Britain's Dreadnought submarine replaces Vanguard, sharing a common Trident missile compartment with America's Columbia class to maintain continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence.
Key Takeaways
- Britain is replacing its deterrent submarine fleet while maintaining continuous patrol coverage, a demanding transition.
- The common missile compartment is a practical example of Anglo-American defence cooperation focused on overlapping requirements.
- Timing between shipbuilding milestones and the operational patrol cycle is as important as the technology itself.
What the video covers
- Britain's Dreadnought and America's Columbia share a common missile compartment but differ in launch tube count (12 vs 16).
- Dreadnought is a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that will replace the Vanguard class, which has been on patrol for nearly four decades.
- The Royal Navy's continuous at-sea deterrence commitment requires a boat on patrol at all times, which drives the timing of the handover.
- Dreadnought's 12 tubes are organized into three quad packs; Columbia's 16 tubes allow for a fourth.
- The number of tubes is distinct from the number of missiles actually carried on a given patrol.
- Dreadnought is distinct from the conventionally armed AUKUS attack submarine, though both are nuclear powered.
- Both countries keep Trident II D5 as their missile, requiring the common compartment design to support it.
- Shared design work offers potential cost savings and logistical benefits over decades of support.
- The lead Dreadnought is expected to enter service in the early 2030s, with later boats following on a staggered schedule.
- Program costs and progress measures should be read carefully, since different stages and budget figures mean different things.
Chapters
- 00:00Introduction: Two Submarines, One Missile Section
- 01:06Why Continuous At-Sea Deterrence Matters
- 02:25Vanguard, Dreadnought, and the Timeline
- 05:59Quad Packs and Tube Counts Explained
- 06:29The Common Missile Compartment and Trident
- 11:07Costs, Budgets, and Program Milestones
- 17:14Handover Challenges and Next Steps
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
Speaker A
Britain and America designed the same missile section for two submarines with different numbers of launch tubes.
Speaker A
Britain's Dreadnought will have twelve tubes for Trident. America's Columbia will have sixteen. That difference is built into a design the two countries developed together.
Speaker A
And when Dreadnought enters service, currently planned for the early 2030s, it'll be roughly four decades since HMS Vanguard commissioned.
Speaker A
Britain has spent those decades relying on Vanguard and her sister boats to keep a nuclear deterrent at sea.
Speaker A
Now it has to pass that job to a new fleet, starting with a submarine built around four tube groups.
Speaker A
The Royal Navy describes those groups as quad packs. Think of them as sets of four launch tubes. Dreadnought is designed around three sets. Columbia's sixteen tubes give it room for a fourth.
Speaker A
That's how you can start with a common design and end up with two configurations.
Speaker A
And when you hear twelve or sixteen, keep one distinction in mind. Those figures tell you how many tubes are built into each design.
Speaker A
The number of missiles actually carried on a particular patrol is a separate question. The immediate British requirement is to keep a submarine capable of carrying out the deterrent mission at sea around the clock.
Speaker A
That word deterrent is doing a fair bit of work. Dreadnought is a ballistic missile submarine. Its job is to help make sure Britain retains the ability to respond to a nuclear attack, even if the country itself has been struck.
Speaker A
The value of putting that capability aboard a submarine comes from the difficulty of knowing where the boat is.
Speaker A
Keeping one on patrol means an adversary has to reckon with that capability being available even in an extreme crisis.
Speaker A
The Royal Navy calls the commitment continuous at sea deterrence. Continuous is the part I'd underline because it tells you what the navy needs from the whole fleet. And it up one possible confusion straight away.
Speaker A
You've probably heard about Britain designing a new submarine with America and Australia under AUKUS.
Speaker A
That's a conventionally armed attack submarine, the successor to Astute. It's nuclear powered, and so is Dreadnought.
Speaker A
In both cases, that describes what powers the boat. Dreadnought's ballistic missiles are what give it the nuclear deterrent role.
Speaker A
It's replacing Vanguard, the class that carries out that mission today. Now put the dates next to each other.
Speaker A
HMS Vanguard commissioned in August 1993. The Ministry of Defence expects the first Dreadnought to be ready to enter service in the early [music] 2030s.
Speaker A
Put those two milestones side by side, and you can see where the nearly 40 years comes from.
