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Why this philosopher converted to Catholicism

Philosopher Brian Cutter (Notre Dame) discusses his path from secular upbringing and naturalism to Catholicism, with Majesty of Reason.

Key Takeaways

  • Cutter's conversion was driven by philosophical reasoning about naturalism, not only emotional or cultural factors.
  • He argues that naturalism is not a neutral methodological starting point and that philosophical intuitions can outweigh naturalistic constraints.
  • Consciousness and the problem of subjective experience are central to his case against a purely naturalistic worldview.
  • He presents Catholic tradition as offering a richer, more coherent framework than the liberal Protestant upbringing he experienced.
  • The interview engages seriously with objections to Christianity, including the problem of hell.

What the video covers

  • Host Majesty of Reason interviews Dr. Brian Cutter, philosophy professor at the University of Notre Dame, about his conversion to Catholicism.
  • Cutter describes a non-religious childhood, with brief attendance at a liberal Methodist Sunday school that did not teach traditional doctrines.
  • He recounts a philosophical atheist phase in high school and drifting through evangelical, Lutheran, and Episcopalian church settings in college.
  • Entering graduate school, he embraced a scientistic, metaphysically naturalist worldview inspired by E.O. Wilson's idea of consilience and Carl Sagan's enthusiasm for science.
  • His first doubt about naturalism came from David Lewis's method of systematizing pre-theoretic opinions and Moorean truths, which made him question whether naturalism should be a hard constraint.
  • The conversation covers the problem of consciousness, qualia (Mary's room, what it is like to be a bat) and whether naturalism can account for them.
  • Cutter discusses reasons for theism, including experiences of nature as a manifestation of a transcendent order and the reliability of human reason and science.
  • The discussion turns to Christian doctrine such as the Trinity and the authority of tradition, and why Catholicism's fuller teaching was persuasive to him.
  • Later segments address the problem of hell and infinite punishment for finite sins, comparing eternal punishment with proportional justice.
  • The interview closes with reflections on justice, mercy, and how moral intuitions about punishment might need reform.

Answers

Questions about this video

What led Brian Cutter to first question naturalism?

Cutter says reading David Lewis's view of philosophy as systematizing pre-theoretic opinions, along with the idea of Moorean truths, convinced him that naturalism was not a good methodological constraint. He came to see that some things we know more confidently than any naturalistic premise.

What is Cutter's religious background before his conversion?

He grew up with a non-religious father and attended Sunday school at a liberal Methodist church that did not teach traditional doctrines like the resurrection. He became an atheist-leaning agnostic in adolescence and later identified as a Christian during college.

Does the interview address the problem of hell?

Yes, later segments discuss whether finite human sins could merit infinite punishment, and compare eternal torment with proportional justice. The discussion considers whether our moral intuitions about punishment may need reform.

Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown

00:00
Speaker A
Hey everyone, and welcome back to the majesty of reason. Today, I'm joined by Dr. Brian Cutter, philosophy professor at the University of Notre Dame.
00:09
Speaker A
Uh and we're going to talk about his conversion to Catholicism. It's it's conversion mania these days, quite evidently. Um and I wanted to interview Brian because, you know, he's an excellent philosopher, first of all, but you know, an even better human being and
00:21
Speaker A
friend. So I'm excited to cover his conversion story. If you guys want to read about his full conversion process, you can check out uh a chapter of his edited uh in the edited collection Faith and Reason: Philosophers Explain Their Turn to
00:33
Speaker A
Catholicism. I will link that in the description. But we'll definitely cover lots of stuff that Brian doesn't cover therein. So um Brian, yeah, thanks for coming on. How about you just start by tracing out your backstory? Like, were you brought up
00:44
Speaker A
religious? Were you an atheist? Let's just dig into it. Happy to be here. Thanks for inviting me on again. Um yeah, so I I didn't have a very religious upbringing. So my my dad was non-religious. My mom went to like a
01:36
Speaker A
very liberal Methodist church, so I went to Sunday school there throughout like most of elementary school and um yeah, it was it was a very wholesome, nice community, but there wasn't a lot of like meaty religious instruction there.
01:51
Speaker A
And I later learned that like I think the leadership of the church is you know, not they they they didn't accept a lot of uh what we would think as like traditional Christian doctrines. So I think the leadership there, like most of
02:05
Speaker A
them, didn't like believe in the literal resurrection of Jesus or an afterlife for humans or any of the miracles in the the New Testament or things like that.
02:15
Speaker A
So anyway, I I I I got some kind of Sunday school education throughout my elementary school years, but kind of gave it up like I think near the end of elementary school and basically was I don't know if
02:30
Speaker A
I would have been agnostic or atheist around then, but I just really didn't wasn't a part of my life throughout like middle school and high school. I did later in in high school, I think, come up with what I thought was a cool and convincing
02:44
Speaker A
philosophical argument against the existence of God that made me an atheist for for some years. Um wasn't a very good one, but anyway, I I was a I was a very philosophical child and I came up with a lot of galaxy
02:58
Speaker A
brained ideas and so it was something I occasionally thought about because it's something that one thinks about. Um but yeah, I didn't um didn't have a very religious childhood and didn't start to think seriously about religion until near the end of high school. Um had a
03:15
Speaker A
good friend Jesse Heind who became Christian um I think sometime in high school and just kind of he was very philosophically minded too, so we just had lots and lots of discussions over the years and um you know, eventually
03:31
Speaker A
I became Christian for a time as an undergraduate and throughout most of my undergraduate years identified as Christian. I kind of went to I was part of like an evangelical campus ministry and went to various churches, some evangelical, some Lutheran, some
03:46
Speaker A
Episcopalian, just kind of made made the rounds, but eventually kind of drifted away from that near the end of college.
03:53
Speaker A
And so I I entered graduate school basically a kind of naturalist and atheist or agnostic leaning atheist.
04:02
Speaker A
Let's pick up there then. So, you enter grad school as agnostic-leaning atheist, kind of like naturalist. And, you know, in your book chapter, you mentioned that it almost sounded like you were just kind of like swimming in naturalism, you
04:14
Speaker A
know. You're just sort of taking it for granted, just like all the cool kids, all the cool folk, you know. You're like, oh yeah, we got to make make our theories naturalistically respectable, right? Like if it if it's not
04:22
Speaker A
naturalistically admissible, then, you know, cast it to the flames for it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion. So, um but of course that somehow your your dogmatic slumbers were um you awakened from them, right? So like what what exactly caused you to awaken
04:38
Speaker A
from them? Yeah, so I mean so at the very end of my undergraduate years and kind of in the summer going into graduate school, I became increasingly excited with a kind of like I don't know, scientistic intellectual progress uh
04:56
Speaker A
project. Um I was really excited about kind of like the ideas of like consilience and um you know, just and and and I had this very like kind of Carl Sagan mindset. Like I just thought like science as a human achievement was
05:11
Speaker A
just unbelievably awesome. Like the way in which we can like understand how matter works at like microscopic scales, at cosmic scales, at all scales in between, the way in which we can like draw connections between them, the way
05:25
Speaker A
in which like we can like draw mathematical equations that describes and explains this behavior. And I just thought like this was like unbelievably cool. And this this kind of project of what E.O. Wilson calls consilience of like kind of seeing how
05:41
Speaker A
all the different puzzle pieces of nature fit together at different levels and scales um through the use of like reason and science was just like an unbelievably cool intellectual project.
05:52
Speaker A
And so this was just something that excited me. And then, you know, I entered graduate school and that was very congenial to the intellectual culture that I entered, which was, you know, less concerned with like the details of this or that science
06:08
Speaker A
and how it all fits together, but there was a kind of background worldview that like science is the guide to figuring out reality and that kind of bled into a kind of metaphysical naturalism that wasn't just epistemological or or
06:21
Speaker A
methodological. And yeah, I mean the the kind of ethos was like okay, we're going to take on all these questions about consciousness or morality or philosophy of mathematics or whatever. And one of the kind of hard constraints we're going
06:34
Speaker A
to work with is like we want it to be naturalistic. We want it to like be as science and naturalistic sounding as as possible. And I mean it you can see how that kind of like rhymed with the intellectual
06:47
Speaker A
project that I was previously excited about and so I just kind of like internalized that. And for a time yeah, that that was just kind of like my MO I think like this this kind of naturalistic project, metaphysical,
07:00
Speaker A
methodological, epistemological like that's what I was all in on. And yeah, I mean I think that like the first uh dent in that armor or whatever the quite metaphor would be came from coming to be convinced that this was
07:16
Speaker A
actually not a good philosophical methodology. And I think this partly came from reading David Lewis. So uh David Lewis has this description of kind of the correct approach to philosophy which is basically just like you know you start
07:33
Speaker A
with you come into philosophy with a stock of pre-theoretic opinions of various strengths. Some some things just seem kind of obvious, some things seem pretty true. And like it's not the business of philosophy to like dramatically overturn what you
07:48
Speaker A
antecedently thought. The business of philosophy is to kind of like systematize our pre-theoretic opinions into some kind of like attractive coherent system.
07:58
Speaker A
And this kind of also went along with his idea. So he introduces the idea of a a Morian truth um this named after G. E.
08:07
Speaker A
Moore which he defines as one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary. So, the thought is like hey, you think you have some clever argument against the
08:18
Speaker A
possibility of motion or against the the the claim that like sometimes we have the ability to do otherwise or against the claim that like there are moral truths like it's wrong to torture innocent people for fun. Uh well, show
08:31
Speaker A
me that argument, make sure it's logically valid, and look at those premises. Like are any of those premises less plausible than uh the the denial of the conclusion? Uh well, yes, probably because like the conclusion you're denying is like one of
08:45
Speaker A
the most antecedently obvious things that like there there could be. Okay, well, in that case like here's a better argument. Logically flip the argument around and make it a reductio of that premise. That's just going to be a
08:56
Speaker A
better argument because it's also going to be valid and by hypothesis it's going to have more plausible premises and so we should argue in that direction. So, and I mean that's a kind of obvious logical point. I think you know anyone
09:08
Speaker A
at a certain stage in their philosophical development like understands this idea about how you can take a valid argument and logically flip it around and turn it into an argument against the premises and so on. Um but like once I internalized that
09:21
Speaker A
I realized oh wait a minute like a lot of the ways in which I was kind of disposed to reason in these early years in graduate school were actually falling afoul of good philosophical methodology and not internalizing these these
09:36
Speaker A
points. So, you like you know I was very tempted to like conclusions to the effect that like you know there's no free will and moral anti-realism and and all this kind of stuff that was just like flying in the face of common sense
09:49
Speaker A
left and right without realizing that like well, actually like whatever argument like led me to that conclusion the flipped around argument would have would be equally valid and have more plausible premises. So, why why aren't I arguing in that direction? So, anyway
10:05
Speaker A
this this just kind of led to a kind of like internal instability in my like naturalistic system. Like I I was attracted to a certain just kind of hardcore all-in naturalistic, scientistic uh approach to philosophy, but I also came to be convinced that
10:20
Speaker A
like the the background methodology that would get you there just doesn't doesn't actually work.
10:26
Speaker A
It's so it's so interesting that something similar happened to me um in high school. I actually uh I was a free will skeptic in high school. I even was a moral skeptic in high school cuz I I literally thought
10:37
Speaker A
that oh well what's my main or even only reason for accepting the existence of free will and moral truths um it's like my intuition, right? They just seem right, you know? It's like when I reflect on it, that's how the way things
10:50
Speaker A
seem. But then I was like well hold on a second, why should I trust my intuitions, you know?
10:55
Speaker A
And I I I didn't have the kind of phenomenal conservative methodology that you just outlined where the fact something seems to us to be the case, the fact that it seems to be like a datum of common sense uh does give us
11:04
Speaker A
good reason to accept it in the absence of sufficiently strong kind of defeaters or reasons to doubt those seemings or doubt those common sensical deliverances. Uh and so I just thought that like I had no reason to just trust
11:15
Speaker A
what seemed right to me. And so I was like okay, well then so much the worse for those things. I mean of course I can trust all the science stuff because it's not just my seemings or intuitions, but then even
11:24
Speaker A
there of course it's like perceptual appearances or perceptual seemings um that we just kind of have to take a default trust towards. Um but I just think it's it's funny that it's interesting that we kind of had um
11:33
Speaker A
a similar trajectory there. Uh and I also um really resonated with this point that like yeah any any valid argument and this is something that I really want the audience to take away um from this kind of segment on phenomenal conservatism,
11:44
Speaker A
any valid argument you can basically just represent that as a collection of propositions, right?
11:51
Speaker A
It's a collection of propositions consisting of all the premises together with the denial of the conclusion.
11:56
Speaker A
And that's an inconsistent set, right? It can't be the case that all those members of that set are true. It can't be the case that all the premises are true and the conclusion is false if it's a valid argument.
12:06
Speaker A
But then it's not like the argument has any kind of like intrinsic force to compel us to accept its conclusion. No, we should just look at all the look at all the members of that.
12:13
Speaker A
member of that that set doesn't mean that's the thing that should be rejected. Yeah, right. So like when we're looking at this plausible than the third thing.
12:20
Speaker A
Yes, exactly. So like okay, we've got an inconsistent set. What should we do? Cuz we can't accept all of them. Well, here's here's a thought.
12:26
Speaker A
Maybe we should reject the one which is the least plausible. Right, right. Maybe that's what we should do. And then you're like, oh, okay. And then yeah, I know. It's like woah. Um and like as you point out in your chapter like listen,
12:38
Speaker A
we have to start somewhere uh in our inquiry and our theorizing and whatnot. Like you can't just give infinitely many arguments upon infinitely many arguments. You For any argument you can ask, well why should I accept that premise? Okay, you might
12:47
Speaker A
give us another sub argument. Okay, but why should I accept those premises? And you might give another sub argument. But we can't go on ad infinitum, right? At some point you just hit like these truths which just strike you as
12:57
Speaker A
plausible and you're justified in accepting them because they strike you as plausible in the absence of reasons to doubt. So um yeah, anyway. I just think uh this is a pretty revolutionary insight to those who uh who have it. Um I don't know if you
13:09
Speaker A
wanted to say more about that. ultimately this like I you could call it like an intuitionist methodology, but just like giving epistemic weight to what seems obvious, maybe in some way that like played the biggest role and just kind of like internalizing like
13:22
Speaker A
yeah, I guess that's what we should do cuz what's the alternative like giving epistemic weight to what doesn't seem obvious? Like um but yeah, I mean like another thing that happened early in grad school. So you know, I I went into
13:33
Speaker A
grad school in 2009 and that was right around the time when Timothy Williamson came out with his book The Philosophy of Philosophy and so everyone was talking about meta philosophy. And one of the big questions there was like should we
13:48
Speaker A
give weight to intuitions understood as like you know, things that seem true upon intellectual reflection?
13:55
Speaker A
And on the one hand, you would have the the anti intuition people. And they would make these arguments that seemed kind of sensible like well, what is this mysterious faculty of intuition that somehow like a reliable guide to like
14:10
Speaker A
metaphysics and morality and modality and and epistemology and normativity? Like like what the hell's the like evolutionary story by which that came about? This is like really spooky and it doesn't fit into our worldview. And I kind of nodded along and it was like,
14:25
Speaker A
yeah, that seems right. This seems kind of hard to naturalize. Doesn't really fit in. And then the the the pro intuition people would turn around and they would like just go through all the arguments that the anti intuition people
14:37
Speaker A
gave and like point to 17 places where they're clearly relying on intuition. And like like okay, well that's a premise. Like why would you accept that?
14:45
Speaker A
Well you're not getting that from science or empirical. Like I mean I guess maybe it like seems true to you.
14:49
Speaker A
So you're like giving weight to what kind of seems true on reflection. And like you can just do this without I mean it's kind of a trivial exercise, but like the the the pro intuition people were just like pointing out the obvious fact
15:02
Speaker A
that like all of the arguments given by the anti intuition people were just like self-defeating because like you just can't even spell out the argument in an explicit way that's fully valid without like relying on something that like
15:13
Speaker A
you're not getting that from perception or blah blah blah. Um so I I guess I epistemic premise about normativity and justified beliefs and what not. It's yeah.
15:20
Speaker A
exactly. And where where you're relying on intuition might vary from argument to argument, but it's clear that you like you're relying yeah, usually it's some kind of epistemic premise about when these conditions are satisfied, then your belief is debunked
15:33
Speaker A
or blah blah blah. Um okay, so basically I came to be convinced that like the the pro intuition people had the upper hand on on that argument. Um and so like the the thoroughgoing like naturalist anti intuition position was just
15:48
Speaker A
self-defeating. That was not going to be in the cards. And like you know that that fit well with this kind of like Moore and Lewis style philosophical methodology and epistemology where like yeah, we kind of have to give some weight to what seems
16:00
Speaker A
obvious to what seems true on on careful intellectual reflection. So that that was kind of the first dent in the the naturalist armor.
16:09
Speaker A
I feel like just a number of things just like sprouted from that, right? So like you started seeing this philosophical methodology. You started seeing the light, right? You um broke out of Plato's cave and you know started to catch a glimpse of the form
16:20
Speaker A
of the good such that uh now you're uh open to accepting like anti-physicalism and free will and you know moral realism and various other things that so maybe you just want to like take us through some of those.
16:31
Speaker A
Yeah, sure. So the the moral realism stuff I think is directly connected here because you know around the same time everyone was talking about these like evolutionary debunking arguments from Sharon Street and others and I kind of thought these were
16:49
Speaker A
powerful arguments on the one hand um like our our our moral intuitions our dispositions to form moral judgments are heavily influenced by evolutionary factors and other kind of non-truth tracking factors. There doesn't seem to be an explanatory connection between a
17:06
Speaker A
realm of objective moral truths if there is such a realm and our beliefs about them and once you see this then then it looks like those beliefs are debunked and I think Street and others are kind of explicit that like we're we're
17:19
Speaker A
assuming some kind of broadly naturalistic picture here. If you're a theist or you know maybe some other piece too but definitely if you're a theist you can tell a story where um where you can explain why our intuitions would be
17:32
Speaker A
reliable maybe you can secure an explanatory connection between the moral truths and our moral beliefs but a lot of the discussion here was just kind of dismissive of the theists like if if we maintain a kind of good
17:45
Speaker A
metaphysical naturalist picture there wouldn't be any explana- any explanatory connection between the objective moral truths and our beliefs and therefore we should give up those moral beliefs. But you know here it eventually kind of dawned on me like
17:59
Speaker A
so on the one hand I think Street Street's arguments are pretty compelling that given naturalistic assumptions we would be led to reject moral realism or like an objectivist view of morality. On the other hand moral realism is just immensely
18:15
Speaker A
plausible like it's very plausible that there are some moral truths like it's wrong to innocent people for fun, and it's very plausible that those have a kind of objectivity to them. I mean, the what Sharon Street wants to do is say
18:28
Speaker A
that like yeah, there are moral truths, but they ultimately like depend on our attitudes. Um, and you know, she's got a complicated story for how that goes, but it I mean, basically the picture leads to all sorts of I think very objectionable,
18:41
Speaker A
implausible consequences. Like if we all kind of consistently held in a held that it was fine to torture cats for fun and we approved of it and we had a logically consistent set of values and so on, um,
18:54
Speaker A
then we would be correct in saying it's good to torture cats. Uh, and it would be good like that that just seems wrong.
19:01
Speaker A
So um, it seems very obvious that there are moral truths, that they have a kind of objectivity, and yet Sharon Street seems correct that it's kind of hard to account for how we could have moral knowledge, how our moral beliefs could
19:13
Speaker A
be reliable under a broadly naturalistic picture. Um, not so hard under theism. And so, you know, at at some point in the my process of conversion, it it it dawned on me that like well, yeah, maybe the the weakest link here is naturalism
19:29
Speaker A
or whatever assumptions lead to the debunking of moral realism. I mean, moral moral realism seems to me more compelling, more plausible than any of the premises of any argument I could write down for naturalism. So maybe naturalism is the thing that should
19:44
Speaker A
should go here. Okay, yeah. So um, moral realism is definitely one of them. I mean, I I would like to camp out on some of these because you know, I think naturalism is you know, I was once a
19:54
Speaker A
naturalist. I think a number of people in the audience may very well be naturalists or have sympathies with it.
19:58
Speaker A
So moral realism is one of the things that sprouted from the kind of phenomenal conservative realization. Um, but you know, there were there were some others that you mentioned in the in the book chapter. So like it seems like
20:08
Speaker A
