ОЛЕГ КОМОЛОВ. ДЕКОНСТРУКЦИЯ.

At the very beginning of my work, I will express my respect for Oleg Komolov as a person from the academic community. A person who often correctly identifies economic problems. The theses that will be voiced cannot, of course, negate the fact that he correctly deconstructed Stas during the debate and rightly pointed out the gaps in his logic. And his theses in recent debates regarding China also had a rational kernel that cannot be ignored in any way. But, you know, the study of Komolov's theses—specifically not the slogans, but the method he applies, deepening the difference between world-systems analysis and Marxism—created a certain déjà vu in the form of Kautsky's theory. Karl Kautsky is indeed a great economist, after all, a man who had a huge influence on the very existence of Marxist works in general, and *Capital* in particular. After Marx's death, Engels wrote and published his manuscripts. And when Engels could no longer fulfill his duties, Kautsky managed the Marxist legacy. Kautsky's work is invaluable.

correctly deconstructed Stas during the debate and rightly pointed out the gaps in his logic. And his theses in recent debates regarding China also had a rational kernel that cannot be ignored in any way. But, you know, the study of

In the history of European thought, there is an interesting historical curiosity. Before joining ranks with Bernstein, Kautsky opposed him and engaged in polemics, for example in the work *Bernstein and the Social Democratic Programme*, but under pressure from Bernstein's supporters, he surrendered and joined his ranks through party compromises. Kautsky was indeed a Marxist, but his desire to save the party by making compromises placed him in the camp of the reformists. His centrism was, in fact, a direct surrender of interests for the sake of an illusory unity within the SPD, while Plekhanov, at the moment when similar transformations were occurring, showed persistence and led a fierce polemic against social democracy and the reformist bias in Europe. In this regard, one must learn from Plekhanov's persistence, which is why I will touch upon the foundations and the epistemological difference between Marxism and world-systems analysis. I cannot fail to note one very important thing. Our reality, constantly changing and transforming, forgets the roots from which it originates. And the most correct idea in science is not just to rummage through minor details, but to uncover the genealogy of ideas. Thus, I will try to reveal to my reader the genealogy and formation of the world-system idea itself, its initial foundation. This will certainly be better than imaginary accusations and name-calling. The majority looks at the world-system through Wallerstein's method, but this is a mistake. More specifically, one should view world-systems analysis not as an isolated movement, but as a product of a specific school—namely, the Annales school, whose founders are considered to be Bloch and Febvre. We will not delve into the theoretical prehistory of the school now, but it is necessary to highlight that it was under their influence that Braudel would create the concept of the world-economy, and it is the Braudelian tradition that significantly influenced Wallerstein. May the academic community forgive me for my audacity and for how tactfully I omit the entire genealogy of the diversity of their thought. But Wallerstein is undoubtedly recognized by the academic tradition as a theorist of world-systems analysis. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Wallerstein is significantly influenced by the reformism of the Annales School. But what is their concept? It lies in the revision of history. The term "revision" is used here not as an insult, but as a methodological definition. They revised history, transforming it from the concept of "total history" in the first generation of the Annales School into geographic and spatial-economic structures in the second generation, and the concept of "mentalities" in the third. And Marxism in their theoretical works is undoubtedly an important milestone in the history of the development of thought. But they conclude that Marxism as a concept is obsolete. Consequently, Marxism and its framework are elegantly discarded from consideration. While the third generation of the Annales School fully completed the spiral of reformism by abandoning Marxism, Braudel remained stuck in the second generation, abstracting from actual, cohesive, and consistent Marxism toward a bare sociologism. These are the very theoretical and methodological foundations that constitute the world-system. Braudel's concept and Wallerstein's invention. May the academic community of Russia forgive me for this European liberty on my part.

very existence of Marxist works in general, and*Capital*in particular. After Marx's death, Engels wrote and published his manuscripts. And when Engels could no longer fulfill his duties, Kautsky managed the Marxist legacy. Kautsky's work is invaluable.

