Robert Pape discusses the decline of U.S. hegemony amid escalating tensions with Iran and the broader Middle East conflict.
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Key Takeaways
- Iran is no longer seeking peace but is focused on expanding power and influence in the Middle East.
- US military strategy is currently paralyzed, with no clear path to decisive action or resolution.
- The conflict is escalating in a chaotic spiral involving multiple regional and international actors.
- Economic pressures from oil shortages and refinery crises are intensifying the global impact of the conflict.
- The US empire is in rapid decline, facing both international challenges and domestic political instability.
What the video covers
- Iran has shifted from survival mode to pursuing power, ambition, and revenge, aggressively pushing its influence through the US midterms and beyond.
- President Trump has repeatedly canceled planned military strikes on Iran, reflecting strategic paralysis rather than de-escalation.
- Iran is negotiating with Oman over the administration of the Strait of Hormuz as part of a 60-day MOU, which is nearing its end.
- The conflict is escalating both horizontally and vertically, involving multiple actors including the US, Iran, Israel, Houthis, Saudis, and proxies in Iraq and Syria.
- Iran is expanding its sphere of influence in the Middle East, creating a 'new axis of resistance belt' from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea to the Gulf.
- The world is facing an economic crisis triggered by dwindling oil inventories, refinery issues, and disruptions in key maritime choke points.
- The US is experiencing a decline in international influence and domestic political challenges, especially with the upcoming midterms.
- Power vacuums in the Middle East are being filled by Iran and other actors, leading to prolonged instability and conflict.
- Congress holds significant power over war funding, which could influence the trajectory of US involvement in the conflict.
- The ongoing war and US response highlight the rapid decline of US empire status and the limits of its military power.
Chapters
- 00:00Iran's Ambitions and US Political Impact
- 01:47Communications and Negotiations over Strait of Hormuz
- 03:09Iran's Leverage and Red Sea Front Shutdown
- 04:58Iran's Axis of Resistance Belt
- 06:46Spiral Phase of Escalation and Multiple Actors
- 08:14Iran's Pursuit of Power vs. US Search for Peace
- 10:02US Political Consequences and Midterm Elections
- 11:47Historical Context and Power Vacuums in the Middle East
- 17:30Future Outlook and US Decline
Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown
Speaker A
Iran's not looking for peace; they're looking for power. I call it Iran having gone from survival to ambition and revenge. There's a good chance that Iran will push its ambitions quite aggressively through the US midterms, even through January. It's gotten worse and worse and worse for President Trump. He is now going to have to own a legacy far more disastrous than if he had cut a deal in April.
Speaker A
As-salamu alaykum, and welcome to another episode on TMJ's Political Current Podcast. President Trump has once again called off planned military strikes against Iran, raising new questions about whether Washington has an actual strategy or whether the limits of US military power are finally becoming apparent. Joining me today to discuss not just the future of this specific war, but also what he calls the rapid decline of the US empire both in terms of its influence internationally as well as domestically with the upcoming midterms, is Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and one of the world's leading experts on military strategy and international security affairs.
Speaker A
Professor Pape, thank you so much for joining me again on TMJ News. Good to have you on and welcome.
Speaker A
Thank you very much for having me. Of course, and you know, we are once again back into the negotiations phase, apparently, of the war. We know Trump has once again canceled planned strikes on Iran, something he's done several times before. And as we know, not just intelligence coming out now, but intelligence that we had even prior to the US and Israel starting this war was pointing to this reality that military strikes, especially if they were to drag on, are highly unlikely to force Iran into a surrender. And let alone surrender, but it seems like now it's not even going to lead to them backing down from any of their critical demands.
Speaker A
So, what exactly would you say, Professor, that the US game plan now is with this war if there even is one?
Speaker A
Uh, well, the way I would characterize what just happened over the weekend is strategic paralysis. It's not de-escalation; it's not a return to negotiations.
