Mohnish Pabrai shares 30 years of investing lessons: spend less than you earn, use index funds, avoid leverage, and hold great businesses long-term.
Key Takeaways
- Spending less than you earn is the foundation of wealth; investing savings in low-cost index funds is an effective, simple approach.
- Valuation matters for index returns: starting valuations strongly influence decade-long performance.
- Prioritize businesses with low leverage, durable competitive advantages, and trustworthy management.
- Find great businesses early, before they are widely recognized, and hold them for long periods rather than selling at fair value.
What the video covers
- Pabrai argues the biggest wealth-building battle is on the savings side: spend less than you earn, and invest the difference, even in a simple index fund.
- Small, early changes in habits compound dramatically over a lifetime, without requiring major sacrifices.
- The S&P 500 averages roughly 9% a year over long periods, but has had flat 10-17 year stretches (e.g., 1965-1982, 1999-2010) that depend heavily on starting valuations.
- Pabrai expects the S&P 500 may deliver weak returns (roughly -2% to +2% annually) over the next decade, and suggests Berkshire Hathaway as a holding during that period.
- His investment checklist (over 200 items) focuses mainly on three areas: leverage/debt, sustainable competitive advantage (the moat), and the quality and compensation of owners and managers.
- Capital-intensive industries like auto manufacturing are generally unattractive because of heavy capital requirements and fierce competition.
- Great businesses like Mastercard are often fully valued because the market recognizes them; Pabrai seeks greatness before it becomes universally recognized.
- He describes a Turkish warehouse-rental company bought for about $15 million that grew to roughly $1.8 billion in market value over about seven years.
- Pabrai admits his early Ben Graham-style approach of selling undervalued stocks at fair value was a mistake; he cites selling a 1% Ferrari stake as a major regret.
- He emphasizes that holding one great business for a very long time is often enough to build significant wealth.
Chapters
- 00:00Introduction: Keep Great Businesses Through Stock Price Swings
- 01:25Spending Less and the Power of Early Compounding
- 03:39The S&P 500's Long-Term Cycles and Valuation Risk
- 05:34Investment Checklist: Leverage, Moats, and Management
- 07:45Finding Undervalued Opportunities: Turkey and Warehouses
- 11:38Lessons from the Nifty50 and Walmart's Early Growth
- 18:18Ferrari, Selling Too Early, and Holding Great Businesses
- 28:20Closing Thoughts on Long-Term Wealth Building
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
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Until a business like Walmart goes into permanent decline, don't worry about what the stock price is. Don't worry about how expensive or cheap it is. Just keep it.
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I'm sitting down with Monish Pabry. For the past 30 years, he's built his career around one simple idea. Don't [music] reinvent what already works.
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Very small changes done very early in life have huge [music] impacts. Every person on that Forbes 400 got there because of one business.
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The S&P 500. I know you mentioned that it's [music] also got its own problems.
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We are at a point now in 2026. The next 10 years the S&P it's probably not a good place to be. [music] He started with 1 million. Today he manages $1.4 billion. So what have these three decades [music] taught him? I
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traveled to Texas to find out. I used to own 1% of Ferrari. Biggest mistake I made was selling them when they approached fair value. Ferrari's market cap today is approaching 100 billion.
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The 1% [music] would be worth a billion. I'm sorry, you made a mistake. Yeah. And and you know how how dumb is that?
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I want to start with this. After our conversation, if I take everything that you say to heart and act on it, what will change about the way that I invest?
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To change how you spend. Most of the battle is on the savings side. You have to spend less than you earn. You don't need to know much about investing. You can put it into an index fund. Over a
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lifetime, because of the asymmetry of compounding, even with relatively small amounts, you're going to become very wealthy. very small changes done very early in life have huge impacts long term without really having to give up anything.
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So I want to switch gears to the S&P 500. I know you mentioned that it's also got its own problems, but it you can't deny the fact that it's had an extraordinary run after more than 30 years of investing.
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How do you view the US stock market right now? One of the things to remember about index investing is that uh even though index investing is very good when we go back and look at the long history of the S&P the S&P on
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average over a 100 years for example has averaged more than 9% a year. That's an excellent result.
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Very good. But if you look at some periods from let's say 1965 to 1982 17-year period it was zero. Even though the US economy grew a lot profits grew a lot. The reason was that in 1965 the market was very overheated and by
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1982 it was very undervalued. It was not a good time to invest in the index and it was an incredible time to invest in the index in the early 80s. And then from 82 to 99 um was a spectacular run. I think the
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S&P went up 15x in that 17-year period. So it was zero from 65 to 82 and then 82 to 99 it went up like 15 times which is a lot. and then from 99 till about uh 2010 is again zero. We
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repeatedly see this pattern and you can go back all the way to the 1920s 1910s. You will find 10 20 even 30-year periods where it's flat.
