Eastern Roman Army: Tactics, Structure, Weapons, Recruitment, Navy, Soldiers

Explores how the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) army adapted over centuries: heavy horse archers, foederati, navy, recruitment and defense doctrine.

Key Takeaways

Byzantine survival depended on continuous military adaptation rather than preserving classical Roman forms.
Mounted archers and nomadic-inspired tactics became central to the Byzantine army.
Byzantines integrated foreign troops and mercenaries under imperial command, drawing on diverse specialized skills.
Defensive doctrine, fortifications, and diplomacy were as important as offensive campaigning in the empire's long survival.

What the video covers

Introduces the Eastern Roman Empire as a survivor that spent most of its history on the defensive after Justinian I's reconquests.
Uses Procopius's account of military change to show Byzantine adaptability and openness to new methods over traditional Roman practice.
Traces the transformation from Roman legions to Late Imperial forces and the smaller, elite Byzantine army of the sixth century, with cavalry growing in prominence.
Describes the hippo-toxotai, heavy mounted archers, including their equipment: composite bows, mail corselets, small shields, and likely unarmoured Cappadocian horses.
Explains the influence of steppe nomads such as the Huns, whose mounted tactics and weapons were adopted and adapted by the Byzantines.
Highlights the use of foederati and mercenaries from many peoples, integrated into imperial armies under Byzantine command.
Covers the Byzantine emphasis on accuracy and stopping power over volume of fire, contrasted with Sassanid tactics.
Discusses later developments including the organization of units (banda, tourmai) under Leo VI, cataphracts, and the kite shield.
Surveys naval warfare from the Vandal period onward, including the dromon and its use of grapples to engage enemy galleys.
Examines diplomacy and mercenary alliances, such as the Catalan Company under Roger de Flor and Turkoman allies, and defensive strategy and fortification.

Chapters

Why does the video call the Byzantine Empire a survivor rather than a conqueror?

The video contrasts the classical Roman Empire's expansion with the Eastern Empire's long defensive history, pressed by Arabs, Bulgars, Normans, Turks and others. Its survival for nearly a millennium past the Western Empire is presented as the key achievement.

What was the hippo-toxotai?

The hippo-toxotai were Byzantine heavy mounted archers of the sixth century who wore mail armour and carried a composite bow as the primary weapon, with a small shield and likely no horse armour, relying on mobility and accuracy.

How did nomadic peoples influence Byzantine warfare?

Steppe groups such as the Huns influenced Byzantine cavalry tactics, bow design and equipment. The Byzantines adapted these, favouring a symmetrical composite bow for easier mass production and a quality-over-quantity approach to archery.

Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown

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INTRO If the classical Roman Empire was a conqueror, then its medieval successor state was a survivor. After the glorious but brief reconquests of Justinian I, the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire spent the lion’s share of its history on the defense, pressed upon by enemies from all sides, be they Arabs,

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Bulgars, Lombards, Normans, Turks, or others. Yet, despite this, the Eastern Empire survived, outlasting its Western counterpart by nearly a millenia. In this special longform documentary, we will explore just how they accomplished this. Through a case study of Eastern Roman

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adaptability, we will examine how the Byzantines used every tool available to survive until 1453, Early Origins of the Byzantine Army Around the middle of the 6th century, general Belisarius’ personal historian Procopius penned one of the most seminal pieces of ancient

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literature relating to the early Byzantine Empire, and specifically Justinian’s herculean attempt at reconquering the west. After his introduction, we might expect the chronicler to describe the emperor, Belisarius or the background of his work following the fall of the West. While

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such profiles do come later, the very first thing Procopius details is a piece on the nature of military change, and resistance to it. Calling out those readers who might decry ‘modern’ achievements as unworthy in favour of, essentially, recalling the good old days

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of Classical Rome, the historian further goes on to outline how some individuals choose to narrow-mindedly deride Byzantine archers, while at the same time lauding close combat fighters who resemble the Roman legionaries of old. Whilst acknowledging that, yes, sometimes

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in the past ‘bowmen’ were forced to hide and seem cowardly, Roman archers were different.

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Clad in protective armour, these expert horsemen used a bow as their primary weapon, but also might carry a shield, spear, or sword. Still, Procopius laments, ‘there are those who take into consideration none of these things, who revere and worship the ancient times, and give no

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credit to modern improvements.’ Essentially, the great historian is giving sixth-century Byzantine traditionalists a verbal slap in the face and telling them to get with the times. Fortunately for Rome’s eastern remnant, the diminished empire did just that, adapting constantly. This example

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from Procopius’ first book is just a single, but an incredibly stark instance of how the standard military doctrines of Rome as a centuries’ old unquestionable hegemon began evolving and molding into that of a limited empire on a controlled and incredibly slow decline in power.

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The fact that the Byzantines were able to make this transition without succumbing to inaction shows us just how resilient the empire was. In essence, to change from iconic Roman military styles was in fact more Roman than maintaining outward trappings. The ‘drill and discipline’

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legions of Caesar and Augustus had been reformed by emperors at the end of the Third Century Crisis into the Late Imperial forces of limitanei, comitatensis and more, detailed in the Notitia Dignitatum. Fifth century disruption and collapse, barbarian incursion, monetary shortage, purposeful

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change and other factors led to the reborn, small and elite army of Byzantium in the early sixth century, where strategy and generalship were more important, and cavalry increasingly prominent.

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Still, we must also quash the simplistic notion that the Byzantines’ new emphasis on cavalry led to the utter dereliction of infantry forces as nothing more than cannon fodder, herded at an enemy as a meager distraction while mounted troops did the real work. To

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begin this process, we must describe this new premier man of the Roman army - Procopius’ vaunted armour-clad archer mounted on horseback. The glacial process leading to the development and adoption of Byzantine hippo-toxotai heavy horse archers of the sixth century and beyond might

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be viably said to have begun as early as the late first century. However, if a single date has to be chosen for the date that the transformation from Roman to Byzantine military truly began, one might choose August 9th 378 - the Battle of Adrianople, when invading Goths tore an entire eastern field

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army apart, triggering a number of unprecedented responses within the buckling Roman Empire. As the Great Migration continued and disparate barbarian coalitions, most prominently the nomadic horselord Huns, shunted others to the west throughout the fifth century, these groups brought their

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practices and tactics with them. Particularly following the Hunnic Empire’s collapse at Nedao in 454, a vast quantity of barbarian mercenaries spilled out from the steppe, using their exotic mounted skills to gain employment in armies of the Byzantine Empire. Procopius details many a foreign

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cavalry unit hired on behalf of the emperor in Constantinople, such as the Heruli, and how they played a direct role in the Byzantine military and a key part in ensuring its conquests went well.

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However, the mercenaries’ battle tactics also found their way into textbooks and manuals for training homegrown cavalry, while nomadic equipment and ‘loadouts’ were adapted and sometimes even improved by imperial generals for use in the future. The model heavy mounted bowman

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of Procopius’ first book, for example, most likely wielded a standard symmetrical composite bow as his primary weapon, replacing the spear and javelin-armed horse of earlier days. This design of bow in particular contrasted with the asymmetrical bow favoured by nomadic horse peoples

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such as the Huns. The modification was almost certainly made because this more ‘standard’ model was simpler to manufacture in large numbers, and therefore equipping the troops would be easier. For protection, this ideal trooper donned armour including a mail corselet and greaves, but

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notably did not wear any kind of helmet, so that the accuracy of his archery wasn’t significantly impaired. Instead, the toxotai would rely on the use of a small shield to protect his face from enemy attacks. Contrary to popular belief, it is also probable that, unlike cataphractarii,

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hippo-toxotai did not clad their mounts in armour. Making effective use of the empire’s terrain-specific resources, the Byzantines reared notably powerful Cappadocian steeds which, bred in military stables especially established for the purpose, could easily maintain high speeds despite the fact that armoured men were mounted atop them. Nomadic influence can also be seen in the training

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and tactics of the armies of Justinian, such as in the practice of archery, both mounted and on foot. In contrast to the method of their Sassanid enemies, which relied on blocking out the sun with a massive blanket of massed fire to inflict casualties, the Byzantine modus operandi was to

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depend on accuracy, precision and stopping power. This ‘quality rather than quantity’ approach was derived from the Huns. Different types of mounted troops supplemented Procopius’ armoured cavalry archers depending on the situation, and, as mentioned, many of these horse warriors

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were allies or mercenary foederati brought into the empire from outside. Much like the eponymous Germanic troops of the united empire’s final decades, these Byzantine foederati were unassimilated barbarians armed in their native styles, but fighting under Byzantine command.

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Among the myriad peoples who served in Justinian’s armies were the Huns themselves, Gepids, Goths, Heruli, Slavs, Bulgars, Berbers and many, many more whose names were either not noted down in the historical record, or whose contribution became overshadowed by other barbarian groups

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with whom they served. So in this domain, we see clearly continuity in that the early Byzantines kept up the Roman practice of welcoming barbarian troops into the army, except they did so more eagerly and in a more controlled fashion. Such a vigour for drawing in the best of ‘barbarian’

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military talent is exemplified clearly by the array of foreign leaders who became high generals in Justinian’s service, despite the taboo that may have developed against such a practice after the collapse of the western empire. Much like the retinue of vaunted commanders under Alexander the

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Great or Napoleon, those of Justinian were skilled at their craft. Four names early in Justinian’s reign come to the fore: Sittas, Mundus, Chilbundus and Belisarius, only one of whom was a ‘Roman’. Roman to Byzantine Continuity wasn’t only maintained and expanded upon in the

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realm of foreign recruitment. Contrary to popular belief, as we have already mentioned, credit must still be given for the maintained quality of infantry troops which, although no longer the neatly polished, standardised soldiers of the old Roman legions, were still a considerable force to

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be reckoned with, and who played their part well in the new Byzantine warfare. They were also far less one-dimensioned than the old legionary heavy infantry. Armed with roughly two-meter-long spears and bows as standard, supplemented by a spatha like sidearm, the new ‘legionaries’, known as

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protostate, would drive their primary weapon into the ground at the approach of an enemy, loosing bow fire into the foe until their progress began to slow, at which the spear was retaken up again.

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Such a formation of relatively short-weaponed spearmen provided a good middle-ground between the flexibility of gladius wielding maniples and the rigidity and range of an old sarissa phalanx.

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In his work, Procopius details an occasion in which some Byzantine heavy spearmen; the armour-clad protostate elite, were charged by Gothic cavalry who thought these footmen to be an easy target. They were badly mistaken. Gathering into a compact but not overly cramped space,

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the infantrymen raised their shields and thrust forward their spears, holding ground and pushing on. Most impressive is Procopius’ detailing of how none of the spearmen interfered with any of their comrades, so sophisticated was their training and proper interval maintenance. Regular,

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leather-armed spear, javelin, sling, throwing axe, or dart wielding infantry formed the inner mass of Byzantine infantry behind the outer shell of heavy spearmen and in front of the archers. They were perhaps trained in a lesser manner, but ability and some level of discipline

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were clearly maintained. In this way, the so-called protostate infantry of the Byzantine Empire was a throwback to the Polybian legion. A heavy triarii equivalent was in the vanguard, followed by mid-range throwing missile troops and then archers at the back.

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One aspect of Byzantine warfare that would’ve made earlier imperial emperors and military leaders scratch their heads in confusion was the bucellarii. We know a significant amount concerning these household troops, named after the bucellatum ration biscuit, from Belisarius’ contingent in the Vandal and Gothic Wars. Unlike many of the other military phenomena of the age,

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this was a completely alien practice. Bucellarii were essentially privately-hired personal guards who held direct loyalty to the general by whom they were hired, rather than to the emperor in Constantinople or to the wider concept of ‘the empire’. Such mercenaries often formed the core

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comitatus of a general - his closest companions and personal army, and were often professional, elite troops which a larger army could be formed around. They might be Roman, but many bucellarii consisted of steppe nobles and their retainers who were hired by a general before or during

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their campaign. This kind of powerful private army was an unquestionable danger to the emperor in Constantinople, who risked deposition at the hands of soldiers who owed no loyalty to him. However, the famous Nika Riots were suppressed primarily by the small contingents of bucellarii under

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generals Mundus and Belisarius. Had these key power-brokers leaned the other way, however, Justinian might have had a real problem on his hands. To many scholars, this lack of a monopoly on military force is a symbol of the decrease in imperial authority.

