Vervaeke explores the rationality debate: Cohen vs. Stanovich on whether human errors are performance or competence failures, arguing rationality is existential and tied to wisdom.
Key Takeaways
- Rationality is an existential matter with real moral, legal, and political consequences, not just an abstract theory.
- The competence-performance distinction can be tested by checking whether errors are systematic and predictable.
- Intelligence and formal logic are necessary but not sufficient for being rational.
- Rationality includes a normativity of construal and insight, not only inferential argumentation.
- Active open-mindedness, the habit of detecting one's own biases, is central to rational self-improvement.
What the video covers
- The episode situates wisdom within the cognitive science of meaning, linking it to the axial revolution and to overcoming self-deception.
- Stanovich's view that rationality involves valuing process over product, and that rationality and ameliorating foolishness overlap, is presented as a bridge concept.
- Vervaeke frames rationality as existential rather than merely theoretical, with moral, political, legal and developmental implications when people are deemed irrational.
- Cohen's argument holds that human competence contains the standards of reason, so reasoning errors in experiments are mere performance errors to be dismissed.
- Stanovich and West respond by invoking Piaget's criterion: genuine competence deficits produce systematic errors, while performance errors are circumstantial and unpredictable.
- Systematicity is tested through predictive patterns across tasks, similar to the positive manifold underlying general intelligence.
- Multiple competencies rather than a single one are proposed as a way to resolve the debate.
- Charniak takes a different approach, agreeing that the difficulty lies in competence but offering a distinct resolution.
- Intelligence and logical skill alone are insufficient for rationality, as the empirical evidence shows.
- Non-inferential normativity of construal, the generation of insight, is identified as a missing component of rationality, alongside active open-mindedness.
Chapters
- 00:00Introduction: Wisdom and the Cognitive Science of Meaning
- 04:00Recap: Wisdom, Self-Deception, and Process over Product
- 07:00Stanovich, Rationality, and Ameliorating Foolishness
- 10:00The Rationality Debate Begins: Experimental Evidence
- 13:00Cohen's Competence Argument
- 16:40Stanovich and West's Reply: Systematic vs. Performance Errors
- 21:40Multiple Competencies and Charniak's Alternative
- 30:00Insufficiency of Intelligence and Logic; Normativity of Construal
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
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[Music] you [Music] welcome back to awakening from the meeting crisis so we are pursuing the cognitive science of wisdom because wisdom has always been associated with meaning right from the axial revolution onward so that's a deep reason wisdom of
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course is also important for the cultivation of enlightenment the response to the perennial problems it's also playing a central role in being able to interpret our scientific world view it way that allows us to respond to the historical forces and so wisdom is
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very important we took a look at we continue to look at Magee and Barber and we saw their convergence argument that at the core of wisdom is the systematic seeing through of Elysian and into what's real and this is very much like
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as the child is to the adult the adult is to the sage and then two other important aspects of it that wisdom is much more with how you know then what you know which means how you come to
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know it and also how you interpret the knowledge and that wisdom is in it therefore in a related fashion deeply perspectival and participatory and that's why wisdom can be associated with in important forms of pragmatic self-contradiction we then noted the
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connection with overcoming self-deception in a systematic fashion and the emphasis on wisdom on the process rather than the products of knowing and that both of those took us into the work of Stanovich and because he famously argues that one of the
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hallmarks of rationality is valuing the process rather than sorry not rather than rather rating of the process in addition to valuing of the products of our cognition and that took us also into the notion the discussion of rationality and
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Stanovich is a good bridge because hip for him the notions of rationality and ameliorating foolishness overlap very strongly and we got into this notion of and which I've been sort of comprehensively arguing throughout this course that rationality has to do with
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the reliable and systematic overcoming of self-deception and the potential affording of flourishing by some process of optimization of achieving our goals with the caveat that as we try to optimize we often change the change the goals that we are pursuing one reason
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being that we come to more and more appreciate the value of of the process as opposed to just the end result of the process so in order to pursue that and to deepen our notion of rationality and thereby deepen our notion of wisdom and
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of course wisdom has been associated with rationality from the beginning Socrates and Plato and Aristotle right we took a look at the rationality debate we saw I gave you three examples of many possible examples experimental results that seem to show reliably this kind of
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thing very reliably no replication crisis on this material so very Eliab lis two things that people acquiesce they acknowledge and accept the authority of certain standards principles of how they should reason and yet they reliably fail to meet those
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standards and so one way to when possible interpretation of that not the only interpretation when possible interpretation is that most people are irrational in nature as I pointed out because rationality is existential man not just sort of abstract theoretical
