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Welcome to the anti-Xi, pro-party Deng lecture. Hello, Deng friends, it’s great to see you. Let’s start with a very important piece of breaking news.
Breaking news on CCP military troop deployment in Beijing hints at political power struggles ahead of October Plenary Session.
Key Takeaways
- Military troop deployment in Beijing signals serious political maneuvering within the CCP ahead of the October Plenary Session.
- Factional divisions exist among CCP elders, with some reluctant to publicly support Xi Jinping despite appearances of unity.
- Key military leaders with deep command experience are instrumental in orchestrating these security and political moves.
- The upcoming Plenary Session could mark significant leadership changes, potentially ending Xi Jinping's tenure earlier than anticipated.
- The CCP's internal power dynamics are heavily influenced by military involvement and elder faction negotiations.
What the video covers
- Military troops were reportedly deployed into Beijing during August 17-18 commemorative events for CCP elders, bypassing usual Central Security Bureau control.
- This deployment is seen as a move by the 'Elder Faction' to secure their safety and influence ahead of the critical 20th Third Plenary Session in October.
- Xi Jinping invited elders to show unity but the troop presence indicates underlying political tensions and power struggles within the CCP.
- Key figures like Li Zuocheng and Liu Yuan are involved, leveraging military command experience and connections to orchestrate the troop movements.
- Some elders, including Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, were reluctant to attend, signaling dissent and complex factional negotiations.
- The military presence in Beijing is interpreted as a strategic move to influence upcoming Central Committee personnel reshuffles and political outcomes.
- Rumors suggest the possibility of Xi Jinping losing power as early as the October Fifth Plenary Session, earlier than the expected 2027 timeline.
- The video contextualizes these events within broader CCP factionalism, military influence, and the fragile unity of the party leadership.
- Historical precedent of troop mobilization during political events is noted, reinforcing the link between military power and political control.
- The situation remains fluid and uncertain, with outside observers closely monitoring military deployments and political shifts in Beijing.
Chapters
- 00:00Introduction and Breaking News
- 01:51Military Takes Over Security at Commemorative Events
- 03:43Elders' Reluctance and Political Signals
- 05:21Key Military Figures and Their Roles
- 07:17Implications for Upcoming Plenary Sessions
- 09:09Factionalism and Power Struggles Within CCP
- 10:58Historical Context of Military Involvement
- 11:58Outlook and Potential Political Changes
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
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It is claimed that during the August 17th memorial for Jiang Zemin at the Great Hall of the People and the August 18th farewell for Zhu Rongji at Babaoshan, the CCP military dispatched troops directly into Beijing. According to the latest reports, the timing of
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this troop movement is highly sensitive. Because a dozen or so CCP elders in their eighties and nineties were making public appearances, who could oppose mobilizing the military to bolster security in Beijing to ensure their safety? Even Xi Jinping himself would
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find it hard to object, as these elders were originally invited by him to show their support. The "Elder Faction," in league with the military, used this perfectly legitimate excuse to deploy a portion of their forces into Beijing ahead of time. With less than two
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months until the 20th Third Plenary Session, this leads to a bold assessment: if this military deployment in Beijing is real, then the October Plenary Session could become a critical turning point, and one cannot rule out more drastic political changes than the
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outside world expects. According to the leak, before the meeting at the Great Hall of the People on August 17th, the military entered the site in advance to clear the area and perform security checks; on the day of the meeting, a
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large number of active-duty soldiers entered the venue and its perimeter to enforce security. First, I must provide some background. According to decades of rules within the Red Wall, the personal security of top leaders, Zhongnanhai, and core security for
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major political events are primarily the responsibility of the Central Security Bureau. This force has historically been controlled by the top leader and is the area Xi Jinping keeps the tightest grip on. But according to reports, the situation changed on
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August 17th and 18th. When the commemorative events were held, the venue security—including some control previously held by the Central Security Bureau—was taken over by the military. In other words, the troops protecting these elders entered the Great Hall of
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the People, though this leak cannot yet be verified. There is another detail regarding the 2024 symposium held at the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s birth. At that time, Xinhua's report focused on incumbent
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leaders, and none of the retired Standing Committee members were mentioned by name. However, this time, the names of three retired senior officials were specifically listed by Xinhua one by one. Clearly, this is the exact kind of photograph Xi Jinping
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needs. The Beidaihe meeting has just concluded, the Third Plenary Session is counting down, and rumors from the outside keep emerging about Xi Jinping losing power, elders forcing his hand, and the military not obeying orders. At this moment, the most useful image for
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Xi Jinping is one of retired elders from all factions gathering together in the Great Hall of the People, thereby proving the unity of the high-level leadership and demonstrating that he still maintains authority. But the question is, the appearance of these
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party elders does not mean they are just here to support Xi Jinping. Especially for those who don't want to back him, including Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, and Wang Qishan, they have one basic condition: they must ensure they can get in safely and get out safely.