Speaker A
Uh, let me say that now, of course, the president of the United States will have some facts that the rest of us do not have.
Speaker A
But what we all have are the current set of facts, which is there are some low-level, I would call them communications, that are happening. Qatar is at the hub of these. Um, and as best we can tell, these communications at most are transmitting the current draft plans that Iran is working out with Oman for the administration of the straits. We have some details on what that current draft looks like.
Speaker A
Uh, I think that what you are seeing in the discussions between Iran and Oman are the discussions that Iran is heading toward for the end of the 60-day MOU timeline. So, realize the MOU, we don't think is enforced, but Iran has actually been following this timeline in some ways. And the key thing to know is that the 60 days is supposed to end on August 17th, and in Article 5 of that MOU, the 60 days is important because Iran promised not to charge fees for 60 days only. The word "only" is in Article 5. And then, as the sentence later is that Iran will work out with Oman the administration of the Strait of Hormuz. And so that appears to be what is happening.
Speaker A
So what you are seeing with President Trump is he was promising an air campaign that was going to be the biggest since World War II, he says, and let's leave aside whether that's really true or not. I know quite a bit about the sizes of air campaigns here. I've been studying them for 35 years here. But let's leave that aside.
Speaker A
President Trump then, at the last minute, decided not to go forward, and in fact, there doesn't appear to be any orders given to say our B-1 bombers to get into the air, things like that, the actual movement of forces. Now, what I think you're seeing when he canceled this is strategic paralysis. This is recognition by the White House, probably President Trump himself, that the air campaign, air power, has failed. Think of us as on the Titanic heading to the world crisis as the iceberg, and with the drawdown of the oil inventories, the increase now in imports by China, the closures, the tankers that are now turning around rather than go through the Red Sea choke points. What you are seeing is the disappearance of the buffers that have prevented price changes from becoming actual shortages.
Speaker A
Well, those shortages now are—we're actually hitting the outer edge of the iceberg. We're actually hitting—we haven't smashed it all together. We haven't sunk the Titanic, but we're actually starting to hit it.
Speaker A
And it's on schedule. So this is on a schedule. I've been publishing this on the escalation trap for several months now.
Speaker A
And what you are seeing is that Iran entered, as I was saying it would on June 15th in this big post I made, its period of maximum leverage.
Speaker A
And that leverage is when the oil inventories are running down. Now, also, then what I said on this June 15th is Iran's—this wouldn't just be a stable state—this is when you should expect the Red Sea front that Iran would start to shut down the Red Sea front. Now, it's done this with the Houthis. Of course, there's some back and forth here with, of course, the Saudis, but the bottom line is that is in fact happening on schedule, you see.
Speaker A
So, even though Washington is now in a state of strategic paralysis, the other actors are not paralyzed, and you are in what I call the spiral phase of the escalation trap, where the war is escalating both horizontally, widening, more and more actors coming in, and also vertically, and it's happening in a spiral way, which is a more chaotic way. So, this is a spiral phase. It's not fully under the control of any of these actors because each of the key actors can initiate the use of force for whatever they think the reason they should do it.
Speaker A
That's the United States can initiate, Iran can initiate, Israel can initiate, although it hasn't lately. Has—well, although it hasn't lately.
Speaker A
The Houthis, although it has, and also the Saudis, and Saudis have, and also the Iranian proxies in Iraq. And so, and also, by the way, there are lots of subgroups here, say in Syria, that we're not even paying attention to. And what you are witnessing is this is all happening. The spiral phase is happening as the oil—as the world is heading closer and closer to, and now we're actually in the beginning of this economic crisis. In the last seven days outside my home here in Chicago, the price of gas has gone up 10% in just seven days.
Speaker A
And there's no reason to think this is topping out anytime soon because we don't have more oil inventories to pour on. There's now a refinery crisis beginning around the world. And what is Iran doing during this period?
