Możemy zostać sami. KRZYSZTOF WOJCZAL: Polska musi być gotowa bronić regionu

Discussion on Poland's strategic uncertainty, defense priorities, and the need for universal military training to secure the region's future.

Key Takeaways

Poland must prioritize defense and military readiness amid growing regional threats.
Universal military training should be implemented gradually with flexible, multi-stage programs.
Military preparedness is both a security necessity and a strategic investment for Poland's future.
Societal awareness and responsibility are critical for successful defense policy implementation.
Political will and infrastructure development are essential to support mandatory training reforms.

What the video covers

Poland faces unprecedented strategic uncertainty and multiple external threats in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.
Despite being a developed country, Poland must prioritize defense and military preparedness to safeguard its sovereignty.
The discussion emphasizes the importance of building a strong military tool not only for defense but also for future political and economic opportunities.
The debate on reinstating compulsory military service or universal military training is gaining traction in Poland.
A proposed system includes basic mandatory training for all citizens, with specialized training tailored to individual skills over several years.
Training should be flexible, integrated with civilian life, and supported by the state and educational systems.
The military training system should include both military and civil service paths, accommodating different health categories and genders.
There are logistical and political challenges to implementing such reforms, including societal acceptance and infrastructure development.
The importance of societal responsibility and awareness that in case of war, untrained citizens will still be involved in defense efforts.
Long-term investment in armed forces and civil preparedness is crucial for Poland's security and regional stability.

Chapters

Why does Poland need to consider reinstating compulsory military service?

Poland faces significant strategic uncertainty and threats from multiple directions, making military preparedness essential to defend the country and secure future political and economic opportunities.

What is the proposed structure for universal military training in Poland?

The proposal includes a two-stage system with basic mandatory training for all citizens, followed by specialized training tailored to individual skills, spread flexibly over several years to accommodate civilian life.

What are the main challenges in implementing universal military training in Poland?

Challenges include lack of existing infrastructure for mass training, political decisions needed to enforce reforms, societal acceptance, and integrating training with civilian education and work schedules.

Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown

Speaker A

Poland has probably never faced such profound strategic uncertainty, such threats from many sides, and such a changing world. At the same time, we have never been such a developed country. What policies should we pursue? How should we develop our country,

Speaker A

and should we introduce mandatory military service or mandatory military training? I invite you to discuss these issues today on the open channel.

Speaker A

The episode is sponsored by Oanda TMS Brokers, a brokerage house offering over 4,000 instruments, including ETFs and CFDs. Click the link in the description. The program is sponsored by the online store steki.pl. Polish beef, steaks, and burgers with safe

Speaker A

delivery to your home. The program partner is siepomaga.pl. Support the siepomaga.pl fundraiser with the slash DMD.

Speaker A

The program is sponsored by the Polish brand Helicontex. Proven tactical, outdoor, and survival clothing and equipment.

Speaker A

Krzysztof Wojczal, geopolitical analyst, author of the books "Third Decade" and "Poland to Power," creator of his own channel, and a man of many talents.

Speaker A

Good morning, Krzysztof. Hello. Good morning, everyone. What do you think is most important today? Before we get through everything that's happening around us, could you point out one thing we must do today?

Speaker A

We must place the greatest emphasis on defense, meaning not allowing anyone to attack us. What would that be?

Speaker A

Well, first of all, let's outline the background and indicate the entire program. We will paint this background. Yes, but we must realize that we, as a state, are not, you know, a causative state, we are not a superpower; we are a middle-class state

Speaker A

, largely dependent on external conditions. And we can draw a line on the map today or point to some golden ideas that will lead us to a certain goal, but I believe there is no single strategy, no single guiding principle.

Speaker A

And if we implement this, it will be great, because our entire environment, our entire geopolitical environment, determines whether we will be able to improve or worsen our situation at all.

Speaker A

We can build tools. I believe that the most important tool we should build for the future—and this is fortunately happening—is a military one.