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I see. And then you find 10, 15, 20 year periods which are spectacular. We are at a point now in 2026 that it would not surprise me say over the next 10 years the S&P is between minus 2% a year
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and plus 2% a year on average. the next 10 years. My the best guess I have looking at the just the levels and where it's been in the past is that it's probably not a good place to be. And
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that is why I suggested that look at Berkshire Hathway like the index. So by 2035 or thereabouts, the S&P will be ready for its next run.
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But we have this 10-year period, the abyss that we have to cross. So 10 years stay in Burkshire Hathaway and then the SMB will be ready to roll again.
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You've said that you have an investment checklist with over I believe it was 213 items.
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Can you give me a an example of a company that you were seriously considering and then something on the checklist made you stop and reassess that decision? Actually that uh happens a lot. Most of these questions fall into
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three buckets. Um they are uh the single biggest reason companies have issues is leverage. They have too much debt or you know they don't have enough equity and that sort of thing. Probably at least 20 or 30 questions related to different
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aspects of leverage. The second uh biggest area where uh we run into problems is the sustainable competitive advantage of a business. The moat, right? Anytime you have a very successful business. Let's say for example, um I I open a sushi restaurant here in
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Austin and it does really well and there's lines out the door. It's busy all the time.
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Well, in a few years there'll be many other sushi restaurants around me because people are going to look at that and say it's good to have to go around good good to and so what may happen in a
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few years is there may be so much competition uh which is so good that that restaurant doesn't do as well anymore. Almost no businesses will do well for a very long period of time. Now what happens sometimes in a
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business is a moat gets built like you start Coca-Cola and a brand develops or you start Mastercard and it becomes the standard and then the third area is stuff related to the owners and managers whether they are being compensated too
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much uh whether they are really good and various things along when you look at a business like Hyundai Okay. Um, one of the negatives of that business is it's difficult to stand out. Auto manufacturing is very competitive, right? You have to continuously innovate
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and improve and now we have a disruptive change with electrification which which takes away a lot of the competitive advantage that Toyota used to have for example. And generally speaking, capital intensive businesses are a negative for the investor because you have to put up
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a lot put up a lot of capital and then getting a return on that capital can be questionable. So when Hyundai competes with Toyota, it's a very tough competition. When I look at a business like Hyundai, I would
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be inclined to say let's leave it alone. It falls into what I would call the two hard pile. Whereas you know there are other businesses like if I look at a business like Mastercard um it's easier to see that it may be
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around for a while even though there are competitive forces in payments. The issue is that um investors around the world understand that Mastercard is a great business and they bid it up in price. So typically what will happen is
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a great business like Mastercard or like Moody's or like S&P um you know global which which runs uh different indices and so on. They tend to uh be fully valued or overvalued. We want to find greatness before it's it's um universally recognized as
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great. And one of the things I found uh maybe like I think uh starting about 8 years back was that I I started going to Turkey.
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Okay. Right. I had a friend and I was looking at the Turkish market. It was screening very cheap.
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So I have a friend who's a very deep value investor in Turkey and I asked him if I could visit his portfolio companies. He said, "Yeah, they'd be great." There were some really good businesses in Turkey that were extremely
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cheap. In fact, they were so cheap that it defied imagination. One of the companies I I met with on my second visit in 2019 is a company that rents warehouses.
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So they rent these warehouses to like Amazon IKEA Carour Mercedes Toyota and they the largest uh warehouse operator in Turkey um 99% leased and the market value of the business was um 15 million. Okay, I'm able to buy a business worth 800
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million for $15 million. I spent $8 million and we owned onethird of the company.
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And now uh you fast forward and the market cap now is uh 1.8 billion.
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Wow. More than 100 times. Wow. In eight years. In seven years. Seven years. Okay.
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In the late 1960s and early '7s, there was a concept in the US known as the Nifty50.
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Nifty50. Nifty50. Okay. And this concept was that uh people said that look here are the 50 best businesses in the United States. Um IBM, Digital Equipment, Xerox, Polaroid, Kodak, all these companies. So they created a Nifty50 index with 50
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companies, each one at 2%. and they said just buy this index and then forget about it and don't worry about how expensive it is. Now what happened is the Nifty50 got so popular that the valuation exploded. So these companies
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were trading at 50 times earnings, 70 times earnings, 100 times earnings in 197172. And then what happened is that in 1973 and 74 the US stock markets went through a major correction.