Speaker A
They're not looking for peace. They're not looking for a way out. Now, Trump, I think, is looking for a way out. Iran's not looking for peace; they're looking for power. I call it Iran having gone from survival to ambition and revenge.
Speaker A
And what does this greater phase of ambition look like? It looks like a steady expansion of Iran's control and influence, a sphere of influence, in the Middle East itself. And the IRGC told us what this was going to look like in May, at the end of May.
Speaker A
And the leaders of the IRGC, multiple times, not just one time, they did this on Telegram, on other posts, laid out that there was going to be a new axis of resistance belt, they called it, and that belt was going to go from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea to the Gulf.
Speaker A
And that, of course, corresponds with Lebanon, their interest in Lebanon, and you also have the—which is on the Mediterranean coast, just for listeners who may not know. And then also the Red Sea, that's the Houthis, Yemen right on the coast. And of c...
Speaker A
And as and it's on schedule. So this is on a schedule. I've been publishing this on the escalation trap for for several months now.
Speaker A
And what you are seeing is that Iran entered, as I as I was saying it would on June 15th in this big post I made, um, uh, its period of maximum leverage.
Speaker A
And that leverage is when the oil inventories are running down. Now, also, then what I said on this June 15th is Iran's uh uh, this wouldn't just be a stable state, uh, this is when you should expect the Red Sea front that Iran would
Speaker A
start to shut down the Red Sea front. Now, it's done this with the Houthis. Of course, there's, uh, you know, some back and forth here with of course the Saudis, uh, but the bottom line is that is in fact happening on schedule, you
Speaker A
see. So, um, even though Washington has is now in a state of strategic paralysis, the other actors are not paralyzed uh and you are in what I call the spiral phase of the escalation trap, where the war is escalating both horizontally,
Speaker A
widening, more and more actors coming in, and also, uh, vertically, and it's happening in a spiral way, which is a more chaotic way. So, this is, uh, a spiral phase. It's not fully under the control of any of these actors because
Speaker A
each of the key actors can initiate the use of force, uh, for whatever they think they reason they should do it.
Speaker A
That's the United States can initiate, Iran can initiate, Israel can initiate, although it hasn't lately. Has well, although it hasn't lately.
Speaker A
The Houthis, although it and it has, uh, and also the Saudis, and it and and Saudis have, and also the Iranian proxies in Iraq. Uh, and so and also, by the way, there are lots of the lots of
Speaker A
subgroups here, say in Syria, that we're not even paying, uh, attention to. And and what you are what you are witnessing is this is all happening, the spiral phase is happening as the oil as as the world is heading closer and closer to,
Speaker A
and now we're actually in the beginning of this uh economic crisis. In the last um uh 7 days uh outside my home here in Chicago, the price of gas has gone up 10% in just 7 days.
Speaker A
Uh and there's no reason to think this is topping out anytime soon uh because we don't have more oil inventories to pour on. There's now refinery crisis beginning around the world. Um and what is Iran doing during this period?
Speaker A
They're not looking for peace. They're not looking for a way out. Now, Trump, I think, is looking for a way out. Iran's not looking for peace, they're looking for power. I call it Iran having gone from survival to ambition and revenge.
Speaker A
And what does this uh greater phase of ambition look like? It looks like a steady expansion of Iran's control and influence, a sphere of influence, in the Middle East uh itself. And the IRGC told us what this was going to look like and
Speaker A
in May, at the end of May. Uh and they uh the leaders of the IRGC uh multiple times, not just one time, they did this on Telegram, on other posts, laid out that there was going to be a new axis of
Speaker A
resistance belt, they called it, and that belt was going to go from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea to the Gulf.