Speaker A

Therefore, not only because of the potential threat to the Russian Federation, but also for future political opportunities, which I believe may arise if, well, history unfolds as we wish (meaning, if the Russian Federation loses in Ukraine), contrary to appearances, this tool in

Speaker A

the form of well-organized armed forces can pay off for us. For now, we're incurring very high costs, but it can also pay off as an investment in our foreign policy, which will also translate into economic issues. So I

Speaker A

believe that this is truly the priority. So let's talk about this aspect of security. Let's immediately take the most difficult bull by the horns, which, in my opinion, is preparing the people, preparing the army—not just the equipment, but the people. And the

Speaker A

debate is finally starting in Poland, although it hasn't really gotten going yet. In my opinion, it shouldn't be a debate anymore, but rather a realization regarding military service, the training of citizens, whether we should reinstate compulsory military service, and if so, how, how should we

Speaker A

train people? What's your view on this? Well, I don't know if it was years ago or a year and a half ago, I wrote a whole analysis on this topic on my blog, and I believe there should be

Speaker A

universal military training. I even put together a system of sorts. It's no longer a novelty. At the time I wrote it, I think it was unique. However, many people are already talking about it. I mean, we need to adapt this

Speaker A

universal training to the realities of society and the fact that society also needs to earn money, needs to fulfill itself in other areas, and of course, has this obligation to the state, and essentially to itself. Because our security, after all, that's where it

Speaker A

all begins—whether we even have money, whether we can meet up with friends, and so on and so forth. So this is a very important issue. However, firstly, we don't have the infrastructure immediately ready for mass reserve training, so it would have to be

Speaker A

implemented gradually. My answer to this was that it would have to be divided—obligatory training for the public, of course. We have two paths for those with category A, for men with category A. This is the non-military path for those with health categories

Speaker A

that don't allow for military service. And of course, for women, there's also mandatory civil service, training in the civil service, in various administrative bodies, in hospitals, and so on. To build this infrastructure in case of conflict, you need a

Speaker A

functioning state in various respects. And such a dual-track system in the military sector would need to be developed extensively in the civilian sector as well, as there's no infrastructure or people to train enough for that, either here or there.

Speaker A

In any case, I would simply divide the training into two stages. The first, basic, could be accomplished very quickly, even with the private sector's involvement. Because it's not a big deal if they were military personnel or private shooting ranges to acquire some

Speaker A

basic skills in this area, right? But could people from WoT even help here? It could be very basic, but still practical, and then we'd have a second stage of training, specifically: whether, I don't know, for drones, if someone is an IT specialist, then

Speaker A

perhaps for cybersecurity, for a specific field, and so on, depending on the competencies, because we need to map society, of course. I also said, and I'll tell you, I don't know if there was a meeting with specialists and journalists at the General Staff

Speaker A

years ago, and if they knew it, they knew it too. It just seems to me that there's also the issue of, firstly, logistics, and secondly—and we'll talk about that in a moment—and secondly, a political issue, right?

Speaker A

Because the government would have to decide to implement such a reform, which is probably unpopular with society. Anyway, getting back to my idea, I believe that specialist training should be spread out over a longer period of time. It can't be like

Speaker A

pulling someone out of their life or job for a year or two, because that's probably how long it takes to train a specialist. It could only be done in a flexible way. Training would be held periodically, for example, in certain

Speaker A

quarters, and someone could fit it into their schedule. So, for example, I sign up for this school, and I have, let's say, a program to complete within four or five years, right? And over the course of those four or five years, I

Speaker A

can set a schedule, like, for example, do I want to do these kinds of courses during the holidays, or maybe during the winter, and so on? Let's say, monthly, quarterly—that's where the military should have a better say. And

Speaker A

of course, all of this should be integrated into a state-wide system, with citizens' responsibility for the state, with appropriate, let's call it, gratifications. But I think here it would be more along the lines of, for example, admittance to work in the

Speaker A

public sector, requiring that such training be conducted and completed, right? And so on, and so forth. So, of course, the entire state system, education, would have to be behind it, because that's what's missing, right?

Speaker A

Well, brother, the basics, the understanding in society that this is important, it's part of our responsibility, but also a simple message. Listen, man, if a war breaks out, it won't be like, just because you haven't had military training, you

Speaker A

won't fight. You'll be fighting, you'll be in the same trenches as a professional soldier. The only difference is that he'll have a much greater chance of making a living than you, because he'll be trained and you won't. So it's better to do that

Speaker A

reserve training, because at the end of the day, you'll want to have those skills to increase your chances and, of course, to help the entire state machine defend itself. And above all, a

Speaker A

should remember. Well, if we truthfully assume that we have, I don't know, 500,000, 600,000 people in reserve who could join the army at any moment, and there's room for them, and they're deployed according to their competencies, then we're not wasting

Speaker A

talent, right? We're just using it to better fight the enemy. Well, this, let's call it, paper itself—but it's obviously backed up by significant capabilities and appropriate state capabilities—well, this in itself deters a potential aggressor, who sees that they'll have to reckon with a

