check it. So, really think about it, try to consider what exactly this big sizing on the flop carries with it.
Speaker A
But it's important to understand that what’s in your head is far from always going to be the EV reality. I got a three-bet here, seemed like they were representing something strong, I bet a bit bigger, and got a fold. No
Speaker A
big deal, it happens; again, there's no need to get upset or try to always trap with the nuts. Although a check could have been quite good here, but that’s not the point right now. In general, my take is that trying to always play
Speaker A
craftily by checking after hitting a strong combination, like the absolute nuts or the second nuts, to set a trap and so on, is not a good idea. Almost always, straightforward play for value will be much more effective. That is,
Speaker A
you need to take the initiative and bet yourself. Now, another type of hand I'd like to draw your attention to is when we have a hand that is not the strongest in the hierarchy of hands. So look, in this case, by the river I only
Speaker A
have a second pair, and not with the strongest kicker, but I'm thinking about my opponent's range. And in my opponent's range at the moment, yes, there is a huge number of ace-high hands, yes, there's even just something like king-queen, king-jack. And in this
Speaker A
case, what do they think about my range ? They think the following about my range: that the eight weakened me significantly. Yes, it gave me the opportunity to have some kind of trips if I had an eight on the flop, but the
Speaker A
total number of those eights has decreased significantly because, well, another one came out. Plus, many draws have missed for me, like 7-9, 7-10, maybe 9-10. Plus, I could have just had two high overcards, like queen-jack, king-jack, and so on. If I bluff them
Speaker A
on the river, they are motivated to call me wide. Therefore, despite having a second pair with a weak kicker, I choose a larger sizing here. That is, I take into account how I look in the eyes of my opponent. And in this case I
Speaker A
got lucky, I got a call, not from ace-high, but his hand isn't much different from ace-high, yes, he opened 5-3, and with the three. Well, in general, he doesn't really beat anything there, he's just blocking, you know, some full houses with threes and
Speaker A
so on. Therefore, in this case, I adjusted to the board, so to speak, and to how I look in the eyes of my opponent, and tried to take advantage of this situation and actually succeeded. And let's look at a hand to
Speaker A
reinforce this topic. I defended jack-ten. I have a solid second pair. I call, and get check-check. And on the river, well, this is practically not a blank card, right? That is, the opponent has almost no deuces. Maybe just ace-two, probably, and that's it.
Speaker A
There. But they are in my range, and at the same time I potentially have bluffs like jack-nine, king-jack, red flush draws, some strong backdoors with a green flush draw, yes, that also didn't get there. Therefore, even though I
Speaker A
only have a second pair, I have a good kicker, so I bet a bit more, but in this case I get a fold, which is not a big deal either. So here, yes, sometimes I get a call, sometimes I get
Speaker A
a fold. It's no big deal when I get a fold. In this case, I'm using a potential range of bluffs that I have in my opponent's eyes, and I'm trying to outsmart him this way and get some extra value. Post-flop in poker is a
Speaker A
very complex thing, given that there are many types of hands. However, there are basic, most frequently occurring types of hands. So in this case, for instance, we only looked at betting the river, and it seems like that's very
Speaker A
little. But in reality, the logic of decision-making in these hands will be very similar to many others. Therefore, learning to properly bet the river, and learning to properly call the flop. Not only to hit based on direct pot odds,
Speaker A
but to sometimes bluff, sometimes just hit a second or third pair and take the pot at showdown. So all these things will really help you advance in your post-flop game. Well, that's why I thought it would be a good idea to
Speaker A
release some videos on a specific small topic, but one that is still quite common, because the most frequently occurring types of hands are hands against the big blind and in the big blind. So, because, well, here, when we
Speaker A
set one BB on the preflop, it's profitable for us to defend the big blind with a wide range. Accordingly, we often find ourselves in a situation where we've defended the big blind and need to do something. That's why
Speaker A
learning to play the big blind correctly in spots is, in fact, the key to success. Well, at least at micro and mid-stakes, for sure. Obviously, there are all sorts of 3-bet pots and RFI situations. If you've watched my video
Speaker A
on breaking down spots, then you understand what I'm talking about. If not, then go watch it immediately. Yes, it's definitely worth examining all those hands as well. But today I decided to touch purely on river play.
Speaker A
And I hope this video turned out to be useful for you. I hope you didn't forget to leave a comment and like this video. That's all I have for today. I hope it was useful and informative.
Speaker A
Good luck at the tables. Most importantly, not just at the tables. Bye everyone. See you on the streams.
Speaker A
Yeah.
Topics:pokerprobe betpost-flop strategycontinuation betpoker tutorialpoker bluffingimplied oddspoker bettingtournament pokerpoker education