anti-physicalism was another one. Like it sounds like that was pretty huge. Uh, maybe that one and free will. So maybe we could you could take those in turn.
20:15
Speaker A
Yeah, good. So um, at a certain point early in graduate school, I kind of became a physicalist about consciousness. I worked with what my co-advisor was Michael Tye, very good philosopher. We we published a couple of things and some of them were
20:32
Speaker A
kind of defending a a certain form of physicalism, a kind of reductive externalist form of representationalism.
20:38
Speaker A
We don't need to get into what that means. But over sometime around, I don't know if it was the end of second year, beginning of third year of of graduate school, I like very suddenly became convinced that physicalism is
20:54
Speaker A
false. So I think like the seeds for the transition were laid by reading David Chalmers' book The Conscious Mind and kind of feeling like oh man, like these are just like incredibly powerful arguments and like the he he's got this opening chapter which
21:10
Speaker A
is like called taking consciousness seriously and basically pointing out that like all the the physicalist theories of consciousness are just like ignoring the main thing that's interesting about consciousness and not accounting for it at all.
21:22
Speaker A
They're maybe they can account for other things like behaviors and functions associated with consciousness, but they're not accounting for consciousness at all. And you know, it gives these kind of very powerful arguments for thinking that consciousness needs to be
21:33
Speaker A
taken as like an extra irreducible property over and above the physical. And I mean, I initially found these arguments like really powerful. He's a very good philosopher.
21:45
Speaker A
But I I wasn't like immediately going in for it. I I was kind of you know, he he lays out these technical arguments using his framework of two-dimensional semantics and I was really into kind of logic and semantics
21:56
Speaker A
and in in in doing this fancy formal stuff. And so I was kind of really excited about like okay, what's what's the best response I can give on behalf of physicalism that like shows like what's wrong with this two-dimensional
22:08
Speaker A
analysis? And and it was just kind of like a fun intellectual game. I was going to like get really technical into these into these debates. And I don't know, one day I remember I was kind of like introspecting my visual
22:22
Speaker A
experience, thinking about like consciousness because I do this a lot as a philosopher. And it just like dawning on me like, obviously, this is not like a physical property of my brain like and it just kind of like felt like suddenly like,
22:35
Speaker A
wait, I've just been lying to myself. This is just like perfectly evident and um and I haven't been like treating this issue with like intellectual seriousness or honesty. Like I've been treating it more just like a kind of an intellectual
22:49
Speaker A
game where I'm going to like get really deep into this technical two-dimensionalist analysis and see whether there's ways of poking holes in it. Um and yeah, it just kind of like wait wait a minute. I'm I'm just kind of like not
23:03
Speaker A
I I I've like at some level just like decided to be partisan to this particular position in the metaphysics of mind and then like decided I'm just going to like use whatever like intellectual skills I have to mount defenses of that. But I I just
23:19
Speaker A
kind of felt like I've just been kind of like playing lawyer to a client that I chose for reasons of just like I don't know not not regard to the truth but just fashion, something like that.
23:30
Speaker A
something like that. So it it was a very sudden just like wait a minute. No, that's that's not how it is. I know that's not how it is. Uh I I I totally understand if people don't find this convincing. I'm not accusing
23:41
Speaker A
anyone else who is a physicalist. I'm not being intellectual dishonest. But it just did seem like come on. This is just something you can see. This is something you can know. Um all the all these other things are just
23:53
Speaker A
kind of like clever maneuvers to deny what seems to me anyway to be uh pretty pretty straightforward. Um Yeah, and do you see um a lot of the main anti-physicalist arguments involving conceivability and you know conceivability of zombies and inverts
24:08
Speaker A
and Mary's room and you know what's it like to be a bat and various other things like that? Do you see them as almost just like trying to flesh out this intuition or almost just trying to like induce or
24:17
Speaker A
elicit this intuition in the audience in kind of variegated ways? Yeah, I mean that's kind of how I'm inclined to think of it nowadays. It's like okay, there's this there's this just like very clear intuition that at least many of us have
24:30
Speaker A
that like experience is one thing, physical processes are another. And some people are like, no, I'm I'm I'm not going for that. I don't see it. And so you can try try to like lay out these arguments.
24:43
Speaker A
Well, then how do you explain we can know all the physical facts without knowing this and you can conceive of this without that and so on. Um but I think a lot of those are not really getting at the main motivation which is
24:55
Speaker A
this like more fundamental like intuition of distinctness and some of the other clever epistemic gap arguments are just kind of like ways of maybe bringing out hidden costs of rejecting that intuition of distinctness and things like that.
25:09
Speaker A
Um so yeah, I mean once I kind of became convinced that physicalism about consciousness was not true, yeah, I mean that was like an important domino to fall. Like like it took a while I think for that to kind of like ramify through my
25:26
Speaker A
web of beliefs, but the idea of I mean Chalmers has this idea of like naturalistic dualism. Like we can accept consciousness as this extra non-physical property over and above the physical, but that doesn't need to upset any kind
25:41
Speaker A
of broadly naturalistic picture of the world. We just have a new fundamental property and we'll posit new fundamental laws that link that property to other fundamental properties like mass and charge and space and time and so on. And
25:52
Speaker A
so we have a slightly expanded ontology, but it's that doesn't need to like change the overall shape of our worldview in any fundamental way.
26:01
Speaker A
But gradually it just kind of seemed like it's very weird that like consciousness would be one of the fundamental properties of our physical universe if if this is like a fundamentally indifferent universe. And that I mean I hadn't yet really crystallized
26:19
Speaker A
my current thoughts on psychophysical harmony and things like that. Um but it did just seem weird to me like, well, wait a minute. So we've got two kinds of laws.
26:29
Speaker A
One kind of law governs like the elementary physical particles and fields and those kind of apply kind of ubiquitously throughout the universe. And then we've got these other laws that link consciousness to physical structures, but they only seem
26:44
Speaker A
to kick in like billions of years after the beginning of the universe and once you have like complex nervous systems evolving, like it almost looks like there's this extra nomological widget in the universe that makes the universe kind of seem like it's it's made for
27:00
Speaker A
consciousness. Consciousness has like a special distinguished role within the nomological structure of reality. And like why would that be? Why would the the thing that seems like the precondition for all meaning and value and insignificance in the world, like
27:12
Speaker A
why why would that like be just kind of glommed on to this fundamentally indifferent world? It just it just seemed like this is not a sensible way for like a a purposeless naturalistic universe to be. So that that was an another
27:26
Speaker A
big factor that made me less keen on metaphysical naturalism and more open to kind of theistic and religious uh pictures of reality.
27:37
Speaker A
Right, cuz under like a naturalistic dualist picture, right? These are additional fundamental laws, right? So that's a pretty big cost in terms of nomological parsimony to just posit these additional fundamental laws that aren't subsumed within like a broader
27:53
Speaker A
explanatory framework whereby, let's say, like God's the ultimate being and then he sets up the world in such and such a way. So like you have these extra fundamental laws.
28:02
Speaker A
It's already quite weird. Secondly, they like yeah, make provision for like the thing which is needed for all or most significant forms of value.
28:09
Speaker A
So that's also really spooky. It's like what's going on there? Um but then third of all, they just take on this really striking form. I mean like they're they seem hopelessly complicated and just totally unsystematizable uh because you know, they they like
28:27
Speaker A
apply to these like yeah, highly localized, highly late like super complicated like nervous systems, like macro-level phenomena that they're like sensitive to. Like just think about specifying a brain state in fundamental terms. Like it's going to be the longest, most disgusting
28:45
Speaker A
thing you can possibly imagine, right? It's like fundamental laws talking about that and looking like that.
28:51
Speaker A
That's how the world was set up totally indifferently. It's just like just like stepping back, the meta narrative here is not plausible.
28:58
Speaker A
Yeah. And what I what I didn't realize at the time but has come to realize later is like yeah, and if you think of like the range of possible psychophysical laws, the ones we got seem to be kind of lucky
29:14
Speaker A
and special in all sorts of respects. So one one point here and we won't go very far into this is just like like most of the simplest, most elegant psychophysical laws you could imagine would just lead to worlds that are like
29:27
Speaker A
utterly boring and devoid of any significant value. So like there could have been like really simple elegant psychophysical laws that just like assign like a different neutral gray experience to every physical object where the the phenomenal brightness is
29:42
Speaker A
proportional to the mass of the object. So this would just be like relating like a simple phenomenal parameter to a simple physical parameter using like a mathematically simple law. Like okay, that that would have been like very simple and elegant, but it also would
29:54
Speaker A
have resulted in a world that's like completely devoid of any of the consciousness involving goods of our our world. And if you just think through like what are all the different ways in which like consciousness could have been
30:04
Speaker A
linked up with matter with a bias towards like the simplest and most elegant like actually it looks like pretty much all of the simplest most elegant laws would would yield a world that's just like pretty much devoid of all the
30:16
Speaker A
consciousness involving goods in our world more or less. So it seems pretty lucky that we we got laws like the ones we did. So for these sorts of reasons like I now think just like naturalistic dualism is just completely
30:30
Speaker A
off the table for me. Like I I can't even now like recover the mindset in which like the combination of naturalism and dualism would even be on the table.
30:39
Speaker A
Like, it's just like, you know, maybe we can fight for some kind of physicalism or something like that. But like like that combination I just I just now think is I previously I thought like it's a bit awkward, you know, theism and
30:52
Speaker A
dualism fit a little bit better. Like now I would make a stronger claim. It's just like naturalism and dualism just like they're logically consistent, but like you can't say much more than that. They just like do not work together.
31:02
Speaker A
Yeah, I I think that extends more generally to just like naturalism and just non-reductionism about consciousness. Like I think even if you want to go in for panpsychism, like so long as the linking or bridge principles between the itty-bitty micro subjects
31:15
Speaker A
and then the large macro subjects like us, so long as those uh are like these novel fundamental principles, um I think you still get the problem. So anyway, we're not going to we're not going to yep.
31:25
Speaker A
camp out on that. But um okay, so like let's let's like focus on one other thing that led you to abandon naturalism. I mean, you mentioned free will, you mentioned like just our ability to do science, and then you also
31:36
Speaker A
mentioned human exceptionalism um in the moral domain. I don't know if you want to summarize all of them or if you just want to pick one. I'll I'll just let you take the reins from here. I just want to cover
31:44
Speaker A
one more thing that led you to abandon naturalism before we get to Embracing Christianity.
31:49
Speaker A
Well, maybe I'll focus on just like human ability to do science. Um I mean, the free will thing is just the kind of usual argument that like there there there's a prima facie tension between at least like materialism and free will,
32:01
Speaker A
and you could argue naturalism and free will that fits well with a more like theistic Christian picture. Um but yeah, the the human ability to do science. So you know, I mentioned earlier like going into graduate school, I just you know, and I still have this
32:15
Speaker A
kind of Carl Sagan-y attitude of like the science is just this awesome, monumental human achievement. Just like the the extent to which we've like achieved like deep, sweeping knowledge of the broad lineaments of reality at deep at at like very small scales, at
32:32
Speaker A
very large scales, like scales that are like not relevant to ordinary human life. Just like the the the depth and breadth the scientific knowledge we've achieved about reality is just like staggering and like really really cool.
32:45
Speaker A
And I also became gripped with this thought of like and and actually like a lot of the the science boosters, the naturalistic science boosters will will say things like this. So like Sam, I think in my conversion essay I quote Sam
32:58
Speaker A
Harris saying something along the lines of like, you know, it's amazing how much we've discovered about the micro physical realm, about the cosmos, their science. That's not at all what you would expect given that like our brains were evolved to like solve practical
33:12
Speaker A
problems on the Savannah about like how to hunt and gather berries and negotiate with other tribes and stuff like this.
33:19
Speaker A
Like like so we've got these brains that were like evolved by natural selection, designed by natural selection to solve practical problems that arose for our ancestors on the Savannah. And somehow the cognitive equipment and tools and methods of reasoning and ways of
33:34
Speaker A
thinking that came from that have when we apply them over many centuries lead to like discovery of like you know the deep laws of physics and their mathematical structure and the broad lineaments of the the the structure of the cosmos and all this
33:48
Speaker A
kind of deep stuff. And they're like this is not at all what you'd expect. It's wonderful. And I was like yeah, it's not at all what you'd expect and it is wonderful but like and you know so people like um
34:00
Speaker A
Peter van Inwagen and Planting have these and what's his name? Steven Steven Bar um have have these arguments that like actually this is this is much more to be expected, this kind of like fit between the way our
34:16
Speaker A
minds work and the structure of the cosmos that allows this kind of deep and broad understanding of the world. This is like much more to be expected under standard theistic views like a the kind of intrinsic rational intelligible
34:29
Speaker A
structure of reality such that it does have like mathematically elegant, beautiful, intrinsically intelligible laws uh with mathematical structure. Like that that kind of fits well with the idea that it's the product of a that the world is the product of this like rational mind
34:47
Speaker A
and then like our ability with our cognitive equipment that we actually have to like discover those deep mathematically elegant principles and laws and structures um not at all what you'd expect if like our cognitive equipment was like just the
35:03
Speaker A
result of like solving survival relevant problems on the Savannah. I mean it's not impossible that that would be like a spandrel byproduct, but it's not what you'd expect. Whereas it's more what you'd expect if like you know God created us in his image and
35:15
Speaker A
wanted us to share to some degree in the like divine understanding. So yeah this this struck me as is just like another striking feature of the world that like fit fit more nicely with kind of theistic world views
35:29
Speaker A
was a kind of awkward fit with um with uh naturalistic atheist world views. For the audience again there were other considerations that led him away from naturalism and you can read his chapter for more on that.
35:43
Speaker A
But what happened after you started uh shifting away from naturalism? I think uh I'll just turn it over to you.
35:50
Speaker A
Just take us forward from the story from here. At the end of my second year in grad school there were some like personal family difficulties that led me to decide to take a semester off of grad graduate school and uh spend time closer
36:04
Speaker A
to my family in the Seattle area. And so this was um yeah this was a time where it was just like well I I wasn't working on graduate school. There was just kind of like four months off. I was um kind of resetting,
36:18
Speaker A
rethinking a lot of things and spending a lot of time around like good Christian friends, friends who had recently converted to Catholicism and just thinking and talking through things in a lot of uh yeah kind of in a in a
36:34
Speaker A
leisurely way. And yeah it was mainly during this time uh a few months off from graduate school that like over the course of four months or so, these sorts of like intellectual currents in my mind and various kind of
36:49
Speaker A
like emotional interpersonal factors led to like eventually kind of identifying as as Christian. There is a lot here, but I do remember, you know, in addition to these like more purely philosophical considerations, there was one line of thought that kind of nagged at
37:09
Speaker A
me, which is like over the previous couple years as as I had gone kind of like more all in with these like anti-religious uh world views and like just opposing religion, I had, you know, just kind of taken this stance towards like my own
37:26
Speaker A
kind of personal spiritual experiences as just like treating them as like an illusion, like not not pointing to any reality at all and um just just a kind of like, you know, this is just like the way the human mind works. We have these
37:39
Speaker A
kind of spiritual experiences and proclivities, but that's that's that's that's not pointing to anything. And just kind of just like systematically discounting these sorts of experiences and like that whole side of me and my natural bent. And like during these like four months where
37:56
Speaker A
I took some time off graduate school, just starting to feel like that was that's actually like a really perverse thing to do to oneself. Um like I started to feel like like I was kind of like voluntarily like making
38:13
Speaker A
myself into something like somewhat subhuman or basically just like attempting to live a life that was just like denying and discounting and trying to like squelch like like a very real and important part of my humanity, which is
38:28
Speaker A
um yeah, this this kind of like sense of spiritual realities. And I this analogy stuck in my mind of like what I was doing was kind of comparable to someone who like imagine they became convinced that like the argument from analogy or
38:45
Speaker A
philosophical arguments for the existence of other minds actually aren't good. And so they kind of like uh like voluntarily dull their natural sense that there are other minds behind the faces that they see because they think it's like philosophically
38:58
Speaker A
unjustified to believe in other minds. Um like this would be like a really perverse thing to do, but I kind of felt like like my kind of voluntarily like dulling my own like sense of spiritual realities and tendencies in in in that
39:13
Speaker A
direction was was kind of analogous to that. Uh just like like here's this part of my like innate natural human equipment that seems to be pointing in a certain direction that's like very important if and very central to what life is about
39:28
Speaker A
if if it's like veridical and and not illusory. Um and I'm just kind of like I've decided on these kind of flimsy weak ass philosophical grounds that like it's all an illusion and I've like adopted this weird intellectual posture
39:41
Speaker A
where I'm like suppressing it and like ignoring it and like that this just seems like an unwholesome and somewhat like morally perverse thing to be doing.
39:49
Speaker A
So I didn't want to be doing that. Right. Um where what were these um what sort of like I mean you don't have to get specific if it's like personal stuff, but like I'm just curious what were some
40:00
Speaker A
of these like experiences like? Are they just experiences of transcendence, of kind of meaning, purpose, significance?
40:06
Speaker A
Were they senses of presence, like a um a sense of divine presence? I'm just curious. I mean you mentioned we'll get back to some of like the intellectual factors cuz that were percolating in your mind throughout those four months.
40:16
Speaker A
Um but it does sound like you know you know as I and many others have said like head factors and heart factors are always at play in conversion, in deconversion, and in maintenance of views. We'll get back to the head
40:27
Speaker A
factors later and this is also a head factor because I think seemings are evidential and religious religious experiences are evidential, but I'm just curious if you can like elaborate a little bit more. It's up to you, though.