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concluding that people are irrational has important implications for their moral status their political status their legal status even their developmental status okay so this is what I keep meaning what I am saying rationality is deeply existential it is
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not just theoretical okay we took a look at one the beginning of what's called the rationality debate and good science always has good debate in it the rationality debate and the argument it was made by Cohen that human beings
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can't be comprehensively irrational because we have to ask this very pertinent question where do standards come from and the argument is the standards have to come from us and how do we come up with that normative theory we come up with that normative theory
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that acknowledges right the way we come up with our normative theory is its consonant with that we're the source of our standards and this is the end this is the idea that at the level of my competence my competence contains all
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the standards and that what I do in order to get my normative theory is I idealize awake all my performance errors and this takes time it takes a lot of reflection right until I get at the underlying competence and then what I'm
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doing when I'm proposing a normative theory is I'm basically taking and giving people this now explicate it excavated account of the competence that they possess and then demanding from them that they do their best to reduce the performance errors and meet that
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confidence so we at the level of our competence we are fundamentally rational and all of the mistakes that people are making in these experiments according to Cohen are just performance errors they're just performance errors okay and just like you do not think I've
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lost English because of all of my performance errors you basically dismiss them and read through them and attribute to me the underlying competence the Cohen is arguing we should read through and dismiss these experimental results and because the argument shows that
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people must have the underlying competence okay so how does stand of it reply to this well in many places but I think the best is Stanovich and west 2000 and behavioral and brain sciences because the argument that this is a
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really for me a gold standard of how you do really good cognitive science the way they integrate philosophical psychological argumentation together for example is really really really impressive so stand of itchin West say well if Cohen is right then all of the
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errors that people are making our performance errors and Cohen is invoking the competence performance distinction which of course goes back through you know to Chomsky and and ultimately to Piaget now let's remember Piaget because we've talked about this well how do you
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know how do you distinguish the child's right speech deficit from the drunkards right the drunker it is giving performance error but we think the child actually her competence for example is not sufficiently developed why do we think that why do we think when the
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children are making all these conservation errors right that that reflects something about their competence at that point well that's because competence errors that reflect a defect or a deficit in competence are systematic errors that's precisely how Piaget did his work right
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that's precisely how you would determine that if I got brain damaged and I'm leaving out like my sentences or broke that it is not performance error because my errors would be systematic across different context different times of day
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different tasks I'd be making these mistakes performance errors are not systematic right so if I if my speech is broken because I'm rushing right it's not going to be broken when I'm not rushing if my speech is broken when I'm
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tired it's not going to be broken when I'm not tired so this is circumstantially driven right and as the circumstances change the patterns of error will change and go all over the place so these errors are not systematic in
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nature okay well that means we have a reliable way of telling whether or not the errors that the people are making in the experiments are performance errors or not how do you see if errors are systemic well this is what you do
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errors are systematic if when I make this error it's highly predictive that I'll make this error it's highly predictive that I make this error it's highly predictive that I'll make this error so if a child is showing conservation in this task that's
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predictive that they'll fail to show conservation right in this task in this task in this task right so the degree to which we've talked about this before the degree to which there's a positive manifold remember when we talked about
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general intelligence the degree to which your performance in one task is predictive of how you'll do on other tasks if you have a manifold in your performance if there's if the errors are systematic across many different tasks that you're performing then that's
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evidence that the errors are systemic rather than not systematic okay so that's easy enough so then what we can do is we can and we've got all this data we can look at people doing these different experiments we and many
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experiments that doing multiple versions the same participant is doing one task rinna so what we can do is the following we can see if if I for example if I make a failure in critical detachment does that mean that all
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I'll also tend to show belief for severance does that also mean that I'll tend to leap to the wrong conclusion when I was doing the task art you know the the lily pads covering the pond and the answer and this is what there is