Speaker A
And that, of course, corresponds with uh Lebanon, their interest in Lebanon, and you also have the which is on the Mediterranean coast, just for listeners who may not know. Uh and then also the Red Sea, that's the Houthis, Yemen right
Speaker A
on the coast. And of course, they are right on the coast of uh Hormuz. So, they are steadily strengthening that security resistance belt. Uh there's a good chance that Iran will push its ambitions quite aggressively through the US midterms,
Speaker A
even through January. Possibly in January, they'll be a new period where we can think about a broader reset, and that would be true, I think, for Iran as well.
Speaker A
But between now and the midterms, and I think even through January, you should expect that Iran will continue in this in this line of building its ambition, and then you should expect that President Trump cannot accept that ambition because the defeat isn't a
Speaker A
defeat like we saw stable in April 8th when we had the ceasefire. It's gotten worse and worse and worse for President Trump. He is now and going to have to own a legacy far more disastrous than if he had cut a
Speaker A
deal in April. And so I've been arguing for months different off-ramps. He should have stopped on March 2nd. He should I mean, every step here, and it's because the escalation trap gets deeper and worse for the United States and
Speaker A
President Trump and his presidency. Yeah, absolutely. And I I definitely want to touch on the midterms and the presidency and all that because I think that's also a really key conversation that's happening here in the United States. But before I get into that, I
Speaker A
want to talk about, you know, you're mentioning Iran and its expanding ambitions going from the whole survival mode to now and being ambitious about what it can achieve in the region.
Speaker A
Analysts that I've spoken to, as well as many who I've heard speaking on this topic, talk about how the Iran war has really called into question the very military doctrine that the United States has been relying on for the past several
Speaker A
decades. I believe you have also spoken about how for the past 35 years, the US has been furthering this idea of being the strongest military in the world using precision strikes and air superiority and this idea of rapid
Speaker A
victory over all of its adversaries, but that's something that just witnessing the reality of this war has failed miserably with Iran this time around. What do you believe, Professor, that this very fact right now means for the US empire in its current state?
Speaker A
Uh it it means the end of US hegemony as we know it. Uh last week I published a very lengthy 4,000 word piece in Foreign Affairs called The New Rules of Global Power. Uh this really develops this in
Speaker A
great at length to really understand what's what's happening in a bigger picture. Um and so just to unpack this a bit here. Um so it's important to understand that the United States has been oh has had a strong military force since World
Speaker A
War II, but in 1991 with the first Gulf War, that was really the beginning of US unipolar power, unipolarity. It wasn't just the end of the Cold War, which then took the Soviet Union back off the map for a
Speaker A
while. Uh and now um it was uh a demonstration in 1991 in that '91 Gulf War of unbelievable power by the United States that shocked the world and made the and made the United States the undisputed military hegemon in the world. And what
Speaker A
do I mean by that? In 1991, Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraq, um which had 10 had big puddle of oil, 10% of oil of of reserves are in Iraq, conquered Kuwait, another uh big oil uh country, and uh then threatened to
Speaker A
take uh the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, which were only about 75 mi south of Kuwait. They're not very far away.
Speaker A
And Iraq had the fourth largest military in the world. They put in 42 uh 42 divisions. This is over 300,000 troops in Kuwait. And the uh United States uh launched a campaign to kick Iraq out.
Speaker A
Well, it's That's a campaign that we need to understand. Before the campaign began, we took 10,000 body bags, the United States, to the region because we were expecting something we we we knew we hadn't more technology, but it hadn't been
Speaker A
demonstrated even to the Americans. And what happened is we ended up kicking Saddam Hussein and that giant army out of Kuwait with a 39-day air campaign, a four-day ground war, and the loss of only, and I hate to say only when you're
Speaker A
talking about uh dead people, but only 147 US troops. 147, not 10,000. That came with uh stealth fighters. That came with satellite. That came with the precision revolution. And that was a stunning event, not just for Saddam Hussein, but it literally defined the
Speaker A
unipolar moment for decades. So, that idea of the hegemony stayed really for quite some time. Now, what's happened with the Iran war is for the first time, and this is 35 years later, we have the bookend. We have the end now, for real,
Speaker A
of the American unipolar moment. It is now over. You can also call it the end of of the American empire or the end of American hegemony. Now, as American hegemony has declined, and now it's quite clear it's declined, um this has created in the
Speaker A
Middle East a power vacuum. A power vacuum because America used to be the number one top dog in power in the region. That's not that's it's taking out multiple pegs at this point.