40:36
Speaker A
I don't know. I'm not very articulate about ex- explaining this stuff I guess and Yeah, we need like Teresa of Avila or something with like her Well, I mean yeah it so it's nothing it's nothing like that and it's nothing
40:47
Speaker A
like you describe as like mystical or anything like that. But yeah, just like very regular like, I don't know, experiences of kind of like the world and nature as manifestations of some kind of like transcendent spiritual order, um some kind of like spiritual
41:06
Speaker A
intelligence that like holds the world together, um beauty as like the filtering through of some kind of like spiritual realm like behind the visible order is is is how I might describe it. So that's on the kind of like sense of a
41:22
Speaker A
spiritual domain or realm or dimension to reality. Um but then kind of interpersonally, you know, there's certain people I would interact with like just like very kind of holy people and morally admirable people where there does seem to be a kind of like
41:39
Speaker A
supernatural presence or life in them. It's not just like, oh, this person has like a lot of the like Aristotelian virtues and has like a lot of admirable qualities, but that kind of like uh I don't know, like holiness or sense of
41:52
Speaker A
the numinous um just like in their character and in what's like animating their their their life and the the kind of simplicity and purity um of their actions. And and then just kind of like various particular things like
42:05
Speaker A
seeing transformations in people that seemed like against all expectations and that seemed to me like naturally interpretable as like the work of some kind of like living vitality uh against the the stream of nature that is in bondage to
42:23
Speaker A
decay. And yeah, that together with like, you know, just like things that I would I would have naturally interpreted as like providential coincidences where it's like, okay, these aren't like one in a million coincidences and so it wouldn't
42:36
Speaker A
be like that unreasonable to think like, yeah, yeah, coincidences happen. It's not it's not anything. Um but it also just struck me as like nonetheless very natural to interpret as like the the work of providence and like is it really such a wholesome thing to
42:50
Speaker A
do to like to like discount that like natural uh seeming of what's what's going on.
42:55
Speaker A
So yeah. So, yeah, we've been covering some of the experiential and kind of heart factors, but let's turn to some of the head factors in your turn to Christianity.
43:04
Speaker A
So, it sounds like it took place I mean, I'm guessing there were uh kind of undercurrents uh before this four-month period uh and probably afterwards as well. But what were some of like the main intellectual reasons that were kind of pushing you towards
43:17
Speaker A
Christianity? Yeah, so um I mean, I've talked about just philosophical intellectual reasons that you know, you might say favor kind of theism over naturalism so far. I mean, all of these kind of fit nicely within Christian forms of theism, so
43:36
Speaker A
it's not like necessarily just favoring a generic theism. Um yeah, when it comes to you know, being pulled to Christianity in particular I mean, there's there's a ton of stuff through a number of conversations. So, I I had a friend
43:54
Speaker A
in graduate school, Richard Richard Davis um who's a Christian philosopher, very smart, and we would you know, before I was warm to this stuff and and actually while I was kind of going through this transition, we would we would talk and you know, he
44:10
Speaker A
would just basically like whip me in like debates about the resurrection and miracles and things like this and well, I was more than vaguely aware of like kind of historical arguments for the resurrection and I guess all along I thought these were
44:27
Speaker A
like not bad. During the times when I was more dismissive, the line would have been some kind of Bayesian prior thing about extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence and it 's not quite at that level, but I never thought
44:39
Speaker A
that there was just like a really easy explanation of like how you account for the the relevant data here.
44:46
Speaker A
And we would talk about like other kinds of miracles too. And so those those were just things that like you know, at a certain point I I would lose these but nonetheless it wasn't like a live option for me, so it wouldn't like
44:58
Speaker A
bother me. But once once kind of theism and these more religious world views started to be a live option to me, then like the fact that I already had in the background that like, well, Christianity like you know, I thought that there were
45:10
Speaker A
decent arguments for like the reliability of the Gospels, um resurrection and things like this. Um you know, I also thought and I I never really gave this up during the time when I wasn't Christian. I also thought like
45:22
Speaker A
Christianity is pretty unique and special in terms of like the extent to which it like morally transformed the world for the good. And so I kind of accepted this picture that like, you know, a lot of the a lot of our like very best moral values
45:37
Speaker A
that are around today are here through the influence of of Christianity and you know, Christianity's role in laying the foundations for for modern science too.
45:46
Speaker A
I accepted that. And so like uh I I always kind of accepted like Christianity is looks pretty good in terms of like the the moral fruits for for civilization. That lent uh a degree of credibility to it. Once I was um
46:01
Speaker A
open to like theistic religious perspectives in the world uh of uh on the world, I just kind of like because of the people I was hanging around with and the way these conversations were going, I was also just like
46:15
Speaker A
reading the New Testament a lot, reading the Bible a lot, reading a lot of Christian stuff. Uh and that that was just kind of like the the natural direction for me to go in given all all the other background. Like
46:28
Speaker A
there wasn't it's not like there was another like expression of theism or other like non-Christian religious tradition that like I found compelling at all. And Christianity did seem compelling.
46:42
Speaker A
Jesus has always seemed very compelling to me. Um you know, just like the the beauty and purity and authority of his moral teaching, the moral fruits of the church, Christianity being like a good thing and kind of like a what seems to be like a
46:57
Speaker A
providential force in in the the history of the last 2000 years. So, I mean, that's that's kind of like what what drew me to Christianity. There was a certain point like at the end of my time off from graduate school where I
47:10
Speaker A
was talking with some Christian friends and they're like, hey, where where are you at now with with this stuff? Like where what do you consider yourself? And it was the first time that I articulated to myself like, well, you know, I'm I'm
47:24
Speaker A
praying, I'm going to church, I'm trying to like follow these teachings etc. Um I'm I'm not like ready to make any commitment. I'm still thinking through stuff, but I guess I guess I describe myself as an uncommitted Christian. And
47:36
Speaker A
like that was the first time I used that label, but I was like, yeah, I guess that that that fits. Like I'm trying to be a Christian. I'm not like not like making a binding irrevocable decision. I'm uncommitted, but I'm a
47:47
Speaker A
Christian. And I don't know. Once I had that as a label, it's like, yeah, yeah, I'm an uncommitted Christian. So, I'm a Christian and then gradually like the uncommitted part of my self-conception faded faded away.
48:00
Speaker A
Yeah, I I would I would want to give people the permission to uh who who are thinking through this stuff uh to to adopt such a self-conception cuz um yeah, you don't you don't need to like make some like final binding decision
48:14
Speaker A
before you like start praying or start practicing or start um trying trying trying to live what what what seems to you to be correct.
48:24
Speaker A
Yeah, a a a final thing for me. I mean, we could talk about there was some of the kind of Pascal's wager style of reasoning that that came up in my essay.
48:33
Speaker A
Should we get into that? Yeah, it's funny you asked cuz I was literally going to get to that next.
48:37
Speaker A
Yes. Cool. Um yeah so I guess one factor for me, which I guess probably played a role in me just like starting to like be an uncommitted Christian and like really try to live this stuff is this kind of broadly Pascalian line
48:59
Speaker A
of thought, which well, you know, I I think I think this stuff is pretty likely, not not totally sure, but I think it's pretty likely. I don't know if I'm going to be in a much different evidential situation down the road.
49:13
Speaker A
There might always be some degree of uncertainty or something like this, but clearly there's like a lot at stake, and if I like if I just like decide to live as a practical atheist or an agnostic or whatever, then like I'm missing out on
49:28
Speaker A
like the central thing of what my life should be about, which is very bad. I mean, even setting aside like afterlife, heaven and hell stakes, like that's very bad to like be ignoring the central thing that one's life should be about.
49:41
Speaker A
Um, you know, on the other hand, if I'm if I live this way and I'm wrong, like the in at least given my life circumstances, it didn't seem to be like wildly costly.
49:51
Speaker A
It's not like I was going to get like persecuted or imprisoned or anything like that. And so um it just did seem like the kind of practical considerations uh were decisive in favoring some kind of commitment or at least some kind of like
50:07
Speaker A
some kind of degree of practice sort of like a a pledge of commitment that would bind me into the future. I mean, I I I found this line of thought kind of convincing and reasonable like before it occurred to me that it was
50:19
Speaker A
Pascalian because I had previously thought like, oh, Pascal's wager, we all know that that doesn't work because of like the many gods and the deviant deity stuff and like I later I later realized that like no, that's wrong.
50:33
Speaker A
Um, well, so there's there are different versions of Pascal's wager. The most ambitious version of Pascal's wager says that if you have any non-zero credence in God's existence, then you should believe in God um because the expected value is infinite
50:50
Speaker A
and blah blah blah. Um, I assume your listeners know how how that goes and how the decision theory goes. And I agree that that version doesn't work because like there are other possible you know, you you you also want to think about
51:02
Speaker A
other scenarios where like well maybe there's some weird god who's going to like punish all and only the people who believe in the normal god or you know there's various things that would like challenge like that naive framing of the
51:15
Speaker A
decision problem. But if your circumstance is like mine was where you think look this stuff is like pretty credible on the intellectual grounds um and the stakes are just enormously high and then I think like the the the Pascalian style argument is
51:33
Speaker A
just decisive. And so one one analogy I like to use here is well I guess backing up a little bit I think we need to distinguish objections to Pascal's wager that are really just objections to the decision theoretic
51:48
Speaker A
like expected value maximizing framework versus objections to Pascal's wager that are like real objections to the intuitive reasoning under underlying that. And so here here's an example. So suppose like um you know I've I've left to go on like a
52:05
Speaker A
uh a long trip and I'm like 10 minutes out from my house and it occurs to me you know what I think I probably left the the stove on I should go back and check. And I might give a kind of like
52:16
Speaker A
decision theoretic like well look the the if if I didn't leave the stove off and I go back and check that's not a big loss I only lost 10 minutes or whatever.
52:25
Speaker A
Um but if I if I err in the other direction where I did leave the stove on but I just like go on my trip anyway without checking well then my house could burn down and so asymmetric stakes. And so like clearly like it
52:39
Speaker A
would be a good and prudent thing to to go back and check to check the stove.
52:43
Speaker A
Now if you wanted to if you wanted to be like mathematical and rigorous you could draw up a decision matrix and you could draw utilities and states and blah blah blah. And and if you did that you could
52:53
Speaker A
do like an expected value calculation and argue that going back and checking has a higher expected value. And then someone could come in and say like well wait a minute what if there's like some weird deviant deity who's going torture
53:06
Speaker A
you forever if and only if you go back and check. Like that's that sounds unreasonable, but like surely you shouldn't have zero credence in that.
53:14
Speaker A
And so like, oh, your your your decision matrix is incomplete. There are states here that you didn't include and like, okay, I don't know how to respond to that like, but it's clearly an objection to like the the expected value decision
53:27
Speaker A
theoretic framework where like, okay, like what what do you do about these like low probability high impact scenarios that you can't rule out with certainty and and they introduce all sorts of infinities into the matrix and like I don't know. That's like a big
53:41
Speaker A
problem with the foundations of decision theory. Um, but like you absolutely should not respond to that technical challenge to expected value reasoning by like not going back and check. Like clearly like the reason like the basic reasoning that led you to go back and
53:57
Speaker A
check your house was good. And if you tried to formalize it in a certain way that has these technical objections, well, that's an objection to the technical framework. It's not an objection to the reasoning. The reasoning was totally fine. And
54:09
Speaker A
similarly like if you reason like, look, I think this is likely true, but I'm not sure. And uh if it is true and I ignore it, that's like really really bad and I'm missing out on like the central
54:21
Speaker A
thing that my life should be about. But if it's not true and I go in for it anyway, then like not a big cost. Like that intuitive line of thought I think is like perfectly good compelling reasoning that we shouldn't we shouldn't
54:34
Speaker A
be bothered by these like technical challenges about like what if you have this weird deity that introduces infinities into your utility matrix in this way. Like that's just like completely beside the point.
54:43
Speaker A
Yeah, I mean, I think um maybe some people will press that like other objections to Pascal's wager are still going to afflict this sort of reasoning, you know, like the mercenary objection or like the manipulative objection where this seems kind of like problematically
54:54
Speaker A
self-interested in some way and you know, like God's not going to reward that kind of faith and so what do you make about what do you make of this sort of objection?
55:03
Speaker A
These objections have more bite the the lower your credences on the purely intellectual considerations. So if you think it's like uh you know, one in a hundred, one in a thousand just on the evidence and then you you motivate yourself to go
55:21
Speaker A
in for these kind of practical benefits, then like maybe you're kind of going against your own sense of what's true. I don't think they have much bite at all if you think that it's probably true on the evidence and then you make a a
55:34
Speaker A
firmer commitment than that based on these these practical considerations. And also I think like what it is that's motivating you makes a difference to how much bite these mercenary concerns have.
55:48
Speaker A
So you know, the the crudest version is just like you know, I want the sweet blissful afterlife many happy days, yes.
55:57
Speaker A
for me uh and so I'm going to go in for it and um okay, well you know, maybe that looks like an unseemly motivation, but that did not at all capture my motivation at the time. It's just like
56:12
Speaker A
look I I mean there's this being God who like if he exists like deserves my worship and my submission and a life lived in love and obedience to him like being his hands and feet in the world to the
56:24
Speaker A
extent that that's within my power in which you know, already seem like a a a beautiful thing in its own right and like not a self-interested thing um and it's just like like that's that's the kind of life I want to live and
56:38
Speaker A
should be living uh if if this stuff is real. And so I don't know, like at at the time I I didn't feel like my my motivations were like narrowly self-interested in an unseemly way that that would make them vulnerable
56:53
Speaker A
to this kind of objection. Yeah. Yeah. No, that that seems totally right. I mean like you could just be motivated by like the prospect of just this like beautiful loving relationship with the creator of the universe. Like that seems really cool,
57:06
Speaker A
you know. And like I think I don't know, we we very often take on commitments or like risky activities where we're not sure that the thing's going to come about, um but we just regard it as very good and not in a problematically
57:18
Speaker A
self-interested way, but we just regard it as very good if it did in fact come to fruition. Like I don't know, you know, like I ask I think it'd be really good and I ask the girl out and I think
57:26
Speaker A
there's only a 100 1 in 100 chance that it happens, but it'd be really good.
57:31
Speaker A
Yeah, it's like what? No, it's like I think you know, she's she's beautiful and like I think it'd be really beautiful to have like a relationship with such a wonderful being. So seeing this in analogy with like interpersonal
57:41
Speaker A
relationships, because it is an interpersonal relationship, is very very helpful and helps dispel with that objection. I mean also like even if it's initially motivated by some kind of problematic self-interest, it doesn't have to remain that way and you
57:52
Speaker A
can sort of recognize that on reflection. You could be like okay, by as Pascal put it, like taking the holy water, having the masses said and whatnot, um you can almost purify your motives and make it much more likely
58:03
Speaker A
that you come to have um a genuinely salvific faith. Um so anyway, I think there are lots of ways to respond to that objection, but uh I was just curious.
58:11
Speaker A
Well, do you have anything more to say about your shift towards Christianity before we turn to your shift towards Catholicism?
58:20
Speaker A
We can we can move to Catholicism. Okay, cool. So what happened? Like why why submit to Rome?
58:29
Speaker A
Yeah, I mean okay, so for me so when I was like a a Christian as an undergraduate for some years, I I didn't really know any Catholics.
58:42
Speaker A
Catholicism was just not on the table for me. It was not a live option. I didn't have any aversion or animosity to it. Um it was just kind of not I just kind of saw it as this like weird other
58:53
Speaker A
thing um that just wasn't I didn't see it as like a distinguished form of Christianity. It was just like one of those weird things that some people do and it was Christian, but it was yeah, not not really a live option
59:05
Speaker A
for me. Um when I came back to the faith in graduate school, there were like a lot of people really close to me had recently converted, to Catholicism, and that just kind of cast the issue in a new light and, you know,
59:23
Speaker A
they were very smart and they had arguments and they uh so kind of when I came back to the Faith and Graduate School, it actually I didn't have much resistance at all like the transition from Christianity to Catholicism. Like I
59:40
Speaker A
enrolled in RCIA, I think now it's called OCIA, but then it was called RCIA. Um pretty shortly I after I started identifying as a Christian, at least to kind of like explore it, but you know, once once it became a live
59:54
Speaker A
option for me it was like pretty strongly just like a default. I mean for a few for a few reasons. I mean one like you know, I thought that the the schism in the church caused by the Protestant Reformation was just really
60:11
Speaker A
deeply sad and unfortunate. Like this is just a horrific thing that happened to to Christendom 500 years ago and and I also thought like well when I like read through the history of the Reformation and I look at the different
60:27
Speaker A
theological disputes that the different theological issues that um that were behind these disagreements, I kind of thought like across the almost across the board like the Catholics just seemed to be right and seemed to have the upper hand. So when it came to
60:42
Speaker A
you know, sola scriptura, I thought you know, the Catholics seem like a more reasonable view on that and when it came to like sola fide, it was like no actually the Catholics seemed to have a more reasonable view on that and purgatory
60:55
Speaker A
like no the the Catholics seem to have the more reasonable view on that and like art and churches and veneration of saints like like across the board it was like no actually like you know, if I'm inventing like my own
61:07
Speaker A
form of Christianity here I'm basically going to be like agreeing with the Catholics on all these these issues and and you know, you can be a non-Catholic and agree on all those particular issues. But I also just kind of thought
61:18
Speaker A
like, well, wait a minute. So this horrible schism happened in the church that just like broke Christendom in the church into a thousand splinters. It's this awful thing. And I think that like pretty much all the issues on the were the basis for
61:33
Speaker A
the schism like the Catholics were right about like I don't want to be like perpetuating these schism by like being outside the church outside the the the the Catholic church. So that that was um you know one one consideration.