Speaker A
Pick a different milestone, [music] and you get a different answer. HMS Vengeance, the fourth and final Vanguard boat, was still being built in the '90s. She launched in 1998 and commissioned the following year. Then, in 2016, the government announced that
Speaker A
the first Dreadnought was moving into manufacture at Barrow. So by the time the lead boat is ready for service, Britain will already have spent well over a decade building the replacement. That's an important part of the story. The Navy has had to keep
Speaker A
operating its existing deterrent while industry builds the next one. And there's another telling detail in those dates. It took years for all four Vanguards to commission, even after the first one joined the fleet. Dreadnought has a lead boat of its own, and that
Speaker A
boat begins a transition that will take more than one hull to complete. That explains why the government is building four Dreadnoughts to take over from four Vanguards. Start with the promise to keep one boat on patrol.
Speaker A
A submarine also needs time ashore for maintenance. Crews need time to train and prepare, and the next boat needs to be ready to take over. If you want that cycle to keep running, the rest of the fleet has work to do even when one boat
Speaker A
is already at sea. I find that a much more revealing way to look at the numbers. The 12 launch tubes tell you about the design of an individual dreadnought. The four hulls tell you about the service Britain is trying to
Speaker A
provide year after year. During the handover, those two questions come together. The Navy needs a new design that can perform the job, and it needs the boats at the point when they can take over from their predecessors. If a new boat
Speaker A
takes longer to become available, the patrol commitment still has to be met. A date on one program becomes a constraint [music] on another. That puts the timing of the whole project right alongside the technology as a measure of its success.
Speaker A
The latest British production plan shows how unevenly the stages of that handover come into view. The Ministry of Defence expects the lead boat to complete sea trials and be ready to enter service in the early 2030s. Under that same phase,
Speaker A
the second boat, Valiant, is due to reach sea trials. Boats three and four are expected to hit construction milestones. Each of those steps represents progress towards a working fleet, and each answers a different question.
Speaker A
Construction gets the boat assembled. Trials let the Navy and the builders see how the systems work together at sea.
Speaker A
Readiness for service brings the first boat closer to taking on the responsibility Vanguard has carried for a generation.
Speaker A
You can see why the arrival of the lead dreadnought will be such a significant moment and why the timing of the following boats matters as well.
Speaker A
Britain is changing submarines while keeping the same commitment at sea. It's also keeping Trident at the center of the mission, which gives the builders a very specific problem.
Speaker A
The missile needs a place in a wholly new submarine along with the systems that support it there.
Speaker A
Across the Atlantic, the Americans were working on a replacement for their own deterrent boats and faced that same job.
Speaker A
So how much of that work could the two countries do together? The obvious place to start was with the missile both navies had chosen to keep.
Speaker A
Trident II D5 was serving aboard Britain's Vanguard boats and America's Ohio boats. Once both countries decided their successors would continue with Trident, their designers had a common engineering problem.
Speaker A
A missile that fits down a tube still needs the equipment around it to keep it secure and ready aboard a submarine.
Speaker A
That equipment has to be designed into the boat from the start. Imagine both teams working independently. Each would have to decide how to house the same missile, how to support it aboard ship, and how to work with the rest of the weapon system.
Speaker A
Both would then have to sustain whatever they came up with for decades. There was a good reason to compare drawings before everybody committed to a design.
Speaker A
The result was the common missile compartment. I like the name for its plainness. It tells you exactly where the agreement begins. Britain and America could build their own successor classes while working together on the part where their requirements [music] already overlapped.
Speaker A
For an American program replacing Ohio, that made sense in its own right. The US Navy's Strategic Systems Programs [music] Office gives two reasons for developing the compartment together.
Speaker A
It points to the prospect of lower costs and less logistical overhead. That second part deserves attention.
Speaker A
You design the boat once, then you have to keep supporting it for as long as it serves.
Speaker A
If both fleets use related equipment for the same family of missiles, sharing that work gives both sides a basis for planning support. An entirely separate solution would leave each navy maintaining its own design for the same job.
Speaker A
That's a meaningful difference, even if you never see the savings itemized on a public balance sheet.
Speaker A
And the arrangement carries through into construction. The US Program Office describes working with its British counterparts on the compartment's construction and installation into their respective submarines. So this went beyond agreeing on the size of a missile tube. Both
Speaker A
programs had to work through how to put the common equipment into their boats. At the same time, they could still make choices about how much of that equipment they wanted to carry.
Speaker A
You can see the Americans making exactly that sort of choice when you compare Columbia with the boat she's replacing.