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So, according to the leaks, the elders came, and the troops protecting them came along too. Xi Jinping originally wanted to use the elders to prove his prestige, but instead, he provided the most legitimate excuse to deploy military forces into Beijing and enter
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the security system of the Great Hall of the People before the Third Plenary Session. On the surface, everyone sat together in harmony, but in reality, the struggle under the table had already begun. According to reports, it wasn't that Hu Jintao couldn't come,
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but rather that he was unwilling to come. Because if Hu Jintao were sitting on the stage, the signal sent would be: even Hu Jintao is here, so what other dissenting opinions could there be within the Party? That would be
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equivalent to Hu Jintao personally endorsing Xi Jinping. But "not entering the venue" does not mean "ignoring the scene." It is rumored that the security requirements for the elders were put forward by Hu Jintao's side. Looking at Wen Jiabao, according to leaks, he also
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didn't want to go originally. Later, Wang Yang specifically persuaded him, with a practical reason: if you don't go, Xi Jinping will label you as "not valuing unity," but if you go, the rumors about the Wen family can be
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dispelled on the spot. In the end, Wang specifically rushed over to accompany Wen Jiabao into the venue together with Wang Yang. Therefore, these elders did not simply come to support Xi Jinping; everyone was calculating their own interests, and the basic prerequisite
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for both sides to finally sit together was that their safety must be guaranteed. Furthermore, this troop mobilization involves several names particularly worth noting, one of which is Li Zuocheng. From 2017 to 2022, Li Zuocheng served as Chief of the Joint
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Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, responsible for the combat command system of the entire military. In the event of a major military situation, any command flow from top to bottom cannot bypass this core department, the Joint Staff
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Department. Li Zuocheng has only been away from this position for a few years, so he is arguably very familiar with how the entire command system operates and which connections can be activated.
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Moreover, Li Zuocheng's military background is quite unique; he is a veteran who fought in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. After years of being sidelined, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Chengdu Military Region in 2008 during Hu Jintao's tenure, re-entering his upward
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career path. After the military reforms, Li Zuocheng became the first Commander of the PLA Army, and subsequently joined the Central Military Commission's Joint Staff Department until his retirement in 2022. To truly orchestrate this situation in Beijing, what is needed is precisely
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someone like Li Zuocheng who is familiar with the military command system. Another key figure is Liu Yuan; with his unique background, he can speak to the retired party elders and is also well-acquainted with the old guard in the military. Actually, this
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tactic of troops entering the capital appeared last year. During the September military parade, reports emerged starting in July of military vehicles and heavy equipment entering Beijing. By August, the 82nd Group Army stationed near Baoding prepared to enter Beijing under the guise of parade
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drills, and security in the Beidaihe area was also noticeably reinforced. After the drills concluded, some of these forces did not withdraw immediately but remained until the end of last year's Fourth Plenary Session, only pulling back once the political
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arrangements were settled. This maneuver can be summed up in one sentence: troops arrive, and the votes fall into line. What is truly worth watching next is this October's Fifth Plenary Session. Hong Kong media and newspapers have already hinted that
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this session may involve adjustments to 15 to 18 Central Committee members. Against the backdrop of Xi-faction officials continuously falling from power, a large-scale personnel reshuffle in the Central Committee will become an important window to observe the power structure based on who
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eventually fills those seats. Some even argue that the Fifth Plenary Session in October might harbor an extreme scenario: General Secretary and Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping may no longer be able to hold his position, and the endgame might not
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wait until 2027; it could begin as early as this October. What exactly happened in Beijing on August 17th and 18th remains un
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top-level power. Over the next two months, the outside world is closely monitoring whether Beijing will see more abnormal military deployments, high-level personnel changes, and further movements from the military and elder factions around the time of the Fifth Plenary Session. Previously, the
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Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection ( CCDI) was held in Beijing. While Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia attended, the CCDI deputy secretaries who worked under Wang Qishan were seen sitting off the main stage. These two deputy
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secretaries of the CCDI should have been sitting on the rostrum; why did they end up off the stage? Some analysts point out that these two might have already been removed from their positions as deputy secretaries.