61:47
Speaker A
Uh you know relatedly very closely relatedly like you know I had studied the history of the church and read a lot of just like you know doctors and doctors of the church and the the patristics and things like this
62:03
Speaker A
and I I I wanted to be part of the historical church. I didn't want to be part of a church that was founded by Martin Luther or John Calvin or you know Henry VIII or um like I wanted
62:17
Speaker A
to be part of like the historical apostolic church that goes all the way back and you know Catholicism at least has a reasonable claim to being that church. I mean you we can get into questions about whether Eastern Orthodoxy has a better
62:30
Speaker A
claim but you know definitely like the Lutherans don't have any such claim or any of the the other kind of Protestant uh options. So it's like okay that that that's just like another thing that makes Catholicism seem like the
62:43
Speaker A
place to be if I'm if I'm going to be a Christian. Um Yeah well could I ask on that one? Was it was it mainly um so like apostolicity, right? Like on the one hand there's like like a literal
62:55
Speaker A
continuation of office like that we can trace back to the apostles and in particular with um the Pope, right? That we just have this apostolic succession going back to Peter. So there's there's like literal apostolicity of like offices passing on
63:10
Speaker A
from you know generation to generation. Uh there's that sense of apostolicity but there's also another sense which is like apostolicity of doctrine. Um so I'm curious is it both of Was it one or the other? Like, what sort of historical or
63:21
Speaker A
apostolic considerations were the strongest in your mind? Maybe it was it like ecclesiology? Was it I'm just curious.
63:28
Speaker A
It was more the second. Like just like the continuity, the consistency, the coherence of doctrine over time within the Catholic Church just like impressed me to a huge extent. It's like this is like I mean, actually like really striking.
63:42
Speaker A
Like how do you have like this degree of consistency and continuity and coherence over time with all these like uh very fallible humans and many times awful humans at at the helm with their own political interests. Like that seemed very striking. Um,
63:59
Speaker A
but yeah, just like the the Catholic Church today is in like just meaningful, substantial like doctrinal continuity going back to to the earliest church. Um, and yeah, there's also the other sense of apostolicity. I mean, that didn't count for for nothing, but it was just
64:16
Speaker A
like a very substantial, clear historical continuity and just kind of the feeling like you've got the trunk and you've got the branches and don't you want to be in the trunk and not the branches? Like I could go to this Lutheran church over here,
64:29
Speaker A
but that's clearly the the branch. I could go to this Presbyterian church. And the branches like very suspiciously seem to just keep on branching and branching and branching, but then there's one big trunk which just continues I I want to be part of the trunk. Um,
64:42
Speaker A
so yeah, so that was uh like a a big thing for me that just made this seem like yeah, once once this is a live option, it's like yeah, isn't just this the way to practice Christianity? Um, and then I maybe I
64:55
Speaker A
don't know. This is a bigger thing, but a big thing. So back when I was like falling away from the faith late in my undergraduate years, like one factor, not the only factor, but one factor that I remember just kind
65:07
Speaker A
of like bugging me was just this feeling that like there's really like no solid ground to stand on with all these like doctrinal disputes and theological differences.
65:18
Speaker A
And I think partly this was just like an artifact of being in a very Protestant community and not having the Catholic Church as a live option. So it was like, well, you know, maybe well, you could take the Bible as inerrant or in in
65:31
Speaker A
which case like that that's going to provide a lot of guidance. But that's also just like a question like should we take it as inerrant? And I was pretty inclined to reject any strong form of inerrancy. And then it's
65:43
Speaker A
just sort of like, okay, well, if it's not an errant then like maybe you can point show that it teaches this, but like maybe that's one of the points of error. And just like just about any issue like what about like the
65:54
Speaker A
Trinity or like Arianism versus the alternatives? And like okay, you can point to verses verses on this side, you can point to verses on that side. But also by the way like personal scientific examination of all the issues to like figure out what's
66:08
Speaker A
true doctrine. Yeah, and it was so it was just like on issue on just like every single issue and it just seemed like everything was up for grabs. Like like you know, I could say this, I could say that, I could just kind of make up
66:18
Speaker A
my own theology, I could reject this part of scripture, I could reject this part of the tradition and like like it all just kind of seemed like up for grabs. And at a certain point it was just like like
66:28
Speaker A
what is Christianity? What is there any solid ground to stand on? It's just like for someone with like like my kind of intellectual question bent, there just wasn't solid ground to stand on and it wasn't like sufficient for just like the practical needs of
66:41
Speaker A
like knowing like okay, this is what's taught and this is what isn't taught um because there was just like nothing like I can tell you what this denomination teaches and I can tell you what that denomination teaches, but it's not like
66:51
Speaker A
I'm all in on like Lutheranism. Like even when I went to like a Lutheran church, I wasn't like a Lutheran. And so I I don't really care what like Lutheranism teaches. I don't really care what like Presbyterianism teaches and so
67:03
Speaker A
on. Um and so everything just kind of seemed up for grabs even to the point of just like things that were settled very early on in the in the historical church like is the Trinity? Like is that the
67:14
Speaker A
right way of thinking about God? Um like yeah, Arianism versus not like it it just all kind of seemed up for grabs.
67:22
Speaker A
Whereas yeah, A mean within Catholicism, you know, there's much more clear cut like, okay, here are the things that are just like definitively taught and here are the things that aren't and here are the things where there's like wiggle
67:34
Speaker A
room and here's the things where there's not and here's where you can have difference of opinion. Um, and I don't know, it just seems like for for me anyway, like there was a kind of practical necessity to like some level
67:47
Speaker A
of clarity of like doctrine and where like putting stakes in the ground of like what are the things that like aren't up for grabs and what are the things that are up for grabs that seem to be just like practically
68:00
Speaker A
necessary for my like devotional life. Like you know, just like meditating on like the mysteries of like the Trinity or the incarnation or the atonement like while simultaneously being unsure about like the doctrine of the Trinity or or whether like
68:16
Speaker A
Jesus is divine or like like I don't know, that's just like I don't know, a lot of the things that just like give me spiritual nourishment and constitute like a a big part of my my like spiritual and
68:26
Speaker A
contemplative life like would just like not even be kind of things that I could do if there were all these like open questions which I think there just necessarily would be out for for me like outside the church
68:39
Speaker A
if I were like a Protestant because like I I just saw that like the the practical upshot of like being a Christian but not being in the Catholic church, being some kind of Protestant or something would just be
68:50
Speaker A
like I would just like invent my own theology and because like everything everything would be up for grabs and it would be a lot of fun. I mean, you know, I've got lots of opinions in philosophical theology but it would also
69:00
Speaker A
just kind of feel like a castle in the air um and like just not compatible with the kind of like devotion uh that we seem to be called to as Christians. So, yeah.
69:12
Speaker A
Yeah, and I mean that's almost like the practical side of what what sort of happens if you if Christ didn't establish this authoritative teaching office, right?
69:22
Speaker A
Like there There are reasons for why uh it's it would make no sense to like inaugurate a kingdom, right? Like this visible kingdom that you're supposed to be a part of and then, you know, you're supposed to be obliged to stay within
69:35
Speaker A
and not break up break away from and what not and you're supposed to basically know what's the true faith from what's not, you know. There's heresy's a big deal in the New Testament, right? So it would make sense
69:44
Speaker A
if Christ is going to establish a kingdom that he wouldn't just give us like the law book, which is like kind of difficult to interpret such that when you leave people to their own devices you get like thousands of competing
69:54
Speaker A
interpretations and denominations and um it would make sense that he wouldn't just give us that, right? That he would also give us like an authoritative teaching office which can actually settle pressing doctrinal disputes so as to avoid just like a radical corruption
70:07
Speaker A
of the apostolic deposit over the course of thousands of years. And it's like it's like precisely what you see. Like I don't know. I just think the meta narrative it makes so much sense when you like you look at okay right after
70:17
Speaker A
the Protestant Reformation we just we get that precise doctrinal corruption over the next 500 years where like all these competing sects and what not. Um and you can just like it's just I don't know. Now having drunk the Catholic
70:27
Speaker A
Kool-Aid it's just like the meta narrative of Catholicism makes way more sense that um God would want God would be interested in preserving the faith whole and inviolate and it seems like the only kind of uh minimally necessary
70:38
Speaker A
means to accomplish that clearly stated divine end uh is to have some kind of authoritative teaching office. So Yeah and I what we're working out there is like the practical effects of not having that in the devotional life of the believer.
70:51
Speaker A
Yeah yeah. So I I mean I was totally convinced at the time like yeah just more on the the intellectual side. It's like yeah like the Catholic Church embodies the kind of unity and living authority that's like practically like adequate in
71:06
Speaker A
practice for the needs of the body of Christ in the way that Protestantism just like manifests like their model manifestly is not practically adequate for like maintaining consistency of doctrine and like clarity about what's taught and etc etc. So yeah I mean I
71:22
Speaker A
just that's a kind that's like a very standard Catholic talking point but like once Catholicism was a live option for me it was like yeah that definitely seems right.
71:32
Speaker A
Right. Do you have anything else you wanted to say about Catholicism, any other like intellectual factors that pulled on you at the time because soon I want to kind of compare and contrast what kind of keeps you in Catholicism
71:41
Speaker A
now, how you would make the case for these various views now. But do you want to like cover anything that we haven't covered yet in your kind of conversion process? Um maybe you want to talk about like the heart factors involved in
71:51
Speaker A
Catholicism specifically because you talked about the heart factors in I think with respect to Christianity, but I don't know. Catholicism has a lot going for it in that in that regard like with the lives of the saints and just
72:02
Speaker A
like the beauty of the tradition and the beauty of the church and I don't know.
72:05
Speaker A
Um Yeah, so I would I don't know. I mean it struck me at the time and it strikes me now that as as I would have put like the the the fullness of truth is just like in the Catholic church in the way that
72:19
Speaker A
it doesn't seem to be elsewhere. I mean it's just like the the spiritual riches and beauty of like what the Catholic church has like the sacraments and the saints and like the the like the the great theologians and doctors and in in
72:34
Speaker A
in fathers of the church and the jawbone of Fulton Sheen like Yeah, the jawbone of Fulton Sheen.
72:40
Speaker A
Yeah, the the the weird stuff and like you got the in in Rome what is it the the crypt of the like the Capuchin monks and there are just skulls everywhere.
72:48
Speaker A
That's awesome too. Um yeah, the the art the yeah, I mean it's just like you know there's just like so many spiritual riches there. It's just like brimming with with with with with beauty and spiritual riches that it's just like
73:04
Speaker A
you know the scriptures too. But there's also this I don't know the cool thing of like when you join the church so if if if you're a Protestant you know you've got you've got your Bible and you've got
73:14
Speaker A
and may maybe you rely on some some degree of tradition too. Um and there's a lot of great stuff there and it's it's full and rich. But when you're when you're a Catholic you get all this like bonus content uh that really does
73:26
Speaker A
enrich. I mean just like you know think of just like the the devotions we have to like our Lady of Fatima or our Lady of Lourdes or in in all these things which are, you know, these special revelations are not like
73:37
Speaker A
binding by faith on on on on Catholics, but they they do uh constitute like a big part of the devotional life of many Catholics and there's just just like reflecting on Fatima, reflecting on Lourdes, reflecting on Saint Faustina and just
73:51
Speaker A
like the saints and and the things that they have in the special revelations that they've received and like all just all the stuff of like Saint Catherine of Siena, like you can take that seriously because it's kind of like it's not
74:02
Speaker A
part of the deposit of faith, but it is kind of like very approved and and encouraged by the Catholic Church to like, you know, Catherine of Siena, she's a doctor of the church. You can like read about like her special
74:13
Speaker A
revelations and like take them seriously and they can enrich So it's just like all this like bonus content. It's like it's not necessary for salvation. It's not it's not like the core essential stuff, but it's there and it's enriching and it
74:24
Speaker A
like speaks to Christians at like different times and places. I mean, there's only so much you can relate to looking at like the apostles and you know, first century Palestine, but like it's just like the lives of the saints.
74:37
Speaker A
There's so much richness there like taking them seriously and venerating them and modeling yourself after them like manifestations of holiness in in different times and places. So there's just a kind of like richness to like just all all the
74:51
Speaker A
like all the extra bonus content that comes with being Catholic. Yeah, it's very attractive.
74:57
Speaker A
Awesome. Well, let's then like compare and contrast uh Yeah. what kind of led you to Catholicism to begin with and even to like theism to begin with, compare that with what leads you to well, what kind of solidifies
75:09
Speaker A
your faith now, how you would argue for Catholicism now, how you would argue for theism now. Like I'm just curious like Yeah.
75:15
Speaker A
how do these compare, what has remained the same, what has changed. I guess I'll kind of like let you take the reins with this cuz I mean, I'm I'm just curious.
75:22
Speaker A
I mean, I should say first of all, like I'm not I'm not like in apologetics. I'm not in Catholic or Christian apologetics. Like I you know, I write some stuff in philosophy that bears on some of these questions, but like,
75:35
Speaker A
you know, at at the time, so you know, you just converted around the same age, I think, as as I did, and you have this like 25 hour like and and and it's it's awesome. I I listened to almost all of it.
75:49
Speaker A
And and you know, of course like you're arguing you're fighting battles on every front.
75:56
Speaker A
Like here's why like not Eastern Orthodoxy and here's why not Protestantism and here's why it's better than like Islam and here's why it's not like impersonal axiology and you got all your bases covered and you got like this comprehensive case. And
76:10
Speaker A
that's that's definitely not like where I would I I wouldn't have been able to produce my 25 hour like in in in graduate school. And so I mean there are a lot of like alternative possibilities that I hadn't
76:24
Speaker A
ruled out at the time and you know, probably still because I'm not um well anyway.
76:30
Speaker A
Well, same here. We're not omniscient. I mean I'm just this limited frail human being and I'm trying my best, but you know.
76:35
Speaker A
yeah. Um you know, for for me there were like two or three other people in my program who are like, oh, you're Catholic now?
76:43
Speaker A
What's up with that? Why? Whereas you're like having to deal with challenges from half the internet. So it's it's it's a very different situation. But yeah, so I guess one thing I'd say is you know, I I'm probably quite a bit more miracle
76:55
Speaker A
pilled now than than I was at the time. You know, I was never like anti-miracle, but I just hadn't looked into a lot of these things very very deeply and specifically like this category of like vindicatory Catholic miracles that
77:11
Speaker A
you and Ethan and Noah have have been um raising to prominence. That was not even like a category in my mind. Probably should have been if I had read my Vatican one. Uh I it it it would have
77:23
Speaker A
been, but uh I think I am like most people and that like that that was just like not even a a way I was thinking about things.
77:31
Speaker A
Basically, you know, I think that like you and Ethan and Noah and uh make make a pretty strong case with these Catholic vindicatory miracles. I mean, I haven't followed all the ins and outs and responses and stuff. And so, um it's
77:44
Speaker A
it's possible that my opinion would change if I looked deeper into it. But on on the surface, that that looks pretty compelling to me. Um so that that's kind of on the the Catholic side. I don't know Right. So you would basically just one
78:01
Speaker A
one one what I'm hearing is like you would maybe import some vindicatory stuff. Of course, you know, like you want to look into it further and whatnot. But like that's at least one difference between now and then is you
78:09
Speaker A
would bring in probably um some vindicatory miraculous cases for Catholicism. Yeah. So if you were to ask me today like make the case for Catholicism that like that would play a bigger role than I it it would have had I been asked to
78:20
Speaker A
do the same, you know, 13 14 years ago um when when this conversion happened. That's probably the main thing on the like why Catholicism rather than other forms of Christianity.
78:33
Speaker A
Um with respect to like how I think about like theism versus naturalism, for example, I guess I I think about that in like a continuous way, but in a lot of ways quite a bit different from how I did
78:47
Speaker A
then. Um now I'm inclined to just think about the whole issue in much much more of a Bayesian framework than I would have been inclined to do uh when when I first converted. And within that framework, like now I feel like I
79:03
Speaker A
can appreciate the the kind of like intrinsic probability of theism much better than I did before. This idea that like okay, there's these priors and the priors favor hypotheses that are kind of simple and elegant and non-arbitrary uh and uniform. And theism has those
79:21
Speaker A
sorts of virtues and spades that like make it like not very implausible on the priors.
79:27
Speaker A
And then yeah, just this whole way of thinking about things like okay, but then now when I look around the world, is this like more like what I would expect if the universe were designed by God versus fundamentally
79:38
Speaker A
purposeless? Um, and you know, so that that that's just like a way of thinking about the question that I I didn't really think in those terms at the time um and and now I do and I guess I'm inclined to think that thinking in
79:53
Speaker A
those terms uh makes theism look more attractive. Obviously that's going to be controversial, but that's what I what I think now. Yeah, so in now I would put more weight on kind of psychophysical harmony than I did at the time like I
80:07
Speaker A
said that coming to believe that consciousness was non-physical that played a role, but I hadn't really firmly appreciated like beyond like the mere existence of consciousness as this extra non-physical feature of the universe, the way in which it's integrated into the physical
80:24
Speaker A
world relative to all the ways in which it could have been lawfully integrated into the physical world um is actually incredibly striking and not at all what you'd expect given a kind of fundamentally indifferent uh naturalistic universe. So that's that's
80:39
Speaker A
one thing that I would put more weight on now. And then another thing is kind of various forms of fine tuning in the physical realm. So I guess I was aware of the fine tuning argument when I converted but
80:53
Speaker A
for whatever reason and I don't actually remember why I don't think that played much of a role for me. Um, I don't remember thinking about it too much, but I think probably at the time I thought like well the multiverse response
81:04
Speaker A
probably works uh now I'm I think the multiverse response is weaker than than I used to think um but I also think like even if it even if the multiverse is in the running then at the very least
81:17
Speaker A
