A Region in Flux: Shifting Strategic Alignments in the … — Transcript

Welcome to this webinar hosted by the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. I'm Hena Shihabi, and I'll be moderating today's conversation. The US-Israel-Iran war has prompted regional powers to reassess their postures, sharpening the urgency of centering regional cooperation as a pillar of a durable regional political and security architecture. These pressures have catalyzed the establishment of a nascent quadrilateral that brings Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt together. Four powers that share an unease over prolonged instability and a growing skepticism about external security guarantees.

So far, the foreign ministers of this emerging quadrilateral have convened three times, most recently on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in mid-April.

This quad holds real promise, drawing on the distinct economic, political, and security strengths of each actor.

However, it faces challenges, considering the complexities unique to each actor's context and the broader volatility of the region. To explore how this emerging quadrilateral is taking shape, we have convened four experts to examine these the region's strategic realignments. Our panelists will discuss what is driving the region's strategic shifts, the obstacles to building comprehensive frameworks, and ultimately how durable these efforts are likely to be. With that, I'm delighted to welcome our panelists today. Albert Wolf, global fellow at Habib University in Karachi.

Faisal Abbas, editor-in-chief of Arab News. Faisal bin Madaqa, editor-in-chief of Gulf Times. And Uzay Genç, visiting fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Albert, I want to go to you first to discuss what surprised us all, Pakistan's growing role in regional diplomacy. Pakistan is considerably expanding its regional engagement in recent years, but specifically in the aftermath of the Iran war.

What are the key drivers of Islamabad's deepening involvement in the Gulf and broader regional affairs?

Well, first I want to thank you and the Council for inviting me to today's panel.

Now, at a very basic level, I think we all know that Pakistan's Gulf engagement rests basically on three pillars: economics, you know, national security, and identity. So, when it comes to economics, we have some just existential issues, such as remittances that are coming from around 9 million Pakistani expats that are working in the Gulf. We have emergency Saudi deposits that come during balance payments crises. Debt rollovers that help to keep Islamabad solvent. Um, we have a security relationship that's transactional in a very literal sense.

You know, for example, Pakistani troops have guarded Saudi Arabia's northern border since the '80s. A mutual defense pact that was signed last September, but it really formalized what was always an implicit quid pro quo.

Um, you know, security services for, you know, for financial lifelines and financial assistance. Now, the current war between Iran, the US, and Israel has stress tested all these simultaneously. Now, Pakistan signed the pact before the war, expecting they would have some degree of constructive ambiguity to give it room to maneuver. And I talked about this in a piece that I was able to publish with Off Center. Um, what he got and said was basically a three-body problem. Pakistan's historically had a pretty good relationship with Tehran that dates back to its independence. Um, Riyadh was watching to see if its nuclear armed partner met what it said in the signed pact.

Tehran was watching from the other direction, and roughly 40 million Pakistani Shia were watching a neighboring Islamic republic absorb American and Israeli strikes. I want to emphasize, of course, the broader Pakistani public was also irate about these strikes. Now, there were about 22 fatalities that died outside the US consulate in Karachi at the beginning of March. And so, the toolkit Islamabad has used for decades was beginning to break down. It was under considerable pressure. However, Pakistan's response has been very sophisticated. So, they've been hosting peace talks as the visible mediator, while quietly tilting toward Riyadh.

You saw just a few days ago, they honored an element of the pact they have with Riyadh by sending fighter jets over. So, there's a consistent logic beneath Pakistan's performance of solidarity. It shows up for the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, when it can manage the costs. Thank you, Albert. Um, and I want to go to you, Faisal Abbas, on the Saudi factor in all of this. So, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a central actor in this evolving regional alignment landscape. Um, so can you speak to us a little bit about the Saudi calculus in all of this?

Um, how is Saudi Arabia approaching these evolving regional alignments, and what are the considerations really shaping its posturing vis-à-vis these other powers?

Uh, well, first of all, thank you for having me, and regards with regards to the Saudi position, I just want to emphasize that from the offset, the position in Riyadh has been to try to avoid this war. Um, and try to find a mediated solution. Um, and when that failed, I suppose the war started, the shift went directly towards limiting the damage that could be inflicted. Um, which together with the other GCC countries, we've seen phenomenal coordination, perhaps some differences put aside until this imminent threat is over. The, you know, there are no shortages of options that Riyadh could resort to, including deterring aggression.

We have a defense pact with the United States. We have a defense pact with Pakistan. There's the joint GCC defense pact, all of which could be triggered. However, there is a deep understanding that starting wars are very easy, and as we are seeing now in Islamabad, stopping them is always a challenge.

As we speak, the Iranian ambassador is still in Saudi Arabia. Many members of the diplomatic team of Iran have been asked to leave, but the ambassador is still there. The foreign ministers still exchange phone calls. The calculus is if we can reach a negotiated solution without rushing to it. I have to also add, it's not like we are urging any solution. In this case, no deal is better than a bad deal.

Because what is evident now, I can speak certainly from what I heard from Saudi officials, but I think our fellows in other Gulf countries might agree that what you don't want to happen now that this war has started is have an injured lion. And in this case, an injured and insulted lion in Islamabad that is still more capable of, more willing, always been capable, but now more willing to harm its neighbor, be it via ballistic missiles, be it via drones, be it via militias, or the nuclear program. So, it's a difficult calculus to difficult equation to reach.