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It was a crash in slow motion. The market crashed over 2 years from 73 to 74. The market went down 50%.
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The Nifty50 went down 70% because it was so overheated. And by the end of 1974, no one was invested in the Nifty50 because they got burned so badly they got sold it.
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But there is some controversy whether Walmart was part of the Nifty50 or not. Let's just assume for argument's sake that Walmart was one of the 50 companies in 1972, 1971 and let's say you just kept the nifty50 from 1970
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till 2026. You didn't do anything. Let's also assume that 49 out of the 50 companies went to zero.
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Okay. So you assume IBM zero, Coca-Cola zero, McDonald's zero. You assume all of them went to zero. You know they went down 60 70% at one point but they didn't go to zero. But you assume they all go
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to zero except Walmart. You just keep Walmart running the way it ran. And when you when you come to 2026, that portfolio which 98% went to zero would have compounded at 15% a year on the whole thing just with Walmart at
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2%. Yeah. And it blew out the S&P by four or 5%. What is the lesson there?
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The lesson is that the nature of capitalism is that the market returns of an index are actually coming from very few companies.
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And the most important thing is not to sell those companies no matter what happens not to sell them.
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Now, the Walton family um when Walmart came public in I think 1971 or '72, after it became public, the Walton family collectively owned 44% of the company.
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Okay. Now, it has been 54 or 55 years since the IPO. They own 46% of the company. So basically the same they have not sold.
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Yeah. And the company has bought back some shares. So their shares have gone up.
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They've been getting dividends. They've lived on the dividends. It's a very big dividend. And if you combine all the Walton family together, they'll be number two after Elon in the world.
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The second wealthiest family. The Musk family is number one, which is just Elon. And the Walton family is number two. Until a business like Walmart goes into decline, permanent decline, don't worry about what the stock price is, don't worry about how expensive or cheap
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it is. Just keep it. So if you happen to own a company like Google, you happen to own a company like Apple, you happen to own a company like Hyundai for example, don't do anything.
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Yeah. don't do anything until there is clear evidence that the decline is permanent. Is there a red flag though on that checklist?
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Recently I was listening to a podcast which was going through a biography of the founder of IKEA. All the decisions he took with IKEA were with the lens that it needs to be around for 500 years. So IKEA never
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went public. It's a private company. And Ingmar never ever took a dollar of debt, right?
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He felt that if IKEA took debt, they would could be a downturn in the future and the company may not survive. Every single IKEA store has been built out of the retained earnings from the past profits. When you
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look at when I look at the checklist, one of the most uh the single biggest reason businesses fail is leverage. What is the debt situation?
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Okay. How much debt do they have for the retail investor? Yeah. What they need to do is buy Burkshire Hathaway. [laughter] Okay. So the first step we are in kindergarten right now we are in kindergarten. We haven't gone to college yet. when you're
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in kindergarten or in first grade or second grade or third grade, you're just buying Burkshshire Hathaway. Uh the second step after Burkshshire Hathaway, after you've learned the alphabet and you started to read is you are going to only look at
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businesses where you are personally using the products. If you love Burger King, okay, or Starbucks, you can study those products. So one thing to remember is it's very difficult for any business to get even $1 from you because as a consumer you are very
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particular that your money gets you great value and great products. So when you are a consumer of some product that is probably a very good company. Are you excited about the products? Are you a user? So for example, do you always buy
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Apple phones? I do. Okay. So there you [laughter] Okay. So you're not going to look at Android and make some investment in some Android company. Okay.
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You're going to uh you're not going to say, "Oh, the Samsung phone is doing well." You're not a user of the Samsung phone. So you're not going to look at that. Do they go to Starbucks? Write it down. Do you buy Coke? Write that down.
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Do you buy uh a more pacific? Write it down. Apple, write it down. Make a list of all the products that you're using.
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So what we want to see is we want to see a great business that we are a consumer of where when you look at it the price is too cheap and then you study it and study it and study it and when you are
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still convinced it's too cheap, then you go 10% that product 90% Burkshire Hathaway. Let's say if I look at Apple and let's say Apple is trading at a trailing earnings of 17.
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Okay, trailing earnings of 17 is not that cheap. But let's say it's trading at trailing earnings of three.