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overwhelming evidence for is yes the errors you make are systematic they're systematic and see so now Santa bitching let's say ah Cohen's argument predicts that the errors are performance errors that's what he claims that means that the errors should be not systematic but
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what we find is overwhelming convincing evidence that the errors that people are making and all these tasks are systematically related together so these are errors at the level of competence and now you go right and this is what I
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mean about good debate makes something problematic right because there's something right about Cohen's argument in standard which acknowledges it right there's something right in that we have to be the source right of our standards and yet caught Cohen's conclusion that
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all the errors are performance errors is wrong it's it's undeniably wrong how do we put these together well you put these together and you can see Stanovich and waste doing this to varying degrees you put this together by stepping back and
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looking at an assumption that's in Cohen's argument it's an assumption about the competence Cohen is assuming that that competence for rationality is a single competence he's assuming that that competence is static right he's also assuming that the competence is completely individualistic
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okay I'll come back to this one much later I'm going to address these two because Stanovich really doesn't talk about this so remember that but we'll come back to it later think about the Platonic idea what if I
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have two competences that both are working towards getting me to reliably achieve my goals correct my own behavior but these competencies could actually conflict with each other that would mean I would be the source of all the standards here all the standards
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here here are all the standards here I am all I'm the source for all the standards but at the level of my competence I can be generating error because these two competencies can actually be in conflict with each other
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so one of this the one the way you start to resolve this debate and this has become a central idea in psychology cognitive psychology and cognitive science is that we don't have a single competency we have to have multiple
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competencies and what that means is and this is why for example assuming and critically uncritically assuming that you could reduce rationality and identify it with the single competence of syllogistic reasoning is just fundamentally wrong it's not paying attention to the science
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here's another issue Cohen is assuming that your competence is full-blown it's finished it's static it's done but and I sort of slipped this in notice the examples I used of small children their competence for example in English or
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whatever language they're speaking I just happen to be speaking English that's why I'm using it the little girl that the two and a half year old her competence is not fully developed she will come to have the standards as that
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competency fully develops but as that competency is immature she can be a source of error from her competence so right we have to give up the assumption that our competence again is static why would it be your cognition is inherently
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dynamic and developmental again assuming oh no this is just what it is right and assuming that there is a single thing we're pointing to when we point to rationality is a mistake see this way Stanovich and West can say and it's
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brilliant right it's brilliant they could say Cohen's argument is fundamentally right but his conclusion that the specific conclusion is wrong because the conclusion that the errors are only performance errors is only a conclusion based on the hidden premise
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right that the competence is single and static you have multiple competencies and they're in ongoing development okay so that's we've learned something very interesting so what's happening is instead of itches an advocate of this right you have dual processing models
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this is the idea that we have different ways of processing information think of how platonic this is how much Plato was going I told you this a long time ago right we have different styles ways of processing information and that are good
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for different kinds of problem-solving and those and neither one of these competencies can be right exclusive or sufficient for us but they have right ultimately a complimentary relationship a relationship I would argue of opponent processing when Stanovich has a
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different view it will come back to that a little bit later okay second person in the debate and you've heard me mention him and you've heard me talk about him with serious respect and he has given to her his respect by Stanovich and with
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charniak has a much different approach to the rationality debate he agrees with Stanovich and west that the difficulty is not at the level of our performance and that's the level of our competence but he has a different move to make he
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has a move that you see you saw me invoke last time this is the odd implies can so this is the question whether or not right whether or not we're applying the right normative theory to people in these experiments when we're judging
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them to be irrational so cherni I can Vokes something that you saw me invoke multiple times when we talked about relevance realization we're in the finitary predicament this is actually his term right we could not because it is combinatorially explosive
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derive make derive all the implications we cannot consider all of our assumptions all of the stuff that we've talked about before we cannot go back and recreate all of the ways in which we've represented something this is combinatorially explosive what we do