But again, I cannot help but note a certain déjà vu. Very speculatively and ironically, there exists a milestone of thought called analytical Marxism. Its main concept is that by discarding dialectical materialism, one is left only with a bare sociological theory. Therefore, whether in 20th-century French thought, modern American thought, or the 19th century, the historical spiral of reformism followed one calibrated path, and we have long since historically documented this path. Thus, the largely valid idea of Bloch and Febvre, struggling against event-based history, was actually attempting to do the right thing: to turn history, as a collection of dates, into a science of interdisciplinarity.

he surrendered and joined his ranks through party compromises. Kautsky was indeed a Marxist, but his desire to save the party by making compromises placed him in the camp of the reformists. His centrism was, in fact, a direct surrender of interests for the

But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Therefore, after two generations, their theoretical assumptions resulted in the theory of mentalities of the third generation of the Annales. That is why I insist that the theory of mentalities is not just banal reformism, but an open trampling of any Marxism, as a consequence of the initial Annales idea. One must understand that the theoretical errors of Kautsky, the ideological decline of the Annales School from reformism to anti-Marxism, and even American sociologism masked as Marxism—all of this is a consequence of smoothing out edges and surrendering the foundations of Marxism for the sake of mass appeal and institutionalism. May my speculation avoid vitriol, but the déjà vu regarding the identity of these phenomena does not disappear for me. There is a historical irony in the fact that Plekhanov's methodological precision accurately warned against the theoretical and practical errors of the French socialists. Thus, Europe repays its debt to Russia, but enough with the barbs.

Plekhanov's persistence, which is why I will touch upon the foundations and the epistemological difference between Marxism and world-systems analysis. I cannot fail to note one very important thing. Our reality, constantly changing and transforming, forgets the roots from which it originates. And the most

What is the first generation of the Annales School? Why do we speak of it as a concept of reformism? This concept can be described as the principle of "neither reaction nor Marxism." And if we are to be accurate in our analysis, Bloch and Febvre never called themselves Marxists. On the one hand, for the Annales School, there was a huge problem in the form of historical positivism. Undoubtedly, their polemics and activity are a reaction to positivism. But with their good intentions and genuinely correct criticism of positivism, what did they arrive at? Production relations were replaced by totality, by spiritual toolkits. It turned out that all that remained of Marxism was psychologism and sociologism, and that the basis of the concrete and actual in Marxism degenerated for Bloch into the concept of collective representations, through which he now views reality; history is like a spiral. Thus, this spiral of reformism of the German and French reformists of the past has the same physiognomy as the reformism of the 20th-century historical school. Amazing historical accuracy. The spiral of reformism always follows the same path, both now and in Plekhanov's time. But if one is to answer directly the question about the difference between the world-system and Marxism, this difference is the same as it was between Marx and Lassalle, Engels and Dühring, Plekhanov and Kautsky. Even a correct, theoretically refined methodology, when deprived of its own root system, detaches from itself through compromises and loses itself. Thus, the difference in Plekhanov's superiority over Kautsky lies in the history of his theoretical, soldierly uncompromising nature; through new trends, Plekhanov was thus able to capture in

better than imaginary accusations and name-calling. The majority looks at the world-system through Wallerstein's method, but this is a mistake. More specifically, one should view world-systems analysis not as an isolated movement, but as a product of a specific school—namely, the Annales

school, whose founders are considered to be Bloch and Febvre. We will not delve into the theoretical prehistory of the school now, but it is necessary to highlight that it was under their influence that Braudel would create the concept of the world-economy, and it is

the Braudelian tradition that significantly influenced Wallerstein. May the academic community forgive me for my audacity and for how tactfully I omit the entire genealogy of the diversity of their thought. But Wallerstein is undoubtedly recognized by the academic tradition as a theorist

of world-systems analysis. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Wallerstein is significantly influenced by the reformism of the Annales School. But what is their concept? It lies in the revision of history. The term "revision " is used here not as an insult, but as

a methodological definition. They revised history, transforming it from the concept of "total history" in the first generation of the Annales School into geographic and spatial-economic structures in the second generation, and the concept of "mentalities" in the third. And Marxism in their theoretical

works is undoubtedly an important milestone in the history of the development of thought. But they conclude that Marxism as a concept is obsolete. Consequently, Marxism and its framework are elegantly discarded from consideration. While the third generation of the Annales School fully

completed the spiral of reformism by abandoning Marxism, Braudel remained stuck in the second generation, abstracting from actual, cohesive, and consistent Marxism toward a bare sociologism. These are the very theoretical and methodological foundations that constitute the world-system. Braudel’s concept and