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When compared to the imperial legions of old, the Byzantine armies of Justinian’s age of reconquest, as we have detailed, were often incredibly small by comparison. While four centuries before, Trajan was able to rally up to 200,000 men for his conquest of Dacia, Belisarius was only able

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to bring about 7,000 to bear during his initial landings in Italy, although he was reinforced significantly in the later years. This decline was due to the simple fact that the old class of Roman Imperial citizens, upon which the ever-expanding legions depended for manpower, was all but gone by

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the time of Late Antiquity. What replaced it was this smaller, but infinitely more surgical and balanced Byzantine army developed by absorbing equipment, training, tactics and doctrine from some of the empire’s greatest enemies, and greatest failures. Such a comparatively

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restrained amount of military power provided the impetus for Byzantium’s sophisticated and tactful approach to warfare and relations with foreign powers as a whole. It might even be said that this latter approach, by necessity, was far more intelligent than that of the united Roman Empire

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which came before, simply due to the fact that the hegemonic Romans did not, before the very end, need to be overly smart when dealing with foes. Those foes could just, most of the time anyway, be crushed under the weight of a legionary’s boot. Still, when laymen and even some historians look

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at the Byzantine army in comparison to the old Roman one, they rightly see a diminished force.

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But it is worth considering Caesar, Germanicus, Trajan or any of the other greats, and how they would view the new military if they were transported forwards in time. Given the available resources and situation that the Byzantine Empire faced, matters could have gone far worse.

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Byzantine Military Manuals - Strategikon One of the most symbolic qualities of the Byzantine military as it developed was the use of so-called military manuals. Primarily aimed at preserving and proliferating sophisticated military doctrine to army officers and commanders, these treatises played a formidable role in retaining the Byzantine military as one of the

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most formidable, organised and disciplined forces of war in the entire world despite Constantinople’s loss of hegemony. Perhaps most notable among all military manuals was the large compendium known as Maurice’s Strategikon. Clinical, analytical writing on the topics of tactics and strategy was a truly Hellenic tradition, with the oldest surviving work

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being that of Aeneas the Tactician, authored in the fourth century BC. His work, and many more lost works besides, were followed by a slew of other pieces on subjects as diverse as archery, proper use of siege machines, spies and secrecy, and every other aspect of what

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might be called military science. By the late antique Byzantine era then, the libraries of Constantinople and the eastern empire were stocked with a vast array of material to which the Byzantines themselves continued to add. Notable among their pre-Strategikon military

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works are those of Syrianos, Urbikios and a Justinianic era writing whose author is not known.

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Some of them just repackage the contributions of ancient authors, while others are suspiciously theoretical. The piece of instructive military literature which can in no way be accused of being an armchair general’s inexperienced fantasy, however, is the aforementioned Strategikon,

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perhaps the single most influential handbook of war in all Byzantine history. The first thing of note about this text is that despite being known popularly as ‘Maurice’s Strategikon’ it was not necessarily written by the eponymous reformist emperor. Most

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historians concur that the Strategikon was broadly penned in the rough half-century between 575, when the Eastern Romans renewed hostilities with Sassanid Persia, and 628, when the Sassanids were finally defeated after a long war. Using information within the text which can be dated,

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such as battles, sieges and document convention the time of authorship can be narrowed down even further to between 592 and 610 - late in the reign of Maurice and into the following tenure of the usurper Phokas. Even though the Strategikon was referred to definitively as being of ‘Maurice’,

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that was a common practice possibly implying that, as emperor, Maurice instructed that it be made. It might even be that a prominent general or veteran, such as the emperor’s brother-in-law Phillipicus, wrote the piece and then dedicated it to Maurice. Equally, however, there are many personal touches

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and bits of literary flair which makes it seem directly planned and written by Maurice. Whatever the answer to this mystery, we know that the author was an experienced soldier, educated in ancient history and had commanded troops on at least two fronts. He is intimately

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familiar with weaponry, armour, martial laws, as well as the daily life of a soldier on the march and in camp. More telling is that he also knows Byzantium’s enemies and how they fight.

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Rather than tediously listing every single book, chapter and point of the Strategikon from detailed battle formations to sieges, it is worth considering the attitude shown by Maurice towards war and how that contrasts to the bold, warrior ethos of Rome in earlier centuries. Appropriate

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to their diminished military position, war to the Byzantines was not a means of demonstrating superiority or expanding, but the least desirable way by which the empire could achieve its goals.

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Whereas earlier Roman Republican and Imperial armies were notoriously bad at scouting, regarding the ambush and irregular fighting as not a proper battle, Maurice’s pragmatic Byzantine army promoted by the Strategikon was precisely the opposite. Costly all-in battles were to be

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avoided if at all possible, and trickery as well as cunning employed at every opportunity. In that way, the Strategikon is very much fashioned in the mould of Sun Tzu. So prominent are these aspects of war in the mind of the author that two out of the twelve books making up the Strategikon - books

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IV and IX, cover the topics of ‘Ambushes’ and ‘Surprise Attacks’ in considerable depth. Even the books not especially concerning misdirection and deviousness, such as those detailing cavalry and Tagma formations, are laced with advice on how to mask one's strength and

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deceive an enemy. In a section on the prescribed depth of a Tagma formation, for example, the text advises that any reading officer or general avoids arraying all of his forces for inspection in lines of an identical size. This was because such a uniform deployment made it

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simple for enemy spies or scouts to quickly extrapolate the size of the entire Byzantine field army by counting the size of one rank, and the number of ranks, rather than having to trawl through the entire throng. Such advice is also given regarding the size of deployed Byzantine

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cavalry units. This is a particularly illustrative example because it shows starkly just how deadly a mistaken advance caused by bad intel could be. If a foe is advancing with 4,000 cavalry, and their scouts, deceived by the Byzantines’ obfuscation tactics, report 3,000 cavalry opposing them, that

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foe might decide to attack and only then would realise they faced 5,000, and were outnumbered.

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Another characteristic of the type of warfare championed by the Strategikon is its extreme carefulness and balanced nature, a theme which is clear throughout the entire text. ‘A ship cannot cross the sea without a helmsman, nor can one defeat an enemy without tactics and strategy’

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begins Book VII - Strategy, and this analytical approach to warfare is prominent in the entire piece. To engage in rash, albeit ‘glorious’ battle is the mark of a bad Byzantine general, and `’it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory which is so costly and brings only empty glory.’ A

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keen sense of caution is also shown in the section concerning war against unfamiliar foes. ‘If we find ourselves at war with a powerful people and one whose ways are strange to us, and the army, not knowing what to expect becomes nervous, then we must be very careful to avoid getting into an

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open battle with them right away’ This kind of approach brings to mind the approach of Achaemenid king Darius the Great recorded at Behistun - ‘First I will think, and then I will act.’ Even in the face of defeat and humiliation, this practical and cautionary approach to warfare

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dominates. Adroitly acknowledging the often overly superstitious and religious nature of common soldiers, the author recommends that a general does not immediately attack again right after he is defeated, even if the general understands why the defeat occurred. The soldiers, he says,

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are likely to view the loss as God’s will and therefore have their morale devastated. In such a situation, the Byzantines are to unashamedly leverage their equally powerful weapons to gain some kind of benefit. If emissaries are sent by a victorious enemy for terms,

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and those terms are reasonable and easily accomplished, then they should be enacted without hesitation to conclude the fighting. But, Maurice relates, such conversations ought to be kept private from the rank and file soldier unless it is an absolute emergency.

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A nitpicky but important consideration is also made in this sense when the author speaks concerning the polishing of weapons and armour, something that the majority of people would never even think about. But the point isn’t to keep equipment polished, but to conceal it on the

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march so that the army can’t be picked out easily by enemy scouts, who might see the sun reflecting from the point of a lance, or a ring of mail. It would be easy to also list the 101 maxims

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listed by the Strategikon for use by any reader who might find himself commanding an army on campaign, but that is not necessary. These range from such personal matters as exercising mental self control and balance at all times, to operational considerations

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such as maneuvering with the cover of sun, wind and dust to their advantage of one’s army, and the detriment of the enemy’s. Compared to the other militaries of its age, especially in the later part of the first millennium, that of the Byzantines is regarded

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as professional and almost futuristic by the standards of the time. The Strategikon has a section dedicated entirely to what we in the 21st century might call intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence operations, and how enemy attempts to gather information about imperial

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forces might be diminished or stopped entirely. Men who are chosen to be the army’s spies, the text states, ‘should be reliable, they should look very manly and be a cut above the other soldiers in physical appearance, morale and equipment, so they may project a noble image in confronting the

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enemy and if captured, make a good impression on him’. These enterprising, ancient 007s were, then, expected to serve as paragons and representatives of the emperor’s armies - formidable and intimidating even if captured, capable of influencing the enemy into doubt by their

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robust demeanor. More broadly, scouting and patrol parties, mounted on swift horses and clad in light armour were to be dispatched in quantities depending on the situation. When the enemy force was at a distance, scouts should only be sent out when specific information is necessary,

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such as the nature of roads, the properties of a nearby fortification, and other such things. However, when the enemy army is near, the entire area surrounding the imperial army should be swarming with scouts, instructed and able to take prisoners for interrogation if discovered.

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So crucial was this duty that the Strategikon’s author recommended that patrols be regularly inspected by capable officers. Any among the reconnaissance parties found to be negligent ‘should be punished for seriously endangering the whole army’. It is worth noting that this

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is one of the only occasions in which the author attributes such grave responsibility to soldiers, further emphasizing the importance of scouting. The text later goes on to detail a trick or scheme which can be used to capture enemy spies roaming around busy Byzantine encampments.

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Every few hours, a trumpet could be sounded at which the soldiers, informed beforehand must immediately return to their own assigned tents or face punishment. Naturally, the enemy spy would either be captured for being outside alone or, if he entered one of the tents, be recognised

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as a stranger and arrested by the squad inside. It might be said of the Strategikon, based on its general nature and emphasized content, that it describes the final formalisation and readjustment of a Late Roman Army into its typically Byzantine form.

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As we introduced with Procopius’ prominent display of mounted archery in his History of the Wars, Maurice or whichever imperial servant wrote the Strategikon emphasized first and foremost the training and drill of archers, both mounted and foot. If the text was followed in future

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generations, which it seems to have been, every single ‘Roman’ man up until the age of forty, and perhaps even beyond, would’ve been required to possess a bow and a quiver. Swords, lances, spears and other instruments of melee combat are, in comparison, barely even

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mentioned. Those men who are ‘unskilled’ in archery were to be given a light bow, so that they could practice this ‘essential’ skill. Interestingly, the book also contains even further evidence that this transformation of the Byzantine army was heavily driven by

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contact with nomadic nations from the steppe, partly because Maurice saw the sheer efficiency of their way and means of war, or in order to counter steppe cavalry armies who were bearing down on the empire at the time. Such ‘Hunnish’ peoples included the Gokturks and the Avars,

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which are grouped with all nomads as ‘Scythians’. The ‘scoundrel’ Avars, as Maurice describes them, are particularly important in the realm of Byzantine equipment and materiel. Throughout the entire piece, the reader is advised to supply items of the ‘Avar type’, such as tunics

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cut in the Avar manner, round and spacy Avar-style tents, Avar-inspired cavalry lances and even Avar scarves made of linen on the outside and wool on the inside. This, much like with the adoption of the gladius, shows just how eager the Romans always were to draw in aspects of other,

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hostile civilisations for their own benefit. Furthermore, the chapter on ambushes contain small tips on how to perform complex surprise attacks in the Hephthalite and ‘Scythian’ manner. The so-called ‘Scythian Ambush’ essentially describes the infamous feigned flight, a tactic so common

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among mounted nomadic tribes. Maurice recognises this frequency of use, justifiably pointing out that ‘The Scythian peoples do this all the time’. Among other terms, the post-Maurice Byzantine army described and brought about by the doctrines of the Strategikon might be described as calculating,

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pragmatic and limited in its action. There was very little of the heroic, glorious flair of battle remaining, just a relentless desire to gain victory by any means necessary and to, through that victory, enhance the prospects of the Byzantine Empire. Among the myriad of

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military manuals in the Hellenic tradition, the Strategikon is particularly important because of its profound influence on later generations. In its general form, the military of Constantinople would remain moulded by this most weighty of texts for almost half a millennium,

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even inspiring a slew of updated editions from later authors of similar texts. Approximately three centuries after Maurice’s overthrow and death, for example, Byzantine emperor Leo VI ‘the wise’, who was a prodigious author on many topics, penned or sponsored the penning of a

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famous military treatise known as Taktika. This particular text is essentially a carbon copy of the Strategikon in style, if not in content, even quoting the earlier text verbatim in many areas.