Speaker A
Ohio was designed with 24 missile tubes. Columbia is being built with 16. That's a reduction of eight, a third of the original design capacity on a submarine intended to carry the same strategic mission into the next generation.
Speaker A
The US Navy says the demonstrated accuracy and reliability of Trident David scope to reduce the number and put money into other areas of its defense program.
Speaker A
That's the explanation the Americans give for their own decision. Britain arrived at a different figure for Dreadnought, and the American explanation alone can only take us so far in understanding that choice.
Speaker A
What it does tell you is something worth holding on to when comparing the two boats.
Speaker A
Even America, with a predecessor designed around 24 tubes, had good reason to ask how many its next submarine actually needed.
Speaker A
Tube capacity is a design decision with consequences for the rest of the program. It tells you what a country has built room for.
Speaker A
To judge that choice, you also need to know what it expects its fleet to do.
Speaker A
And this is where sharing a section of a submarine [music] looks like a clever place to draw the line.
Speaker A
The two countries could settle some questions together and leave room for different answers elsewhere.
Speaker A
Look at propulsion. The Royal Navy lists a Rolls-Royce PWR 3 for Dreadnought. The US Navy describes Columbia's reactor as designed around a core that lasts the life of the boat, so it can avoid taking it out of service for mid-life
Speaker A
refueling. Those are propulsion decisions with consequences for how each Navy expects to support its own submarines.
Speaker A
The common missile section [music] tells you very little about those choices. It tells you where both navies had enough in common to design together.
Speaker A
I judge the partnership in those terms. The Americans had a a to work with Britain because they could use the result aboard Columbia.
Speaker A
Britain could use the result at Barrow while fitting it into a boat built for the Royal Navy's requirements.
Speaker A
The arrangement works precisely because both teams knew what they were sharing. Now, follow that relationship one step further and it gets more interesting.
Speaker A
We've been talking about the part of the submarine where the missile goes. There are two more things to account for.
Speaker A
There's the missile itself and then there's the warhead it carries. The compartment is where Britain and America work together on the design.
Speaker A
The missile Britain plans to put aboard Dreadnought is the US-manufactured Trident II D5 and the Ministry of Defence says it will carry a sovereign British nuclear warhead.
Speaker A
That gives you three different relationships within what usually gets called the Trident system. You can have a jointly developed piece of submarine, an American-made missile, and a British-designed warhead in the same boat.
Speaker A
Ask where Trident comes from without saying which part you mean and you can easily get three perfectly sensible answers to three different questions.
Speaker A
The cooperation makes more sense once you pick those questions apart. It also makes the next question sharper.
Speaker A
If Britain depends on an American-made missile to carry its own warhead, what does independence look like once the submarine is out at sea?
Speaker A
That depends on who supplies the equipment, who operates it, and who has the authority to decide whether to use it.
Speaker A
The Ministry of Defence draws those distinctions clearly and they matter to anyone trying to work out what Britain gained by working with America.
Speaker A
The place to start is the missiles themselves. When Britain needs one for its fleet, it draws from a stock of missiles that it shares [music] with the United States.
Speaker A
Britain purchases title to a number of missiles in that shared pool. That's the wording the Ministry of Defence uses in its annual update to Parliament and it helps explain what the agreement actually does.
Speaker A
Britain has bought ownership of missiles under an arrangement that draws on a common stock.
Speaker A
The legal framework goes back to the Polaris sales agreement of 1963, which was amended for Trident in 1982.
Speaker A
So when the designers of Dreadnought and Columbia began working together, the two countries had decades of experience with an arrangement that links their missile supply.
Speaker A
The new compartment gives that relationship a place in the next generation of boats. For Britain, there's an obvious consequence.
Speaker A
The country can build the submarine at Barrow and still rely on American manufacture for the missile and supporting systems.
Speaker A
That matters well before a submarine goes on patrol. If you intend to operate a class of boats for decades, you need to know how the weapon it was built around will be supported across that time. There's a second arrangement
Speaker A
inside that first one, and it leads back to Aldermaston. The Ministry of Defence says the warhead currently fitted to Britain's Trident missiles is the Mark 4 A.
Speaker A
Its design is sovereign to the UK, and AWE maintains it. That gives Britain a responsibility of its own, even with a missile supplied through the shared pool. Someone in Britain has to assure that the warhead remains safe and
Speaker A
effective through its service life. In other words, the national part of the deterrent involves an ongoing engineering job as well as a decision about who can use it. And the decision itself sits squarely with the British government. Only the UK Prime Minister
Speaker A
can authorize the use of Britain's nuclear weapons, according to the Ministry of Defence. The government also declares the deterrent to the defence of NATO. That tells you about the countries its existence is meant to help protect.
