Analysis of the Karabakh conflict's origins, mutual hatred, and social media's role in ongoing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Key Takeaways
- The Karabakh conflict is rooted in complex ethnic and historical grievances exacerbated by imposed borders.
- Population exchanges maintaining Soviet borders eventually ended the conflict but did not resolve underlying animosities.
- Social media is a powerful mirror and amplifier of societal hatred, influencing public perception and political discourse.
- Political leadership may not fully control or reflect the sentiments of their societies, complicating peace efforts.
- Preventive measures are critical to avoid future conflicts fueled by unresolved hatred and revanchist rhetoric.
What the video covers
- The Karabakh conflict stems from deep ethnic hostilities dating back to the collapse of the Russian Empire and the complex ethnic makeup of Transcaucasia.
- The borders drawn by the Bolsheviks were seen as unjust by both Azerbaijanis and Armenians, creating dissatisfaction on both sides.
- Azerbaijanis accepted the imposed borders reluctantly, while Armenians rejected them and pursued population cleansing and territorial annexation.
- A population exchange maintaining Soviet-era borders was proposed early on but was only completed in 2023 after prolonged conflict.
- Mutual hatred peaked during the summer of 2020 following border clashes in Tovuz, leading to violence and diaspora confrontations worldwide.
- Social media played a significant role in spreading hatred and hostility, reflecting societal tensions and exacerbating animosity.
- Despite political leadership in Armenia favoring peace, social media rhetoric reveals widespread revanchism and hatred among the populace.
- There is uncertainty about Armenian leader Pashinyan's true intentions and his control over societal sentiments.
- The video raises concerns about the future leadership of Armenian society and the necessity of preventive measures to avoid renewed conflict.
- The conflict may be over territorially, but the deep-seated mutual hatred remains a significant barrier to lasting peace.
Chapters
- 00:00Historical Background of the Karabakh Conflict
- 00:47Challenges of Drawing Borders
- 01:14Perceptions of Soviet-imposed Borders
- 01:46Population Exchange Proposal and Armenian Rejection
- 02:15Conflict Escalation and 2023 Resolution
- 02:45Enduring Mutual Hatred Post-Conflict
- 03:08Violence and Diaspora Clashes in 2020
- 03:35Social Media's Role in Amplifying Hatred
- 04:00Political Leadership vs. Societal Sentiment
- 04:30Future Risks and Preventive Measures
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
Speaker A
The Karabakh conflict, for understandable reasons, caused deep hostility between the two nations. At the time of the Russian Empire's collapse, almost all of Transcaucasia—specifically the Erivan, Baku, and Elizavetpol governorates, which later became the territories of independent and subsequently Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan—represented a patchwork of settlements for two main ethnic groups, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, alongside smaller peoples. In very rare areas was the population ethnically homogeneous.
Speaker A
The overwhelming majority of this territory was ethnically mixed, with settlements interspersed. Under these conditions, drawing a dividing line based on the existing ethnic map—setting aside the historical narratives of each side—was an extremely difficult task. There was no border
Speaker A
that would have left both sides completely satisfied. With any variant of a dividing line, one side, if not both, would have remained dissatisfied.