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According to reports from the party media Xinhua News Agency, the Sixth Plenary Session of the CCDI was held in Beijing on August 22nd. Only 116 CCDI members attended the meeting, marking a new low in attendance. Zhao Shiyong and
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Zhang Zhong were elected as deputy secretaries of the CCDI at the plenary session. Footage from CCTV reports reveals that the number of military CCDI members attending the meeting decreased again compared to the previous session, dropping from the original 22 members to only nine, a
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reduction of more than half. Zhang Shengmin, Deputy Secretary of the CCDI and Vice Chairman of the CMC, did not appear on the rostrum as usual during this sixth plenary session of the CCDI, nor did he attend as an ordinary member
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; this phenomenon has no precedent. After Zhang's promotion to Vice Chairman of the CMC, he was not publicly removed from his position as Deputy Secretary of the CCDI, and the new CMC Secretary, General Zhang Youxia , was not appointed as a Deputy
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Secretary of the CCDI at this session; the reason for Zhang's absence remains unclear. Furthermore, two of Wang Qishan's former subordinates have also seen abnormal developments; CCDI Deputy Secretaries Xiao Pei and Fu Kui have been unexpectedly replaced, and the
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reasons for their departure have sparked speculation. Both of these individuals were part of Wang Qishan's camp; it is possible that this is an effort to shrink Wang's circle and purge his influence. Netizens often ask me when the CCP regime will collapse,
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and whether China's cycle of autocracy can truly be broken. I find this question very difficult to answer.
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Pessimistically speaking, this cycle of autocracy is very difficult to break. For 2,000 years, Chinese history seems to have been repeating the same story: the rise of a dynasty, clear governance , centralization of power, bureaucratic corruption, the suffering of the people
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, and social chaos—a recurring cycle. Then, a new dynasty rises from the ruins, only to perform the old story all over again. The Qin falls and the Han rises; then the Han falls and the Wei and Jin rise; the Tang, Song, Yuan,
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and Qing dynasties cycle on without end . By the 20th century, the emperor disappeared, but certain deep-seated structures of imperial politics did not vanish; thus, some assert that the Chinese cannot escape autocracy, citing culture, tradition, or even national
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character. Another perspective is much more optimistic; they believe China's problems are not that complex and that the issue is simply the Communist Party . They argue that once CCP rule ends and a democratic system with multi-party competition, judicial
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independence, freedom of the press, and universal suffrage is established, China will naturally walk the path of democratic constitutionalism. We disagree with the former fatalism, and we also remain wary of the latter revolutionary optimism. Ending one-party rule and establishing
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democratic constitutionalism is, of course, an unavoidable step for China's journey toward freedom. Without a change in the basic political system, civil society cannot gain space to grow , and personal rights cannot be reliably guaranteed; however, we increasingly believe that toppling an
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autocratic regime is not the same thing as ending a society's capacity to produce autocracy. Regimes can collapse overnight, and systems can be established within a few years, but changing a social structure, a set of behavioral habits, and a type of
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personality may require a generation or even several generations of time. The real problem with China is not who rules it, but how the Chinese people are prepared to live together—this is the deepest issue at the heart of the
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cycle of autocracy. When we discuss Chinese history, we have been too accustomed to focusing on the emperors: good emperors, bad emperors, wise rulers, foolish ones, honest officials, corrupt officials, eras of prosperity, and eras of chaos. Chinese history seems to have become a story of
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shifting power. But if we shift our focus from the imperial court to society, and from emperors and generals to the daily lives of ordinary people, we will discover that the truly stubborn cycle is not just one of emperors, but a cycle in the
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relationship between the state, society , and the individual. How does this work? It goes something like this: the state constantly devours society, and society constantly loses its ability for self-governance. The less society can govern itself, the more individuals
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must rely on power. The more individuals rely on power, the weaker horizontal trust becomes within society . As horizontal trust weakens, people increasingly hope for a powerful authority to step in and dispense justice, and thus, the state gains the
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justification to further expand. This is a self-reinforcing closed loop. In such a society, it is difficult for a person to exist first as an independent individual; they are first someone’s son, someone’s student, a person from a certain unit, a certain system, or a
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certain network of connections. They need to find backing, judge which way the wind is blowing, and know who is actually in charge. This creates an extremely contradictory social psychology: we hate privilege, yet we hope to know people who have it; we
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dislike back-door dealings, yet when we truly face difficulties, we scramble to find connections; we demand that others follow the rules, yet we hope for leniency in our own special circumstances; we hate unchecked power, yet we still pine for an enlightened