There's certainly a need to end the war as soon as possible, but also at the same time, we don't want to rush and accept any deal that will not secure the best possible outcome for us. The last thing I want to say is this is certainly not a regional conflict. This is a global conflict. Perhaps some other countries in the world don't realize the storm that is coming in terms of energy prices and in terms of inflation, but this is something that needs to be contained, and everybody needs to be a stakeholder. Thank you, Faisal. And can I briefly ask you to touch on the more regional dynamics of this posturing and of this evolving strategy? How has the war particularly catalyzed or enhanced regional coordination and integration?

Um, look, it has proven that the GCC stands for the Gulf Cooperation Council, not the Gulf Competition Council. And you've seen Saudi Arabia, for example, open up makeshift airports for fellow Gulf countries to move their fleets and operate from there. We've seen logistics cooperation. We've seen military and security cooperation at the highest level.

You saw just a few days ago, they they've honored an element of the pact of the pact they have with Riyadh by sending fighter jets over. So, there's a consistent logic beneath Pakistan's performance of solidarity. It shows up

for the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, when it can manage the costs. Thank you, Albert. Um, and I want to go to you, Faisal Abbas, on on the Saudi factor in all of this. So, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a central actor in this

evolving regional alignment landscape. Um, so can you speak to us a little bit about the Saudi calculus in all of this?

Um, how is Saudi Arabia approaching these evolving regional alignments, and what are the considerations really shaping um its posturing vis-à-vis these other powers?

Uh well, first of all, thank you for having me, and regards with regards to the Saudi position, I just want to emphasize that from the offset, the position in Riyadh has been to try to avoid this war. Um, and try to find a mediated

solution. Um, and when that failed, I suppose the and the war started, the shift went directly towards limiting the damage that that could be inflicted. Um, which together with the other GCC countries, we've seen phenomenal coordination, perhaps some

differences put aside until this imminent threat is over. The you know, there there are no shortages of options that could Riyadh could resort to, including deterring aggression.

We have a defense pact with the United States. We have a defense pact with with Pakistan.

There's the joint GCC defense pact, all which could be triggered. However, there is a deep understanding that starting wars are very easy, and as we are seeing now in Islamabad, stopping them is always a challenge.

As we speak, the Iranian ambassador is still in Saudi Arabia. Many members of the diplomatic team of Iran have been asked to leave, but the ambassador is still there. The foreign ministers still exchange phone calls. The the calculus is if we can reach

a negotiated solution without rushing to it, I have to also add. It's not like we are urging any solution. In this case, a bad deal in no deal is better than a bad deal.

Because what what is evident now, I can speak certainly from what I heard from Saudi officials, but I think our fellows in other Gulf countries might agree that what you don't want to happen now that this war has started is have a

injured lion. And in this case, an injured and insulted lion in Islamabad that is still more capable of more willing always been capable, but now more willing to harm its neighbor, be it via ballistic missiles, be it via

drones, be it via militias, or the nuclear program. So, it's a difficult calculus to difficult equation to reach.

There's certainly a need to end the war as soon as possible, but also at the same time, we don't want to rush and accept any deal that will not secure the best possible outcome for us. The last thing I want to say is this is

certainly not a regional conflict. This is a global conflict. Perhaps some other countries in the world don't realize the storm that is coming in terms of energy prices and in terms of inflation, but this is something that needs to be

contained, and everybody needs to be a stakeholder. Thank you, Faisal. And can I briefly ask you to touch on the more regional dynamics of this posturing and of of this evolving strategy? How has the war particularly catalyzed or enhanced um

regional coordination and integration? Um, look, it has proven that the GCC stands for the Gulf Cooperation Council, not the Gulf Competition Council. And you've seen Saudi Arabia, for example, open up a makeshift airports for fellow Gulf countries to move their fleets and

operate from there. We've seen logistics cooperation. We've seen military and security cooperation at the highest level. As I said, I don't think anybody in the audience, uh, I would be telling them a secret or a surprise that if I

say that just before this conflict there were major differences albeit tactical differences between some of the GCC countries. But all of that has been put to aside and the coordination is at its best um, because this is a threat that, uh,

uh, affects us all. Um, you know, in a sense, in a way, we are lucky in Saudi Arabia given the geographical space and to put that into perspective or context, you're talking about a country the size of Western

Europe. Um, so what happens in the Eastern province, you don't hear about or see in Riyadh or in Jeddah. The same does not necessarily apply when you talk about Bahrain, for example. Um, the, you know, the the other thing is the,

uh, you know, the the fact that we don't host any military bases in Saudi Arabia and we've made it clear that we are not using allowing our airspace and, um, ground to be used in the war might have

reduced a little bit the intensity of the attacks compared to other Gulf, uh, countries. But at the same time, it's not that you're you're dealing with an opponent that has the gloves off. So I say that, um, you know, with, uh, with a caveat that,

um, even Oman which for decades has been Iran's best friend in the region and up until the war started, they were trying to negotiate on their behalf, even them, they were not spared from the, um, indiscriminate attacks that have

happened since the start of the war. Um, clearly, uh, for Iran, making the war as expensive as possible by hitting Gulf countries' oil and energy facilities uh, was more important than any bilateral relationship or agreement that they had.

Thank you, Faisal. Um, and Özge, I want to go to you on the view from Ankara. So in recent years, we've seen, um, the rapprochement between Turkey and several Gulf states and also other, uh, major regional powers. Um, so what is the view

and what is the calculus on Ankara's end? Is this a strategic convergence or is it a recalibration um, that's being shaped by Turkey's economic pressures and evolving foreign policy priorities?