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right do we just arbitrarily choose whatever implication we want no so here's the point right we can't be algorithmic right we can't use standards that work in terms of certainty and completeness because for example if I tried to be comprehensively deductively
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logical then I would engage I would fall very rapidly into combinatorial explosion for any problem that I'm trying to solve and I would then have committed cognitive suicide it cannot be a standard a normative standard of rationality if trying to follow it would
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commit me to cognitive suicide which would undermine any attempt to satisfy any of my goals to see what journey I could saying right you can't do this but of course you don't just arbitrarily choose whatever representation you want
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choose whatever inference you want choose to check whatever contradiction you want so you can't check them all and you can't just arbitrarily and before and it's one that I write you do relevance you picked the relevant implications you check the relevant
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contradictions you check right which aspects of your representation you consider relevant etc you do relevance realization and Stanovich is like yeah that's right we're not going to argue with that and that's part of what I've been arguing throughout there's this
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consensus on how central this ability is at least it's an emerging consensus Herbert Simon from New Orleans Simon you know talks about bounded rationality that we can't be purely computational algorithmic etc for all of the reasons we've already explored these or and then
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what Changi Act says is but look what people are using in the experiments they're using formal logic they're using formal probability theory they're using all these formal purely algorithmic by the way you say oh but probability certainly doesn't work in certainty yes
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it does it gives you certainty about probabilities that's what makes it a formal theory that's why it has axioms and theorems etc okay don't confuse properties of the theory with properties of what the theory is about so what Jenny Act says is the
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scientists in the experiment are using all these formal theories that can only be applied in very limited contexts if I try to apply them comprehensively in my life and that's where rationality matters because rationality is an existential issue if I try to apply it
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comprehensively in my life from within the finitary predicament I am doomed to fail and then you're laying an art on me that I cannot possibly meet which means you scientists have the wrong normative theory because if you're laying a
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normative theory on me that I cannot possibly meet that's evidence that it's the wrong normative theory and that's journey X argument it's a powerful argument it's a good argument it's an argument I take very seriously so does Stanovich and West they go yes all of
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this is right however Chani ak is talking about he thinks he's talking about one thing and he's actually talking about another and this is such a clever response and it's going to tell us something really really important right okay first of all this tells you
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that you again here's another argument why you can't equate rationality with merely being logical merely using probability theory right does that mean I can be arbitrary and ignore logic no it's the much more difficult and notice how this starts to
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overlap with wisdom it's a much more difficult issue of knowing when where and to what degree I should use logic and probability in a formal manner etc okay how does stand a virtue and West reply again I think it's brilliant they say
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all of this is right but it's not about rationality all of this right all of this stuff they tend to talk about in terms they use the phrase computational limitations they always describe it sort of negatively instead of positively
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instead of relevance realization although the two are inter defined they always talk about it in terms of computational limitations but they say all this stuff that chair niak is talking about in terms of computational limitations is actually not about
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rationality it's actually about intelligence now this is gonna be a brilliant move and what its gonna also show us is there's a D and I said there's a while ago if there's a deep difference between being intelligent and
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being rational in fact Stanovich is gonna argue that what makes you foolish is you're highly intelligent and highly irrational and that is going to make sense right of what we've already argued that the very processes that make me
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adaptively intelligent are the very processes that also subject me to self-deception how does he do this well he basically argues and you saw an analogous argue how did they do this and how does television do it elsewhere right
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basically argue ah right when we test for people's ability to zero in on relevant information right how what how can we test to see how well people deal with computational limitations so what Stanovich basically argues is and again myself and Leo farrago of Leo
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Ferrara argued this in a convergent fashion other people right basically what we're testing when we're testing people's intelligence is we're testing their capacity to deal with computational limitations and this lines up again also you've heard me mention this the measures of intelligence
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correlate with measures of working memory and blah blah blah are giving you all that argument stand of itch is giving you an additional argument here he's saying okay so we understand intelligence as the capacity to deal with computational