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leader. To uphold justice, we criticize corrupt officials while longing for honest ones; we hate the emperor while searching for a wise monarch. Our resistance is often not against privilege itself, but simply because we have not attained it. If this does not
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change, even if the emperor is driven out, people may still seek a new one; even if an organization is overthrown, people may still build a new one that demands absolute obedience, and autocracy will have completed its most secretive replication. So, why is
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overthrowing autocracy not enough? It is not to say that overthrowing autocracy is meaningless. If a regime systematically suppresses speech, assembly, belief, and political participation, and if power refuses to be truly constrained by the law, then ending such a system is a necessary
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condition for a free society to grow. The problem is that a necessary condition is not a sufficient one.
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Since the 20th century, the world has not been short of revolutions that overthrew dictators. Some countries move toward democracy, while others fall back into authoritarianism, military coups, populism, civil war, or new forms of tyranny after a brief period of euphoria. Why is that?
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Because democracy is not merely an operating manual for the state apparatus; a constitution may stipulate presidential term limits, but it cannot automatically make those in power willing to step down. Laws may guarantee freedom of speech, but they cannot automatically teach a society to
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tolerate voices it dislikes; elections can produce a majority, but they cannot automatically ensure that the majority respects the minority; parties can be established, but there is no guarantee they won’t practice personality cults internally; and the opposition may oppose a dictator, but there is no
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guarantee they won't become new dictators themselves once they take power. This is the uncomfortable fact we must face: opposing authoritarianism in politics does not mean one has shed authoritarianism in their personality.
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An individual can be entirely against Xi Jinping, yet demand absolute obedience from their subordinates; they may demand the Communist Party respect free speech, yet refuse to tolerate dissenting opinions within their own organization; they may oppose personality cults, yet cultivate a new
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leader within their own small circle; and they may shout for democracy, yet treat those with different views as enemies, or even believe that procedural boundaries and individual rights can be set aside for a "just" cause. Even if the old system has
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perished, the personality soil that fostered that old system still remains. That is why we increasingly believe that China’s truly difficult future transformation is not just a regime transition, but a social and character transformation. Modern Chinese intellectuals, when discussing national
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salvation, have long been accustomed to starting from the state level, designing national structures, debating presidential versus parliamentary systems, centralization versus local autonomy, bicameral versus unicameral systems, and federalism versus unitary states. These questions are certainly important, but beneath these grand
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institutional designs lies a more fundamental question: what kind of people actually constitute this republic? If there are no boundaries between individuals, if private property can be seized at any time for political reasons, if contracts can be voided by power, if personal dignity
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can be trampled for "grand goals," and if families, businesses, schools, associations, and even private life must submit to a certain political will —Then, no matter how beautifully written the constitution is, constitutionalism may remain only on paper. Thus, we have formed a concept:
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"Private-Legal Constitutionalism"— constitutionalism based on private law and legal order. So-called " Private-Legal Constitutionalism" does not mean replacing the constitution with civil law, nor does it mean political institutions are unimportant; rather, it seeks to answer what the social soil is upon which a
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constitution actually grows. We believe that it first stems from the recognition of boundaries between people in daily life: this is mine, and that is yours. This is my body, this is my property, this is my thought, this is my belief, and this is my private
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life. I have the right to say no, and you have the right to say no as well. I cannot infringe upon you simply because I hold power, nor can I negate your status as a subject just because I
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believe I represent truth, the people, the nation, or justice. This is the most original purpose of constitutionalism: the constitution limits state power, while civil law trains ordinary people to understand the boundaries of rights. Civil law tells us that you possess rights, and
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others possess rights as well. You can choose freely, but you must bear responsibility; promises must be kept; if you harm others, you must compensate them. Others are not your appendages, and the private sphere is not a place where any public power can intrude at
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will. Therefore, in the sense we understand it, civil law is not just a set of legal regulations, but also a school for the public. The civil law state we speak of is not just a country with highly developed civil laws; a
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nation can perfectly well have thick civil codes and still remain an authoritarian state. The civil law state we understand is a form of political civilization, where a lifestyle of equality, autonomy, keeping promises, accountability, and respect for boundaries among private