Speaker A
The borders established by the Bolsheviks were considered unjust by the Azerbaijani people. Indeed, territories such as Zangezur, Goycha, Daralayaz, Zangibasar, and Amasia, with their clearly Azerbaijani majorities, were transferred to Armenia. But the paradox is that these borders, imposed
Speaker A
from above, were perceived as unfair not only by us but also by the Armenian side. Nevertheless, Azerbaijanis forced themselves to accept that the borders were what they were. As the saying goes, "to hell with it," we have to learn
Speaker A
to live on with these imposed republican boundaries. In Armenia, however, they could not force themselves to accept the same. In a situation where each republic had a significant population of its neighbor, the most reasonable course of action, especially toward the end of the USSR,
Speaker A
would likely have been an exchange of populations while maintaining the borders drawn by the Bolsheviks. It seems like a case for "Captain Obvious," but in Armenia, they decided to disagree with the Captain. They decided to clear their own territory of the
Speaker A
Azerbaijani population, while keeping their autonomy within Azerbaijani territory, then annex it entirely, driving out the Azerbaijanis from there as well, and ultimately wanting to have their cake and eat it too. At the sunset of Perestroika, Azerbaijanis, to put it mildly, did not like such
Speaker A
audacity, and Armenians did not like that their audacity did not please the Azerbaijanis. The conflict ended in 2023 with what Captain Obvious had proposed from the very beginning: the completion of the population exchange while maintaining the Soviet borders,
Speaker A
with the only small difference being the appearance of the Alleys of Martyrs in Azerbaijan and Yerablur in Yerevan.
Speaker A
And yet, they could have been avoided. Who is to blame? The answer is once again known by that same Captain. The conflict seems to have ended, but the mutual hatred remains. Now, let's talk briefly about that. Throughout the
Speaker A
years of the conflict, the peak of mutual hatred—its culmination, so to speak—was, by all our observations, the summer of 2020, when border clashes occurred in the Tovuz direction. If we look back at those days, protests were taking place all over the world. And
Speaker A
unlike in previous years, they were accompanied by something that had not happened before: violence. It is enough to recall the throwing of stones at Azerbaijani protesters outside the country's embassy in Brussels. Attacks in Los Angeles, Paris, and Moscow cafes
Speaker A
, along with street clashes and mass brawls between groups of Azerbaijanis and Armenians. It even reached the point of meetings at the Russian Interior Ministry, where leaders of the two diasporas were summoned. We won’t even mention what was happening on
Speaker A
social media. The galvanization of Azerbaijani society led to an unauthorized visit by protesters to the Milli Majlis building, something that had never happened before either. By the way, the management of Food City, as we remember, imposed an embargo on
Speaker A
Armenian apricots in those days. It was the very height of the season. Throughout the conflict, as observers have noted, individual representatives of Armenian and Azerbaijani business in Russia maintained a certain degree of commercial interaction. But when the conflict reached these circles as well
Speaker A
and ties were severed, it was appropriate to consider this an indicator of the very culmination of mutual hatred. Even during the forty-four-day war and in the following years, the level of animosity did not reach the threshold recorded in the
Speaker A
summer of 2020, during and immediately after the Tovuz clashes. Why have we suddenly recalled all of this? What is happening on social media in recent days forces us to recall that record-high intensity from six years ago. We all remember what all of that
Speaker A
led to. Armenian users in those days threatened to reach Baku. Today, they promise to return to Karabakh and assure everyone that the main events are still ahead. We, in turn, console ourselves with the fact that Armenian society, by voting for Pashinyan's
Speaker A
party, preferred peace over revanchism. However, this cannot be said when monitoring the rhetoric of Armenian social media users, where an overwhelming majority spew bile and hatred toward Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis. Social media is a mirror of society, even taking into account
Speaker A
bots and trolls. But based on the level of hatred on social media over the last week, one simply cannot say that the Armenian people want peace. And yet, a very large portion of these users are Pashinyan's electorate. It now remains
Speaker A
to wonder whether Pashinyan himself is skillfully masking as a politician oriented toward peace while in reality harboring a long-term strategy of revenge, or if he has no influence over his own society. And this, in turn, forces us to reflect on the following:
Speaker A
what kind of leader will this Armenian society produce after Pashinyan? And would it not be better to take preventive measures?
Speaker A
what kind of leader will this Armenian society produce after Pashinyan? And would it not be better to take preventive measures?
Topics:Karabakh conflictArmenia Azerbaijan conflictTranscaucasia historyethnic conflictSoviet borderspopulation exchangesocial media hatred2020 Tovuz clashesPashinyanmutual hatred