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Had the Strategikon been written half a century later, we might think there would be a key characteristic missing. In the book’s later sections, there is a fascinating segment detailing the various enemies which might be confronted by imperial armies. Included in this roster are

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Lombards, as well as other Germanic peoples, the Persians, Slavs and others. The insignificant, as Byzantines thought, and peripheral Arabs, meanwhile, were barely worth a mention.

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Structure of the Byzantine Army, Themata and Tagmata The rapid expansion of the Arab Caliphates as well as the appearance of a new northern foe, the Bulgars, forced the Eastern Roman Empire to either reorganize its army and war strategy

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or become a memory of the past. However the ever-adaptive Romans took up the challenge and introduced one of the most famous military structures in history called themes or thémata.

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Historians still debate as to exactly when the first themes were established with some attributing their establishment to Emperor Heraclius, while others supporting a later date during the reign of Emperor Constans II. Another point of conflict between scholars is

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whether the themes were well-defined regions, or the word originally referred solely to the armies and later also came to mean the district each army protected.

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In any case, we can safely say that the first themes were created sometime during the mid-7th century, with the first mentioned in the bibliography was the Armeniac theme in 667 AD. Also, amongst the first to be created were the Anatolic, the Thracesian and

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the Opsician themes. The latter was the most prestigious and served as the Imperial reserve until its involvement in several revolts in the 8th century when it was subsequently demoted to an ordinary theme army. Starting from the eastern lands of the Empire the theme system

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gradually spread towards the west and became the norm until its decline during the 12th century.

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The soldiers who served in the theme armies were, generally speaking, well paid. They received both monetary compensation and grants of land, as well as rations during active service, occasional bounties, and a share of the loot taken during the campaigns. Disabled men would receive a

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pension and widows of fallen soldiers would get a lump sum as compensation. Their landholdings were heritable by the holder’s eldest son so long as he was willing to carry on his father’s military obligations by becoming a soldier. As one can easily imagine not every theme soldier was on

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an equal economic footing. Some were rich, to the point where they could afford to hire servants and slaves. These men usually constituted the elite thematic cavalry, as their higher-income could ensure better equipment. On the other hand, there were soldiers so poor that they couldn’t afford to

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buy their own equipment. These men would have to band together so as to at least make sure to equip one of them to serve or have their gear sponsored by one of their richer comrades. Those who were still unable to supply one armoured horseman to the army, even with the help of others,

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would be evicted from their land and transferred to the irregulars. This was the case for the cavalry. Regarding the thematic infantry little is known from the sources of the era.

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A possible explanation could be that there was no distinction between cavalry and infantry. However, we can assume that at least a fraction of them must have been professionals and served permanently while others were levied. A special note should be made here for the

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akritai, men who guarded the eastern borders of the Empire against Muslim raiders. These men were not a specialized unit but rather a mix of professional soldiers, militiamen, and irregulars. Some of them were even of mixed ethnic or religious origin, as the Empire recovered lands

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to the east. Despite that, their exploits were recognized by the population they protected, who sang numerous songs praising them, with the most famous being the epic poem of the half Cappadocian Greek and half Arab, Digenis Akritas. But how was the army organized during that period?

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From Leo the Wise’s “Taktika” we learn that the basic unit of the Byzantine army of the period was the bandon which was led by a komes or count. The term bandon itself comes from the Gothic word bandwo which in Latin became bandus and meant banner. For a cavalry unit,

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a normal bandon would consist of 50 or 100 riders but there were banda that could number up to 400 men. Three banda would make a droungos, led by a droungarios and, in turn, three droungoi constituted a tourma, the highest subdivision of the army, which was commanded by a tourmarkhes.

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On the top of the hierarchy stood the general of the army, the famous strategos, who was not only the military commander but also the civil administrator of the district. As the strategoi of the themes had absolute control over the districts they governed, it was not uncommon for

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the most powerful of them to covet the Imperial crown and rebel to acquire it. The aforementioned hierarchy wasn’t the only one used by the army. For battle, the equestrian units were subdivided into less permanent structures consisting of Kentarchiai, Pentakontarchiai, Dekarchiai,

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and Pentarchiai, which were made of 100, 50, 10, and 5 men, respectively. As for the infantry, the thematic army had the same structure down to the bandon, with the obvious difference being that of the size. The average infantry bandon would be 256 men strong and would be

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thus divided into 16 lochaghiai each numbering 16 men that were commanded by a lochaghos. Further infantry subdivisions included squads consisting of 10, 5, and 4 men. For heavy infantry units, three-quarters of the total force would be men armed with spears and shields, called skoutatoi

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and the rest would be archers. It should be noted here that the size of a unit was not fixed and there were cases of units being larger or most often smaller than the “recommended” strength.

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Leo VI warned that the size of the bandon should never exceed that of 400 soldiers or a tourma more than 6 thousand, as the increased size would hinder their ability to understand and effectively obey the commander’s order. He also advised the generals to never have all of their banda on equal

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numbers, as the enemy would be then able to easily estimate the size of the force he would be facing.

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Finally, he noted that it is better for some fluidity to exist in the structure of the army and that units should be created in accordance with the needs of the army and the available manpower.

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The themes were the armies that patrolled and protected the various provinces of the Byzantine Empire but were not the only armed force. Constantinople and its surrounding region were not organized in a theme and the defence of the capital relied on the elite Imperial tagmata.

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The cavalry of the tagmata was an offensive weapon as well, accompanying the Emperor on expeditions and there were cases of regiments accompanying the thematic armies in the defense of a district for long periods of time. The soldiers serving in these elite regiments were fully professional

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mercenaries recruited from both within and outside Byzantium’s borders. They were organized in various regiments as emperors created new or disbanded old ones. During the 10th century, the most famous of them were the Scholai, the Exkoubitores, the Ikanatoi, Vigla,

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and the Athanatoi. In 988 Emperor Basil II would formally institute the most famous of the tagmata, the Varangian Guard. Along with those units some sources include as part of the tagmata the infantry that served as the garrison of Constantinople, the Noumeroi and Teichistai,

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as well as the men of the Vasilikoploimon, the Imperial War fleet. These elite regiments had in general the same structure, though there were differences in the titles used by their commanders and their sizes. The Scholai was considered the most

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important and oldest of the tagmata descending from the Scholae Palatinae that was created by Constantine the Great. During the 10th century, they were organized in 30 banda, with each bandon most likely being 50 men strong as suggested by Nikephoros Phokas in

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his work Praecepta Militaria. The commander of the Scholai had the title of Domestikos while the second in command was called Topoteretes. These titles were used by the commanders of other tagmata apart from that of the Vigla, who were called droungarioi. The Domestikos of the

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Scholai would become one of the most important figures in the Byzantine army, considered the most senior officer in the Imperial tagmata and supreme commander of the army in the Emperor’s absence.

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Second in seniority was the tagma of the Excubitors that were created by Leo I the Thracian around 460. Originally, they were a force of 300 men with the purpose of replacing those of Scholae Palatinae as Imperial Bodyguards. Later and as the Excubitors seemed to have become a

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more or less parade unit, the emperor Constantine V reformed them into one of the elite tagmata.

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They too were commanded by a Domestikos, with perhaps an anomaly occurring during the reign of Romanos II, as sources suggest the split of the Excubitors in two units each governed by a Domestikos. The Excubitors would participate in several campaigns until the disastrous battle of

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Dyrrhachium of 1081 where it was last mentioned. As we have already told the Vigla was the only unit that was not commanded by a Domestikos. It was created in 786 AD by Empress Irene from the cavalry of the Thracian theme. Though we have no references regarding their numerical strength,

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we know that their duties including protecting the Emperor and the Sacred Palace as well as guarding Constantinople’s Hippodrome. With a structure similar to that of the Vigla, the Ikanatoi was created in 809 by Nikephoros I to serve as his personal bodyguard. According to de Ceremoniis

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they numbered 456 men or around 9 banda. Finally, the Athanatoi, their name literally meaning “Immortals”, were created by John I Tzimiskes in 970 to fight off Svyatoslav’s invasion and played a decisive role during the Siege of Dorostolon where the Byzantines triumphed.

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In addition to these cavalry regiments, some sources include the infantry units that formed Constantinople’s garrison; the Noumeroi and the Teichistai. Totaling around 4000 men, the recruits for these two units were provided by the demoi or districts of the city that were

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once associated with the Hippodrome factions, the well-known from the Nika riots red, green, blue, and white. The Teichistai, as their name implies, were responsible for defending the city’s famous Theodosian Walls. On the other hand, the Noumeroi’s primary duty was guarding

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the Imperial prisons, but they would also help in protecting the walls when such a need arose. Both of the infantry tagmata were permanently stationed inside the city and never left its walls and were responsible for protecting the capital when the cavalry regiment accompanied the Emperor

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on an expedition. Complementing the city’s defense was a militia formed by members from various guilds and units of urban police, though these were not considered part of the Tagmata.

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Finally, the Imperial War fleet, the Vasilikoploimon, was the naval equivalent of the Tagmata. The fleet was stationed in Constantinople and protected the Queen City by seaborne attacks, from Propontis to the Black Sea. Aside from having the finest ships the docks of Constantinople produced, the 12 thousand professional sailors that served

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in it were probably the best the Empire could offer. Vasilikoploimon’s command structure was similar to that of the other Tagmata with its commander bearing the title of Droungarios ton Ploimon, but informally called strategos. The Tagmata were elite fighting regiments

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but besides them, there were four more major units and some minor, that formed the authentic Imperial Guard, the Basilike Hetaireia, the Emperor’s private flotilla, the Maglavites, and the Basilikoi Anthropoi. Later on, these regiments were joined by the famous Varangoi,

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the Varangian Guard. The men who served in the aforementioned units were palace guards and attendants, quartered within the Sacred Palace and tasked with protecting the Emperor at all times, while also performing various ceremonial roles. Earlier in the video, we mentioned the skoutatoi,

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the backbone of the Byzantine infantry, armed with shields and spears. Now we are going to take a closer look at the arms and armour of both the humble infantryman and the prestigious cavalryman.

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Three types of metal armour were used, the scale armour, the mail armour, and the lamellar, the so-called klivanion, which became the more prevalent of the three during the 10th century.

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Klivanion’s lamellae were made of iron, leather, or even horn and it was usually sleeveless or short-sleeved and covered the torso only to the waist, however, some rarer versions were longer.

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It was often worn above the mail armour, the lorikion alusidoton, which usually reached the wearer’s knees with the sleeves reaching the elbows or even the wrists. In the case of the katafraktoi the lorikion might even have been as long as to cover the angles. Scale lorikion

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was also a popular alternative to the mail. As the katafraktoi were the heaviest armoured unit of the Empire it is no surprise that they were further protected by wearing padded armour made of cotton, leather, or wool, either over the klivanion, called epilorikion or under it,

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the kavadion. Tubular splinted constructions were used to protect the forearms and the lower legs named cheiropsella and podopsella respectively while strips of leather, quilted cotton, or splint armour were hanging from the waist and the shoulders resembling the pteruges of antiquity.

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Their helms were also fitted with a mail skirt that covered the entire face except for the eyes.

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Finally, their defence was further boosted by a shield that was originally round and smaller than the one used by the infantry, but in the 12th century, it would be substituted by the kite shield. Their offensive gear was quite diverse. A katafraktos would be armed with a

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variety of weapons, as a mounted warrior could not simply dismount to recover a lost weapon and there was always the danger of a weapon breaking. Their primary weapon was the lance, the contarion, which was slightly shorter than the infantry spear, at around 2.5m.