Speaker A
The authority to use it remains British. You can see why one word, independent, can cause such a muddle here.
Speaker A
Ask who has authority over the operational decision, and you get a clear answer. Ask whether Britain manufactures every part of the system, and the missile pool gives you an equally clear answer about the supply relationship. Both facts matter, and
Speaker A
each tells you something different about how the deterrent works. I'd be most interested in where those responsibilities meet. A government can retain the authority to use a weapon while relying on a partner to keep supplying and supporting it in the years
Speaker A
ahead. The operational decision is made when it matters. The industrial decisions that make the capability available have to be taken years earlier. There's a very practical implication for Dreadnought. Keeping Trident means the weapons still has to be supported through the lives of boats
Speaker A
that have yet to enter service. Britain also has its own responsibilities [music] for the warhead and for the submarine that carries it. Lose sight of any one of those, and you can end up judging the health of the program by the progress of
Speaker A
whichever part happens to be most visible. A hull taking shape at Barrow is easy to picture. The arrangements that will keep its equipment working for decades are harder to see.
Speaker A
One of the best examples is buried deep inside the boat. Dreadnought's Rolls-Royce reactor is called the Pressurized Water Reactor 3 or PWR 3.
Speaker A
The Royal Navy says the Ministry of Defense examined three reactor options, including the PWR 2 system used in Vanguard.
Speaker A
It gives a revealing account of what it expects [music] from the newer design. It points to simpler operation, a longer service life, and lower maintenance costs over the life of the boats. Those are practical benefits for the people
Speaker A
who will run and maintain the fleet. Take simpler operation. The crews will have to run these submarines on patrol for years after the design team has finished its work. A decision that makes their machinery easier to operate has
Speaker A
value every time they go to see. The maintenance point is just as important. Work that takes a boat away from the patrol cycle has to be planned around the availability of the other boats. A design that eases that workload
Speaker A
gives the Navy more room to manage a small fleet. So when the Royal Navy talks about reducing maintenance costs, I'd listen for what operators learn once they've had time with the boats. That's when the expected advantages can be
Speaker A
judged against actual experience. It also gives us a concrete way to think about what a new class has to prove. A submarine built to carry out the deterrent mission needs all these pieces to come together in one hull. The
Speaker A
propulsion system has to take the boat to sea and support it there. The missile compartment has to work as part of that particular submarine, and the Royal Navy has to be able to crew and sustain the resulting boat.
Speaker A
Each organization can make real progress on its own part, while the date that matters to the fleet still depends on the work of others. That's why I'd pay close attention to the move from construction to trials. It's the point
Speaker A
at which the program starts to show how the boat functions as a whole. The significance goes well beyond the engineering achievement of getting a new submarine into [music] the water.
Speaker A
Britain needs evidence that this design can become the boat the Navy will rely on for patrols.
Speaker A
The government has committed funding for the phase intended to get the first dreadnought through sea trials.
Speaker A
And this is where the size of the announcement can get in the way of understanding it.
Speaker A
You'll hear 8.4 billion pounds attached to dreadnought, but the useful question is which pieces of work that sum is meant to pay for.
Speaker A
Follow the money through the program and you'll see how different the government's objectives are for each of the four boats.
Speaker A
The first figure I'd pull out of that announcement is 5.9 billion pounds. That's the value of the contract the government agreed with BAE Systems in July 2026.
Speaker A
It sits inside the 8.4 billion pound commitment for the fourth phase of dreadnought production.
Speaker A
BAE is responsible for delivering submarine production at Barrow. The Ministry of Defence also said further investment would go to Rolls-Royce submarines in Derby and to the wider supply chain.
Speaker A
So if you see both numbers quoted, think of one as the overall funding commitment for this phase and the other as a contract within it. Add them together and you count the BAE work twice. And if you divide the larger figure by four,
Speaker A
you get a tidy calculation that tells you nothing about the price of a submarine.
Speaker A
To see why, go back to the first production phase. In 2016, the government announced nearly 1.3 billion pounds of initial investment with BAE. The work included making structural steel for a space that would house electrical equipment and reactor
Speaker A
controls. It also included more design work, purchases of materials and items that needed to be ordered well ahead of time, and investment in the shipyard itself.
Speaker A
Before the Navy can take delivery of a boat, the yard has to be equipped to build it.
