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This is what Hull's attack distribution looked like, and it's one of the reasons they were able to cause United so many defensive problems despite having just 29% of the ball. Losing to a promoted side is a horrific result, but we did
Analysis of Carrick's attacking tactics in Man Utd's loss to Hull City, focusing on pressing, formations, and midfield overloads.
Key Takeaways
- Hull exploited Manchester United’s pressing structure and defensive shape to create scoring chances despite low possession.
- United’s midfield fluidity and overloads showed promise but were not fully capitalized on in the final third.
- Carrick’s tactical approach favors controlled build-up with back threes and positional rotations to create attacking options.
- Pressing decisions on the wings are critical and require better coordination to avoid leaving defenders exposed.
- Improved creativity from new midfield signings could be key to unlocking compact defenses in future matches.
What the video covers
- Hull City caused defensive problems for Manchester United despite having only 29% possession by exploiting pressing weaknesses.
- United defended in a 4-4-2 shape but struggled with pressing decisions, especially on the wings, leading to defensive vulnerabilities.
- Hull's 3-4-3 formation and back three created pressing challenges for United’s wingers and pivots.
- United’s front two tried to tie up Hull’s pivots, but Hull baited the press effectively, creating space and progression opportunities.
- United attempted to build attacks using back threes and overloads in wide and central areas, showing Carrick’s tactical approach.
- The midfield showed fluidity with Cunha and Fernandes operating as a double false nine, creating numerical advantages centrally.
- United’s upgraded midfield, including Santos and Tielemans, enabled line-breaking passes and better creativity than last season.
- Hull’s compact 5-4-1 defensive shape forced United to switch play and create wide overloads, especially on the right flank.
- Dynamic runs by Doğukan and overlapping full-backs created space and crossing opportunities, but finishing was lacking.
- The video highlights tactical nuances and suggests alternative pressing strategies to improve United’s defensive structure.
Chapters
- 00:00Hull's Attack Distribution and Defensive Problems for United
- 00:30United's Defensive Shape and Formation Analysis
- 01:14Hull's Back Three and Impact on United's Wingers
- 01:41Pressing Decisions and Defensive Risks
- 02:08Consequences of Pressing Errors and Defensive Vulnerabilities
- 02:44Strategic Pressing and Funnel Play Options
- 03:17Alternative Pressing Approaches and Timing
- 03:49United's Build-Up Play and Use of Back Threes
- 04:27Challenges Against Hull's Back Five and Midfield Overloads
- 05:02Midfield Creativity and Line-Breaking Passes
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
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get a closer look at what Carrick might be looking to do with his attacking tactics as United did dominate the ball.
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So, we'll examine both sides of United's play. When it comes to analysis, there's a lot of talk about formations, about how they're the most important thing, or they don't matter at all. More often than not, the answer is it depends
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on the context. In this encounter, shape did play a part as United, both deep and high up the pitch, were looking to defend in a 4-4-2 with Fernandes alongside Cunha. And where you might have expected the Red Devils to come out
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guns blazing and trying to press high up the pitch, United were actually trying to do the exact opposite. And whenever possible, they tried to remain solid using their front two to tie up Hull's pivots and giving their own pivots the
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freedom to patrol this area. But Hull were great at baiting the press, holding onto the ball until United were forced to come towards them.
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And here's where shape comes into it. As deeper on the pitch, Hull could form a back three with the goalkeeper being the third man, but more often it was the traditional back three in their 3-4-3 shape. And this directly impacted
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United's wingers. See, if the front two were dragged into the press high up, but the midfield four stayed put, it would be far too easy for one of the wider center-backs to be the outlet and move up the pitch. So, not only did
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the United pivots have to back up the press, the ball-side winger had to make a decision on whether to press or not.
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And initially, in the case of Doğu, the decision was to press, leaving the Reds effectively in a lopsided 4-3-3. But with their pivots tied up here and unable to assist out wide, it could lead to disastrous defensive situations as
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the Hull wing-back could now receive with space as well as numbers ahead of him. Here's the perfect example. United trying to hold a mid block, but Doğu being drawn in on the press. This time it's the midfielder who's rotated into a
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wing-back position, but the result is the same. Time on the ball to play up the pitch and then progress the team.