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Too cheap. Yeah, we're going to buy Apple. Okay. Because it makes no sense. There were two articles in the Wall Street Journal that Burger King uh has come up with a new Whopper sandwich. you know, their their burger,
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they changed they changed the whopper, they changed the bun, okay? And they changed the mayonnaise they use and they improve the packaging. And what happened is in the last quarter, the sales of Burger King went up by 10%. 10%
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in one quarter is a lot for Burger King because people started going back for the Whopper. And uh I tried the Whopper recently. They said, "Oh, let me write it." It was much better than before.
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Okay. And so I said, "Okay, let me study if this is going to cause a change where people in the market may not understand that Burger King may have some advantage that it didn't have in the past." Now, I have not made any
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decision yet. More than likely, it means nothing. Okay. Okay. But it's there's some possibility there because there's something going on where it may not be reflected in the price.
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Okay? So that's what we're looking for. We're looking for things. Now, you may find a brand of cosmetics, where they have something going on where the wrinkles go away, something works better than it did, and the market doesn't recognize it, but you're a
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consumer. You recognize it. Yeah. It seems like what you're saying is that a retail investor because we're consumers can also have a piece of that circle of competence.
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In fact, we can be better than the institutional investors because you have direct knowledge.
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Got it. And uh and you may you may understand things better. So we can't talk about investing without talking about AI these days. So these days it seems like everyone wants to invest in AI. They want exposure to it
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especially companies like Nvidia. So, you're the expert in the history of finance and investments. Does this kind of excitement also feel like history is repeating itself? Does this remind you of something you've seen before?
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In general, you don't want to be looking at areas where everyone is excited. Generally, those are going to be overheated areas.
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The bubble is what they're saying. Yeah. So what I would say is that on the AI side, the only area I would look at possibly is memory.
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Okay, the pickaxes. Okay, or I could look at Nvidia for example, but I I wouldn't look at anything else. But I would say even better than that, even better than looking at that is the Turkish warehouse operate.
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[laughter] So looking at the public portfolios of great investors including among value investors, the number of holdings, position sizing and approach to holding cash are all different. So you're what known as one of the investors who most faithfully follows uh the Warren Buffett
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investment philosophy, but I'm curious, has there ever been a case where you and Buffett looked at the same company and reached different conclusions? reaching the same conclusion would be more the exception than the rule.
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Okay. The reason is that our life experiences are different. Warren Buffett made a very big investment in American Express I think around 1964.
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So what happened in 1964 was American Express had um a big uh uh loss because of some lending they did and that loss was so big that the stock got taken out back and shot. It was really taken down a lot. He put 40%
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of his fund into American Express. And the reason he did that was that he said the main moat of American Express is whether people have confidence in the credit card.
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So the brand the brand but and and for him the important thing was that a merchant let's say a restaurant. So if a restaurant accepts the American Express card, they have to have faith in Ammex because what happens is that you have
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dinner. You don't pay them. You give them the AMX. Now AMX owes them money.
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And so they have to have confidence that AMX is going to pay them. So when this whole crisis was taking place, Buffett's question was, do people have faith in American Express? So what he did was he went to a
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number of fine dining restaurants in Omaha, okay? And he stood by the cash register and he just watched whether they were willing to accept the AMX card or whether they had some hesitation.
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None of the restaurants had any hesitation. Zero. And this is after the crash. Right. Right. When this was in the papers every day, the restaurants are just accepting the MX card like nothing happened. So he said they don't care. They they have
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confidence because it's an intangible. When people don't have confidence in you, it's over. So the decline is temporary.
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Yeah. So so he put 40% in. But then what happened is it came back to normal and he sold it.
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Okay. Now today Burkshire Hathaway has a very large MX position. But they sold in like ' 66 or ' 67 and they didn't buy it back I think till uh maybe the mid90s 95 or 96. Buffett said that he was playing he was playing
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golf with the CEO of Hertz Rent a car. The two of them are playing golf.
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[snorts] Warren asked him questions about American Express. So, Hertz um accepts the American Express card and American Express charges more than Visa or Mastercard. So, when Hertz accepts the MX card, they have to pay 3% to AMX.
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But Visa and Mastercard, they only had to pay 2%. So, Warren asked him, when you accept Ammex, it costs you more.
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Okay? And when you accept Visa and Mastercard, it costs you less. Why don't you stop accepting the AMX card? And the hurt CEO said, "I can't." He said, "If I stop accepting the card, I will see a drop in revenue. There are customers who
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have such strong affiliation with AMX that they will go to Avis." I see. So he said in order to save that 1% my revenue is going to drop. So he said I cannot he he actually told Warren this he said don't tell them this but if
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they raise it from 3% to 4% I'll still pay it. I have to he said I have to. So what what Buffett did after that right after that golf game Yeah.