Wallerstein’s invention. May the academic community of Russia forgive me for this European liberty on my part.

But again, I cannot help but note a certain déjà vu. Very speculatively and ironically, there exists a milestone of thought called analytical Marxism. Its main concept is that by discarding dialectical materialism, one is left only with a bare sociological

theory. Therefore, whether in 20 th-century French thought, modern American thought, or the 19th century, the historical spiral of reformism followed one calibrated path, and we have long since historically documented this path. Thus, the largely valid idea of Bloch and Febvre, struggling against

event-based history, was actually attempting to do the right thing: to turn history, as a collection of dates, into a science of interdisciplinarity.

But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Therefore, after two generations, their theoretical assumptions resulted in the theory of mentalities of the third generation of the Annales. That is why I insist that the theory of mentalities is not just

banal reformism, but an open trampling of any Marxism, as a consequence of the initial Annales idea. One must understand that the theoretical errors of Kautsky, the ideological decline of the Annales School from reformism to anti-Marxism, and even American

sociologism masked as Marxism—all of this is a consequence of smoothing out edges and surrendering the foundations of Marxism for the sake of mass appeal and institutionalism. May my speculation avoid vitriol, but the déjà vu regarding the identity of

these phenomena does not disappear for me. There is a historical irony in the fact that Plekhanov's methodological precision accurately warned against the theoretical and practical errors of the French socialists. Thus, Europe repays its debt to Russia, but enough with the

barbs. What is the first generation of the Annales School? Why do we speak of it as a concept of reformism? This concept can be described as the principle of "neither reaction nor Marxism." And if we are to be accurate

in our analysis, Bloch and Febvre never called themselves Marxists. On the one hand, for the Annales School, there was a huge problem in the form of historical positivism. Undoubtedly, their polemics and activity are a reaction to positivism. But with their

good intentions and genuinely correct criticism of positivism, what did they arrive at? Production relations were replaced by totality, by spiritual toolkits. It turned out that all that remained of Marxism was psychologism and sociologism, and that the basis of

the concrete and actual in Marxism degenerated for Bloch into the concept of collective representations, through which he now views reality; history is like a spiral. Thus, this spiral of reformism of the German and French reformists of the past has the same

physiognomy as the reformism of the 20 th-century historical school. Amazing historical accuracy. The spiral of reformism always follows the same path, both now and in Plekhanov's time. But if one is to answer directly the question about the difference between

the world-system and Marxism, this difference is the same as it was between Marx and Lassalle, Engels and Dühring, Plekhanov and Kautsky. Even a correct, theoretically refined methodology, when deprived of its own root system, detaches from itself through compromises and loses itself.

Thus, the difference in Plekhanov's superiority over Kautsky lies in the history of his theoretical, soldierly uncompromising nature; through new trends, Plekhanov was thus able to capture in detail the ideological decline of socialism in Europe. And we, poor decaying Europe, decided to very

modestly pay back this new type of reformism in the same coin. An idea, even one correct in its essence, when detached from living life for the sake of compromise or fraternizing with prejudice, becomes its own opposite.

Just as Marx's theory of classes turns into theoretical drifting and evasion in Kautsky, just as dialectics was torn from Marxism under the slogans of "back to Kant," creating something distinct from Marxism, and mixing Durkheim's sociology with the class method.

Neither class nor sociology resulted. You shall create a cult in my name. You shall preach day after day. I give you a sword that breeds enemies. We hack down infidel heretics. There.