Speaker A
Well, that leaves a power vacuum. Iran is filling that power vacuum, but so too are other actors, and they're they're This will happen likely even more in the coming months because power vacuums don't like to stay in a vacuum. Power
Speaker A
rivalries fill the power vacuum, and that's how when empires end, that's how you get a lot of chaos. And there's history There's the We have case after case of this in world history. Well, that's what's occurring here. So, this
Speaker A
is bigger than the uh Iran the the than another forever war. This has much bigger implications. It has big implications for the region of the Middle East. It has big implications for Asia. It has big implications for uh
Speaker A
Russia and Ukraine. What's happened in the 35 years since is globalization itself has undermined it undermined American unipolarity cuz the the technology that used to be precision, that technology that used to be GPS, well, this is now on all of our phones.
Speaker A
This phone, which is by the way, I have a 5-year-old phone, okay? This 5-year-old phone is more powerful than an IBM 360 mainframe that was a whole uh floor of a building in 1965.
Speaker A
This one phone. And just think about how this has spread. And so, the Shahed 136 drone, this is this famous drone. Iran has many thousands of them. They can produce them cheaply.
Speaker A
They can they fly in swarms. So, if you knock down 70-80%, you haven't done nothing. You haven't stopped and defended the target.
Speaker A
What these are are basically the components from these phones. This is not a temporary phenomenon.
Speaker A
This is going to establish new rules of global power for years to come. Other it's going to spread.
Speaker A
The the thing I just gave a big briefing on my Substack here where I showed not just the phone, but I showed some of the things that are coming in the next 5 years as AI improves all these phones.
Speaker A
This is about to become obsolete by a factor of 10 in just a few years. I'm going to have to get a new phone.
Speaker A
And so, what you are what you are seeing though is this is now a second precision revolution which is far more you could even call it democratic. It's far it's it's not just the province of the United States and a
Speaker A
handful of its rich allies. And this is going to reshape global commerce. This is going to reshape balances of power in the region. It's going to lead to power vacuums and likely power rivalries which will slip into we
Speaker A
hope not. I don't want this to happen. But these are the kinds of these are the actual seeds of violence and conflict that happen that I've been studying for decades and decades.
Speaker A
And so, these are these are all well-known mechanisms for that coming conflict. So, that's what we are facing here and that's what is unfortunately going to engulf the Middle East for some time to come.
Speaker A
Yeah, and you just spoke you know very extensively about all the international global realities that we're going to be seeing coming out from this war. I want to focus as well a little bit on the domestic side of things. We were talking
Speaker A
a little bit earlier about the midterms coming up. And interestingly, we're actually looking at two very different political calendars for the two leaders that actually initiated this war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and President Donald Trump. In Israel,
Speaker A
we know the elections are approaching in October, and the analysts that I've spoken to, several of them, have said how this whole war for Netanyahu is about winning and being reelected. In the United States, however, that political reality is almost the
Speaker A
opposite, where with the midterms approaching, the political incentives are really in a way where further escalation could actually carry significant domestic costs for the Trump administration. So, both of these countries really that started the war are facing two very different domestic
Speaker A
realities in the fast-approaching upcoming months. What significance, Professor, would you say that has at this current stage of the war?