Speaker A
You can spend money advancing the program while the visible work on an individual hull is still at an early stage.
Speaker A
By September 2025, the yard was cutting the first steel for King George VI, the fourth boat. That was a milestone for the last hull in the class.
Speaker A
Look at what those dates tell you about the spread of work. The first boat had been in manufacture for years by the time the fourth reached its steel cutting ceremony.
Speaker A
Both would later fall under the same production announcement. And there's another pair of numbers worth untangling before we get to what that announcement promises. The Ministry of Defence's published manufacturing estimate for all four submarines was 31 billion pounds, including inflation over
Speaker A
the life of the program. The department also set aside a 10 billion pound contingency. [music] The estimate gives the scale of the planned manufacturing effort.
Speaker A
The contingency gives the program room to deal with extra costs [music] if they arise.
Speaker A
Those are different things from a commitment to fund a defined phase of work. And a contingency figure tells you how much room was allowed for uncertainty.
Speaker A
You need a record of actual expenditure to judge how much of that room has been used.
Speaker A
Here's the way I'd read the July announcement. Start with the boat furthest along and ask what the government expects it to have done by the end of this phase.
Speaker A
For HMS Dreadnought, the answer is to complete sea trials and be ready to enter service in the early 2030s. For Valiant, the objective is to reach sea trials.
Speaker A
Think about the gap between those two milestones. The first tells you the lead boat should have been through the trial program.
Speaker A
The second tells you the next boat should have reached that part of its development.
Speaker A
The same phase of spending can move both boats forward while leaving them at different stages.
Speaker A
Warspite and King George VI are expected to reach construction milestones. By the end of the phase then, the Navy expects to have gained ground across the class with its first opportunity to bring a Dreadnought into service resting on the
Speaker A
lead boat. That's a much better guide to what taxpayers are buying than an average across four hulls.
Speaker A
It also shows why I judge progress boat by boat. A construction milestone on Warspite can be worth reaching in its own right.
Speaker A
The milestone that gives the Navy an immediate route to using the new class is the completion of trials on Dreadnought.
Speaker A
A healthy program needs both kinds of progress. They serve different points in the handover.
Speaker A
There's also a revealing detail in how the government says it's structured that BAE contract. The Ministry of Defense says the arrangement is intended to reward gains in productivity and cost control when agreed performance targets and program outcomes are met.
Speaker A
That makes the link between spending and delivery explicit. It also gives you a better question to ask when the next milestone is announced.
Speaker A
Did the program move a boat into the next stage of work? And what does reaching that stage allow the Navy or the yard to do? A submarine that's ready to begin trials can start demonstrating how it performs at sea.
Speaker A
A boat that's completed its trials gives the Navy evidence it can use to prepare for entry into service.
Speaker A
When you hear the program is advancing, that distinction is the substance behind the phrase.
Speaker A
I'd apply the same discipline to any comparison with the Americans. A date for delivery from a shipbuilder and a date for a boat going on its first operational patrol answer different questions.
Speaker A
Each Navy has to manage the time between those events while the outgoing class is still doing the job.
Speaker A
For Britain, the headline date that matters here is when the first dreadnought can enter service. The July funding tells us what work the government intends to pay for to get there.
Speaker A
The trials will tell us far more about whether that work has produced a boat the Navy can take on.
Speaker A
And there's a reason to resist treating a target date as a formality, even when a program has the highest priority.
Speaker A
Over in the United States, the lead Columbia is also meant to relieve an aging class of deterrence submarines.
Speaker A
The Americans have put years of work into it, and their government's own auditors have identified a significant gap between the date in its delivery contract and the date the Navy now expects.
Speaker A
That gap is worth looking at closely because it shows how much can ride on the calendar between the yard and the first patrol.
Speaker A
At least 18 months. That was the projected gap between Columbia's contracted delivery date and the US Navy's estimate, according to a report from the Government Accountability Office in April 2026.
Speaker A
The auditors described the lead boat as the Navy's top acquisition priority. That makes the figure worth dwelling on.
Speaker A
Priority can decide where people and money go. It can do little to recover time once certain work has to be finished before the next team can begin.
Speaker A
And the 18 months measures a slip against a contract for delivery. Working out what that means for the first patrol requires knowing what can still be done in the time between those milestones.
Speaker A
If the yard takes longer, the Navy might have less time to test and prepare the boat against the original operational plan.