Thank you, Hoda. It's a pleasure to be here. Um, so as as for your question, whether Turkey's rapprochement with the Gulf, it's been some time and so many things have happened since, uh, since, since the, the rapprochement, Turkey's

rapprochement with with the Gulf countries and, uh, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt, more specifically.

Uh, I would say, it's both strategic convergence and pragmatic recalibration. It's just the sequence matters, I think.

Uh, it definitely began as a pragmatic, uh recalibration. Turkey needed to reduce diplomatic friction, uh, attract Gulf investment, stabilize economic relations and stabilize its own economy, also repair ties with, uh, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. And after years of, uh, geopolitical and,

uh, ideological rivalry, um, Ankara understood that confrontation with these regional powers was costly and, uh, unsustainable. But it's, uh, I think it's it will be very limited to see this as a, uh, pragmatic, uh, recalibration or an economic move. Uh, the rapprochement,

this rapprochement gradually, uh, evolved, um, into a strategic convergence around selective interests like defense cooperation, reconstruction connectivity energy security, Syria, Iraq and crisis diplomacy. And, uh, the adjustment from a pragmatic recalibration to strategic convergence uh is uh happened, uh, under a very dangerous,

uh, condition, the regionalization of, uh, war after October 7. And, uh, we are, I mean, these, um, when we are talking about, when we are discussing regional alignments, we are not, uh, we should not discuss them as if they

emerge, uh, in a stable environment. They actually, they are emerging under pressure as, uh, has been the case in the latest, um, uh war against Iran. Uh, so this this convergence happened, uh, under the pressure of, uh, Israeli escalation, uh,

US permissiveness and most recently the Iranian responses, the vulnera- vulnerabilities faced by the Gulf and the erosion of concepts of, um, diplomacy ceasefire deterrence.

Uh, so it's it's not purely transactional, but, uh, it's it's something, uh, something in in between and I would say, um, three main drivers, uh, there are three main drivers. Uh, economic interdependence, um, uh, Turkey needs, um, Gulf capital, Gulf

investment, trade, financial confidence and Gulf states meanwhile see Turkey as a large market, a production base, a an increasingly relevant, uh, And the second main driver is, uh, security diversification.

Uh, the Gulf no longer wants to depend exclusively on one security, um, arrangement. Uh, and, uh, as we see in the, in the most recent discussions, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar and others are becoming part of a wider regional conversation on,

uh, burden sharing, de-escalation and diplomatic hedging. And the third, uh, driver is, uh, crisis containment. This is perhaps the most important driver today.

Uh, after what happened in, uh, October 7, after Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, uh, Red Sea, then now Iran, Strait of Hormuz, they all show that the region's main problem is actually the presence of actors willing to escalate uh, in

addition to absence of, uh, of cooperation. So, uh, so this, um, this this, uh rapprochement is, uh, and finally culminating into this quartet, the formation of the, uh, of the regional alliance for a ceasefire uh, of the current war is, uh, as a result

of, um, of of multiple, uh, multiple factors. Um, All right, Özge, did you have something else you wanted to add? I will stop here and continue.

Thank you so much. Um, and Faisal and Dhafer, I want to go to you and ask you about a point that Özge had mentioned.

These regional convergences, they happen under pressure, they happen in times of crisis. So I wanted to ask you about your view of the durability of these efforts. It's true that the war has catalyzed the wave of regional cooperation both within the Gulf but

also with other regional partners as we're seeing. But is this threat-driven convergence a durable foundation for a long-term security architecture or do these coalitions fade as threat perceptions diverge?

No, I don't think so. I think it's the whole region have been, uh, reshaping. So if you think about it, uh, uh, Iran and India, they are, you know, a classic, uh, conflict there.

But again, you see, uh Israel um and, uh, and India is, uh, more, uh, in support of the war in Gaza.

So Pakistan, there was also a conflict. So it's more like, uh, the region are reshaping and then that comes to the war on uh uh, Israel and, uh, US and Iran war and then the attack on the Gulf.

That's one. Uh, for example, Qatar, uh, defense, uh, uh, and economical agreement between, uh, Qatar and Turkey. This is not something that has been only done temporary. So I think, uh, um, most, I think, the fundamental, uh, belief of Pakistan and Turkey and

the GCC, uh, share not only the religion or share that the emerging, uh, economic, uh, and I think the, uh, the war have put them more together and I think for the future, you have, uh, if you think of the Gulf has, uh,

a very low a limited population with a lot of money. And then you have Turkey, our NATO ally, and also emerging, uh, country. And then you have Pakistan with a huge potential.

Um, and and and her neighbor and the neighboring, uh, countries is what? Iran? And another neighboring country and India that is in classic. So there is, I think uh this combination between, uh, uh, Pakistan, uh, and the GCC and Turkey,

um, maybe now it's defense, maybe it's an ally, but I think, uh, future-wise, it really makes sense.

Um, you know, that So how I This is how I think the geopolitican is, uh, reshaping, uh, after the war.

Uh meanwhile uh, this is not, uh, secret. Also, all this ally, Turkey, uh, GCC, which is the Gulf countries and Pakistan, also, uh, a great ally of the United States.

Uh, military-wise, economically-wise, and I think this will also expand after after the war. Uh, and other side also the GCC countries and Gulf countries and Turkey and Pakistan.

All these countries have suffered from the war uh for many years. The war of Iraq, the war of Iran and Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait.

Uh, the war in Afghanistan. So, for me, all these countries have uh kind of like looking for a new vision.

And I think also they share the same perspective on that. So, it's not a temporary ally. I think it's more like finding the real friends and finding a common interest and um historic-wise, all these countries have left uh

uh, in a way and in another the same experience. Uh, also there is no secret feeling at least between the public not maybe the government. There's a lot of disappointment on this war.