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subjects forms the social foundation of the entire national order. In such a state, the government is not an omnipresent father; it does not take it upon itself to decide for adults what books to read, what ideas to believe in
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, whom to love, what organizations to join, or how to arrange their own lives . What, then, is the primary duty that the state should assume? That duty is to protect everyone's right to have their own life. This is the deeper
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meaning behind what we understand as small government. It is not simply about reducing the number of civil servants or mechanically cutting budgets, but about acknowledging a fundamental fact: society precedes the state and has its own life. The state
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is not the master of society, nor is society a department of the state. Where does the boundary of the state lie? It lies exactly where the rights of the citizen begin. These reflections of ours did not start from
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institutional design in a study; first and foremost, they come from exile. When a person has to leave their own land to preserve their thoughts and dignity, many concepts once taken for granted suddenly become questionable: What is a nation? What is a homeland?
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What is a country? What is loyalty? Should a person ultimately be loyal to the land, the regime, or the nation, or should they first be loyal to their own conscience? If a state demands that an individual sacrifice their dignity to
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prove their loyalty, what moral value does that loyalty have left? It is time for us to rethink the state. We are gradually realizing that in China, there is a deeply ingrained idea: the state does not exist for the people;
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rather, the people exist for the state. For the strength of the nation, individuals can be sacrificed; for national rejuvenation, rights can be deferred; for stability, freedom can be paused; for the grand cause, the suffering of the little person can be
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ignored. The state thus becomes a massive living entity with a will of its own, while a concrete individual becomes nothing more than consumable material. We hope to achieve a shift: it is not that people belong to the state, but that the state belongs to
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the people. The state has no sanctity that transcends the human. The reason for the existence of a political community is to allow a concrete person to live in safety, dignity, and freedom . If we are to finally answer one
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question, that question is: what kind of state is worth free people living in together? Merely limiting the state is not enough, because a more difficult question arises immediately: if the state no longer manages everything, will society fall into chaos? This is
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authoritarianism's oldest and most effective intimidation: "Without a powerful government, you will be in chaos; without an authority in charge, Chinese people will prey upon one another." Without stability overriding everything, everything will spiral out of control. We are attempting to answer
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precisely this question, and our answer is that order is not something only the state can create. In fact, the vast majority of order in a healthy society is not created by the police in the first place. Families, markets, schools
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churches associations businesses non-profits, professional guilds, interest groups, and local communities —countless ordinary people are creating order every day through countless tiny relationships. Is this order maintained by the police? Two strangers are willing to sign a contract, a person fulfills a promise
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they made, a few people form an association for a common goal, community residents can solve public problems together, the loser accepts a fair vote, and the majority is willing to leave space for the minority to speak. These things seem insignificant,
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but it is precisely these most inconspicuous things that form the true foundation of a free society. We might call this a "faint glimmer." The glimmer is small; it lacks the spotlights of the revolutionary square, the thunderous applause of a leader’s
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speech, and it will not appear in grand historical narratives. But what a civilization can truly rely on to resist the darkness is often just these faint glimmers. Therefore, this glimmer is not the fire left over after a grand
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revolution, but the very starting point of a free order itself. So, the question from netizens is whether China's cycle of autocracy can truly be broken. Our answer remains yes, but we do not believe there is any one-size-fits-all solution. We don't
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believe that if the Communist Party suddenly falls one day, Chinese people will wake up the next morning living in a mature, free society. Such a free society must be built by us. Similarly, we also don't believe that because
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Chinese people have experienced a long period of autocracy, they can never become modern citizens. True change will be much longer and more pragmatic than both of these imaginations. It happens within an individual: moving from subject to citizen, from seeking
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patrons to trusting rules, from waiting for virtuous officials to demanding institutions, from worshiping leaders to being vigilant against power, from a society of status to a society of contract, from an ethic of relationships to an ethic of boundaries
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, from asking what the state tells me to do to asking by what right the state forbids me from doing something, and from viewing differing opinions as enemies to acknowledging that even if you are wrong, you still have rights.