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They would also carry two swords, the straight double-edged spathion which descended from the Late Roman spatha and the curved single-edged paramerion, as well as the emblematic mace called matzoukion or bardoukion. Finally, their arsenal was completed by an axe that was less favoured in

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comparison to the other weapons but nonetheless still used on the battlefield. On the other hand, the light cavalry consisted of horse archers, who used a composite recurve bow for ranged attacks and the paramerion for close quarters combat. As mobility was of the uttermost importance

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for these troops, their armour was not as heavy and was mainly of padded cotton with full-length sleeves that were often fastened back behind the shoulder, while in some cases they could also wear a klivanion or a scale shirt. The defensive equipment of the infantry was,

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more or less, similar to that of the equestrian units. The famous barbarian spangenhelm remained in use and from the 11th century onwards it is accompanied by its taller and pointier version known as the “Caucasian”. During the 12th century, the ancient type of the Phrygian

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helm was revived and quickly became popular, but we also have the appearance of another innovation, an early form of kettle hats. The types of armour that were worn by cavalrymen were also used by the infantry, though assuming the lower economic status of a humble foot soldier the most common

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type must have been that of soft armour made from padded cotton. Their weaponry depended of course upon their type. Light infantry was armed with bows, javelins, and staff slings. An interesting part of the Byzantine gear was the solenarion, which was a hollow tube that enabled an archer

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to launch small darts, like those of the western crossbows, rapidly, using a thumb draw. Because the darts were smaller and lighter than the normal arrows the energy transferred to them by the bow’s string would accelerate them to greater speeds potentially increasing the damage they could

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inflict. Another advantage that occurred from the usage of the solenarion was that the enemy could not pick up the darts and use them from their bows as could have been the case with arrows.

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The infantry used the same types of swords as the cavalry did, but there were great differences in the spears used between the two forces, with foot soldiers using three different types. The first was the small spear - kontarion mikron which was about as long as the lance of the cavalry,

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but the pike used by the first ranks to form a Macedonian-like phalanx was about 4m long. The last type of spear was the menavlion, which was made from a whole sapling with a thick shaft and was used to counter heavy cavalry charges. Lastly, another common weapon between the footmen of the

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empire were the axes which could be either single or double-bladed, but always one-handed so as to allow the usage of a shield on the other hand. The imperial tagmata, with the notable exceptions of the Varangian Guard and other foreign units, used the same types of armour and weapons as the

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thematic cavalry. However, owing to their wealth their equipment was of considerably better quality and was often richly decorated. Weapons and especially swords, within the palace guard and courtiers, were used to signify their rank. One weapon that seems to have been used exclusively

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by the palace guards and not by the common troops fighting on the frontier, was the rhomphaia. The exact nature of the rhomphaia remains unclear though the most prevailing theory is that it was a falx-like weapon but with less curvature. The centuries that followed brought further

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changes to the Byzantine army, forcing the Romans to enact reforms. How the Eastern Roman Army Declined The most known of the reforms introduced under the rule of Alexios I Komnenos was called the pronoia system. The pronoiai were grants of the revenue of the land and the labour services the inhabitants of the district owed to

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the state. The fiscal rights were bestowed to an individual by the Emperor and they were generally claims on taxes burdening the peasants and immovable property such mills, mines, docks, etc.

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The pronoiar, as the one receiving the grant was called, appropriated the fiscal rights only over properties which the Byzantine state itself owned and since revenue sources varied from region to region so too did the forms of the grants. Like their predecessors, the theme soldiers of

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the middle Byzantine era, the pronoia-holders characterized the military of their age. They might not have been the more numerous type of soldiers nor the most important but they are what represents the Late Byzantine army better. The pronoiars were, most often natives of the Empire,

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though there were foreigners whose remuneration was tied to the land, yet unlike the thematic soldiers, their employer was the central government, not the local administration. Thus he was not a provincial soldier but one of the central army and

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was consequently quite often an absentee landlord. This should not create a misconception that they were full-time military men, as they were reservists that were called upon when needed and otherwise his taxes would be used to raise troops elsewhere. The wealthiest were also accompanied by

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small retinues, the largest not exceeding 80 men, while the norm was probably a mere handful. These men were called oikeioi or kinsmen, and sometimes were supplemented by household mercenaries. They were expected to fight as heavy cavalrymen while the infantry was provided by smallholders who had

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been granted land to cultivate, though even in their case it wouldn’t have been necessary to do the farming work themselves and they could instead lease the land to peasants.

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The pronoia system has a lot of similarities with Western feudalism yet there are substantial differences: Unlike fiefs, the pronoiai could only be granted by the Emperor and thus couldn’t be subdivided. Furthermore, the land was technically still owned by the state, and was not the personal

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property of the pronoiar who had only been granted the fiscal rights to it. Thus, unlike serfs, the paroikoi were free men, able to buy and sell the property or move from their village.

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The pronoiars, whether poor or rich, were still soldiers and therefore had to be organized into units. Unfortunately, late Byzantine authors are inconsistent and use archaic terminology. Yet there is one term that is tightly connected to the pronoia soldiers, the allagia.. Commanded by the

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allagator, who was the equivalent of a dux or the modern day major, these units probably consisted of 300 to 500 men. In the “Chronicle of Morea”, general Constantine Palaiologos had 18 allagia for a total of 6000 pronoiars which would mean around 330 men in each[1] . Theoretically speaking, they

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could be subdivided into smaller units of 100, 50 or 10 men and going up in the scale, several of them could be merged to form taxeis, syntaxeis, lochoi, and tagmata. The latter shouldn’t be confused with the Imperial Tagmata of the earlier centuries. Byzantine sources also mention some

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different “types” of allagia if we could possibly call them. These are the vasilika (imperial), the megala (great) and the authentika. The first type most probably refers to units that were part of the Imperial Guards, while the great allagia are likely to have been large contingents, the size of

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a modern day brigade. It’s likely those included every soldier of the province whether cavalry or infantry, garrisons or reserves, who were referred to as megalollagitai. They first appeared in the 1280s under the Palaiologoi and lasted roughly a century, as the provinces on which they were

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based were gradually conquered by the Ottomans and the Serbs. From then on the organization of forces in the Byzantine army seems to be entirely ad hoc. Of the famous guard regiments, only the Varangian Guard survived the death of Alexios. To them was added a regiment of Vardariotai

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who mainly performed police duties. These men were of Hungarian and Cuman origin that during the reign of the emperor John III Vatatzes had settled the upper valley of the Vardar river, hence the name. Although viewed as foreigners in their early days, they were gradually Hellenized

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until they stopped being considered mercenaries and became citizens of the empire. The Imperial Guard also included two allagia of Paramonai, one being infantry and the other cavalry, as well as a unit of foot archers, the Mourtatoi, who were of mixed Greco-Turkish origin or Christianized Turks,

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and there was also the mace-armed bodyguard of marines, clad in their distinctive breastplate adorned with white lions, the Tzakones. Finally, Nicephorus Gregoras mentions that the emperor John VI Kantakouzenos had as private guard an allagion of 500 Catalans led by Juan Pelatra.

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It is from a contemporary of John Kantakouzenos, Theodore Palaiologos’ work called “Instructions”, that we learn more about the armour used at the time. Theodore’s work constitutes the top military manual of the Late Byzantine era and although it uses western terminology it isn’t hard

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to translate it to the Byzantine equivalents. The typical Byzantine cavalryman of the 14th century would furnish a pourpoint, haubergeon and gorgeré, the cuiriee and some gambeson, chapel-de-fer, sword or glaive, greaves, cuisses, with the lance and shield. The pourpoint probably

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refers to a padded surcoat similar to those that existed in the Middle East. Under the surcoat was the haubergeon or coat of mail which was worn in a great variety, either short or long-sleeved, knee or waist long, and with attached or separate mittens. Some late Byzantine soldiers, however,

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preferred to wear cuirasses on top or in place of the hauberks. These were made out of metallic or hardened leather lamellae resembling those of Turco-Mongolic origin. The gorgeré was a kind of neck guard either mail or plate. Contemporary Byzantine art depicts various

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kinds of neck guards, rigid or semi-rigid made of iron lamellae or hardened leather. However, the cuiriee Theodore mentions, which was a leather garment worn under the hauberk is not mentioned nor seen in Byzantine sources. Finally, the most common type of helmet used during the

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late Byzantine era was the chapel-de-fer, literally the iron hat. Its shape ranged from conical to roundish and its brim was either flat and wide or narrow and sloping downwards. As with previous helmet designs, it wasn’t unusual for it to have attached mail aventails or be

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worn over a mail hood. The defensive equipment of the typical cavalryman was completed with a large shield of an elongated triangular design, the often called “Norman” shield.

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On the other hand, it is not a secret that the infantry branch constituted the Achilles’ heel of the Late Byzantine armies. It was separated into heavy and light infantry that fought as spearmen and archers respectively. The spearmen, the so-called kontaratoi, were armed with a

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long spear, a sword, and a large western-type almond-shaped shield. Their armour was usually leather or chainmail with the first ranks often wearing extra protection. In battle they deployed in formations four ranks deep and unlike their predecessors they had no archers to support them

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as part of the same unit. The archers themselves were divided into two subcategories. On one hand, there were well-equipped and disciplined units able to even defend themselves in melee combat, however, these troops were limited in numbers. Much larger and common was the second type that

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consisted of unarmoured archers that besides their bow were only equipped with a dagger or knife. From the end of the 13th century, these men weren’t even professional soldiers but instead peasants that were called to fulfill their duties towards the state. During the 14th

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century, a large percentage of the Byzantine archers abandoned the traditional composite bow for the western crossbow, which the Byzantines called tzagra. These men constituted a separate force and were commanded by the stratopedarches ton tzangratoron. Famed archers were also many

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of the Cretans who served in the Byzantine army of that period with great distinction and whom Doukas describes as the Empire’s most faithful subjects. Characteristic of their bravery and loyalty is the story of the Cretans that fought during the siege of Constantinople in 1453. It is possible that

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these men were part of a guard unit, the existence of which was recorded in 1422. But whether guardsmen or not the Cretans showed such great tenacity in their task of defending three towers near the Blachernae palace that the Ottomans allowed them to leave the City unmolested.

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While archers and crossbowmen constituted the vast majority of missile troops of the time, by the late 14th century a new technology was spreading in the Balkans, gunpowder artillery followed by handguns. Despite the fact that the Byzantines knew of the existence of firearms by 1392 at the

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latest, the virtually nonexistent economic sources of the Empire meant that it was impossible for them to participate in this late medieval arms race and it’s unlikely they possessed their own until 1422 when according to Chalkokondyles cannons were used to defend the walls of

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Constantinople from the Ottoman besiegers. These guns were probably acquired from Venice or Genoa. Any new cannons Byzantium obtained after 1422 were given as gifts from various European states, and so far there is no evidence that the Byzantines ever manufactured their own. The only known record

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of a cannon-founder in the area of Constantinople is that of the Hungarian Orban who had offered his services to the Byzantines in 1452, one year before the Ottomans would capture the city, but the Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos could not afford his high salary demands nor

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could supply the materials necessary for the gun’s construction. Thus Orban approached the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II and was given abundant funds and materials to create a giant gun that would demolish the City’s walls. Ironically the Hungarian engineer would die during the siege by

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one of his own creations when a cannon exploded claiming the lives of both him and the crew. The Byzantines also used artillery during the siege of 1453, however, their guns were not as numerous as the Ottomans, and contemporary historians that were also eye-witnesses inform us that their

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discharge “shook the walls, and did more damage to them than the enemy”. Leonard of Chios adds that because of a shortage of both powder and projectiles, the guns could not be fired very often, but when they did they caused a great number of casualties in the Turkish camp. From

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two instances during the siege of 1453, we can see that the Byzantines not only lacked artillery but also lacked comprehensive knowledge regarding its deployment and usage. This inability to understand how artillery was supposed to operate seems to have created frictions amongst the defenders

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as Leonard of Chios informs us that Loukas Notaras denied Giovanni Giustiniani’s request to use the city’s cannons to defend his section of the wall. The second incident revolves around an unlucky anonymous gunner that served the largest cannon the Byzantines used. According to

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Chalkokondyles when the gun exploded, which was a common occurrence at the time, the gunner was accused of having received bribes from the Turks. The smaller firearms for which the Byzantines had several names like molybdobolon (lead-thrower), skopeta or touphax, might not have even been

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adopted by the Byzantines at all. The only evidence we have is the suspicious account of Doukas who in 1462 wrote that the Byzantines during the siege of 1453 shot lead balls which were propelled by powder, 5 and 10 at a time, and as small as Pontic walnuts”. However, it is known

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that among the Italian defenders of Constantinople there were some equipped with handguns. The limited artillery and the unimpressive number of defenders that had gathered to defend Constantinople in 1453 was in fact a small miracle accomplished through the hard

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labour of Constantine Palaiologos. Despite his efforts, however, the small, ill-trained, and ill-equipped Byzantine army couldn’t defend against the might of the Ottoman besiegers.