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And within two passes, Hull are in the final third and eventually this leads to a dangerous cross. And this wasn't a one-off. And having been stung once, Doğu could find himself in no man's land like here, beginning to be drawn towards
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the third man, but at the same time knowing he's leaving Shaw at risk. And though the pass doesn't come off, you can see the risk we're talking about as Shaw is potentially two versus one down against the wing-back and the attacking
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midfielder, meaning Heaton is now drawn out of his more central position in order to compensate. There are different ways of dealing with this build-up structure from a 4-4-2 base besides just completely sitting off. One of the most common is deliberately funneling the
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play into one direction. So, the front two would press strategically and use their pressing angles to cut out the play to the left, for example, meaning that when Doğu began to press, there's only one region the opposition
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could play into safely. And because of those limited options, the wide area could actually function as a pressing trap where the back line can then shift across and look to apply pressure onto the receiving wing-back proactively rather than arriving a
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second late. Alternatively, United could have looked to apply pressure earlier. So, in scenarios like this, one of the issues is the wider center-back has time to receive and face the play before the pressure arrives. Whereas imagine a
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scenario where the side has committed to pressing and Doğu's press arrives as the man is receiving the ball. It would be much harder for the wider center-back to play out as he hasn't had the time to look up and assess his passing options.
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Comment down below any other ways you think they could have effectively handled this pressing problem. But the bulk of the play came, of course, with United on the ball and it told us a lot about Carrick's approach for the
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upcoming season. Take a look at their average positions. It's hard to discern much, as it often is with the average positions, but in United's case, this was by design. Initially, United were looking to build with back threes in case Hull pressed with their
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front two. And this could be through either pivot dropping in, though for the most part it was Mazraoui tucking in early doors. And United's approach against Hull's shape perfectly positioned them to take advantage of the wide areas and the central channels
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evenly. And it all started and ended with United's desire for overloads. As much as possible, United when higher up the pitch would look to build with Santos as the solo pivot, which was made easier by Hull sitting
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deeper. And crucially, with Shaw almost always pushing up outside of Doğu in that first half, the winger would come infield. Simultaneously, Tielemans pushed into the right-hand half space almost in line with the front two.
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But when these inside players were pushed high, it was a lot easier for Hull to deal with the threat due to their back five. As the center-backs were relatively close to the attackers and were comfortable stepping out
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knowing that they had cover in behind. United looked most dangerous when they shifted focus from overloading this final line to overloading the midfield line instead, which was made possible as they effectively operated with a double false nine. As Cunha and
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Fernandes were always alternating positions or both coming deep into these midfield regions. And this was a theme throughout the 90, as all of these central players were highly fluid leading to those scattered average positions. And this is where United's
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upgraded midfield will bear fruit over the season. As where last season it would have been Bruno here sacrificing his creativity, Santos and Tielemans in particular when they got on the ball were able to thread these line-breaking passes into the men
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between the lines. As Hull struggled to deal with the sheer numbers in the central region. This overload was exaggerated as United chased the match, with Mazraoui now providing the width on the right-hand side, allowing Mbumo to join the central overload. And
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oftentimes, with these two men preferring to drop deep, it was up to him or Doğu to occupy the center-backs and stop them from pushing out. As dynamic runs in behind were crucial for United, as they weren't
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afraid to go more direct with their passes in behind. The result was not just multiple line-breaking opportunities, but also a midfield that had close proximity in the central zone. And having so many players close together unlocks the potential for
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combinations. And we saw United were able to get into threatening positions like this repeatedly, but just couldn't make it count. And naturally, the overloads forced Hull to defend more compactly, mainly in a 5-4-1. And we saw United looked to immediately switch to
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wide overloads, particularly down the right, again with the likes of Tielemans pushing into the wider regions. And Hull would have to drag their midfield across to deal with the threat. And here is where the dynamism of Doğukan came in
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handy. As despite Hull having a back five that could cover the entirety of the width, his arrowing runs meant the right wing-back often found himself being sucked narrow, leaving space out wide for Shaw to receive the switch.
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And we saw Carrick's other pillar come to the fore as constant box overloads meant that the full-back always had men to hit, usually at least four crashing the box. And again, plenty of dangerous situations emerged that just weren't maximized. And despite
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t
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the perfect time to up your tactical knowledge. If that sounds good, check out Football Fundamentals down in the description, which is my free 30-day program designed to teach you the fundamentals of tactical [music] analysis. It's fair to say this is far
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from an ideal start from United, but I thought in possession [music] there were positive signs for what might come further down the line as the side continues to gel. But I'm curious whether you agree and what you made of
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Carrick's side in the first game of the season. If you enjoyed this video, check out this one examining the tactics of every post-Ferguson Manchester United manager. And don't forget to check out Football Fundamentals to up your tactical understanding ahead of the new
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season. Mhm.
Topics:Manchester UnitedHull CityCarrick tacticsfootball analysispressing strategy4-4-2 formation3-4-3 formationmidfield overloadfootball tacticsPremier League
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