Uh, you know, Qatar Saudi uh UAE, Oman, Bahrain, you know, this small countries in the Gulf.

Uh, strong ally with the US. Tight relationship economically. And then one day they started the war with Iran and now we are hijacked by Iran.

Stuck in the middle. Uh uh, without consulting us in this war. So, uh everybody uh we are a strong ally of the US, but the publicly everybody's saying, why the US haven't told us?

Uh, why we are not consulted? Why uh there was uh you think there was no game theory on that? That that that they were not expecting that uh the Iran will hit the Gulf.

Which they did actually with Israel. Uh uh, you know, and Qatar. Uh, during the 12 days war.

So, there is also uh that disappointment between the public and the GCC on this kind of war. On of course on Iran who have carried this aggression.

But again and put uh uh, the US on putting us in the middle of this war and uh without consulting us. Uh, so that's really uh what also leading to this reshape between Turkey and Pakistan.

Thank you, Faisal. That was very comprehensive. Um, and of course considering these tensions, complexities uncertainties that heightens the momentum for initiatives like this, initiatives with homegrown powers at the center to really be functional and durable. Um, and so

Albert, I want to go back to you and ask you about Pakistan's role in all of this. In your view, how consequential is Pakistan in the region's multilateral drive? And I think we've also touched on external actors um role in fueling

certain dynamics or um capitalizing on certain dynamics as well. Um, and so in your view, how is Islamabad's role being shaped by external actors um including the US? Could they potentially be seeking to leverage Islamabad for their strategic objectives?

That's That's a great question or a great couple of questions. First of all, let's look at Pakistan's mediation role in the current war is the most concrete answer to um to a couple of your questions. So, J.D. Vance flew to

Islamabad for 21 hours of talks ultimately didn't work out. But that didn't happen unless Washington believed Pakistan had something that no one else could provide. I mean, usually the go-to country would be Oman.

Um, maybe there would be a different interlocutor such as maybe they could go to Switzerland or something like that. But Pakistan has a channel to Tehran that direct American pressure just simply failed to create.

Now, Pakistan didn't stumble into this position. It wasn't an accident. Um, it self-selected it uh itself into this through dec- decades of deliberate hedging.

It's had a you know, a live and let live arrangement with Iran uh, that's been born of some some degree of mutual nuclear vulnerability. Um, and a shared interest in keeping the Baluchi frontier quiet. Um, to at different times trying

to keep uh things quiet, you know, in um Afghanistan. Um, this is more in uh Pakistan's interest right now.

Um, and this has been Islamabad's choice. Now, the defense pact with Riyadh was was Islamabad's choice brought on by a degree of financial dependency.

And uh you take the IMF dependency that makes it accountable to Western creditors. That's the product of the successive Pakistani governments' fiscal decisions.

Um, and every one of these choices individually made is uh you know, made sense.

So, um and also there's there is the fact that President Trump seems to like General Munir, the head of the Pakistani military. There seems to be an affinity there. And I don't and I think that that's something uh to keep in mind.

So, when Washington leverages Pakistan, um it's exploiting um a vulnerability that Pakistan largely constructed itself.

That's not influence per se. It's a structural exposure that's that's being mistaken for uh for centrality.

Um, and this and the distinction matters because it tells you how durable Pakistan's role is. Now, once the war resolves, and I don't know when specifically it will end, the leveraging I think the leveraging will stop it will

stop and Pakistan will be left holding whatever costs it accumulated. So, we saw this with the 22 uh fatalities outside the US consulate in Karachi at the beginning of March.

Um, you look at Saudi-Pakistani relations. The mutual defense pact is the clearest illustration of how bilateral ties shape and constrain Pakistan's regional role.

The relationship has has largely been transactional, you know, with petrodollars, military advisers, um on the nuclear issue.

But what sep- what what you saw with the September 2025 agreement, it formalized that transactionalism into a public commitment. And this immediately created audience costs.

So, Pakistan's foreign minister invoked pact publicly early on in the war. Um, you know, you know, spent the ambiguity it was designed to preserve and sort of closed the commitment trap before Islamabad had decided what it was actually prepared to do.

Um, we look at we look at something like Yemen, you know, more about 11 years ago, Pakistan's parliament voted not to join Saudi air strikes.

And at the time, you know, you had uh I believe it was Javad Zarif had actually gone into the lower chamber of the Pakistani parliament to whip votes um, you know, against joining the Saudi air strikes.

Um, Riyadh was understandably furious. Pakistan absorbed the criticism, maintained equidistance, kept its border with Iran uh quiet, didn't stir anything up in Baluchistan.

And but the financial relationship survived. The logic was consistent. Show up for Riyadh when the costs are manageable and relatively low, find reasons to step back when they aren't.

And so what's different now is that the costs of stepping back have risen dramatically. Um, you know, you had you know, Iranian missiles have struck Abu Dhabi on the first day of the war.

Um, and they killed a Pakistani migrant worker. Um, Pakistan's, you know, the the fact Pakistan's domestic opinion is much harder to manage right now.

So, they found a third option um that they didn't necessarily have back with um you know, the Yemen issue in 2015.

Become visibly indispensable as a mediator while deliverly while delivering quietly for Riyadh. A few few days ago, you know, you saw them, you know, uh send um different fighter jets over to Riyadh.