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he bought AMX. I see. So he sold it and he rebought it. We bought it after almost 30 years.
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I see. And the thing is he said and he said this publicly. He said I understood MX but I didn't really understand it really well enough till I had the conversation with the her CEO because the her CEO showed me that
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the moat was very powerful. Yes. Now what happened in I think the late 80s or early 90s is there was a revolt amongst restaurants in Boston. I don't know if you remember that maybe it was before your before your time but
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restaurants in Boston were very upset that AMX charges extra. So you know restaurant business is very tough and tight. These credit card fees really bite at them right and Ammex charges more. So these restaurants in Boston all banded together and said we're not going
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to accept the MX card if all of us don't accept it in that area. The customer will switch to Visa and we will not see a drop. Okay, AMX now had a problem.
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Okay, because their concern was what if this spreads to other cities but AMX did not blink.
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They just said that our So this is what AMX's response was. They said that our card members have higher incomes than Visa and Mastercard. And that's true.
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Okay. Okay. And they spend more. So they said that do you want to focus on the 1% or do you want my customers because you want my customers because they are spending more.
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Eventually the Boston restaurants went back to accepting AMX. So again, the moat stayed. Now, this is a company that charges more.
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Yeah. And it has stayed. It has stayed in in in business. And recently they increased the annual fee. Their their annual fee is the highest now.
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It is $8.95. Exactly. [laughter] And you know why you have one? Because you get value.
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I do. Exactly. I I actually had a special Let's see what's It's still It's still a good deal.
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Yeah. Yeah. and um and and and and so so AMX uh and Warren was saying recently I was I I think in the last few months he made a quote he said that they earn a return on equity of more than 30%. He
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said there's no bank that earns that. You know, bank has to lend money to make money. These guys don't lend money. They just have the brand and the brand makes money. So, it's it's a phenomenal business.
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So, what I would just say is that this notion of understanding the moat is very complicated. Buffett made an investment in Apple because he had friends who told him these his friends had private jets. They said they would
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give up the private jet before they gave up the iPhone. That's a good statement. Yeah.
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And you can see why they're saying that, right? So Warren and Warren talked to his grandkids. They all had iPhones, of course.
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And they said there's no way there's no way we're going to go get a Android phone. What are [laughter] you talking about? And so he he bought Apple because he understood that moat, right? And again, so it's these finer
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things about these companies that you need to understand, right? And when you understand these finer things, then that gives you the edge, right?
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And that gives you the conviction to own that company for a long time. Is there another investor that you admire that you've looked to their portfolios or the way that they found their philosophy of investing? we all belong to the same church, right? So
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there are there are a number of people who have done really well uh with uh with investing. There's a Chinese investor uh Yongpin Dwan. Have you heard of him?
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No. So Yongpin Dwan is the founder of Oppo and Vivo. You know, Oppo and Vivo have Android phones and they're very good phones and their market share is almost going toe-to-toe with Samsung. So, they have huge global market share.
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I have to ask, what kind of phone do you have? Apple. [laughter] Okay. Do I look like an Apple kind of guy?
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Yes, of course I'm an Apple kind of guy. Please continue. Yeah. Yongpin Dwan owns Oppo and Vivo, right? He also has a big stock portfolio.
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his largest position is Apple direct competitor. Interesting. And you know what he said to me because he's a friend of mine. He said to me, "We can never replicate what Apple can do on the software side, the you know the the look and feel of
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the brand." So he said that the smartest thing for me to do is to own them.
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And it's been a great investment for him. Yeah. So that's a person that's that's quite a remarkable thing for a person to buy a competitor. It's a exercise in humility.
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Yeah. Right. At the end of the day, you just need to hold one great business for a very long time.
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And it doesn't matter whether you were the founder of the business or you were just an outside investor.
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The end result is the same. Every person on that Forbes 400 got there because of one business. You let these great businesses sit in your portfolio and let them ride and they'll become most of the portfolio and that's fine.
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Buffett and Mer became legendary investors. But there is another person that was once part of that same circle, Rick Garin.