the traditional fine tuning argument should like raise your credence in theism perhaps in addition to raising your credence in in the multiverse and so I would put more weight there and then I'd also put more weight on these
81:27
Speaker A
kind of like a priori fine tuning arguments that like forget about the actual structure of the laws that has the property that like it's got constants that need to be dialed into a narrow range to allow for life. We can
81:40
Speaker A
just kind of think through a what does an a universe need to be like in order to host life or in order to host any kind of interesting organized complexity at all? And you can just think about like different possible
81:53
Speaker A
laws, including very simple laws that could govern concrete realities and just see that like actually most of them are not going to lead to like anything interesting ever happening ever.
82:04
Speaker A
And you know, could just be laws where there's this like particles and they follow like a law of inertia of just like always moving in a straight line forever or always moving in a circle. Like anyway, I won't go
82:16
Speaker A
deep into these, but I think there's there's a case to be made that just thinking through the matter a priori without looking at like the actual structure of our laws, like a lot needs to be right. A lot needs to be
82:29
Speaker A
fine tuned in the fundamental elements and structures and laws of the universe in order for there to be life or any any interesting organized complexity at all.
82:40
Speaker A
So that that that I think I would I would put more weight on. At least like for me I I whether other people would find that convincing or the guy on the airplane would find that convincing, for me that
82:50
Speaker A
strikes me as just like a more powerful consideration that I that I didn't really appreciate during my conversion, but I feel like I appreciate now.
82:58
Speaker A
Yeah, it really gets me. I mean cuz I don't know, I just sit back and it's like, dude, like just look outside. Like this is this is for me what kind of like it's it's the formal kind of rigorous
83:09
Speaker A
way of articulating the thought of like look at the trees, right? For me at least cuz like dude, like look at all this like insanely complex, orderly, like beautiful nature and it's just like among all the conceivable ways that like
83:24
Speaker A
a physical world could have been, it seems like there are so many that are even like way simpler than the actual world, like these super simple and elegant and compactly describable fundamental laws, but where it literally is just like a two-dimensional grid
83:37
Speaker A
which just like is like it's like a checker pattern or something or yeah, just like a particle just moves in a straight line for all of eternity and there's one single simple law about this one fundamental particle. It's
83:47
Speaker A
we passed like the world just happened to passed over this vast horde of like extremely simple laws to enable this.
83:57
Speaker A
It's like wow. Yeah, and there's a nice Yeah, go on. Well, yeah, there's a nice point that Luke Barnes makes in I think it's in Ergo paper um where he's he's considering like the I think he calls it the lamp light
84:11
Speaker A
problem where it's like okay like maybe if you just look at universes that have laws with the structure of our laws only a very narrow range allow for life or organized complexity. But what if we zoomed out and we looked at just the
84:24
Speaker A
space of all possible laws? Maybe like a large fraction of those would allow for life. And you know basically he says is like well it's kind of hard to like put a measure over that whole space but but here's
84:36
Speaker A
something we can say. You know there are people whose day job it is to think of like possible mathematical equations that could govern a concrete reality and you know they're called theoretical physicists and you can do similar stuff in like computer
84:50
Speaker A
science and mathematics and his claim is nobody has ever written down a set of equations or laws that would generate life without a high degree of fine tuning of some of its parameters or and so I thought it was
85:06
Speaker A
like we can write down laws or equations that can generate life that are compatible with life but you need to tune its parameters into a narrow range and you can write down lots of equations probably the probably the majority where there just
85:21
Speaker A
there's no ways of setting its parameters that would would give you life and so I mean granted we haven't like as theoretical physicists or mathematicians investigated every possible mathematical structure but like this does kind of encourage the idea
85:34
Speaker A
that like like you just do need a high degree of like things being fit just right at the fundamental level to have a world where like cool interesting organized complexity happens like you know even before we talk about life just
85:45
Speaker A
like interesting law yeah yeah in interesting organized complexity at all. Well let's move on to some like objections and like how you would now kind of resolve and respond to them um objections to theism objections to Catholicism because you know lots of
85:59
Speaker A
people have lots of different objections to Catholicism and theism so for theism maybe let's just camp out for a little bit on the problem of evil right so like you know someone comes up to you there's like hey
86:09
Speaker A
look at the world seems really really bad in lots of ways right there seems to be lots of um seemingly pointless suffering suffering that doesn't seem to like serve any good ends that doesn't seem to be justified by um any
86:20
Speaker A
outweighing goods um that it's necessary for you know there are lots of horrors which seem to just make some people's lives just like kind of not worth living um there's all this animal suffering around like what's the deal with all
86:32
Speaker A
these animals like ripping each other to shreds isn't that kind of like a a bad creation so um obviously I've just kind of thrown together three different kind of separable thoughts one about like gratuitous evil another about horrors
86:44
Speaker A
and another about animal suffering but I think those are maybe like the three biggest planks that a lot of people worry about and of course I haven't like articulated the argument in any like rigorous uh terms but how do you
86:55
Speaker A
respond to the problem of evil? Yeah I mean I'm say up front it's not like I have a really super duper satisfactory response I can say some things that explain why I'm not hugely worried by it um yeah so I guess there there'd be a few
87:13
Speaker A
factors just in the way I think about it you know one would be to lean at least to ex a limited extent not too hard on kind of skeptical theist kinds of considerations of a weak form just like there there are
87:28
Speaker A
lots of reasons that might be available to god that we can't think of given our limited intellects and so not hugely surprising if there are things that happen in the world for which we can't think of a god justifying reason there
87:43
Speaker A
might still be a god justifying reason um and then I would just say well we can also tell plausible stories that kind of fit well with kind of Christian commitments in various ways, uh, on which there there might very well
87:58
Speaker A
be decent reasons for at least many of the evils that we find. So, you know, here I would lean on, um, some places I would want want to lean on kind of like free will responsibility style theodicies. So I think some of the
88:14
Speaker A
evils that are in the world result from there being free responsible agents who use their freedom badly and with with bad results.
88:25
Speaker A
And I would accept the story on which like there is value there like God had good reason to create free and responsible agents including agents with the power of of of doing evil broadly because it allows for well
88:41
Speaker A
things like very significant meaningful uh responsibility over how well things go for others, how well things go for us, having responsibility over the formation of our own characters, the development of other people, um, providing for others, contributing to
88:58
Speaker A
the the collective resources of of humankind, the common good like at a time and overtime. Like I think it's there there there there's great value to having having that kind of meaningful responsibility like a world in which like our choices could only make a very
89:13
Speaker A
tiny difference like whether you get a brownie or not depends on what I choose.
89:17
Speaker A
Like that that's a world in which, you know, our our choices are not as meaningful and significant and there there's a real loss in that. Uh, so so that that's going to be part of the story.
89:29
Speaker A
Maybe part of the story is just like certain kinds of value and excellence that can only be exhibited in worlds where there's suffering or other kinds of evils. So just the familiar point that like you know, the exercise
89:44
Speaker A
of courage or resilience or patience or compassion or forgiveness or mercy, a lot of these virtues and displays of moral excellence like couldn't happen in worlds uh where there's there's no suffering and bad stuff. And you know, whether this is like God's reason
89:58
Speaker A
directly for like injecting bad stuff into the world or God's reason for or part of God's reason for not intervening and when when other people might freely create conditions where there's bad stuff, like I think that's going to be
90:11
Speaker A
part of the story. You know, I I also think I mean there's there's various more speculative ideas. So people have like these multiverse theodicees and there's some versions of this that that I don't really So one one version
90:26
Speaker A
of this is like well the best possible world is one where God creates every conceivable universe that's on balance good and guess what our universe is one of them and that's why we're around and um in some universes that are on balance
90:38
Speaker A
good still have a lot of bad stuff that's just outweighed by the good stuff. I I don't really like that version, but some kind of like plenitude style theodicees I find attractive as speculation. So like here's an idea and this is very
90:53
Speaker A
half-baked but you know, you you might think like there are there are a range of different kinds of goods and there are some kinds of goods like you know, the exercise of courage and resilience and compassion and so on that
91:09
Speaker A
can only happen in worlds where there's suffering or horrific suffering. And maybe maybe one thing God is trying to do is create a world that is plenitudinous with respect to the kinds of goods that are exhibited somewhere. And maybe
91:24
Speaker A
there's great value to to having that or at least God is justified in in in doing that. And so like if God is seeking to realize every kind of good somewhere in creation, this kind of like global feature of reality might have enough
91:38
Speaker A
value to justify there being like local pockets that are um that that have a lot of bad stuff in them. So yeah, I mean there like there there might be more speculative proposals along these lines that would explain at least some of the
91:51
Speaker A
evil. And then I've got this kind of whole omission theodicee that I think maybe you've talked about a little bit that's mainly I mean, the original idea was this was supposed to account for uh animal suffering especially like during
92:06
Speaker A
during the course of evolution. Could talk about that a little bit but um Yeah, no I mean so maybe we want to go to the hell stuff and stuff that's distinctive to Catholicism. I did just want to like at least for the audience,
92:16
Speaker A
people who might be worried about this, I wanted to I wanted you to give them like a bird's eye overview of like how you approach the problem of evil and I think that's sufficient for those purposes. And of
92:23
Speaker A
course, you know, there are many ways that one can push back and then respond and then try to counter respond and then counter counter respond so like obviously we're not tracing out the philosophical dialectic.
92:32
Speaker A
and I don't think like anyone should listen to what I just said and say like oh I guess evil's not a problem for theism at all. Like every what I just said is woefully inadequate and you know there's there's
92:41
Speaker A
a lot more that would would have to be said. And and that you know that has been said. So of course for the audience like definitely check out links in the description to Brian's papers and his work and um other interviews and whatnot
92:52
Speaker A
that I will link in the description. So if you guys want more you can check that out. But let's move on to some like Catholic distinctive problems and problems that like really bother a lot of people, right? So
93:03
Speaker A
one of these definitely concerns hell. Now this is of course a cluster of problems.
93:09
Speaker A
Maybe let's start off because you've given a lot of thought to proportionality objections to hell. Um so the thought here is that well hey all of our crimes seem only finite in severity. Um you know how could our
93:19
Speaker A
crimes that are committed for only a few minutes or a few seconds um especially given our like frailty and our seemingly finite culpability, how could that kind of merit like an infinite punishment that's dealt out to us in the afterlife?
93:32
Speaker A
And doesn't hell seem to be an infinite punishment? I mean after all it's like everlasting suffering under Catholic teaching. So doesn't the punishment here seem disproportionate to the crime and isn't that doesn't that contravene God's justice? So what do you make of this
93:47
Speaker A
proportionality objection? Yeah, I guess my thought on this is there are like lots of ways of responding that I find adequate and satisfactory and I've I've written and developed some I think novelish ideas here but I mean maybe just briefly kind
94:06
Speaker A
of go through the the range of possible responses. So you know first of all there's this kind of traditional idea that um well maybe our sins do have infinite gravity because all of them or at least some of them are sins against God who is
94:26
Speaker A
a being of like infinite dignity and worth. In the background idea here would be that like the the moral gravity of a wrong is dependent on two things like the kind of like objective character of the action but also the the
94:42
Speaker A
the dignity or worth of the one wronged against. This is a very intuitive principle that we recognize in a lot of cases like you know kicking a a squirrel is not as morally grave as like kicking a human being and you know so uh and and
94:58
Speaker A
this would just be like a natural extension to the infinite case and so uh at least if the wrongness or the gravity of the action scales in a kind of natural way then if the one offended against is of
95:09
Speaker A
infinite dignity then there would be something infinitely grave about the act. Now one one reaction a lot of people have and I guess I would have to some extent uh is okay but like surely it mitigates our responsibility
95:24
Speaker A
if we're not like conceiving of the act as an offense against God or as a sin against God and like most sins that people commit you know however bad they are they're not like actively conceiving of it as like I'm going to put up the
95:38
Speaker A
middle finger to God. They're you know they're they're you know you're you're stealing the pack of gum. You just want the gum.
95:46
Speaker A
You're not thinking of it as in in its guise as like disobedience to God and things like that.
95:52
Speaker A
Well I think that that probably does mitigate responsibility here but one thing you can say here is like okay let's grant that um there there's another factor that accepts your that that affects your degree of culpability for an action, which is like your degree
96:06
Speaker A
of lucidity, like how clearly you understand what it is you're doing. And let's just, you know, here's a simple model. There's like the the objective gravity of the act um and then there's the degree of lucidity, how clearly you understand
96:23
Speaker A
what you're doing. Uh and let's just say that your overall and maybe let's measure that on a scale from like zero to one. And let's just like say that the overall degree of culpability, how blameworthy you are for the action, is
96:35
Speaker A
some kind of like simple product of those two factors. So the action in itself, like you know, maybe you're like murdering a human being, that's really bad, but you only kind of dimly realize that that's what you're doing. You have
96:46
Speaker A
like degree of lucidity 10% and okay, so then that's going to mitigate it to some extent. Okay, but now in the case where like the objective gravity of the act was was was infinite, uh if you have any
96:57
Speaker A
non-zero uh degree of clarity as to what you're doing, then at least on the simplest models, that's still going to be infinitely blameworthy. Okay, so anyway, there there's going to be some principles that um make it hard that
97:09
Speaker A
that seem well-motivated and natural, but then make it hard to resist the conclusion that sins against God um are infinitely grave. I mean, another thing to say here is even if like none of the ordinary sins committed in visibly in
97:25
Speaker A
our day-to-day lives are infinitely grave in the sense that they merit infinite punishment, uh here's a here's a hypothesis.
97:33
Speaker A
Maybe God kind of shows up to everyone uh at the moment of their death, like immediately prior to the separation of soul and body, and kind of makes in a relatively clear form some kind of like final offer of like grace and salvation
97:49
Speaker A
that can either be accepted or rejected by the by the person like immediately prior to death. I think that that's like a real possibility and there are saints who have talked about this as something that happens in many cases or possibly
98:00
Speaker A
all cases. And that's one reason why like you can never be sure about the the eternal fate of any particular person, even if they like die suddenly in a car crash after living a visibly like dissolute life full of mortal sin. Like
98:13
Speaker A
you should not be sure of any in any particular case of of their damnation.
98:17
Speaker A
Okay, but if that's right, then it could be that like before death like those who do reject God do so under like conditions of sufficient clarity about what it is that they're rejecting, in which case like it's it's at least more
98:30
Speaker A
plausible that like that sin uh the kind of conscious rejection of of friendship with God and God's like final offer of grace with a relatively lucid understanding of what the stakes involved are, like maybe that would be infinitely grave. Okay, so that's at
98:45
Speaker A
least an epistemic possibility that like would would have the result that like actually maybe some people's sins prior to death uh really do merit infinite punishment. Okay, so that's all kind of like ways of rejecting the assumption that nothing
99:01
Speaker A
anyone does in their earthly life merits infinite punishment. But then another thing you can do, and this is what I do in the the hell and proportionality paper, is say like actually you don't need to say that um
99:12
Speaker A
the punishment involving everlasting suffering is an infinitely severe punishment. In one sense this is kind of totally obvious because like imagine a life that's like as good and similar to like my life now, but just like extended infinitely far.
99:28
Speaker A
Well, I suffer every day. Like there's just like various little things that happen that cause suffering. So a life that's like as good as mine now extended infinitely would be uh an existence of everlasting suffering.
99:42
Speaker A
But like that kind of afterlife would definitely not be disproportionate. Like I don't deserve that much and like like and you definitely can't tell me that like like Hitler doesn't deserve anything as bad as that. Like that's way better than
99:56
Speaker A
than Hitler deserves. And so like like the mere commitment to there's an afterlife and it involves suffering that never ends without further details, like there's no reason at all to think that that's going to violate like intuitive proportionality constraints because you
100:13
Speaker A
and you know one reason this is relevant is like there are some people in the Catholic tradition like Jacques Maritain who have proposed like very gentle models of hell where like basically everyone in hell ends up in a state of kind of perfect
100:27
Speaker A
natural happiness, kind of limbo-like natural happiness, but that's intermixed with a kind of like interior sorrow and regret for their sins. So they they realize that they've missed out on the end for which they have made. They don't
100:38
Speaker A
get the beatific vision. There's a kind of lasting sorrow and regret for that, but it's intermixed with a kind of like contented grateful acceptance of what God has given them. And like, you know, on the whole it's like, you know,
100:49
Speaker A
they're they're very happy, but there's this kind of sorrow intermixed. That fits the letter of you've got an afterlife of everlasting suffering, but nonetheless like it would be insane to think that like, well, that's way worse than Hitler deserves. That's way
101:03
Speaker A
worse than or like no no no that's that's way better than most of us deserve any of us deserve deserve. Um so in order to get the the the proportionality concerns off the ground, you know, presumably you need to think
101:17
Speaker A
that it's not just everlasting suffering, but you know it's not counterbalanced by other stuff that could make it like positive on that and so on. Um okay so let's just assume not counterbalanced um none of that Maritain funny business. Still it doesn't follow
101:32
Speaker A
that the the punishment is going to be infinitely severe. So one possibility that I explore in the paper is a kind of diminishing suffering model where like suffering diminishes by a geometric proportion. So you know suffer 100 units in the first year and
101:48
Speaker A