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limitations that's negative way of putting it I would say it's the capacity to do relevance realization but let's keep going and then we have a way of therefore measuring people's capacity to deal with computational limitations so chair niak is saying people fail in the
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experiment because of computational limitations there in the finitary predicament and we have a way of measuring how well people can deal with computational limitations that's intelligence we have a way of measuring G reliable robust way of measuring G so now notice what we can do
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again so brilliant right we have reliable ways of measuring G remember what he what stand of itch and Weston was showed with answer to Cohen that all of the reasoning tasks also form a pause strong and manifold they don't label
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anything but I'm gonna call it R there's right sort of gr all right there's this general factor of reasoning because the reasoning tasks form a strong positive manifold okay so what we can do is we can measure the G of our right and now
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we can do something very very very basic if what's happening in the experiment is a measure of rationality and rationality is equivalent to dealing with combinatorial explosion computational limitations then these two should approach parody intelligence and rationality should be identical right so
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notice what what's going on here if cherni AK is right then rationality and intelligence would be identical and there would be a strong relationship between how intelligent you are and how well you do on these experiments and this is again where good science
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reliable robust well replicated lots of convert decades the relationship here is at best 0.3 so you know that correlation goes from zero to one where zeros no correlation and one is very strong correlation 0.3 intelligence what this clearly shows is that intelligence is
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necessary but nowhere near sufficient for being rational so here's two things that are insufficient for making you rational just being very intelligent and just being able to use logic the science is actually clear on this so notice notice how a lot of the ways our culture
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has tried to understand rationality are now coming into question we right oh well rationality is equivalent think of descartes now you see my Descartes is wrong of course right of logic allottee well that turns out to be false
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oh well rationality is the same thing as being really smart really intelligent right nope that turns out to be false Oh what is that then what is that then so now we're starting to do good science right we're starting to get away from
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common sense which sudden you have some humility we're starting to it's now a real problem well what is it what is it and it gives us a guy a way of like talking about what we've been talking about through the very processes that
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make you intelligent can actually cause you to be irrational there is no contradiction in saying you're highly intelligent and highly irrational not at all so now we have to ask ourselves well what's the missing piece so let's remember that we've got an important
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question that we need to ask an answer what's the missing piece for rationality what's missing something else is going on and that missing piece is going to tell us quite a bit I think about the overlap between wisdom and rationality
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now there's a third argument and it's an important argument because it's also going to connect to the issue of understanding which is again a crucial feature of wisdom now stand a fiction let's talk about this argument but they
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don't cite an individual who actually came up with the argument explicitly I think it's just because I don't think there's any fraud I think they just didn't read it because the person was the person I'm going to talk about is
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Medlen and the article is from the Scandinavian Journal of Psychology in 1970 so you know it's impossible to read everyone everywhere at all times again we are in the finitary predicament buts Medlin pointed out something that Stanovich and west do take seriously and
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because medellin makes an explicit and clear argument for it we should pay attention to what he says he says well there's a difficulty with easy so this is the third response we've had Cohen we've had chair niak and now a response
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that I will attribute to smellin Stanovich and West don't but they should but again no no crime on their part okay so Aslan says well there's a difficulty with interpreting the experiments again that's the issue always the issue of interpretation and
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you can't do an experiment to decide the interpretation because then you have to do right then you have to interpret that experiment you can't experiment your way out of interpretation interpretation is always going to be needed in science and
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that means theoretical debate is always going to be needed okay so back to the theoretical debate sense it says now interpreting these experiments relies on a distinction between a fallacy and a misunderstanding because there's two ways in which I can
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give the wrong answer one is I write I interpret the problem correctly I understand it but then I reason incorrectly and that's why I get the wrong answer so the fault in a fallacy fallacious reasoning is this is
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where the error comes in the poor reasoning a reason incorrectly but there's another way in which I can give the wrong answer to get to the same conclusion with the wrong answer well what is it I actually reason correctly in a normative