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The conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans signalled the end of the Empire and consequently the end of the Imperial Army as a constitution that had existed for over a thousand years.

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Byzantine Navy We have talked extensively about the Byzantine army, but its navy was also crucial in the defending of the empire. At its apogee, the Roman Empire controlled all the lands surrounding the Mediterranean, essentially making the sea a Roman lake or, as the Romans themselves famously called it,

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“Mare Nostrum”, “our sea.” The lack of any strong competitors in the waters of the Mediterranean gradually led to the decline and shrinkage of the Roman Navy, which had limited itself to tasks such as pirate hunting and escorting merchant vessels. The old days of massive naval battles like Actium

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were long gone. However, the civil wars of the 4th and 5th centuries, as well as the collapse of the Western Roman Empire and the establishment of the Ostrogothic and Vandalic kingdoms rekindled naval warfare in the Mediterranean. The Vandal fleets sailing from Northern Africa and raiding the coast

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of Greece forced the Eastern Roman Emperors to spend large sums of money to reestablish a strong navy. Despite the strong naval tradition of these lands, their attempts were not always successful; such as when the enormous 1000-ship strong fleet of Basiliscus was almost destroyed, bringing the

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Eastern Empire to the brink of economic collapse. The true revival of Roman naval power came during the following century, especially under the reign of Emperor Justinian I when he launched his massive campaigns to reclaim North Africa and the Italian peninsula. After this, the Mediterranean

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was once more dominated by the Roman fleet, even after the loss of much of Italy to the Lombards, who were not seafaring people and preferred not to clash against the Byzantine fleet. The greatest naval threat presented to the Empire until the advent of the Islamic caliphate came from the

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Slavs during the Sassanid siege of Constantinople in 626, whose canoes were still not up to par with the imperial dromons. The Dromon The Dromon was the primary warship of the Byzantine navy and was a new type of galley

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whose design had originated from the earlier Roman liburnae, which were small but very fast ships. Yet the dromons had characteristics that set them apart from their predecessors.

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They featured a full deck, a trait that would soon define all Mediterranean galleys, and used lateen sails as opposed to the square sails of the liburna. Perhaps the greatest difference between the Dromon and its ancient ancestor was the abandonment of the waterline ram,

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an element almost synonymous with the ships of antiquity, in favor of an above-the-water spur that historians have suggested was used to break the oars of enemy vessels. No clear reason exists for why the Byzantines opted to abandon the ramming prow, but it is likely that innovations in

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the mortise and tenon method of construction of the ship’s hull made ramming obsolete. The dromons that first appeared during Justinian’s reign were single-banked, with one mast and roughly 50 oarsmen, 25 on each side. In the 9th and 10th centuries, larger dromons appeared

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on Byzantine waters, with two banks of oars and roughly 100 to 120 oarsmen. These larger versions were also equipped with two masts instead of one. The ships were steered using two-quarter rudders at the stern. Also at the stern was the captain’s quarters, a rather humble tent and a bed. Towards

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the center of the ship, between the masts, there were wooden fortifications, the xylokastra, that provided cover for the archers of the ship when they were engaged in combat. The archers were not the only attacking option of the ship, as they also carried a sizable marine force that could

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board an enemy vessel. Beyond this, the imperial dromons also had a trump card: a weapon that made them infamous and feared throughout the medieval world and remembered even today; Greek Fire.

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The Greek Fire Incendiary weapons were not a novelty. Many combustible mixtures made from sulphur and petroleum existed as early as the 9th century BC and had been used by the Assyrians. But the exact substance that came to be known as Greek

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Fire was discovered around 672 AD, ostensibly by the Byzantine engineer Kallinikos, who was born in Heliopolis in modern day Lebanon. However, some historians have suggested that Kallinikos merely improved upon an existing weapon or that a team of scholars created the substance. On the

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complete opposite bank of the river stands Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennetos’s account, which states that the recipe was revealed by an angel to Constantine the Great. While there is little doubt that the creation of this medieval napalm was not due to divine intervention, the emperor’s

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account goes to show how important the secret of the Greek Fire was to the Byzantines. In fact, the level of secrecy surrounding the weapon was so great that none of the empire’s enemies were ever able to copy either the flammable substance or the method of deployment. A great example of this is

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the capture of both siphons and large quantities of the substance by the Bulgarians in 814, who, despite having large quantities of the chemical substance in their hands, were unable to figure out how to reproduce their own. Even the Byzantine’s chief enemy of the time, the Arabs,

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were unable to copy the siphons and used pots filled with their own incendiary mixture that was thrown by hand or artillery, such as catapults. Greek fire’s uniquely destructive properties, such as its ability to burn on water and only be extinguished by sand or vinegar

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were truly miraculous, but so was the means of its deployment: the siphons. These tubular projectors were usually mounted on the dromon’s prow under a forecastle that would provide cover for the operators, but in later times and when facing more dangerous enemies, additional devices were

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installed in the midst of the vessel or even at the stern. We don’t know exactly how the mechanism was made, but some sources give us a general idea. It seems that the oily substance was heated inside a bronze vessel, while a hand pump would add in air to pressurize it. When the proper pressure had

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been reached, the crew would open a valve, and the oil would travel with great speed through bronze pipes to the nozzle. Just beyond the tip of the nozzle, there would be a flame, either a torch or lamp, that would ignite the oil as it was launched at the enemy ship, with sources claiming that a

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loud roar and smoke accompanied the discharge. Portable versions, the cheirosiphon or hand-siphon, were also created, with Emperor Leo the Wise claiming to have invented them in his Tactica. These smaller flamethrowers differ in their mode of operation and were mostly used in

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land battles and especially sieges, as they proved extremely effective at repelling enemy troops. Perhaps the most famous incident where Greek Fire was used was the Arab siege of Constantinople in 698, when the Byzantine navy utilized its fearsome weapon to save the city. Yet despite having the

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Greek Fire in its arsenal, the Byzantine fleet was not an unstoppable and unbeatable force.

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The weapon had limitations of its own, such as a shorter range than catapults, and was tricky and even disastrous to use in unfavourable wind conditions. Additionally, the Byzantines’ enemies soon adapted to contend with Greek Fire, such as the Arabs, who adapted their strategies

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to keep outside of the siphons range while also upgrading their ships with vinegar-dipped animal hides that were resistant to the flames. For centuries, these two naval powers would clash in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, trying to wrest control of the seas from each other.

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Naval Tactics Various treatises such as the “Taktika” by Leo the Wise, “Peri thalassomachias” by Nikephoros Ouranos and “Praecepta militaria” by Nikephoros Phokas give us insight into the tactics used by the Byzantine navy of the early Middle Ages.

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Great emphasis was placed on the professionalism and training of both the admiral and the sailors, who should especially be well versed in the naval maneuvers that were necessary for fast ships such as the dromons. The commander was also encouraged to fight mostly in areas of his own choosing,

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where familiarity with the local geography would grant him an advantage. He was also expected to coordinate plans with fellow captains using a signaling system, and even rehearse tactical plans before battles. The fleet, depending on its size and the environment,

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was usually deployed in a crescent, sigma-shaped or semi-circle formation, with the flagship in the middle and the other stronger ships placed at the tips of the formation. Moreover, a reserve force was usually kept behind the main formation. The plan during most battles

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was usually to lure the enemy inside the curve and then surround their ships. Then, they would attack using a combination of the Greek fire from the siphons, archer volleys, ballistas and catapults. After softening the foe up, they would send a boarding party on the enemy ship. This was

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the main tactic that was used for galley warfare in the Mediterranean up until the 16th century.

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Through the use of iron grapples and ropes, a dromons could tie itself to an enemy galley.

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Sometimes, multiple dromons could dock to form a larger fighting platform. Once the ships were close, the Byzantines would use large spears, the menaula, to kill the enemy oarsmen. Other weapons used by the Byzantine seamen during the melee included swords and axes, as well

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as shorter spears and personal weapons such as knives. Great emphasis was placed on armour, with both the heavily armoured kataphrakts of the upper deck and the rest of the crew wearing mail or lamellar cuirasses, padded jackets, helmets, greaves and vambraces. Naturally,

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the ranged troops and the oarsmen who were not expected to be on the frontline during close combat had less protection. Naval Organization The organization of the Byzantine navy was similar to that of the Byzantine army. In response to the rapid Muslim advance into Roman territory in the early Middle Ages,

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the Byzantines created the Karabisianoi fleet, which comprised the main naval force of the empire and was headed by a strategos. This highly monolithic system proved inadequate, and it was later replaced by a system that included maritime themes, with the first being the Theme

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of Cibyrrhaeots, the Imperial fleet stationed in Constantinople which was most likely created sometime in the early 9th century and highly local policing squadrons that belonged to land themes.

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As we have mentioned, the head of the fleet was called strategos, and the rest of the ranks followed a similar terminology to their land counterparts. Below the strategos, there were usually two or three tourmarchai as vice admirals; below them, the droungarioi served as rear

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admirals. In the lower ranks, there were the komes who would command a squadron of three to five ships, while the captain of each ship was called the kentarchos. Following them, there were other officers such as the protokaraboi, who acted as helmsmen; the proteus, who was the prow officer;

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and protelatai, who were the first oarsmen. The Imperial fleet was a special case, with its commander called the droungarios tou basilikou ploimou. While originally the title lacked much prestige, it soon rose among other offices and was classed separately from the other

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commanders of the themes or the tagmata, in a group of officials called stratarchai, just below the commander of the Imperial Bodyguard. During the Komnenian reforms of the high middle ages, and with the dissolution of the thematic fleets, this position was placed under the new office

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of the megas doux, which was in command of the reformed and unified imperial fleet.

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Decline of the Byzantine Navy The supremacy of the Byzantine navy would not last beyond the 12th century. After that, while the Empire still had a rich maritime heritage and skilled sailors, it was on the economic decline and could not compete with the rising naval power

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of the Italian city states, especially Venice and Genoa. The disastrous Fourth Crusade only worsened the fate of the late Byzantine navy, and while attempts were made to rebuild some of its lost strength, its glory days now belonged in the past. The most notable attempt to reverse the declining

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trend was made by Emperor Michael VIII, who created three new marine units: the Gasmouloi, the Tzakones and the Prosalentai, which were a dedicated oarsmen corps. While the new Vasilikos Stolos had some successes, especially under Philanthopinos, it was disbanded in 1283 by

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Andronikos II, who deemed the upkeep costs to be too great and instead preferred to rely on the maritime strength of his Genoese allies. However, in 1349, the Byzantines were forced to raise their own fleet to fight against the Genoese, who had turned against them.

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In the ensuing battle, only nine out of the 100 ships the Byzantines fielded were state warships, so the decisive defeat they suffered shouldn’t come as a surprise. From Kantakouzenos, we are informed that later, the Byzantine fleet consisted of 200 vessels. Still, the vast majority of these

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ships were requisitioned merchantmen, and sources never mention more than ten imperial galleys. Such was also the case during the final siege of 1453 when the last small Roman naval victory, if we can call it that, took place when four ships from Chios with Genoese and Greek sailors sailed

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past the naval blockade of Mehmet’s admiral Baltaoglu and even managed to hold off an attack from the Ottoman navy for several hours. It is said that the furious Ottoman Sultan even rode his horse into the sea, cursing his own admiral and later wanted to impale Baltaoglu,

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who was saved by the pleas of other officials. Mehmet would then transfer part of his fleet overland into the Golden Horn and seal the fate of the city. The fall of Constantinople on the 29th brought an official end to the history of the Roman navy that spanned over a millennium.

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Georgian and Armenian troops Various mercenary groups played a crucial role in the formation of the Byzantine armies and the next section of this documentary will discuss just that. Ever since their conversion to Christianity both Georgia and Armenia developed and retained

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close ties to Constantinople even when these lands were occupied by the Persian Sassanids or, later, by Muslim caliphates. The Armenians had particularly good relations with the Byzantines because their lower aristocracy, the nakharans, were able to establish a great military

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reputation that lasted until the 8th century. These lower nobles were willing to rent their military services to the highest bidder whether he was offering gold or richer lands. Naturally, the Byzantine Empire and especially Emperor Maurice took advantage of this deal, encouraging

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many nakharans to resettle in Pergamum during the 7th century. These men formed an elite 2000 strong unit of horsemen that mainly fought against the Avars in the Danube front. Armenian troops played a prominent role in the ultimately unsuccessful defense of Byzantine Syria against the Islamic

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Caliphate. After the Muslim conquests of the area, the political scenery changed, with many Armenians fighting under the Caliphate’s banner against the Byzantines. Still, even after this, some Orthodox Armenians served in the Byzantine army and even managed to rise in ranks. Both Georgia

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and Armenia continued to supply mercenaries and auxiliaries to Byzantium well until the 14th century, but by that time the majority of foreign forces were either Turks or Latins.