50 units in the next year and 25 in the next year and so on. Um finite total suffering over everlasting time if it diminishes in that way. So everyone will agree like okay that's like a mathematical possibility, but I think
102:04
Speaker A
a natural reaction is like okay it's like a gimmick. Yeah it's like a gimmick. Like come on, that's not that that like why would it be that way?
102:12
Speaker A
And so one thing I do in the paper is try to say like actually there are kind of theologically attractive models that would get you something like that. So it's not purely a gimmick. So if you start out with this idea that's common
102:25
Speaker A
in some traditions that like the life of the the blessed in heaven involves this kind of gradual process of theosis, you become ever more like yeah increasing beatitude, increasing godlikeness. You're participating ever more fully in the infinite life life of God. Of course,
102:43
Speaker A
you never reach a terminus to that because God is infinite and so on. Um but there's this kind of gradual process of becoming ever more like God further up and further in into the infinite heart of God. And then like if that's
102:54
Speaker A
your picture of what life of the blessed in heaven is like, then the the kind of mirror image of that in hell would be a kind of anti-theosis where like those in the outer darkness, they grow kind of
103:05
Speaker A
like ever less substantial, ever less real, ever approaching kind of sheer nothingness, but never quite reaching it. Um and as they approach kind of sheer nothingness, like their capacity for meaningful forms of consciousness including suffering dwindle with it. So
103:21
Speaker A
you get this kind of like thinner, more tenebrous consciousness gradually and so on. So you know that that kind of fits nicely and kind of goes along with so some things that like you know CS Lewis says in the
103:33
Speaker A
Great Divorce um he doesn't have like the diminishing picture over time, but he definitely has this picture which is actually common in the tradition that like the the consciousness of those in hell is like way thinner and less real and less
103:49
Speaker A
substantial than the consciousness of those in heaven. So he's says somewhere like you know if you like if all the sufferings of hell entered the consciousness of yon wee yellow bird, he's this is talking in the voice of
104:01
Speaker A
George MacDonald and the the bird is like in heaven, it would just be kind of like swallowed up without a trace. It wouldn't even like register because like it's just like such a thin, tenebrous, shadowy form of consciousness. You know,
104:13
Speaker A
there's some it's it's a it's a form of suffering, but it's like almost non-being. Okay. So that's that's like a model that I find at least somewhat theologically attractive on which we'd get finite total suffering combined with everlasting suffering. And then there's
104:28
Speaker A
there's other models. Well, I don't know how how long we could go into I think maybe if you could at least very briefly talk about the model under which there actually is infinite total non-counterbalanced suffering, but it doesn't amount to an infinite punishment
104:44
Speaker A
because it's not like an infinitely bad detraction from welfare for the kind of intrapersonal repugnant conclusion reasons.
104:51
Speaker A
Yeah. So here's a here here's the model. Suppose that like in the afterlife, those who are damned, they're kind of you know, maybe there's some they're like reduced to some kind of like subpersonal state. They're they're a ruin of a human being.
105:07
Speaker A
And there's still some kind of like consciousness, but it's like it's almost like a dim, shadowy like animal-like form of consciousness. And it's it's it's negative. It's it's negatively balanced. It's suffering.
105:20
Speaker A
You might think of this as just like at at the limit this might be like you know, imagine just like the consciousness of a lizard that's like in a slight state of like discomfort and confusion, but like extended forever.
105:32
Speaker A
Okay. Now let's ask, is that an infinite punishment? Is that an infinitely severe punishment if if that's what hell is like for the damned?
105:41
Speaker A
Well, here's an argument that the answer is no. Take that existence where you've got this lizard-like consciousness stretched on forever.
105:50
Speaker A
And now compare that to an afterlife that consists of like a trillion years of the worst torture imaginable.
105:57
Speaker A
And ask which would you prefer? Well, probably you would prefer the lizard-like afterlife rather than the trillion years of the worst torture imaginable.
106:06
Speaker A
Well, that suggests that okay, so a punishment involving infinite lizard-like unhappiness is less severe than a trillion years of the worst torture imaginable. But a trillion years of the worst torture torture imaginable is definitely like finitely bad. That's like a
106:23
Speaker A
finitely severe punishment. It's very bad, very severe, but it's finitely severe. We've just we've just granted that the lizard-like one is less severe than that, so it's less severe than a finitely bad punishment, so it's not finitely bad. Okay, so that's that
106:36
Speaker A
basically what I'm relying on here is like if you reject the repugnant conclusion, for those who know what that is, then you have to say that in general there can be ever afterlives involving everlasting suffering that don't diminish and aren't
106:51
Speaker A
counterbalanced that are only finitely bad, or at least they're less bad or less severe qua punishments than finitely bad punishments. Okay, so that's that's the basic thought.
107:03
Speaker A
Yeah, so I mean you just gave like four or so responses to the proportionality objection, each of which would be individually sufficient to um undermine it. And I think together have a very significant degree of force um in
107:15
Speaker A
undermining the objection. Maybe we'll talk also about um Sider's kind of vagueness problem. So Ted Sider has this paper in Faith and Philosophy, and I take it that the argument here is something like the following. Um like any criterion that you want to use
107:29
Speaker A
to try to separate, you know, the saved from the damned, any moral criterion that you're going to use uh is like going to admit of borderline cases, or at least, you know, people who differ only minutely in the relevant respects such
107:42
Speaker A
that like one of them falls on the saved side, one of them falls on the damned side. Um but like, you know, Catholics are committed to this binary heaven or hell scheme. Um and that's like that imposes some kind of enormous
107:52
Speaker A
discontinuity in the treatment of these people. And so like one person who's in heaven who only barely differs in morally relevant respects in their earthly life from someone who's in hell is being treated overwhelmingly different with respect to
108:09
Speaker A
like how they're treated in the afterlife by God, right? But it seems maybe it's some kind of unjust activity on God's part that he's imposing such radically different outcomes on nearly identical people, you know, like nearly identical lives,
108:22
Speaker A
nearly identical culpability. And so just like this radical disparity seems to be unjust. What do you make of that?
108:29
Speaker A
Yeah. So I I think I would reject both of the key premises of the argument. So, you know, one of the premises is this like justice requires a kind of relative proportionality condition where relevantly similar people get relevantly similar treatment.
108:47
Speaker A
So, you know, whatever the respects are that determine our our punishment or reward or whatever, those who are relevantly who are who are like very similar in relevant respects will get very similar treatments and those who are like
109:00
Speaker A
moderately similar will get moderately similar treatments and and and so on. So I do think that I I would reject that and maybe we'll come back to why.
109:10
Speaker A
But but then there's also this assumption that the human race is a smear in the sense that there's no way of partitioning it into two class two non-empty classes such that every member of the one class is very very different
109:22
Speaker A
in morally or spiritually relevant respects than everyone in the other class. Um so I'll say at the at the outset I'm not totally sure I've like thought through this issue with full clarity and but I'm I'll just kind of
109:37
Speaker A
off off the cuff say some things because I have given some thought to it.
109:41
Speaker A
So, you know, on the on the Catholic picture, whether you end up in heaven or hell is a function of like whether there is any sanctifying grace in your soul at the moment of death. Anyone with non-zero sanctifying grace in their
109:57
Speaker A
soul, which is a matter of the kind of like indwelling of of the triune God and a kind of supernatural life that's qualitatively different from the natural life like if if you got any degree of that non-zero then you're you're going to heaven, I
110:12
Speaker A
mean maybe after a process of purgation, and if you don't you're not. Okay. So that seems like a pretty Well, I mean the first thing to say is like that's a qualitative difference between the two classes and arguably
110:29
Speaker A
that would be enough to like not violate this kind of relative proportionality. Like we have a deep metaphysical qualitative difference between everyone in this class and everyone in this class. At least the the initial challenge is why wouldn't that be enough
110:41
Speaker A
to to justify different treatment? Now, there's also a kind of like temporal dynamic here because you might say well, suppose you've got someone over here on the good side and he's got some like small but non-zero amount of this of the
110:58
Speaker A
supernatural life in his soul whereas you got someone over here just like qualitatively different doesn't have it at all.
111:05
Speaker A
So that even though there's a qualitative difference that still might look like a relatively small difference just like in physics there's a qualitative difference between something with zero acceleration and small positive acceleration but it's still like a small difference even
111:20
Speaker A
though it's like a difference in kind rather than I mean it's a small difference in degree that's also associated with the difference in kind. Maybe something like that is is going on here.
111:30
Speaker A
And wouldn't this also call for like similar treatment even if it's kind of different in kind? But I think on the Catholic story you actually do get both similar treatment that is different in kind. So you get the kind of like two aspects that that
111:45
Speaker A
fit the structure of the situation. So it could be that like the the suffering initially undergone like through the process of purgatory for this person over here on the on the good side is very similar to the suffering initially
112:00
Speaker A
undergone by this person without any sanctifying grace in their soul such that like their initial treatment just like is almost in indistinguishable.
112:09
Speaker A
It's just that this person because they have the the supernatural life in their soul which comes with like like a charity animated fundamental orientation of the will towards the good they respond to that purgative suffering by go going in like like a good direction,
112:27
Speaker A
um becoming more pure and more sanctified and in in in in in all in more holy.
112:33
Speaker A
And then as a result like they they suffer less and less. There's less for them to less for them to expiate and so on. Um whereas like this person because of the utter and complete absence of the supernatural life in their soul,
112:46
Speaker A
they don't respond to that suffering in the same way. It's not similarly just purgative. And so like over time these people end up in very different states um reflecting in over time their their different ultimate states. So that's
113:01
Speaker A
that's one thing to say. Yeah, curious if you have thoughts on that, if you think that that picture solves the problem. I mean there is a worry that like like you you can push the problem back uh about like okay but
113:17
Speaker A
like if if The conditions under which you get that little bit of quantity of sanctifying grace versus the no sanctifying grace.
113:24
Speaker A
Is that what you Yeah, that's where I was going to go. Um I guess like that that's where the worry is. It's like you know One of these people stamped out um supernatural charity from their soul because they committed a mortal sin and
113:34
Speaker A
the other one uh didn't commit a mortal sin after they adequately repented. But you know the conditions on mortal sin it's like full knowledge, deliberate consent and grave matter. And some some things where it's like the grave the
113:45
Speaker A
gravity of the matter is like a scalar um you know it's such that you can like it could be more grave or less grave and there's going to have to be some kind of cutoff that God kind of imposes.
113:54
Speaker A
Likewise with full knowledge like you know we have degrees of knowledge or awareness or cognizance of the gravity of our our actions um degrees of justification, degrees of credence, degrees you know like all this stuff.
114:05
Speaker A
And then also with like uh deliberate consent there's degrees of deliberation, there's degrees of kind of giving full consent of your will. Now maybe Catholics are are ultimately just committed to thinking no there really is just like um like natural kinds here in
114:17
Speaker A
the moral domain um or maybe we're maybe maybe not. Maybe we could just say well you know God imposes some sort of um He has reasons for it, but like exactly where it goes is kind of arbitrary where
114:28
Speaker A
the cutoff is between mortal and non-mortal sin, at least in some cases. Uh but anyway, that that that's probably where I would want to go back.
114:34
Speaker A
so this is very the the obvious natural next place to go. You know, and I like the way you put it up. You like you have two people who are like say not in a or yeah, they're they're like in a state of
114:44
Speaker A
grace and then one commits a mortal sin and destroys the sanctifying grace in their soul and the other commits a sin that's just short of the threshold of mortality I on one of these dimensions, deliberate deliberate descent, gravity, or
115:00
Speaker A
whatever. So two two ways I see to go. So I when I've talked to other Catholic philosophers about this, I think they they they tend to want to say like no, it isn't just like an arbitrary threshold. There's some kind of like
115:15
Speaker A
deep difference in kind and it's hard for me to see how that works because it really does look like there's a kind of spectrum here and if there's a threshold, it's going to look like one kind of arbitrary point in the threshold
115:28
Speaker A
of like how clearly we understand what we're doing or to what extent there was duress or to like the the gravity. So so suppose that it is just a kind of threshold. So in that respect, it's it's a little bit like um
115:41
Speaker A
so, you know, this is a supernatural life in your soul is a little bit like the natural life of the body in that there's kind of arbitrary looking thresholds about what kinds of blows to it will result in
115:55
Speaker A
death versus like just being very damaged but not dead. So like, you know, this is just think of like different ways of physically bludgeoning you.
116:05
Speaker A
Um there might be like there's going to be an arbitrary looking threshold about like how hard it hits like that like would kill you, but if it was a little bit less hard, it would not quite have killed you and like why was
116:17
Speaker A
the threshold there? Well, it just that's just kind of how how how the body is built that that there are these kind of arbitrary looking thresholds about what what blows are sufficient to completely snuff out the life versus
116:29
Speaker A
just put you in a a bad position. And in so suppose that's true for the the supernatural life too, uh then it does look like there are these pairs of actions that are relatively similar, but one kills the supernatural
116:44
Speaker A
life and the other doesn't. It just leaves it very wounded. But I don't see yet that there's a failure of justice because Sider's point was here's what justice requires.
116:58
Speaker A
If you have similar people and you're judging them based on some criteria, then two beings that are similar with respect to the relevant criteria should get similar treatment.
117:08
Speaker A
Um but if the loss of supernatural life in the soul is not a matter of justice, it's just a matter of kind of like given the way God has set things up, the conditions under which you will lose or
117:21
Speaker A
not lose the the supernatural life in your soul, there hasn't yet been a failure of proportional justice.
117:28
Speaker A
The only place where there could be a failure of proportional justice is when at the later point God decides uh like some eternal uh fate for these people.
117:39
Speaker A
But my thought is that later decision, that's just based on whether there's sanctifying grace in their soul or not, which is a qualitative deep metaphysical difference that's not just a matter of like arbitrary degree.
117:54
Speaker A
And so as long as like the ultimate like reward or punishment or whatever is being decided on the basis of like whether this life is present at all, then that that decision is not going to violate proportional justice.
118:10
Speaker A
There is another thing that happens earlier which violates a kind of proportionality condition, uh but that's not a proportionality condition on justice and it's also not one that we have any reason to ex- expect is true in general.
118:24
Speaker A
That's just that that would just be the condition that like similar causes lead to lead to very similar effects in like whether they destroy a life or not. But that's just wrong because like in the case of biological life, like we know
118:38
Speaker A
that there's like there are violations of that principle. We're just saying that the same kind of thing happens with the supernatural life of the soul.
118:46
Speaker A
Mhm. Two two sins that are like very similar, one of which one could have the result of like extinguishing the supernatural life, the other leaves it wounded but not extinguished. That's just a thing that can happen just like
119:01
Speaker A
it can happen with with physical life. As long as the the ultimate like decision of the afterlife isn't based directly on that but is based on like the effect of that, then I don't see that there's a violation of
119:13
Speaker A
proportional justice. Yeah. Okay, that's really interesting. And I wonder if um there's a way to push back which is like, well, hold on a second. Like whether or not someone has the supernatural charity in their soul is ultimately like a gift from God, right?
119:27
Speaker A
So ultimately this is still down to a divine choice of whether or not to give the gift to the relevant people. And they still don't differ in morally relevant respects and he gives the gift to one of them and not to the other
119:38
Speaker A
while knowing that one of these is inexorably going to lead to eternal life and the other one's going to lead to eternal damnation. You might just wonder like I don't know, is there still some kind of Yeah.
119:50
Speaker A
Is there still some kind of at least lingering worry about the distribution of gifts when you know that they're inexorably going to lead to the relevant, you know, disparity in in treatment with respect to how you kind of retributively punish them or reward
120:03
Speaker A
them. I don't know. I mean maybe maybe even now we just should think about like well, a parent could like I don't know.
120:10
Speaker A
They they give they give gifts to their children and it's like a vase, you know, and it has a certain degree of uh fragility, right? And you give them both the gift of the and it has the same
120:20
Speaker A
fragility and you know, you know that your children can trip and sometimes they're clumsy and like it's their fault, you know, if they trip and you know, they reach some kind of um and And like the kind of trip where they would
120:31
Speaker A
break it is like the one where like they're going to have to be at fault for it, you know?
120:35
Speaker A
For whatever reason we we kind of specify the case like that. And you just say yeah like listen whoever comes to me with a non-broken vase at the end of the day you're going to get like a bunch of
120:44
Speaker A
cookies, okay? And that's the condition. And so you give them both you give them both the vase and they both tripped and it was very similar to like their culpability and whatnot but one of them was unfortunately just slightly more
120:55
Speaker A
culpable and they tripped slightly harder and they broke the vase and the other one didn't.
121:00
Speaker A
Sorry, you don't have the vase and I don't know it's the parent's gift to give. They can specify the conditions under which you know you you know you get the cookies and it was a gift in at the outset. You
121:12
Speaker A
didn't deserve it to begin with. I mean both you know the other person is indeed getting what they deserve. I mean now now maybe I'm sort of starting to veer into your second response to this this objection but
121:23
Speaker A
Yeah, I mean I do think it gets into that territory. Maybe let me say one more thing one more potential response.
121:29
Speaker A
I I agree that the issues you're bringing up are and I I I like this example and I I agree that there's there's further issues and the things I said initially don't clearly solve all the problems.
121:41
Speaker A
One one thing I think should be on the table is like going back to this idea which I'm very attracted to this idea of like the antimortem opportunities of salvation of like God showing up to the soul especially of sinners kind of at
121:57
Speaker A
the last moment and giving them some kind of like final offer of salvation wherein it's clear to them what's being offered and giving them the freedom to accept or reject.
122:07
Speaker A