Speaker A
Well, in the Israeli case, about 75% of the Israeli public supports more war across the board against Gaza, against Lebanon, against Iran. So, changing leaders here might actually lead to more aggressive action by by Israel, but it's not likely to lead to
Speaker A
de-escalation. The United States is a completely different story because if the when we get to the midterms, if the Democrats, if there's no solution, and I'm saying there's not a solution, very unlikely to be a solution to this by the midterms,
Speaker A
then what's going to happen is there's a very good chance that the Democrats in the United States will win one or both houses of Congress. And then, if they are seated, and there's an if because we have to remember President Trump used
Speaker A
extra constitutional means before when he didn't like an outcome with January 6th. But, if they are seated, then they are extremely likely to pass uh laws, not just voice resolutions, to end the funding for the war. And this would then
Speaker A
uh look a lot like how the Vietnam War ended. So, people may not really know.
Speaker A
They know the Vietnam War eventually ended, but it didn't end because the president suddenly said, "Oh, yes, I now see the light." What happened was in 1974, the last time Congress actually acted in a serious way in foreign
Speaker A
policy, was 1974. It passed uh a resolution, and I'm sorry, laws, that blocked funding for the Vietnam War.
Speaker A
That's how the Vietnam War came to an end. Now, there was still money in the pipeline, so it didn't literally end on a day. It ended in in 1975 with the famous helicopter coming uh from the embassy in Saigon, US embassy in Saigon.
Speaker A
But, that war really That was Congress ending the war. And our US Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse.
Speaker A
It also gives Congress the power uh to declare war. And so, this is why the midterms are going to be the most dangerous midterms in our lifetimes. Uh I have um uh another book coming out here in just um
Speaker A
uh about 6 weeks called Our Own Worst Enemies, where for 5 years I've been studying the trajectory of uh political violence in the United States. I call it America's era of violent populism. Well, that was before the Iran War. Now, you
Speaker A
layer on top of that the issues of the Iran War. This becomes existential here if you're in MAGA, because what happens when uh the Democrats win? Uh a couple of things happen. Number one, if they end the war, this locks in the the the
Speaker A
the the most horrible President Trump's legacy as the most horrible president here that maybe we've ever had, ever. I mean, this is this is an incredible and you this would lock in, you see, that outcome for for President Trump.
Speaker A
But then also Maga's domestic agenda. And I'm not trying to defend all these these, but I'm just trying to analyze.
Speaker A
The domestic agenda for Maga, the deportations and so forth, these are likely to come to a complete grinding halt if not be reversed here, even though President Trump may still be technically in office.
Speaker A
And on top of that, third point is that come January, if the new Congress is seated and the Democrats win and President Trump is the lamest of lame ducks and has Who's going to want to campaign with President Trump for 2028
Speaker A
with this kind of a way So, you can see right away President Trump will become radioactive in the United States, much the way Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War in 1968 here when he was compelled to withdraw from running for president. Nobody
Speaker A
wanted to be around Lyndon. Nobody's inviting Lyndon Johnson to some rallies here to help build support. And that's why Richard Nixon was able to coast into the the presidency.
Speaker A
Here and got reelected again in 1972. So, these are This is We are coming to a true pivotal moment here. And we have already had a tremendous amount of political violence in the United States around our elections.
Speaker A
This is We're now heading into the beginning of this season. And so the Iran war is going to fuel the fires that will make these the most dangerous elections in our lifetimes.
Speaker A
Well, Professor Pape, thank you so much for joining me on TMJ once again. It was wonderful to hear analysis like always.
Speaker A
Thank you so much. Thank you for having me. If you like what you see here on TMJ News, don't forget to like and share and subscribe to our channel for more interviews. You can also sign up for our
Speaker A
weekly newsletter, the TMJ Insider, for access to all our reporting, articles, breaking news, and interviews. TMJ News is an independent, grassroots media outlet, and you can find ways to support us as well as the links to all our
Speaker A
resources in the description below. Thank you so much for joining me today, and I hope to see you next time.
Topics:IranUS hegemonyMiddle East conflictRobert PapeTrumpmilitary strategyStrait of Hormuzoil crisisescalation trapaxis of resistance