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Catalan Company In September of 1303, two envoys arrived at the court of the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologos. They had been sent by Roger de Flor, commander of the newly founded but soon to be famous Great Catalan Company. As a name, the mercenary company was just a newborn but its men and commander were

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seasoned veterans of the decades long war of the Sicilian Vespers between the Angevin Kingdom of Naples and the Crown of Aragon for control of Sicily. The Catalan mercenaries, also known as the “almogavars” were fierce and sought after warriors. War was truly part of their DNA, for

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they and their ancestors had for centuries fought against the Arabs who had conquered much of the Iberian Peninsula. They fought as poorly dressed light infantry, often adorned in nothing more than a sheepskin coat called zamarra, leather sandals, breeches and gaiters made of hides. Their helmets

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were also made of either steel or leather. Their weapons consisted of javelins and the distinctive hunting short spear, the azcona, which in dire moments could also be thrown at the enemy. Some of them also carried falchions and knives. By far the most unique piece of their equipment was a piece

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of flint they carried with them and which they struck with their blades shortly before battle to create sparks that would terrorize their foes while crying “Awake iron! Let’s kill!” If an Almogavar had distinguished himself in the virtues of warfare, had the support of his fellow

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soldiers and the approval of the captains, he would be promoted to the rank of Almocaden, a rank roughly equal to that of modern day sergeant. If he also possessed a military mind, versed in tactics, wisdom and intelligence and the more strategic aspect of war, he could be

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promoted to the highest rank, that of Adalid, the equivalent of modern day captain. To do so, twelve Adalids were needed to approve of his promotion. They would then lift him on a shield and facing all cardinal directions he would make the sign of the cross with his sword,

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challenging every enemy to fight him as he swore fealty to his king. In 1303 Roger de Flor’s ambassadors promised the services of these ferocious warriors to the Byzantine Emperor for nine months. In exchange, the Roger’s men would be paid double the usual

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rate, while he would receive the Emperor’s fifteen year old niece’s hand in marriage, Maria Asanina, who was also the daughter of the Tsar of Bulgaria, Ivan Asen III. Furthermore, the Italian condottiero would be appointed to the office of megas doux. This was a highly

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prestigious title, and as commander-in-chief of the Imperial Navy, only a handful of people in the Byzantine Empire would outrank him. De Flor was certainly demanding a hefty price for the services of his mercenary company and he would have surely been refused hadn’t Andronicus been in such a

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precarious political situation caused by the rapid expansion of the Ottoman Turks in Asia Minor.

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Before the end of the year, Roger arrived at Constantinople bringing with him 8000 men, of which 4000 were almogavar foot soldiers and 1500 were cavalry while the rest were an unspecified number of servants and auxiliary forces. The Company also had its own fleet that they used for

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transportation, consisting of 36 ships, half of them being galleys. The arrival of the mercenary company in Constantinople, however, brought unexpected trouble as the Genoese inhabitants of Pera did not see eye to eye with the Catalans and felt that their presence in the city meant

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that the House of Barcelona was trying to undermine the interests of the Genoese Republic.

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It wasn’t long before armed conflict between these two factions broke out, which resulted in the deaths of around 3000 Genoese, and only stopped after Andronicus personally intervened.

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Realizing the stay of the Catalans in the capital would only cause further bloodshed within the city, the Byzantine Emperor ordered them to cross the Bosphorus and assume military action against the Turkic beyliks in Anatolia to reclaim the lost lands. Landing at Cyzicus,

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which was under siege by a Karasid Turkic army, the mercenaries would soon prove their worth, as they crushed the unsuspecting Turks. After wintering in the area and looting everything precious they came across to the dismay of the locals, the Catalans moved to the south to

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relieve the besieged city of Philadelphia. In what would be known as the battle of Aulax, Roger and his men once more delivered a devastating blow on the Turkic forces who abandoned the siege, leaving behind 18000 dead. With Philadelphia secured, de Flor moved to Magnesia where he

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established his headquarters and resumed his campaign against the Turkic beyliks achieving great victories at Tire, Ania and Kibistra at the Cilician Gates where the Catalans triumphed over a Turkoman army three times their numbers. The almogavars would have pushed even further east

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but their commanders did not want to take the risk and thus the company retreated to Magnesia.

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There they found out that the Byzantines had killed the Catalan garrison and stolen the treasury. Apoplectic, de Flor immediately laid siege to the city. This hostile attitude on the part of the Byzantiens did not come out of the blue. Over the past two years de Flor was acting

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as if he was the governor of Anatolia, winning the enmity of appointed Byzantine officials while his men had at times looted the very same people they were fighting for. The siege was however lifted when Andronicus asked de Flor to move into Thrace, which was being threatened by

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the Bulgarian usurper Theodore Svetoslav. Considering the events that followed this, was very likely a ruse. Reaching Adrianople, de Flor attended a lavish banquet that was thrown in his honor when a band of Alan mercenaries paid by Andronicus’ son and co-emperor Michael IX,

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broke into the chambers and slaughtered Roger and his men. It was a poorly calculated decision because the news of their commander’s death sent the Catalans into a devastating rampage across Thrace and Macedonia. Not even the monasteries of Mount Athos escaped their wrath, which prompted

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the monastic state to issue a ban on the entry of Catalan men that lasted until the year 2000.

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Eventually they moved south towards Thessaly and the Duchy of Athens, then under the control of the Burgundian Gautier de Brienne. The Catalans would soon conquer the Duchy for themselves and soon extended their control over Thebes and Thessaly and they would rule these territories in the name

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of the Crown of Aragon until 1390 when they were defeated by the Navarrese company of Pedro de San Superano and the Italians of Nerio I Acciaioli. Serb and Bulgarian troops Byzantium's Slavic neighbors could not be absent from this video. The Bulgars had fought in the

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service of the Empire ever since they settled as foederati in Thrace and eastern Macedonia and campaigned against the Ostrogoths under the command of Belisarius alongside other foederati forces made up of Lombards and Gepids. Throughout the following centuries, Bulgarians would continue

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to be enlisted either as mercenaries, under the thematic system or even forced to serve as prisoners of war. During the last centuries of the empire they were hired as small bands of brigands that fought mainly as cavalry archers, but there were a few instances of Bulgarian Tsars sending

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large allied contingents to fight in service of the Empire. Their involvement during this time period in Byzantine affairs mirrors that of the Serbs in that these auxiliary forces were mostly involved in civil wars. The Serbs, originally vassals of the Empire

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during the 12th century, were required to supply a certain number of troops when Byzantium was at war, 500 men for Asiatic campaigns and 2000 for European ones. Just like Bulgaria, of course, there were times when the Serbian states were openly hostile to Byzantium and refused to provide

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any aid. They, too, would provide occasional assistance during the Empire’s later centuries, such as during the battle of Pelagonia, though these auxiliary forces were not always composed of ethnic Serbs. Stefan Urosh II loaned 2000 Cuman cavalrymen to Michael IX in 1312. The last

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recorded instance of Serbs fighting alongside the Byzantines was in 1352 when 4000 Serbian horsemen were provided to John V Palaiologos. Turkic troops We are well familiar with the various Turkic tribes of Anatolia and their hostile relationship with Byzantium, but Turks also served as soldiers of the Empire in quite large numbers and,

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from the 14th century onwards, they were actually the largest foreign element of the Byzantine army. Turkic peoples who fought for the Eastern Romans included the Pechenegs, Cumans, Uzes and even Seljuks. During the middle period, the Pechenegs, who sources sometimes refer to as Scyths, constituted the majority of Asiatic mercenaries

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employed by Byzantium and, together with the Cumans, might have been what came to be known as the Vardariotai. According to Pseudo-Kodinos, the name comes from the Vardar valley in Macedonia, where they settled upon the orders of an old Emperor. The Vardariotai were a civic police

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unit which served as part of the palace guard, equipped with whips, staffs and batons and tasked with policing duties, especially that of keeping the order during ceremonies. Besides serving as Vardariotai, both Pechenegs and Cumans provided mercenaries that fought in the field of battle,

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typically as horse-archers, drawing from their long standing nomadic tradition. Due to this, the Byzantines came to refer to them the Skythikon, after the long-faded Scythian peoples who had inhabited the steppe in antiquity. First employed at the end of the 11th century, the

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Cumans and Pechenegs quickly became an important part of the Byzantine army for the next 200 years and in 1241, Emperor John III even settled a large number of them in Thrace and Anatolia from where he and his successors would frequently muster troops at least until the end of the century.

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We have already mentioned the names of other Turkic people that were recruited into the Byzantine army such as the Seljuks who were either employed directly under the Emperor’s pay, or were loaned out by friendly Turkic rulers in Asia Minor. A rather famous example of the latter

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case is that of the Turkoman bey, Umur of Aydin who provided troops to his Byzantine allies in various cases, such as during Andronikus’ Albanian campaign in 1338 when Umur offered 2000 foot archers. Umur would again provide men, this time to Andronicus’ successor, John VI Kantakouzenos,

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with whom he had an especially warm and friendly relationship, during the Byzantine civil war of 1341-1347. Reportedly Umur Pasha campaigned in Thrace with an enormous contingent of 30,000 men, first saving his friend in Didymoteicho in early 1343 and then unsuccessfully trying to

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besiege Thessaloniki during the fall of the same year. Kantakouzenos also reports that two years later Umur campaigned with him in Thrace this time accompanied by 20,000 horsemen. However, the opposite side was also keen to employ Turks with Empress Anna of Savoy receiving 6000

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soldiers from the emir of Saruhan, though they quickly abandoned her and joined Kantakouzenos. What might surprise our audience the most is that even Ottoman Turks, who eventually would be the Empire’s end, also served and assisted the Byzantine army. Again, Kantakouzenos,

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made extensive use of large Ottoman cavalry contingents that numbered 6000 men in 1345, 10,000 in 1348 and 20,000 in 1349, though we should note that in that last case the Ottoman troops did not play an active role in the hostilities. While Kantakouzenos and his successors sought

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their assistance whenever possible, valuing their prowess in battle, he criticized them for their lack of discipline which was only exaggerated when concentrated in such large numbers. Turkic troops would continue to be employed throughout the 14th and 15th century and even during the Empire’s

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twilight in 1453, 600 Ottomans, loyal to Orhan Celebi, fought during the siege of Constantinople, defending part of the sea walls and the harbor of Eptaskalio. Finally, noteworthy is the service of the Tourkopouloi, literally the sons of Turks, who were Christianized Turks,

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often of mixed Byzantine-Turkic origin who fought as horse archers and light cavalry. Throughout its millennia-spanning history, the Byzantine Empire's fate was intertwined with a multitude of adversaries and, equally so, with allies, friends, and intrepid adventurers who fought on its side whether they were motivated by loyalty to their faith,

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their sovereign or the allure of riches. These warriors stand as a testament to the multifaceted nature of the Byzantine Empire and its enduring influence on the annals of time, and the relative cultural tolerance demonstrated by the Byzantines was crucial because of the

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difficult geopolitical situation that the Empire had to endure throughout its existence. The Geopolitical Situation On the 11th of May of 330, Constantine the Great, having reunited the war-torn Roman lands, officially consecrated the new capital of his empire, the New Rome or, as it quickly became known, Constantinople. The city,

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situated on the crossroads of two continents, enjoyed some unparalleled geostrategic advantages, mainly significant importance as a central trade hub. The city was also easily defendable, surrounded on three sides by the sea. It also served as the Empire’s second major

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administrative center, closer to its eastern provinces, which were of greater economic value. However, Constantinople and her provinces also faced many disadvantages, most notably the lack of strategic depth and unfavourable geography. For most of its long life, the Byzantine Empire

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faced enemies from at least three directions, enemies who were quite often stronger militarily and used radically different ways to conduct warfare, making the adoption of a single method of fighting impossible for the Byzantines. China, another long-lived empire, had natural barriers

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such as impassable mountain ranges, jungles and deserts protecting it from most sides, with the only real outside threats coming from the north. Byzantium, on the other hand, had none of these defences, especially when the northern borders were moved from the speed bump that was

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the Danube river. Even its western counterpart was in a geographically more advantageous position, with the natural shield of the Alps and safe inland provinces such as Iberia, whereas the Eastern half’s most important province, Asia Minor, was under constant threat from outside

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enemies from the East and South. Perhaps not coincidentally, these foes, the Sassanids, the Arab Caliphates and the Turks, were the most significant threats the Empire would face.