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If one must call this transformation a revolution, then perhaps what China truly needs to complete in the future are three interconnected revolutions: a political revolution, a social revolution, and a personal revolution.
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The first revolution determines who holds power, the second solves whether society can self-govern, and the third solves what kind of people we ultimately become. The truly difficult parts are the latter two. Everyone, since modern times, too many people
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have tried to save China. Some looked for enlightened rulers, some for ideologies, some for political parties, some for revolutions, and some for a sufficiently great institutional design . Some of these efforts were great, some were tragic, and some, in the end,
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turned into new forms of oppression. Perhaps today, we should change direction. Instead of constantly asking who can save China, we should start asking how a society that doesn't need to be saved by anyone can actually grow . In such a society, even without an
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enlightened ruler, people can live normally; even if bad actors appear, they cannot act with impunity; even if people disagree, they can still live together; even if the state is powerful , individuals still have inviolable boundaries; and even without heroes,
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millions of ordinary people can still maintain a basic, civilized social order through contracts, self-governance, and mutual assistance.
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This may be the only true path for China to break out of its cycle of autocracy. The revolution China truly needs to complete is not just taking power away from a political party; it must also liberate order from the grip
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of power, liberate society from the shadow of the state, and liberate personality from the state of dependency. When that day comes, a Chinese person will no longer first ask , "Who is my patron?""What does 'the top' think?""Does the leader allow it?"
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Has the wind shifted? They could simply and calmly say, "This is my power, and it is also your right; this is my boundary, and it is also your boundary.
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" We don't need to submit to each other , yet we can still live together. The true sign that the cycle of tyranny is broken may not be the fall of the last dictator, but rather the day when, even
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if someone tries to become a dictator again, society no longer needs them, no longer worships them, and no longer permits them. Only when that time comes will we have truly completed the long transformation from a society of subjects to a society of citizens. And
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freedom is nothing more than billions of ordinary people finally learning a task that seems simple but is exceptionally difficult: standing on their own two feet and allowing others to do the same. For the joyful segment, please watch the video. Hu Xijin
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actually spoke some sense; let’s see what Old Hu has to say. Mm. But regarding this country, I truly feel there are issues with the overall national direction. I think how should I put it—the country has introduced an ideological dead end in its strategy
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. Yes. That is highly inappropriate. A country is first and foremost realistic; it is not purely ideological. A country is about daily necessities—cooking oil, salt, sauce, and vinegar.
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It’s about everyone living their lives—food, clothing, shelter, and transport. So the fundamental point is, I don't think we should force ourselves to set a vision that doesn't match our actual strength, effectively pushing ourselves into a dead end. Alright,
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that's it for today. Remember, public opinion is the truth, and subscribing is power. I welcome everyone to subscribe and support. Thank you.
Topics:CCPXi Jinpingmilitary deploymentBeijingElder FactionThird Plenary Sessionpolitical struggleLi ZuochengHu JintaoWen Jiabao