Speaker A
If that remaining time proves insufficient, it has to revisit its timetable. For the US Navy, the practical concern is how the lead Columbia's arrival fits around the retirement of the Ohio boats she's there to replace.
Speaker A
That's where a date on a ship building contract can start to affect decisions about a fleet already at sea.
Speaker A
The useful comparison with Britain begins there. The two countries share part of the design and publish different measures of progress.
Speaker A
The British announcement sets out a window for the lead dreadnought to be ready for service.
Speaker A
The American audit measures projected delivery against an agreed contract date. Put those two dates into a league table and you'd be comparing different events.
Speaker A
I'd ask the same question of both programs instead. How much flexibility does the Navy have if the incoming boat takes longer than expected?
Speaker A
The American finding gives us a concrete example of why that question matters. It gives us no basis to put the same delay on the British calendar.
Speaker A
For the Royal Navy, the answer will depend partly on what happens at Barrow and partly on what can still be asked of the Vanguard fleet.
Speaker A
A government can fund work on a future submarine years ahead of its arrival. The Navy still has to plan maintenance, prepare crews, and arrange patrols with the boats it can use. Those decisions are linked and the link becomes more
Speaker A
important as the planned handover approaches. Imagine the first dreadnought needs longer than expected [music] to finish trials. Assume that the patrol commitment stays the same and the Navy can use Vanguard boats to cover it.
Speaker A
There's an immediate consequence. The Outgoing class has to cover more of the transition than the original plan allowed for.
Speaker A
That could mean changing when maintenance takes place or how the Navy manages the remaining service life of its existing boats.
Speaker A
The effects would depend on the length of the slip, the condition of the Vanguards, and the options available at the time.
Speaker A
That's why I'd watch for two things in public updates. First, has the lead dreadnought started and then completed sea trials within the planned window?
Speaker A
Second, what is the government saying about its ability to sustain Vanguard through that period?
Speaker A
A broad statement about construction progress can be accurate while leaving that second question open.
Speaker A
There's a where more detail would tell us little. We can judge whether the government is reporting progress against its milestones without expecting the Navy to disclose which submarine is at sea or when it's due back.
Speaker A
What matters is whether the transition plan still makes sense as the evidence changes. That brings us back to the bit Britain and America chose to design together.
Speaker A
The common missile section helps both programs focus their effort where the two sets of requirements overlap.
Speaker A
Each country still has to finish, test, and operate its own submarines. And there's a bigger distinction than the national differences in propulsion or the number of launch tubes.
Speaker A
Both navies can use the same approach to housing [music] Trident while having different amounts of room in their schedules for things to go wrong.
Speaker A
That room depends on the fleets they already operate and the time they have to get the new boats ready.
Speaker A
You could cut some duplicate engineering by sharing a design and still face a difficult transition at home.
Speaker A
A difficult transition would tell you little by itself about whether sharing that design was a good idea.
Speaker A
I think that's the fairest way to judge the decision. The cooperation gives the same family of missiles a home aboard two different classes.
Speaker A
The United States had a stake in the result because Colombia needed that solution. Britain got to build a new deterrent boat around a system it knew while keeping the decision to use its deterrent under British authority.
Speaker A
From there, the test moves out of the design office. The Royal Navy will have to show it can bring a new class into the patrol cycle without a break in the commitment it's replacing the boats to sustain.
Speaker A
You can see why the second boat matters even after the first reaches service. An individual boat can give the Navy a new capability.
Speaker A
The boats that follow give it more scope to sustain that capability while a submarine is ashore.
Speaker A
That's why I put more weight on the sequence of milestones than on any single launch or commissioning ceremony.
Speaker A
Britain is building its first new class of ballistic missile submarines since Vanguard, whose lead boat entered service a generation ago.
Speaker A
America helped develop the missile section because its next deterrent submarine needed to carry Trident II.
Speaker A
For Britain, the design choice makes sense. The decisive evidence will come when Dreadnought completes her trials and the Navy can show how the new boats will take over the patrol commitment from Vanguard.
Speaker A
That is when a submarine Britain has spent years building can start doing the job it was built for.
Speaker A
What would give you more confidence in that handover? Dreadnought completing sea trials on schedule or a clearer public plan for keeping Vanguard available if those trials [music] slip?
Topics:Dreadnought submarineTrident II D5continuous at-sea deterrenceVanguard classColumbia classcommon missile compartmentRoyal Navynuclear deterrentAUKUSsubmarine defence