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In the past, Rome employed a different type of strategy to defend its enormous borders against the various barbaric tribes that threatened the imperium, that of raw strength. A vast standing army, a military machine with no equals in the ancient world,

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was stationed near the empire’s borders. It was this strength of arms and the fear it inspired that kept Rome’s enemies at bay. However, this strategy would not be viable indefinitely, as it put too much of a strain on the imperial coffers. Instead, Byzantium would rely on a different grand

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strategy based on diplomacy and roundabout means of dealing with their adversaries. Containment, not destruction, was the preferred method of dealing with the Empire’s adversaries.

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This was a very Roman and pragmatic approach to the subject, for the Byzantines knew that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies and vice versa. Famous examples include the Justinian pitching the Gepids and the Lombards against each other to contain the threat these two Germanic

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tribes posed for the Empire and the tributes paid to the Huns, though the latter mainly stemmed from the inability of the Eastern Roman armies to face the Hunnic horse archers in open battle. This approach should not be mistaken for weakness and lack of military strength

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on the Empire’s behalf. The Eastern Romans could still use hard power when necessary, but generally speaking, the Byzantines preferred to win their conflicts without bloodshed, a tactic that echoed Sun Tzu’s famous sheathed sword. Perhaps the greatest Byzantine general in history,

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Belisarius, seems to have averted an entire Sassanid invasion during the spring of 542 using trickery. When Khosrow I invaded Byzantine Syria to raid the land, Belisarius moved into the area with a much smaller force of around six thousand men, largely consisting of Goths and Gepids,

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and positioned his army in such a way as to threaten the Persian flank. Khosrow, who couldn’t gamble his advance into the enemy territory with his rear exposed, sent an ambassador to assess the strength of the Byzantine forces. Belisarius,

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knowing the ambassador's true purpose, ordered his men to make their numbers look bigger by moving constantly and lighting more fires at night. The trick worked, and the Persians preferred to retreat rather than risking an engagement or prolonging their encampment in the area,

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out of fear of catching the plague. Belisarius kept applying pressure to the retreating Sassanid forces, who sacked a few towns and crossed the Euphrates back into their homeland.

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The Sassanids posed a serious threat to the Empire as they were also an advanced and organized civilization, able to conduct warfare in the same way the Byzantines were. Complex army logistics, lengthy sieges against fortified cities, and cunning espionage and diplomacy were not out

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of the Persians' capabilities, so Maurice, in his Strategikon, advised caution when fighting them. But just as the Byzantines were fearful of their eastern neighbours, so too were the Sassanids wary of the well-disciplined Roman heavy infantry ranks. Despite the Byzantines

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successfully recognizing Persian weaknesses in the field of battle, mainly their commitment to tight formations and susceptibility to flanking attacks, the two Empires were so close in terms of power that during the great wars of the 7th century, they

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fought themselves almost to the point of total collapse. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the Arabs, spurred by their new religion, spread out of their peninsula, conquering large parts of former Byzantine territory and completely bringing down the former Sassanid juggernaut.

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The Arabs, replacing the Persians, would be the main rival of the Imperium from the 8th century onwards, at least until the advance of the Seljuk Turks into Asia Minor. This new enemy fought in a different manner and compelled the Byzantines to switch their defensive strategy. Border conflict,

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especially raids, became the norm between the Byzantines and the Saracens. Even smaller-scale raids, however, could be pretty dangerous, and they still required the drafting of thematic soldiers to deal with them. These thematic soldiers were partially warriors and partially

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farmers and, as such, could not abandon their homes for an extended period of time, so the Empire adopted an elastic defence doctrine, allowing a few incursions here and there and focusing on blocking the narrow passages to prevent the enemies from

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getting inland to untouched and richer territory. With the usage of spies, the Byzantines were able to accurately ‘predict’ when and where the enemy would amass and set up their defences accordingly, forcing the raiders to either look for another route to circumnavigate the obstacles or abandon

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their expedition altogether. However, this strategy was rather costly because of the number of spies and professional troops that needed to be employed alongside the thematic troops to redirect the Saracen raids. In addition, the Arabs had their own spies and would

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know beforehand whether or not the Byzantines were ready to intercept them and could redirect their attack to a different sector or call it off. They could even do a little bit of trolling by keeping their forces in the area, forcing the Byzantines to keep their own thematic soldiers under arms.

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Thus, the Byzantines developed an alternative reactionary strategy where instead of trying to prevent the incursions, which was almost impossible, they allowed them to raid deep into imperial territory and then trapped the enemy forces inside. The raiders, encumbered by the

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additional weight of the loot they had collected and the prisoners they had taken, moved slowly, and thus, the Byzantine troops enjoyed significant tactical advantages. It was also easier and cheaper for the imperial war machine to draft troops reacting to the raid instead of calling

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them in anticipation of the attack. In this way, they could more accurately predict the route the enemy’s columns would follow and which forces needed to be mobilized. Victories following this stratagem include those of Leo Phokas and Ioannis Tzimiskes against Sayf al-Dawla in 950 and 958,

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respectively and the battle of Hyelion and Leimocheir in 1177 against the Seljuks. Not forgetting the tactics developed during the time of Leo the Wise, the Byzantine army led by John Komnenos Vatatzes ambushed the Seljuk forces near the villages of Hyelion and Leimocheir that were

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returning home after having successfully raided as far as the seashore of the Aegean. The Byzantines crushed the Seljuks as they crossed a bridge, achieving a victory of significant psychological importance as the year before, they had suffered a devastating defeat at the battle of Myriokephalon.

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But what about the civilian population of the borders that was plagued by those constant raids?

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The raiders were primarily aiming for cities that had enough plunder for them to justify the amount of time and effort they had invested in this campaign. Villages that could only yield cattle, crops and slaves were simply not worth it, especially since the people living there went the

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extra mile and fortified them too. These villages were intentionally built high upon mountains, with houses forming walls and narrow alleys and their denizens preferred cattle which in the event of a raid could be hidden, or having crops that were harvested in spring, long

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before the summer raids. Naturally, the strategy wasn’t waterproof and eventually the population of these areas got tired of the constant raids, abandoning the region and undermining the strength of the local thematic armies. The Spies and the Diplomats Let us further elaborate on the usage of spies the Byzantines employed to receive information

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about the movements of their adversaries. Indeed, espionage was one of the pillars the Empire relied upon for its survival. Throughout its millennium-spanning life, with the exception perhaps of its twilight years, the Imperium enjoyed an information superiority over its enemies, thanks to the extensive intelligence network it was able to cast.

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Byzantium had the ability to send cultured and educated men to faraway lands where they mingled with the population and acquired vital info. Tasked with intelligence gathering and analysis as well as counterespionage, these men gave Byzantium the upper hand both in military operations and

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diplomacy. Their ranks, numbered in the thousands during the Byzantine-Sassanid wars, showcase the reliance and importance the Empire placed on them. But perhaps the wildest and most famous example of their activity does not concern matters of war but rather industrial espionage, perhaps the first in

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the world. Around the year 550, Emperor Justinian sent Nestorian monks to China to steal silkworm eggs, which they hid inside their hollowed-out canes and brought them back to Greece. The local silk production brought less than the desired results, and Byzantine gold continued to flow

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through the Silk Road eastwards, yet it did provide a new source of revenue for the Empire.

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Of course, regular border monitoring and intelligence gathering were less adventurous but far more paramount for the Empire’s survival. Crucial for this were the akritai, men who lived on the far edges of the imperium and guarded the borders, similar to the older Roman limitanei.

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They were tasked with constantly surveying the enemy’s land and, if possible, befriending some of the foreigners, especially disaffected officials, who, due to their rank, could reveal more. They would inform Constantinople of their findings through the public postal service,

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the cursus publicus and especially by using a highly sophisticated phryctoria system, a beacon system similar to the one Gondor uses in Lord of the Rings. The astonishing speed by which news travelled across the land can be seen in the way Basil the Bulgar Slayer, informed of a

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Saracen attack against Aleppo, quickly abandoned his campaign against the Bulgarian Czar Samuel, crossed the land in the middle of winter and within 16 days he was personally leading the Byzantine forces in Syria. The usage of spies when the Byzantine armies were

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marching into foreign lands did not differ that much from what any sane commander would do. That is, they employed light and fast-mounted foot scouts that infiltrated the lands a few days in advance to gather info and report back to the commander about the strength and position of the

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enemy. These men were also encouraged to capture and imprison foreign troops and, through torture, collect further intel. A trick the Byzantines also employed was getting intentionally captured and, once questioned by the enemy, supplying him with lies and false information to confuse him.

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Besides spies, gathering intel, spreading misinformation and hostility among the enemy was something another type of agent could also accomplish; the diplomat. Not enough can be said about the art of Byzantine diplomacy which became an example for future imperial powers to follow,

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but the empire’s diplomatic corps was a significant factor that contributed to its longevity. This was an era with no permanent embassies and ambassadors, not to mention nomadic tribes that didn’t even have permanent cities of their own, so delegations

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were sent when the need arose. Nonetheless, the Byzantines selected their diplomats with great care. Educated and cultured people were selected, outgoing men with an affinity for languages, respected for their dignity. Most importantly, they ought to be willing to travel to distant

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lands and risk their lives for the empire, as such a journey was often dangerous.

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Armed with extensive knowledge about the people they were visiting and, of course, collecting their own on their stay, these men used every trick imaginable to ensure the empire’s survival and dominance. Bribery, misinformation, alliances, trade agreements, marriage proposals and divide and conquer stood at the forefront of Roman politics ever since the

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days of the Republic. This strategy was especially effective against the tribes of the north, so much so that Anna Komnene notes that it was highly unusual for her father’s failure to spread hostility among the Pechenegs. Christian missionaries and Christianity, in general,

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were also used as part of Byzantium's diplomatic arsenal. Missionaries such as Cyril and Methodius, who are famous for evangelizing the Slavs and creating the Cyrillic alphabet, courageously ventured far into unknown and often hostile territory and collected much knowledge about

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the customs and manners of the people there, so they were extremely useful in delegations.

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The Christianization of their neighbours, while not eliminating the threat entirely, did lower the chances of hostility as the two people were now spiritually bound.

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But it wasn’t only Byzantium that sent diplomats and delegations to other people. In fact, the opposite would have been far easier since the empire had an established capital. And Constantinople was the diplomatic chessboard where the Emperor would win the game. A foreign

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diplomat who came to have the chance to talk to the Emperor would come face to face with all the imperial splendour, prestige and wealth of the capital. Dazzling clothes, expensive utensils, a strict protocol and most strikingly of all, next to the throne, there were medieval automata of

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golden birds that moved their wings and tweeted and lions that wagged their tails and roared.

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All these served the same purpose: to remind the ambassador of the difference in status between the Byzantine Emperor and the monarch he served. Faced with this tremendous exhibition of wealth, power and cultural superiority, any visitor would indeed be charmed. Famous is the example

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of Vladimir of Kyiv’s envoys who visited Constantinople and were so impressed by the Hagia Sophia that they reported to him: “We knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth, for surely there is no such splendour or beauty anywhere on earth. We cannot describe

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it to you; we only know that God dwells there among men and that their Service surpasses the worship of all other places…” Following this, Vladimir the Great was baptized and took the Emperor’s sister as a wife. Through soft power, Byzantium had turned a potential pagan

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threat into a steady Christian ally. This was the epitome of Byzantine persuasion and grand strategy, turning foes into friends. The Empire, which could not face the dozens of enemies that surrounded it on the field of battle, had found a new and more effective way to deal with its foes.