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fashion but I've understood the problem incorrectly all right and that's a misunderstanding somebody misunderstands us the error comes in because they've interpreted the problem they've understood the problem incorrectly but once once you give them that right incorrect interpretation
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there there's nothing wrong with their reasoning there's nothing wrong with their reasoning okay okay great so there's two places we can get there's two equally good explanations for why we produce the wrong answers one is we reason incorrectly and that's
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a fallacy because we've got correct interpretation the other one is we are reasoning correctly there's nothing wrong with our reasoning but we've understood the problem incorrectly and that's a misunderstanding right and that's okay so this distinction is really crucial because right this
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distinction is really crucial keeping these apart is really crucial because the if we want to conclude that people are irrational we have to be attributing to them fallacious cognition not pure sorry not sorry oh wow where did Pierre come wait we
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have to attribute to them fallacious cognition not some kind of distortion in the communication that they've misunderstood us one of the ways in which people typically often avoid self criticism avoiding the possibility that they might have reasoned correctly is to
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always claim that they have merely being misunderstood they misunderstood look for that in somebody look for somebody who never says ah right my argument is wrong I did it wrong look for somebody who always says no no I've been
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misunderstood yeah because they're basically trading on this in an equivocal fashion they're bullshitting you in a way okay so no sometimes they should say I've been misunderstood totally sometimes but sometimes they should say I reasoned wrong okay let's get back to
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this okay so far so good right but then medicine said but this is difficult because these things aren't independent the way we need them to be what what I mean the attribution of fallacy or the attribution of misunderstanding are not independent the
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way we need them to be in order to cleanly interpret the experimental results as showing that people are largely in gating engaging in fallacious reasoning well why so smitherland does something and of course I think it's preliminary but we'll have to come back
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to it right which is give a preliminary account of understanding and he basically says well what is it to understand something and he says well to understand X we asked people to give us something that's identical to acts well
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let's use arrows here to acts we asked us to give us something that contradicts acts right we asked us to give things that X implies and these are all of course related because identity as a kind of implication
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contradiction as a failure of implication and then we also asked them to give us things that are relevant to X now there it is again uh-huh I would also add by the way because when you look at further
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research and understanding people talk about it not only what what is relevant to X but also what is X relevant to and I don't thinks Medellin would it would object to that but here's the here's relevance again of course ok so what's
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the problem ah now put this one aside and SMED Flynn just sort of puts it aside in his argument and of course that's something I'm not going to sort of let sit by he puts aside this he says well ignoring
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that look at these three the way we determine if somebody has understood us is we determine we determine if they have drawn the identities we would draw draw the contradictions we have drawn drawn the implications we've drawn right
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so somebody understands us if they reason the way that we do so what's medicine says this is what the scientists are assuming the scientists are assuming that the participants in the experiment have understood the problem sorry right have understood the
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problem correctly and then reason incorrectly but notice how this is a pragmatic contradiction because if they've understood the problem correctly then they reason the way the scientist does in this very difficult task of interpreting a problem then but then they reason in the way the
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scientist does it when they're actually trying to solve the problem and that's problematic in fact couldn't I say this couldn't I say the fact that the right participants in the experiment are consistently producing the wrong answer is good evidence that they are
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misunderstanding the problem people are reliably misunderstanding these problems well that can't be because their scientists made them what scientists can't be making mistakes scientists can't miss misunderstand community what do you what are you tributing to science is godlike Authority now stick with the
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argument here right you can you could you can conclude that they're making the fallacy but it's it's sort of like you have to say for some reason right at this really difficult problem of interpreting what I'm saying their
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reasoning very correctly and then when they go to solve the problem their reasoning poorly or you can say right their reasoning correctly but they've misunderstood the poem but that also means that their reasoning poorly or maybe or maybe I've misrepresented or
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miscommunicated the problem see it's not so much more problematic okay so two things to note here two important things to note first of all we got to come back to this because there here's here's there's an opening here
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Constanta vision West because they haven't read smudged linen because they don't have this so clearly explicate it they can't sort of pick up on that so I'm not criticizing them for not seeing this right right but they do come up