So if that's like part of the picture and suppose like everyone gets that or everyone who's like is not in a state of grace immediately prior to their death gets gets that final opportunity then it looks to me like actually there will
122:25
Speaker A
be a pretty large significant difference between those who end up in heaven and those who don't that you wouldn't see if you were just looking at their like publicly visible acts, like how many swear words they said or how many,
122:40
Speaker A
you know, how many times they got drunk or committed adultery or whatever. Yeah, like you stared clear headedly at the offer of salvation and you just rejected it. Like any other people accepted it. Yeah, you said no. Sorry.
122:53
Speaker A
that that seems to me like oh actually that's that's very significant and big. And if that's the basis for the the sheep, you know, some going this way and some going that way, then actually that like that that that's a
123:06
Speaker A
big difference and so it would merit a a a big difference in in treatment in a way that wouldn't violate proportional justice.
123:13
Speaker A
So that's that's one thing I want to be on the table there. Um and then the other thing is so I I would want to reject I mean so I accept that there is like a defeasible proportional justice uh
123:30
Speaker A
principle that like justice gives like defeasibly requires similar treatment to similar cases and moderately different treatment for moderately different cases and so on. Um but I just think that like this this is defeasible and might be defeated by other reasons God has in the picture.
123:51
Speaker A
So let's just take a a really simple case where you just got two people in the human race and they're both kind of like sinners.
123:59
Speaker A
Um and you know they they live pretty simple lives. But one of them uh like towards the end of their life is repentant.
124:08
Speaker A
And let's just say like like a bit repentant, not like complete conversion turnaround, but they're like pretty like they're they're a little bit repentant. They they feel bad for what they did. They they kind of want to change. And and the other one is like
124:21
Speaker A
not repentant at all. Okay. So if you look at their their lives look pretty similar. The there's this difference in that one has a little bit of repentance and the other doesn't. But that's that's not like a huge difference by ordinary standards.
124:36
Speaker A
But now suppose like God wants to do two things or God has reason to do two things. One is to give at least some person to be a beatific vision.
124:46
Speaker A
Just like for reasons of grace and in generosity. Like he wants to give at least some some person to be a beatific vision.
124:53
Speaker A
And but also he wants because justice is a good thing, he wants to give at least some person what they like intrinsically deserve. Like what what their their life and actions intrinsically deserve. And suppose so first of all the the one
125:07
Speaker A
thing to notice is it's absolutely impossible for him to do both of those things without violating proportional justice.
125:16
Speaker A
Because the beatific vision is just like really awesomely good, just amazingly good. Much much like infinitely better than what anyone deserves. So if he gives one of these guys the beatific vision and he gives the another of these guys what
125:35
Speaker A
they intrinsically deserve, then like there just has to be a massively in fact infinitely large gulf between the treatment of people who are finitely different and in fact not not very different.
125:47
Speaker A
And so this is just a case where like here are three things you might want to do.
125:52
Speaker A
Satisfy absolute proportionality for at least one person. Like giving them what they what they intrinsically deserve.
126:00
Speaker A
Give at least one person the beatific vision because that's great and generous and a show of grace and mercy. And satisfy relative proportionality.
126:09
Speaker A
It's you cannot satisfy all those three. In this scenario it's logically impossible to satisfy all those three conditions. So maybe this is just a case where there's a kind of normative tradeoff. Like God has reasons of justice to give at least some person
126:23
Speaker A
what they intrinsically deserve. God has reasons of love and beneficence and mercy to give some person the beatific vision. God also has these kind of siderian reasons of relative proportionality to treat like cases alike. You can't have all three, so God
126:39
Speaker A
chooses two, and he chooses uh satisfy absolute proportionality and and and give some people the beatific vision.
126:47
Speaker A
Okay, now that's a simple model with at least with only two people, but the exact same point follows if you have eight billion people. If if God wants to give for reasons of justice some people what they intrinsically deserve and
126:59
Speaker A
wants to give other people uh the beatific vision, then it and then given that the the beatific vision is just infinitely better than what anyone deserves, it's literally impossible to do both of those things while also satisfying a relative proportionality
127:15
Speaker A
constraint. And so this is just one of those cases where there like might unavoidably be a normative tradeoff where you can't do all of three things that you have reason to do, and God like permissibly chooses to do two of them.
127:28
Speaker A
Uh so that that's that's one thing I would want to say here. And then okay, given that in order to do these two good things, both of which are like good and God has reasons to do, like satisfy absolute
127:42
Speaker A
proportionality for some and give some people the beatific vision, uh there's going to have to be a violation of relative proportionality, but we can hope to um make that discrimination on the basis of some factor that seems like relevant.
127:58
Speaker A
And so it might just be that in the circumstances the the best way to do it is to make the decision on the basis of like maybe an arbitrary threshold on a relevant factor. So a relevant factor would be things like did you like sin
128:14
Speaker A
and how gravely and and how deliberately and with full knowledge blah blah blah. But it might be that just unavoidably there has to be some kind of uh arbitrary threshold there, otherwise you're not going to satisfy the other
128:26
Speaker A
conditions. And so the example I give in the the paper is so it like it's one thing to single out a group for for special treatment better than they deserve on the basis of some totally irrelevant factor like skin
128:40
Speaker A
color or height, and it's another thing to single out a group for special treatment based on an arbitrary threshold on a relevant factor.
128:49
Speaker A
So an example of the second would be like suppose like you only have so much room in your prison and so you need to show clemency to some people who would otherwise go go to prison. Um you could
129:00
Speaker A
do it just based on like, oh, what letter does their name start with? All the vowels are going to go free. Like that that would be an irrelevant factor.
129:07
Speaker A
But but suppose these people are like in for like drunk driving. You can say like, okay, it's illegal to have a blood alcohol level above .05 so or point .08 or whatever. Um so all these people by justice should be in jail. But let's
129:21
Speaker A
show show clemency to anyone who while above the .08 threshold was still below .09 or something like that. Uh so that you know that's better than the people who are like way above the the the threshold. So that would be a relevant
129:34
Speaker A
factor. Like they weren't as drunk as these other guys, but it is a somewhat arbitrary uh threshold. And it seems to me that like if if you're in a circumstance where like other normative considerations require you to violate like cider strong
129:47
Speaker A
relative proportionality constraint, the best you can do maybe is pick an arbitrary threshold on a relevant factor and that's maybe what God has done.
129:58
Speaker A
That's fascinating. Uh I hadn't thought of that. That's really cool. I'm glad you shared that. Um I mean I'm also just like I'm open to the thought that like, yeah, this relative proportionality stuff just isn't even a constraint. We
130:09
Speaker A
got two murderers out of the benevolent mercy of the the judge. Lets one of them free.
130:18
Speaker A
The other one is given the just deserts for murdering another human being. I mean I I just think like you don't really have grounds to complain. Um you know you murdered a human being. Like I'm giving each of you I mean I'm giving
130:30
Speaker A
you what you deserve, right? I mean are you jealous of my generosity? I was generous towards this other person. They don't deserve to go free, but like yeah, you certainly don't and I was just generous to them. Uh I mean I'm I'm open
130:39
Speaker A
to that. Yeah, and of course there's the parable of the vineyard workers where like that is what's on like, well, it's not punishment, but everyone gets at least what they deserve, but some people are given more than what they deserve and
130:51
Speaker A
in in the last like 30 minutes. money. He can do with it what he wants.
130:54
Speaker A
He has that kind of discretion. So, I mean maybe I mean that that's like an easy way out and maybe that that works on its own.
131:02
Speaker A
But I also think it's worth looking into like how much of what I'm with you.
131:05
Speaker A
cider says can we concede but still find some plausible response. I'm I'm totally with you. I just think there are many responses to this and like I don't know. I'd have to think about it further, but I'm I'm
131:15
Speaker A
again I'm not totally closed off to the idea that there is some kind of like deep natural kind difference between you know mortal sin and venial sin. Like maybe if we specify that like you got to be morally certain that what you're doing
131:29
Speaker A
is gravely wrong for instance like with respect to the full knowledge condition. Well, moral certitude is like this category in like Catholic moral theology and maybe actually it is kind of like more of a a categorical thing like it's
131:42
Speaker A
like kind of fundamentally different from when you just don't have moral certitude where you like you just aren't able to practically rule out relevant alternative options for your deliberation um and like just is a natural kind difference and
131:53
Speaker A
maybe we can go through um the other conditions on mortal sin and just find something like that, but maybe not. I I doubt that this is something that the magisterium has settled um but maybe one final thing if you're cool
132:05
Speaker A
with that on hell and then we'll just end it um and uh yeah but so what do you think about the the question like well listen why does God create anyone who he foresees will be damned? Like couldn't
132:17
Speaker A
he just extend mercy to everyone? Um is doesn't this seem to just be like a fundamentally unloving thing? Like if he knows in advance that they're going to go to hell, why create them? Um why is there a hell in the first place, Brian?
132:32
Speaker A
Well, so I'm not sure how much this solves the problem, but I I do think the the framing of the question presupposes a certain view about the relationship between will and God's providence that I at least would reject.
132:52
Speaker A
So I think like the logical moment uh at which God is deciding whether to create them is prior to the logical moment at which they do the things that make them worthy of damnation, which is prior to the logical
133:08
Speaker A
moment at which God knows that they will be damned. And so there's there is foreknowledge, but it's not usable foreknowledge here because in the scenario where God decides not to create them in that scenario, because I think there
133:24
Speaker A
are no true counterfactuals of freedom and that that's a necessary truth, in that scenario God wouldn't doesn't know that if he had created them, they would have sinned because there would not have been any true counterfactual of that form. So there's
133:38
Speaker A
there's no scenario in which like God has usable foreknowledge to the effect that they would sin if if God creates them. It's only true that God that they would sin if God creates them like logically after God creates them. So at
133:53
Speaker A
that point like it would just be logically incoherent for like God to have decided never to have created them at all. So yeah. Do you think that that solves the problem? I mean there's further questions about like why
134:04
Speaker A
Yeah. That's my approach as well. I mean um it's basically you had to go to the um this view that like God's knowledge of what we will freely do uh is sort of explanatorily uh I mean it's explanatorily prior to his
134:22
Speaker A
decision about you know where to send us. Um and also uh he basically explanatorily prior to actually us being there, us being created and making decisions that we do, explanatorily prior in that logical moment he doesn't know what we're going to do. So this is
134:37
Speaker A
not open theism. We're not saying that like God doesn't have comprehensive foreknowledge of the future. The point is that like in creating uh in some sense God is kind of taking a risk that free creatures would go astray and it's
134:48
Speaker A
not like he knows like ah yes, this person is going to mortally sin and be damned and I'm going to create them knowing that. He kind of creates them. They perform their free actions and he damns them or rewards them on account of
135:00
Speaker A
you know um well he will damn them on account of what they do. So it's like his his choice to act on.
135:06
Speaker A
His knowledge that they will let's say sin mortally explanatorily depends on the fact that they will sin mortally.
135:13
Speaker A
Yeah. But then it doesn't make sense to say well why didn't he use that knowledge as the basis of a decision not to create them in the first place because Right.
135:21
Speaker A
like that that just creates a kind of logical incoherence where he's using a fact as a reason to do something that had he done that thing it wouldn't have been a fact in in the first place such that he wouldn't have known. So yeah I
135:32
Speaker A
think if we're yeah if we think in terms of this kind of simple foreknowledge picture of freedom that way of phrasing the question just doesn't actually make sense. It doesn't answer the question of like why God instituted a system where
135:46
Speaker A
some people could be damned or other questions like for me the the hardest question about hell is just why not have a policy where God is just going to give unlimited second chances and which would like arguably all but
136:03
Speaker A
guarantee universal salvation. Um that that would be a different problem. Do you want a very I know I'm really I mean I don't you know there are there are some things that could be said but might respond that these aren't weighty
136:17
Speaker A
enough considerations to justify it but you know one one factor is well if if God has a policy that guarantees or all but guarantees universal salvation then nobody has difference-making responsibility for whether they are eventually saved. Nothing about I mean
136:38
Speaker A
their free choice might make a difference to whether they end up in heaven earlier rather than later but no one's free choice to like cooperate with grace makes a difference as to whether they end up in heaven And
136:52
Speaker A
you might think that a world like that would be losing out on something of value where like we get to be like meaningful meaningfully partial contributors to like our becoming in perfect union with God, which wouldn't exist under a policy that
137:10
Speaker A
guarantees universal salvation. Now you might say, okay, that but so you something would be lost under the the policy that guarantees universal salvation but a lot would be gained and wouldn't what's gained outweigh what would be lost?
137:26
Speaker A
Um so maybe maybe there's some of our intuitions just need to be reformed here. I'd be curious if if you have thoughts. I mean there's other thoughts in the tradition which is like, well, justice is a good thing and isn't it
137:39
Speaker A
also a good thing for like, you know, God's justice is part of God's overall perfection? Isn't it a good thing if like all aspects of God's perfection are adequately and permanently on display in the created order? I mean God created
137:53
Speaker A
the universe in order to like manifest his perfection and his perfection is like multifaceted, multi-aspect, multi-aspectual.
138:02
Speaker A
And one aspect of it is is justice in in a world where despite the fact that lots of people deserve eternal punishment, no one gets it, is a world where like God's justice is not permanently manifested in the created
138:16
Speaker A
order and it's at least permissible for God to choose to create a world in which God's justice is permanently manifested in the created order because of how valuable it is to have like the the rich multifacetedness of God's
138:30
Speaker A
perfection adequately manifested in the created order. I think both of those are are sensible replies. I mean I think I probably favor favor the first one a little bit more.
138:39
Speaker A
Um and I just think uh sure, something is lost by adopting that policy whereby, you know, there's some definitive moment where you're either permanently lost or permanently saved.
138:51
Speaker A
Um but that does give us this difference making responsibility as you point out with respect to whether or not we are in ultimate, permanent communion with God.
138:58
Speaker A
And it's not very implausible to me that us having that difference making responsibility can redound to even like an infinitely better afterlife had we used it correctly, right? So I don't know. If we use that sort of freedom correctly,
139:14
Speaker A
maybe it gives us a better relationship with God for all of eternity. Maybe it gives us a better relationship with each other for all of eternity.
139:20
Speaker A
And that might indeed aggregate in ways that are at least very, very, very, very, very large finite goods result or maybe even infinite goods result.
139:30
Speaker A
And if we think of like damnation in such a way that the lives of the damned are on the whole worth living, then it's not like we are introducing you know, something which is like an infinite bad you know, into the world or something
139:47
Speaker A
like that. So like actually it's like actually a finite tradeoff for the potential the potential of like an infinite payoff or at the very least a very, very high and arguably larger finite payoff. So I don't know. Like
139:57
Speaker A
these these commitments are connected and Yeah, if the lives of the damned are like infinitely good on the whole, then it does really change how the problem looks. And then then it starts to look a little bit more like the situation where well, just
140:13
Speaker A
focusing on those who are saved, some experience greater blessedness than others, partly as a result of how how they behaved in this life.
140:20
Speaker A
Yeah. And you know, there it didn't have to be that way. We could have all been like at the level of beatitude that Mary has, but I don't know. There there's nothing about this situation that seems to call for complaint.
140:37
Speaker A
And and you can think of reasons for for God to institute this things this way that seem totally adequate.
140:45
Speaker A
And yeah, maybe the the situation with damnation is kind of relevantly similar. Right. Well, thank you, Brian, so much for your generous time, effort, energy, thoughts.
140:57
Speaker A
Um, it was super insightful. So, for the audience, like check out the links in the description. I put links to um stuff on hell, some papers that Brian has written on the omiscient theodicy and hell and proportionality and other
141:07
Speaker A
interviews that I've done with Brian. Um, yeah, check out the other resources that I'll put there in the description.
141:13
Speaker A
And hey, um I guess I want to just reiterate what Brian said earlier on in our conversation, you know? Like some of you may very well be at that point where you're like, yeah, I'm not really sure whether or not Christianity is true, but
141:25
Speaker A
um or even whether Catholicism is true. And But like I I don't know. I see some attractions to the tradition. I see some of the arguments. Some of the miracles might be pulling on me. Um, yeah, I've got some objections and I'm kind of
141:36
Speaker A
uncertain. But yeah, you don't you don't have to be full-bloodedly committed before you start praying, before you start reading the scripture, before you start, you know, immersing yourself um within religious communities. So, I would just like encourage some of you listeners who
141:52
Speaker A
are at that stage um to start considering yourself uh a non-committal Christian as Brian said or um you know like maybe consider just attending OCIA classes. It's not like you're signing up to you know definitely go through with
142:06
Speaker A
the confirmation or with the baptism or whatever. You know, that's just like kind of being a non-committal Catholic.
142:11
Speaker A
So, like consider doing that um for those of you who are sort of on the fence. Um, I think like the stakes are pretty high, but also there's just like a beautiful life of self-gift and beauty, truth, and goodness that awaits.
142:24
Speaker A
Uh and so I would just encourage you guys to to consider doing that. And pray the Rosary too if you're in that circumstance.
142:31
Speaker A
Yes, please. Definitely. If you're in that you know one decade of the Rosary a day at least. So, yeah. I mean I have I have I do not despair of your salvation and conversion if you do that. So, um okay. Thanks
142:43
Speaker A
Brian again. Um, wonderful chat. And uh for everyone, please check out the links in the description. Um, consider supporting on Patreon. Smash that like button of course. And of course, what better way to end as there than I'm Josh
142:53
Speaker A
Smith. This is the Madison Reason and peace out.
Topics:Brian CutterCatholic conversionphilosophy of religionnaturalismDavid Lewisconsciousnessproblem of hellMajesty of ReasonNotre Dametheism

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