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Early Fortifications and the Theodosian Walls Another crucial factor for the Byzantine military was its fortifications, especially the Theodosian Walls of its capital. In 330 AD, Constantine the Great found his new capital on the site of the ancient Megaran colony of Byzantium. The location

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of New Rome was an informed decision. Constantine recognized not only the strategic importance of the city sitting on the crossroads of three continents but also the naturally defendable location. The city, built on the Golden Horn, was surrounded on three sides by sea,

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with only the western side offering an overland avenue that nonetheless could easily be walled. Constantine himself traced the limits of Constantinople and ordered the construction of new fortifications to replace the old ones. However, it seems that Constantine did underestimate the

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city’s development. Constantinople grew at a phenomenal rate, and before long, people were literally running out of space. The need to extend the limits of the city was apparent and with that, Constantines’ successor, Emperor Theodosius, would bequeath the capital's new defences, ordering the

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construction of a new set of walls that would be impregnable for the next thousand years.

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The new line of fortifications rested one and a half miles west of Constantine’s older walls.

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That might not sound like much space, but given the geography of the area, that 2400 or so square meters of new space was plenty of room for the city to develop. Leading the construction efforts was Flavius Anthemius, who was the Praetorian Prefect of the East at that time. Though,

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in truth, work had already begun before Theodosius was crowned, around the year 404, during the reign of Emperor Arcadius. However, both sets of walls were rather unlucky as they were heavily damaged by two earthquakes, one in 437 and the next ten years later. The second earthquake was

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particularly devastating, destroying 57 towers. It also happened at quite an inconvenient time for the Empire, as Attila was rampaging through Thrace and was threatening to strike at the capital. But thanks to the great efforts of the Praetorian Prefect Constantine and especially those of the

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Hippodrome factions, the Blues and the Greens, whose members volunteered to do the construction work, the walls were repaired in a record time of just 60 days. Other natural disasters would strike the walls of the city in later years, such as earthquakes and floods of the nearby Lycus river,

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but as long as Byzantium enjoyed economic prosperity, Constantinople’s defences were diligently repaired under the supervision of the Domestikos ton Teicheon. It is also possible that during the repairs following the earthquake of 447, the walls assumed the form that is still

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visible today, excluding, of course, later add-ons, such as the sector of Blachernae. Structure of the Theodosian Walls Stretching for three and a half miles from the Marble Tower on the coast of the sea of Marmara to the coast of the Blachernae quarters,

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the fortifications of Theodosius consisted of three lines of walls and a moat. The moat was roughly 20 meters wide and ten deep. Its sides, which are called scarp and counterscarp, were made out of bricks and stones, the same as the walls. At random intervals,

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there were walls intersecting the moat, vertically separating it into compartments. These walls were tapering towards the top to avoid being used as bridges, and some of them even had hidden pipes that were probably used to flood the moat and or transfer water into the city. On the inner side of

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the moat, the scarp, there was a short crenellated wall, about one and a half meters high, that served as the first line of defence. While the height of this wall is not that impressive, the proximity to the moat offered significant advantages to the defenders. Once the attacker

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had overcome this obstacle, he would find himself on the first terrace, the so-called parateichion, which was 18 to 20 meters wide and separated the low breastwork of the moat from the outer wall, which was also called the small wall. The outer wall was much more intricately

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constructed as it was intended for serious defensive action, not just a mere speed bump.

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It was two to two and a half meters thick at the base and nine meters tall with the battlements, seven without them. It had towers that were 12 to 14 meters tall and four wide, which were usually square or crescent-shaped and spaced out at intervals of around 55 meters. The

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towers projected some 5 meters from the wall and were separated by wooden floors into different levels. On the level of the inner terrace, the peribolos that separated the outer wall from the inner, the towers had a room with windows where war material could be stored,

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and archers could be stationed. Also, on the same level, the wall itself featured arched chambers that added strength and stability to the structure and provided secure cover for the soldiers.

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Lower, at their base, some towers had small posterns that allowed access to the parateichion.

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Beyond the inner terrace was the last and most serious defence, the inner wall. It was significantly thicker and taller than the outer wall, standing at 12 meters tall and 6 meters thick. It had 96 towers, which were naturally bigger and stronger than their outer

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wall counterparts as they could be as high as 20 meters tall and 12 meters wide. They, too, were mostly square and octagonal, though other shapes were used. Just like the smaller towers of the outer wall, these towers were also separated into different levels by wooden floors. The lower level

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was accessible from the city through a gate and was primarily used to store war material or for the defenders to rest. A small door on the outer side of the tower allowed access to the terrace between the two sets of walls. The upper level, which for security reasons did not communicate

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with the lower, was only accessible from the battlemented walkway of the wall. Contrary to the mostly windowless lower chamber, this room had large windows from where the defenders could throw projectiles. From here, a flight of stairs led to the tower's battlemented rooftop that was

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used as a fighting platform and, because of the tower's size, could also host siege engines.

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Along both the inner and outer walls, there were two series of gates. Following an alternate pattern, these gates would either be open to the public and allow access in and out of the city or be reserved for military usage only. The latter type only allowed movement from the inner wall to

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the peribolos and the outer wall. Thus, the outer wall presented fewer gates, which was a serious weak point for the defences. The most famous of the gates was the Golden Gate, which lies on the southernmost part of the walls. It didn’t feature a suspension bridge like the modern Golden Gate,

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but it was a sight nonetheless. Μade out of large white marble blocks, the gate featured three large arches, with the middle one being slightly bigger than the rest; it was flanked by two large towers. It was richly decorated with statues, trophies, murals, and gold, which is how

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it got its name. Because of that, it served as the main ceremonial gate of the city, especially for the triumph of a victorious Emperor returning to the capital, such as the one of Michael VIII after he reclaimed Constantinople from the Latins in 1261, which coincidentally was also the last

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Roman triumph ever held. The Golden Gate was also used in Imperial coronations and, in some cases, to welcome foreign visitors of high status. We should note here that the gate was not reserved for such events and was usually open for everyday traffic and commoners,

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with the exception of the central arch. Besides its ceremonial role, the gate was also a valid defensive position. It had additional walls, and later on, Emperor John V Palaiologos added two more towers, turning it into a real fortress known as the Kastelion tes Chryseias. It was also during

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the rule of the Palaiologos dynasty that the gate was walled and became an impregnable castle. Its strategic importance and value as a defensive position were also noticed by the Ottomans who conquered the city, with Sultan Mehmet II ordering the construction of 3 additional towers to form

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the Fortress of the Seven Towers, more commonly known by its Turkish name, Yedikule Hisari from which the homonymous neighbourhood took its name. Besides the Golden Gate, scholars have identified a number of other gates that bear historical significance. Of these, three stand out. The

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Belgrade Gate, also known as the Xelokerkos gate, was walled off by Emperor Isaac II Angelos, fearing a prophecy which stated that Frederick Barbarossa, the Holy Roman Emperor, would enter the city through it. The gate of Charisius was the second most important gate after the Golden

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Gate and was the one used by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II for his triumphal entry into the city in 1453.

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Beyond these, there was the gate of St. Romanus, where tradition holds that the last Roman Emperor, Constantine Dragases Palaiologos, drew his final breath, fighting off the Ottoman armies.

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Walls of Blachernae and Sea Walls We mentioned earlier that the walls built by Anthemius were not the final form of the walls we see today, and later, Emperors added or modified the defences as they saw fit. The biggest of these additions were the walls

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around the area of Blachernae. During Anthemius’ time, the area was not included to be protected by the double walls. Instead, the suburb had its own defences that were probably older and less strong than the Theodosian walls. However, the siege of the Avars in 627 made it obvious that the area

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needed new fortifications that would protect its religious sanctuaries of Panagia Blachernitisa and St. Nicholas from heathen invaders. Through the centuries, the area grew in importance, and the Palace of Blachernae, in later times, even became the preferred residence of the Byzantine Emperors,

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displacing the Great Palace, so the walls of the area were consistently being improved upon by various emperors, like Leo V and Manuel I Komnenos. Contrary to the Theodosian walls, the wall surrounding Blachernae was single-ringed, not double-ringed, though to make up for this,

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it was thicker and somewhat taller, its height ranging from 12 to 15 meters. With that said, the Blachernae walls lacked a moat, aside from a part near the Golden Horn where John VI Kantakouzenos constructed one. Despite that, its quality and defensive capabilities proved to be just as good

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as the rest of the land walls, if not better, as evidenced by their performance during the Ottoman siege of 1453, when they were able to withstand intense bombardments from Orban’s cannons.

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The walls of the quarters of Blachernae and the double Theodosian walls constituted the fortifications that protected the Queen City from land. The sea that surrounded Constantinople from the other sides was an obstacle for any invading army, and the Byzantine navy was more than capable

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of protecting it, but the Byzantines did not rely solely on their ships for the city’s defence from naval-borne threats and a long sea wall stretched from one end of the land walls and ended at the other, enclosing the capital. The sea walls were not as formidable as the Theodosian walls,

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nor did they need to be. They were of similar construction but single-ringed and quite lower than their counterpart. The defences facing the sea of Marmara had extra aid from nature itself, as the strong currents of the sea made any landing attempts suicidal. The sea

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in the bay of the Golden Horn was much calmer, but access to it was blocked by a heavy chain that stretched across the mouth of the bay and was first installed by Emperor Leo the Isaurian.

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The chain, while simple as an idea, was quite effective, as evidenced by numerous occasions, especially during the Ottoman siege of 1453 when Mehmet II ordered his ships to be dragged across the land to the Golden Horn Bay in order to overcome this obstacle. Despite this,

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the sea walls on this side proved to be the weakest point of the Byzantine defences during the siege of 1204 by the Venetian lead crusaders who managed to storm the defences and conquer the city. Following the recapture of the city in 1261 by Michael Palaiologos,

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the Byzantines took care to reinforce the defences by adding another line of walls and strengthening the existing ones, fearing a possible future attempt by the Latins to reclaim Constantinople.

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The Garrisons The walls that surrounded the capital were a formidable defence, but they would amount to nothing without the brave men who mounted the defences to protect it. For most of history, Constantinople’s protection rested upon the shoulders of the Imperial guards and the city’s garrison. In the early periods,

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the former consisted of men of the Scholae Palatinae and later on added to them the 300-strong bodyguard of the Excubitores, as well as the armed citizenry that was provided by the guilds and the demoi of the city and formed a unit called Pedatoura or Kerketon. These

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men were mostly tasked with policing duties and were under the command of the Eparch of the city.

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With the decline of the Scholae and the establishment of the tagmata system, more named units made their appearance, such as the Athanatoi, the Ikanatoi, the Vigla and others. However, the role of these units was to support the thematic armies of the provinces,

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so they often found themselves campaigning for large periods of time away from the capital. Two units closely associated with the tagmata and oftentimes considered as such were responsible for the defence of the city, the Noumeroi and the Teichistai. These were infantry regiments,

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permanently stationed in Constantinople, with men provided once again from the demoi of the city with the Blues and Whites serving in the Noumeroi and the Greens and Reds in the Teichistai and were commanded by a Domestikos and Komes, respectively. The Teichistai, as their name implies,

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were responsible for the defence of the walls, while the Noumeroi guarded the Imperial prisons, which were called Noumera, hence the name. Regardless, they, too, would fight on the city’s walls if it was placed under siege. We should also note that between them,

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they had no more than four thousand men, a rather small garrison for a city that once housed half a million people. The reasons behind this were that one, because of the nature of the defences and their strength, a large force that would drain the empire’s coffers was not needed,

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and two, Byzantine Emperors tended to heavily dislike the idea of a large military force inside the capital that could be used to threaten them or even topple them.

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Lastly, the defenders of the city included the foreign mercenaries and bodyguards of the Emperors, with the most notable being the Varangian Guards, who almost never left his side. Besides the axe-wielding Norse, Rus and Saxons, there were the Vardariotai of Magyar

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or Cuman origins and the Mourtatoi of mixed Byzantine-Turkish descent. Circumstantially, foreign forces also included Latins like Catalans or Genoese like those of Justiniani in 1453.

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The Ottoman siege of 1453 would be the end of the Empire. The Theodosian Walls, impregnable for a thousand years, were simply no match for the massive bombards of Mehmet II.

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Nor was the determined but meagre garrison of the capital, which by that time largely consisted of mercenaries. The Ottoman forces found their way through the battered walls and conquered the city. This, however, is not technically the end of the story of the walls,

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which were repaired and kept until they were no longer maintained and left to crumble sometime during the 19th century. Today, visitors can still see well-maintained large parts of the impressive walls erected by Theodosius, who saved his capital time and again for over a millennia.

Topics:Byzantine armyEastern Roman EmpireJustinian IProcopiushippo-toxotaifoederatiByzantine navydromoncataphractByzantine military history

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