Um, you know, to fulfill some of their obligations under the defense pact. Whether whether Saudi Arabia finds that sufficient whether and whether Tehran finds that to be intolerable is an open question, but this is a way that Pakistan is able to survive right

now. And it's a way that they can balance these these larger powers in the region against each other.

Thank you, Albert. Um, and as you know, I wanted to go back to you um and talk about the bilateral dimension specifically which I've seen referenced a a of times. This multilateral effort that's being led right now is of course

not emerging in isolation and it builds on strong bilateral ties that exist both within the members of this emerging quad, but also within the broader region.

And so again, I wanted to ask you about Turkey specifically. Turkey of course has a distinctive profile, right? It's a NATO ally, it has a significant military industrial base, it's actively involved across multiple fronts both within the region and beyond. But how is Turkey

leveraging this differentiated profile and what what is the role by its bilateral relationships are playing in shaping its engagement.

Mhm. Uh thank you Hannah. First of all, I want to say that I agree with Mr.

Faisal that it this alliance is not a temporary alliance, but I think it is um uh it is definitely not a temporary alliance, but it is also a new model of flexible alliance flexible alliance. Of course, the regional agency, regional ownership,

regional initiative are very important here but it it it is not I I I just want to clarify my my point in the first in the first round uh saying that I I never thought it was a temporary alliance, but a

but I I was focusing more on the the the alliance the the group grouping being having a flexible coordination and um uh and um you mention Hannah, you mentioned Turkey's NATO alliance and most of the time Turkey's NATO membership is described as

a complication to its regional role. This is the question I always have and this is a very lively debate in Turkey as well between different political political actors from different different perspectives. So I think I think uh it is in some ways

a complication to its regional role, but in many other ways it's not a complication. It creates Yes, it creates suspicion among actors like Iran or Russia and in it it sometimes limits how far Ankara can go in presenting

itself as an autonomous regional actor, but I think this is half of the story and I think Turkey's uh NATO membership is one of the reasons why Turkey matters especially matters at at these mediation and ceasefire tables.

Uh it's Ankara is is not outside of the Western security architecture trying to mediate from the margins of Western security architecture, but it's inside NATO. It's a NATO member and this gives Turkey a a huge leverage a particular form of

leverage. It's it's it's a regional actor which has good relations with and very close relations with with with for instance Qatar and with now improving relations with other regional actors, but it's also a Euro-Atlantic defense actor and this duality is not is

difficult, but it's not a contradiction. It's it's actually the source of Turkey's strategic weight and that's how Turkey takes up a role in the in the Pakistani led talks as well.

So then the NATO membership gives Turkey deterrence, institutional access, a smooth plug into NATO's military operation, intelligence channels and bargaining power, but um it also makes Ankara harder to ignore in any crisis involving involving the region wider region, I will say like Iran,

Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, Iraq and also European security. And this is why the Iranian crisis is so important because if Turkey if Turkey was pulled directly into a war with Iran this would not have been the same as a Gulf state being

pulled into the conflict because Turkey is a NATO member and Turkey's um uh so um and similarly Turkey uh Turkey's direct involve involvement would would raise NATO questions because Ankara is an integral part of the of NATO's decision-making. And this matters

for the Gulf and for for the region for for our region as well because when Gulf actors engage Turkey, they're not only engaging a Middle Eastern power, but they are engaging a NATO member with serious military capacity with a growing um

defense industry base with Black Sea experience which has been referenced a lot during the Hormuz opening of Hormuz Strait of Hormuz talks which has the Caucasus reach Syria and Iraq exposure and which has access to Western security conversations.

So Turkey's value for for the for the for the Gulf states and for the states in the region who want which want to uh want to you know create a post-war situation is not only first ceasefire situation and then post-war situation is not only

that it can speak the language of the region, but also it connects the region to Euro-Atlantic uh security debates and I think this is a very crucial and it is this kind of multi-alignment looking from the Western side this kind

of multi-alignment is not a clean break from the best best, but it's um Turkey is not leaving one camp for another, but what Turkey is trying to do is to increase the number of rooms in which it has a seat. Yeah, thank you.

Thank you Eske. And on the note of networked approaches and building a more diversified diplomatic portfolio of that, I wanted to go back to you and bring this back to Saudi Arabia.

Another power cultivated deep bilateral ties with various regional powers one of which were mentioned. I think the the Saudi-Pakistan relationship has been highlighted various times by the panelist. Eske, you highlighted the Saudi-Turkish relationship as well.

On the Saudi front um how are these regional partnerships whether it be with Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt feeding into the multilateral efforts?

How is Saudi capitalizing on these strong bilateral relationships to create a more institutionalized cooperative framework?

Well, look it's a very important question and look building on what my colleagues have been saying, I think it's very important to highlight the fact that all countries involved with Turkey which actually has been attacked by Iran since the

beginning of the war, the Gulf in general even countries that as I mentioned in my earlier answer, Oman who are very close and were negotiating on behalf of the Iranians.

There is there's an element there of avoiding this to become an Arab-Persian war or Sunni-Shia war and we need to be very careful from being dragged into that you know that's a point of no return.

And it can get very ugly. So all efforts have been at a very I have to say at a very expensive uh cost in terms of reputation, in terms of people second-guessing and and doubting. But the reality is

you know these are rich countries and are very well the most of them are very well equipped. Turkey is a NATO ally. So there is no shortage of bullets or bronze or courage to to do this, but uh

the idea is how to you leverage these relationships in a way to find a route to de-escalation and a negotiated outcome which would be the best possible solution out of this.