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Yes. And his story turned out a bit differently. Why was that? I used to play bridge with Rick recently and he passed away a few years back. Uh wonderful guy and yeah the three of them used to invest together. Buffett told me
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this story. He said that uh Charlie and I always knew that we would become very wealthy and we were not in a hurry. He says Rick also knew that but he was in a hurry. So he was using leverage
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uh in his portfolio, margin loans. And when that downturn in 1973 and 74 came um he got margin calls. Warren bought Rick's Berkshire shares at $40 a piece.
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Those shares are today over 700,000 each. Rick sold those at $40, right? because he was forced to sell because of the leverage. And when Warren told us this story when we met him for lunch, he said that if you are even a slightly above
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average investor and you spend less than you earned, you cannot help but get wealthy over a lifetime if you don't use leverage.
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So the important lesson with Rick Gur now Rick became very wealthy when I met him. He's driving a Ferrari. He has multi-10 million dollar homes and all that. So Rick was a a very wealthy man, but he had to come back again and
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rebuild it. Yeah. So for a novice re retail investor like myself, what is the one line that I should never cross?
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Human nature doesn't change and those of us who don't know our history are cursed to repeat it. Leverage is very dangerous. Chasing fads is very dangerous. Uh doing what the what your neighbor is doing is very dangerous.
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So all these things, you know, people uh the the natural course for humans is to follow what their neighbor is doing.
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Generally speaking, if you want to do well, you have to carve your own path.
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And you have to carve your own path when it makes great sense. doing no work and following her mentality. Those are all negative.
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Yeah. One should avoid all that. Is there something that you look back on and to this day you think, "Ah, this was a mistake." I've made so many mistakes, right? It's a very forgiving business. But the biggest mistake I made was that I
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overdosed on Ben Graham and I underdosed on Charlie Bunger. So what I was always focused on doing till until maybe 7 8 10 years ago was look for things that were undervalued and selling them when they approached fair value. A business like Walmart
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should not be sold when it approaches fair value. That great businesses are very rare and they should be held even if they appear overvalued took me more than 20 years to learn. I'm hoping that your listeners save themselves the 20 years of anguish.
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I would not want to trade the journey for anything else. I think that's just the nature of it is that we are going to have blind spots and we're going to learn slowly and that's perfectly okay.
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We sometimes we may not learn at all. That's also okay. You know, I used to own 1% of Ferrari.
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Okay. And the 1% of Ferrari was bought less than $10 million. You know, when I look back, probably closer to $6 million. Ferrari is a business that should never be sold because uh recently they sold the first production run of
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their electric car for $40 million. One car number one was sold for 40 million.
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And when they announce any model, they are all sold out in 10 minutes, right?
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At 80% margins. You know, they'll announce a car, they'll say, "We're going to produce 500 of this car.
Speaker A
Therefore, $5 million each. Out of the 5 million, 4.2 million is profit for Ferrari." And in 10 minutes, they all sold. Okay? So I was still under the spell of Ben Graham when I owned 1% of Ferrari for even let's say 10 million.
Speaker A
Ferrari's market cap today is approaching 100 billion. The 1% would be worth a billion.
Speaker A
Sorry, you made a mistake. 100x. [laughter] Yeah. And and you know how how dumb is that?
Speaker A
Yeah. What is so special about understanding that Ferrari is a special company, right? It's a very special company. So, this is the thing that's amazing about investing is that we don't need to do much. If we if we find
Speaker A
ourselves in the happy position of owning 1% of Ferrari, we go to sleep. [laughter] Don't need to do anything.
Speaker A
Rich men have very few ways to express their wealth. Rich women have more ways but rich men have very few ways. One of the ways rich men uh express their wealth is with cars. And uh I used to I I had bought a
Speaker A
Ferrari because I used to own stock in the company and I had gone for 3 days of Ferrari driving school in California.
Speaker A
And there were about maybe 30 other Ferrari owners who had come. When I would go meet any of them because we spent like three days together. I say so which model do you have? Right. And I soon learned that that was the wrong
Speaker A
question. The right question was how many do you have? Because when I used to ask them which model do you have, they'd get confused.
Speaker A
They said I have 15. I see. I have all the models, you know. And so why does he have 15 or 30?
Speaker A
Where else can can he spend his money? you know he can have a watch, he can have a tie and he can have a Ferrari and that's it. Nothing more. And once you understand that it's a great business,
Speaker A
then life becomes easy. Yeah. Well, Monish, thank you so much. This was so insightful.
Speaker A
All right.
Topics:Mohnish Pabraivalue investingindex fundsS&P 500compoundingBerkshire Hathawaycompetitive moatinvestment checklistFerrariNifty50