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with a very important point and this go and this is convergent with their argument against Cohen they argue for this they argue in order to break this impasse we need a normativity on Const rule we need a normativity on how people
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interpret make sense of size up the situation of the problem that's what construal means basically we need a normativity on how they formulate the problem and this has to be an independent normativity independent of what independent of inferential norms
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right if I try to use inference as my stand good inference is my standard for doing this I'll fall into this circle I have to be evaluate I have to be able to evaluate control independently of evaluating how people make inferences
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that's the only way I'm gonna break out of this but that's okay because that means but Stanovich doesn't take this as deeply as they should but that means that there's a non inferential aspect to rationality that is central there's an
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aspect of rationality that has to do with understanding with control that is non inferential in nature and that of course points back to this because relevance is pre and parental the way you formulate your problems remember that has to do with relevance
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realization and that is something that is pre inferential in nature so we can actually put this together very cleanly I would argue we can say now see what Stanovich and West's say is okay we need this normative EVDO and control it has
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to be independent of our inferential normativity and then they go ah we don't know what this is what could it be what that normativity of construal would look like it's oh right and it's like granted but here's a proposal
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right I think it's a proposal that sort of it's it's clearly a right presented to us from a lot of the arguments we've already considered right we do have a normativity on control we have standards of what a good problem formulation is
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versus a bad problem formulation where do we study that normativity in psychology well we study it in insight problem-solving we know right what a bad problem formulation is a bad problem formulation is one that puts you into a combinatorially explosive search
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space a bad problem formulation is one that does not turn your ill-defined problem into a well-defined problem a bad problem formulation is one in which you are not paying careful attention to how salience is misleading you so that
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that's telling us something really interesting right that there is in it in addition to inference being crucial to being rational insight is crucial to being rational too because if what we mean by insight is somebody who is good
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at formulating problems avoiding combinatorial explosion of waiting ill-defined administering salience misdirection right then being insightful is going to be central to being rational it's not going to be something that comes up out of the irrational aspects of the psyche
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it comes it comes in from the Noren and Forenza but why should we be identifying nobody is here identifying rationality with just a pure logical normativity on inference so what I propose to you is that we need to
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understand the role of both insight and inference in rationality and that's much more problematic but we need that because we need to integrate rationality and understanding together in a integrated account and notice how now more and more rationality and wisdom are
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starting to overlap for us in a serious way because if I now get rationality and understanding inference and insight in meshed together then of course I'm starting to talk more and more and having to happen in a systematic and
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reliable way I'm starting to talk more and more about the ways when we talk about how people are wise if we give up thinking of rationality as being like mr. Spock or mr. data and we give up you
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know the the idea that being rational is just being really smart then we start to get into the problematic notion of rationality and we need the idea of multiple competencies we need the distinction between being logical and being rational being intelligent being
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rational and we have to understand that there's an important component of rationality that is non inferential in nature it has to do with a normativity of on construal the generation of insight not a normativity of argumentation and the generation of
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inference right and that's important that's really important so the issue of control is acknowledged but not in any way resolved by Stanovich so it's not going to play although it should given the his own arguments it's not going to play a significant role in
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his theory of rationality what is that theory what does it look like what is the missing piece according to Stanovich so we said right that intelligence is not predictive or an only weakly predictive of right rationality these are not equivalent
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and along the way we got yet another argument for intelligence being relevance realization okay that's all good what is the missing piece then the relationship here is only 0.3 what accounts for most of the variance then as a scientist would say so Stanovich
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argues very clearly for what he calls a cognitive style well this term is equipped is a bit equivocal it's used in slightly different ways in psychology for different things and he also invokes the notion of bad mind where
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inappropriate psycho tech so that's also in there so there's there's sort of cognitive styles in psycho tact that can both be part of the missing variants so what part here is the psycho tech you're using right you can have poor what he