Um certainly what helps to answer your question also, it does definitely help that Saudi Arabia has a great relationship with China, has a great relationship with Russia. It's a great relationship with India despite the security pact that we have with with

Pakistan. And to be able to navigate all of those conflicting agendas and find the sweet spot in between is really phenomenal and it's proving to be very useful in this conflict. Um at the end of the day as I said in my also

my first answer, everybody gets affected. It's true. Uh the Gulf countries, some more than others, are being impacted financially, um reputation-wise in terms of ability to attract tourism, expats, particularly countries on the on the coast. Uh yes, they are we are paying a higher uh

price, but uh we are trying to avoid this war not just for our sake, but for the sake of the rest of the world because uh this this has a a potential to be to ignite um several wars, not just not just one.

And um I think we have been very successful um in uh bringing closer um the uh Europeans, um the Chinese, the the Indians, um and try not to alienate people. Um um We are very supportive of all the

diplomatic diplomatic efforts, um especially the one led by the United Kingdom uh to try to find the coalition of the willing, but for uh diplomacy uh to try to find this. At the same time, you know, everybody knows the armed forces

are locked and loaded in case we have to return to war, which is a situation we are trying to uh avoid at all costs.

But, as I said also earlier, um not with a bad uh deal. You know, the it's non-negotiable that the Strait of Hormuz needs to be opened the way it was, and um you know, energy shipments, all shipments should be able to pass through

without any uh threat, and we need to avoid returning to the war. Thank you, Faisal. Um and very briefly, I've heard this point referred to by a couple of the panelists, so I wanted to gauge your insights on it. Um this sense

of the purpose this emerging quadrilateral is serving. Is it a ceasefire? Is it a more durable form of cooperation? Is it security-based? Is it political? Is it economic? In your view, what are the most promising avenues for cooperation for this emerging

quadrilateral? And could it expand include more actors? You alluded to, for example, the coalition of the willing.

Could we see more Western engagement on that front, or is it best a regional um effort that also, of course, relies on Pakistan's backing?

Look, uh at the moment, it's a matter of need. As I said, uh we have clear evidence of uh countries within the GCC that had uh you know, intense I I wouldn't say boiling point, but intense um differences just before this war erupted

and managed to successfully put it aside and work together. Um the GCC will And I want to also remind the audience that the GCC, when it was formed in the early '80s, uh before it was an economic and

social uh cooperation, the main uh the main reason of the formation of the GCC was to stand up to what would be the potential Iranian uh threat. Uh so, in essence, the the GCC was formed out of a

security concern. So, that's not going to go away, and we are seeing um the GCC go back to basics uh uh when it came to this war. Uh so, nothing else matters, so to speak, um until the uh war is over.

Um I see uh the relationship with Pakistan and and Turkey also not being transactional, but being more strategic.

Uh I mean, countries uh so, uh historically, Turkey has had a closer relationship with Qatar. The relationship with Saudi Arabia is improving, and I I expect after this crisis for it to improve even more.

The relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has always been excellent. Uh now, it's going to become uh after this uh crisis, it's going to grow um deeper, um and I expect better relationships with other countries, possibly with countries

like Qatar, for example. So, these things are not going away. Um uh The Americans are already you know, I think the administration is already you know, very serious about this war. Um The Europeans will, you know, and it's I

don't want to what to sound very stereotypical, but you know, it took them a while to understand that this also impacts them. Um but, they have been showing all the right signs of concern now. Um and don't forget there was, I have to say there

was an element at the beginning of the war because of the checkered relationship many European leaders have with President Trump due to the inpersonality, due to the rhetoric, a lot of them unfortunately took this personally as opposed to strategically. Um you know, I

mean, they found a way to uh you know, get back at President Trump for things like Greenland, for things like um the way he treated the way he spoke about them, for example. Um but, I think now they're coming to their senses and

putting their personal differences with the Trump administration aside, and realizing that if this war continues, it can be a catastrophe. And we're you know, we're not talking in years, we're talking in a matter of weeks or months the latest.

Thank you, Faisal. Um and I want to go back to you, Faisal Al Mudakha, on the broader view from the Gulf. Um so, we've touched on this our potential perspective convergence in strategic priorities and this evolution from a

more strategic recalibration to a long-term convergence that lies on a shared interest in enhancing regional stability through region-wide frameworks. But, I'm wondering what would it take for the region to move beyond a more crisis-driven based approach when it comes to cooperation to

establishing institutionalized, formalized, and sustainable cooperative frameworks? Well, uh you know, I want to build on Faisal Abbas's sentence by talking about how Saudi uh kingdom, Saudi Arabia, on on um uh helping the GCC on opening the the airports, but I think it's also more

than that. You know, today I was um if you think of logistic, uh trains, uh trains network, uh energy and gas network.

Uh why there is no pipeline that goes from Qatar all the way to the Mediterranean crossing Saudi, crossing Jordan, and crossing uh or maybe to Turkey?

Why there is no a gas pipe that goes from Qatar to the Red Sea? Despite the war, uh it's all we will always be in risk, I think, if Iran is there.

Why the uh the Dolphin pipeline that goes from Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Oman, why it's not gone to Pakistan, uh and then maybe to India?

Uh so, between uh logistic, aviation, uh between uh economical uh why do I have to go to Kuwait and cross to Saudi, uh and Qatar, and stamp two stamps?

You know, why do we have uh six uh tax or custom? So, those those kind of things, why don't we have uh we have a good uh coordination between which our military have done very well on the defensive, but why don't we have

uh uh one currency? Why don't we have uh one you know, those kind of things? This is the people request now.

Um and uh in each crisis, you know, if you think if you think of the first crisis when Iraq invaded Kuwait, if it was not Saudi and the GCC and the world alliances, we will not have Kuwait today.

So, uh same what we see now, Iran was trying to undermine the GCC, and I think uh collectively, the GCC countries have uh uh done very well. Uh Iran wanted to damage the GCC cities uh throwing missiles more than even

Israel itself. Uh but, together we had uh and coordination, but I think uh and more going forward, we don't have a choice.

And and I think the GCC is not I agree also with Faisal, that's not a competi- there is no competition. We can complement each other.

Uh one country has a very little population, but maybe uh a lot of gas.

Another country has a big land, but with uh lack of energy. Uh you know, so uh as you see today, uh most of the logistic comes from the Arab Sea, from Oman, and uh and the other logistic uh we are using the port of the Red Sea.

So, why an emergency? And by the way, Qatar have tried you know, Qatar have tried during the Sau- and Syria during the Bashar regime to have a pipeline that goes from Qatar all the way to uh uh to the Mediterranean, but

uh Bashar wasn't in favor of Iran, and Iran have stopped this. So, uh all those kind of project that was being hold uh if you ask me as a citizen uh uh why why it's not there? Why don't

don't why don't we have a a gas uh network? I have seen uh I have seen it in the US, right? Uh and uh I have seen it in the US, Texas all the way to California, all these gas gas

pipelines. Uh we uh I understand, yes, uh uh if we have drones, if we have rocket missiles, we'll always be under threat even if we have all this uh uh collaboration, but at least we will have more leverage.

And I think uh even after the war uh maybe uh some master plan of uh energy network that even can uh have an international interest uh to build it. So, uh you know, we played in the North Field

by have a di- uh diversity of investment. But why don't we have a diversity of investment on a energy network that can protect it from uh can can gather even international investment?

Uh today this war have proven that uh Iran by choking the Hormuz have created uh uh tremendous problem to the world uh to the world uh energy and to the world economy. And and we have seen little many things are

coming. Uh I heard Italy end of April they're going to have a electric lockdown. This is a new term that is we are hearing.

Uh and Egypt had it even before. Uh they closed their electricity at 9:00. And uh and in Italy they will have 3 days working from home or 2 days.

They will have the cars with odd numbers driving on this day and the other. So, we we it's it's uh it's uh it's going to be similar uh if not more than uh the COVID.

Uh we have restaurants are shutting down in and and Mumbai in Mumbai. We have airlines in Philippine are grounded.

So uh any you know, this is more uh really a a very critical uh situation and I think uh answering your question, yes, we can have uh more economical and not not a well we have we have to have it.

Thank you, Faisal. And I think as you highlighted, there is of course an imperative to enhance economic integration specifically. This of course is not just a region wide, it's a global crisis as you've highlighted with countries already suffering from the

fallout um and other countries which will face imminent consequences should the war prolong. But I think there is a lot of room to think about connectivity as you mentioned, energy resilience, and these are all factors that will figure

heavily um in how countries in the region and beyond chart the future of this war um and regional stability at large. With that, we come to our concluding round. Um so, I have a brief question I wanted to pose to all of you.

So, looking ahead, we know that regional turbulence has always produced a new round of summits, frameworks, declarations, but what is genuinely different about this moment? Is the region building something that will outlast this crisis? And I'll start with

Uske. Um Oh, what is uh yeah, I I think the question is what is what is different about about what is genuinely different about this moment uh of regional um multilateralism regional integration.

So, think this uh the Pakistani, Saudi, uh Turkish, and Egyptian labor was important uh not because um we don't know if it can solve the crisis. It's it's it's a difficult crisis. It's it's beyond um anyone's control, but Israel and US and

uh and Iran. Um so, because we know that uh the the the order is fragile for for for for certain reasons like first Israeli escalation we set the entire regional agenda overnight. Uh Iran remains uh as a rival, but also as a

uh necessary interlocutor, but also these frameworks are uh are built on overlapping interests for the for the time being. So, we don't know um we don't know how uh everything will play out, but um it uh it the the the the quartet matters

because it shows uh a new instinct instinct and um it gives us confidence and it was evident in every speaker's speech.

The regional uh powers and adjacent powers want more agency over uh regional outcomes. So, uh they are trying to build um islands of stability around themselves um through defense cooperation, through uh economic corridors, uh through mediation platforms, ceasefire tables,

energy routes, and um and diplomatic coordination. So, for all states uh which are part of this, I think um that this coming together creates uh an opportunity, but also responsibility uh and uh they they can all contribute uh to this

um to this regional uh um uh regional initiative uh through uh through different uh through their different assets, uh but um um but it's it's it's it's as I said, it creates uh a lots of opportunities and uh but

also uh responsibilities because they also all these countries also have to avoid overreach and and combine ambition with a with with a little bit of uh restraint as well. So, uh I I think um uh what this moment produced is more

uh of a disciplined regional practice. Um it involved more consultation. It involved more interdependency. We're in this boat all together kind of uh understanding and more crisis management capacity. Um So, uh so, this this is a good um

good start, I would say. Um Um Albert. Well um there there are a couple things that are that are genuinely different that deserve serious attention.

The first is the Strait of Hormuz. And, you know, as as been demonstrated, you know, the global economy's most critical or certainly one of the most critical choke points can be effectively closed and not by a great power um but by, you know, what's

been a significantly degraded at best middle power with very limited you know, conventional capabilities with an economy that's that's, you know, in terrible shape. Um um and it can't and according to a number of reports, it can't even locate

all the mines it laid um in the Strait of Hormuz. Um so, the shared vulnerability creates a genuine structural incentive for durable agreements that previous crises never produced. That's one thing.