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calls mind where which is like software he's picking up on the psycho tech idea here all right and then the other and this is what often gets given more priority because it accounts for a lot is an appropriate cognitive style the
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difference between these are not as as it's clear I think at the end of it seems to think they are so we'll have to come back to that when we come back to relationship between psycho technology and wisdom so what's what's what's the
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cognitive style so a cognitive style is an act is something you can learn at least as Stanovich is using it and it's to learn a set of sensitivities and skills notice the procedure allottee and the perspectival in here but it's it's
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implicit it's in the background right but what is the cognitive style that's most predictive of doing well on the reasoning test he gets this from Jonathan Barron this is the notion of active open mindedness and when you see this you're going to
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see a lot of stoicism here and this overlaps a lot with the cognitive behavioral therapy that right that is derived from stoicism and again that's convergent that's not by design or deliberate and that tells you something something crucial is being senior what
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is active open mindedness so active open mindedness is to train yourself to look for these patterns of self-deception to look for biases okay so here's a bias you've heard me mention you've heard me mention some of these the confirmation
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bias or right the essentialism bias right or the representational ism or the availability misusing the availability heuristic notice that a bias is just a heuristic misused we've talked about this so this is I tend to only look for
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information that confirms my beliefs right this is I tend to treat any category as pointing to an essence shared by all the members and maybe we should give up an essential ism of sacredness or at least in the terms of
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its content I've already suggested that to you the availability heuristic is the availability biases I judge some things probability by how easily I can remember it or imagine it happening we've talked about all of these there's many of these
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so what do I do first of all I have to do the science I learn about all of these alright so this comes from Barron I want to point out something that Stan a [ __ ] doesn't say
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as clearly as Barron does so what I do is I learn about these and I sensitize myself I sensitize myself and this is like a virtue because I have to care about the process not just the result i
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sensitize myself to looking for these biases in my day-to-day cognition and then I actively counteract them I actively say no no I'm doing confirmation bias I need to look for potential information that will dis confirm it and here's where you can now
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begin to also give up the individualistic assumption of competence part of the way in which I can be rationally competent is I can ask you to help me overcome my confirmation bias because it's very hard for me to look
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for information that this confirms my beliefs it's much easier for you and then if I practice with you and not your eye scan start to internalize you and I can start to get better at looking for my own instances where I fall prey to
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the confirmation bias so I now actively counteract those that's sort of where Stanovich leaves it barren points out right but you don't overdo this because if you overdo this you will start to choke on the tsunami of combinatorial
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explosion that it will overwhelm you so again you have to do this and you have to do this to the right degree and that becomes much more nebulous and again again we're starting to shade over into wisdom right so what you should then ask
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is what predicts if being intelligent doesn't predict right if intelligence predicted rationality then and being intelligent would predict how well you've cultivated active open-mindedness but of course it doesn't so what is it about people that predicts how well they
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will cultivate active open mindedness and this is the degree to which people have a need for cognition this is people who problematize things they create problems they look for problems they go out and on their own try to learn I
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would add to that there's two aspects to need for cognition there is a curiosity in which I need to have more information so that I can manipulate things effectively and that's important people that are in that sense more curious and
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want to solve problems not just gather facts but solve problems because that's what needs for cognition points to that's important but also think about how important wonder is right how much it opens you up to putting into question
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your entire worldview your deeper sense of identity deep need for cognition and that's relevant to do because rationality is ultimately an existential issue not just a theoretical inferential logical issue so what we're going to need to do is to come back and look more
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about at standing bitch's account of rationality some criticisms of it and then on the basis of that because we've already overlapping with it so much take a look at some of the key theories of the nature of wisdom and try to draw
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that together into a viable account of wisdom which we then can then integrate with the account of enlightenment thank you very much for your time and attention [Music] you you
Topics:rationalitywisdomcognitive scienceself-deceptionStanovichCohen rationality debatecompetence vs performancePiagetactive open-mindednessmeaning crisis