Now, the second thing that hasn't come up um are the Abraham Accords. Um you know, with you know, everything post-October 7th, one would think that they would have fallen apart by now.

But you actually see on the Emirati side uh you know, you see the uh the Abraham Accords have, you know, they they've they've been sustained and they've even they may even arguably have gotten closer. Um So, you you have that going on. The war

has demonstrated that um to some to some in the Gulf that their security for the for right now can is still very sensitive to um you know, their their um to patronage from the United States.

Um and they may need to, at least, as we like to call it, de-risk from America because we're we're just not seen as reliable. Just as a number of Europeans are are calling for this like Keir Starmer.

Um the third is is that with Pakistan specifically, you know, you see um you know, General Munir is a qualitatively different kind of actor than some of his predecessors.

He's comfortable swimming in deep waters on national security questions where more risk-averse army chiefs would have sought cover or maybe deferred.

And so, the fact that Pakistan's army chief has spoken directly with Trump, Vance went to Islamabad, they're supposed to have the second round in Islamabad that Trump canceled. Um Pakistan's simultaneously mediating and quietly helping Riyadh.

That's not just structural positioning. It reflects a leadership willing to operate at the center of a dangerous situation and absorb the risks that come with it.

Um you You what argues against the durability is Israel. And you know, Israel I mean I'm if you look at this I mean, you know, it wasn't that long ago. I mean Israel was saying I mean they they were using a lot of the

rhetoric you heard back in the 1990s of Shimon Peres. And now it seems like they're okay with having a almost a chain of failed states in the neighborhood. You know, I mean as opposed to say pursuing a peace

agreement with Syria for example. Um you know, maybe it disintegrating the country. Um you know, and with Iran something similar.

Um so they don't seem to want peace on terms that constrain its operational freedom.

So any regional framework that cannot account for Israeli behavior or cannot constrain Israeli behavior as potential spoiler is is incomplete.

Um and then of course, you know, as I mentioned before, I'm sorry. I'm I don't mean to go long. I just wanted to you know, acknowledge you know, the side meeting at Antalya.

Um I think that that's going to be we're going to see much more of that. You're going to see ex you know, extra regional powers um as the answer. Not just Turkey but also India.

Thank you. Yeah, I think uh many in the region have called for uh a a a GCC NATO that include Turkey and Pakistan.

And maybe will any uh will later on when uh maybe Syria, right? Later on.

But uh that's that's that's really the the motive here after this crisis. Stuck in the middle.

Uh you know, and in you know, Israel and the Abraham Accord, I mean I think you know, President Trump like destruction destruction and I think the the whole key of all this destruction is to have uh you know, a Palestinian state that

recognize uh uh by you know, by the international law and it's already recognized by 135 and activate because that can be the the key uh uh solution for all what he what we see because we see peaceful modern Arab

nation that is following international law and then we see rebels and militias which it have the same objective but using it as a propaganda people like Iran or Hezbollah.

So that destruction I think it has to be is to activate you know, the Palestinian peace process rather than siding up with agreements that really all the main problem that the Abraham Accord. So I think that's really the

the key of any strategic solution for what we see in this mess. And that's what I wanted to contribute and thank you for the last word. Thank you so much and Faisal Abbas.

Um look, I think this war has taught us quite a lot and things are going to have to be different if not indeed already on the way to be different. Uh first of all, we need to realize we are in 2026

not 1991. So might does not always make right. You can have the biggest air flight carriers, you can have the F-16s, the F-35s. Um you know, latest weaponry uh you know, in terms of bombs uh but the reality is

um it is precision is no longer expensive to achieve. You can achieve it with a $20,000 drone.

Uh which the Iranians have used very well. And if it wasn't that the Gulf countries were very well equipped, wealthy and uh you know, ready uh to put their money to prioritize defense um we would be perhaps me at least me and Faisal wouldn't be

with you on this on this panel because we would have had a the very different reality.

So first of all on one hand, it proves that the investment that the Gulf countries have done uh in terms of defense was not vanity or personal interests like many have criticized before but actually a necessity.

Uh but second of all, I think we need to learn possibly from people like the Ukrainians uh which we are having discussions with how to upgrade our military solutions but not necessarily by uh paying more.

As I said wealth is always going to be an advantage but in the sense having the biggest and the and the latest is not necessarily the solution.

Um the second thing is the vulnerability when it comes to uh things like water desalination and food security.

Um as Faisal was saying also connectivity. Um you know, we were very lucky that apart from the establishment of the GCC in the early '80s um the late King Khalid and then King Fahd established something called the East-West pipeline which has been

literally a lifeline for not just for Saudi Arabia but for the Gulf countries and the world.

Uh we now ship 70% of our oil production from the Eastern province to Western province to be shipped from Yanbu. And I think the idea is to connect it with Qatar and the the rest of the countries and to increase capacity so we are no

longer uh being we were we are no longer blackmailed or put in a corner by Qatar by sorry by by Iran um in in the future.

So all of these are lessons that have been learned and I think we have to quickly adapt to them so that we don't leave ourselves vulnerable in future wars.

Thank you so much. Thank you all and with that we conclude our session. So the Middle East is of course navigating a moment of heightened uncertainty but also one of immense potential for the establishment of durable regional frameworks across multiple domains.

Economic, political, security, these are all areas that can benefit from greater regional cooperation and I thank you all for touching on all of these dimensions and for your rich insights.

And thank you to our audience for tuning in.