Speaker A

significant percentage of society who will resist, and that the potentially attacked country has the capacity not to fight for two weeks, but to resist continuously, and ideally, as if the enemy knew we were capable of overwhelming their rear so severely

Speaker A

that they wouldn't be able to wage war. So I'm not worried about these issues, because the whole point of the transformation, as Chief of the General Staff General Kukuła also talks about, is that one of the priorities is to

Speaker A

acquire these deep-strike capabilities. So, there's a need to build a system based not only on the professional army and reservists in the form in which it currently operates, because there will be too few of them. But we also need

Speaker A

this civic component, because I believe that modern armies, or armies for future conflicts, should be mass-based.

Speaker A

And here, I can boast that I was probably one of the first people to say that future conflicts would be mass-based, many years ago. And unfortunately, yes, unfortunately, Ukraine confirms this, so these professional armies without reserves, unfortunately, will not fulfill their

Speaker A

intended role in such a conflict. Yes. We've learned that wars are not waged by armies, but by states, right?

Speaker A

For example, Ukraine is the best here. Yes, half a state might not wage war there, a large part, you know, it depends on the type of war, because it also depends on what the enemy wants.

Speaker A

If the enemy wants to take control of the entire country, as is the case in Ukraine, then we actually have a war of attrition. If we have a war like the one in Iran, then we can wage such a

Speaker A

war technologically, utilizing a given instrument, right? But we don't have the information about what war we will be waging.

Speaker A

Exactly. We need a universal army. We have to be prepared for various scenarios. What's driving me crazy is that this program has only been in its new version for four months, but I've actually been running it for five years

Speaker A

, and I'm wondering what kind of conversation this is, and I've been talking to different people. You say you wrote a text two years ago in which you described it, and we're still at the stage of appealing for a serious

Speaker A

discussion. I don't think we need a serious discussion. We need to implement it now, and we will, but the problem is, you won't agree with it, because you've already said it, right?

Speaker A

The problem with politicians is that they're afraid to make this decision, because, in my opinion, it's exactly the same on both sides, because, of course, men over 50 will be happy, while men over 30 or 20, especially in

Speaker A

some, might be dissatisfied. And those are potentially a few percentage points of votes that the parties could lose. I remember hearing this indirectly from one of the leading figures in the Polish army, who said that we believe —we're all absolutely convinced—

Speaker A

that this should be implemented, but we need a political decision, and politicians won't do it unless they're forced to. So, as a society, we have to force them to feel they have the means.

Speaker A

I think they agree with this too, but unfortunately, their calculations remain what they are, regardless of what they do. What's comforting is that I saw a poll on this some time ago, and the fact that young people voted

Speaker A

against it, but overall, the poll showed that over half of those who participated said that we need this kind of universal military training, so let's say understanding is growing.

Speaker A

Perhaps it's also because we're an aging media society, with the 40s, so that's the age range where people are actually in favor. But if you'll allow me to share some of the details, how will we describe it? Because when we

Speaker A

say universal military service, even young people, even if they don't remember it themselves, know it from stories about how terrible it used to be, right? Because the Polish People's Army was one big pathology, and that evil, black legend is still circulating

Speaker A

somewhere. Because that's how it was. But if we talk about the fact that during such service, yes, you can gain qualifications, right? You can learn things that will be useful to you, you can either receive direct funding or

Speaker A

get some amenities that will make things easier for you. And it could also be an adventure in life, because you'll learn cool things, like shooting or something else, well, then attitudes about this could also change, but the communication has to be very, very

Speaker A

convincing. But unfortunately, all of this lies ahead. I think this product can be packaged well, especially since the younger generation doesn't remember this reserve. I, for one, didn't participate at all, although, you know, I kind of have an idea of what it was like,

Speaker A

because everyone was complaining back then. It was still a time when you knew that even though I'd signed up for those three-month training courses at university, they simply didn't want me, and I didn't go in the end, even though

Speaker A

I'd signed up. But anyway, this reserve service wasn't popular. But now, you know, the younger generation, I think there aren't such negative associations , so there's a new beginning, and it's a matter of how we can use it now and

Speaker A

how well we can package and sell it. Because it also has to be a product, and, you know, just like you said, attractive. Attractive for life, right?

Speaker A

You know, when you look at how Polish gyms are developing, right? It's unbelievable how many there are, and yet it still seems there are fewer than in many Western countries per 1,000 inhabitants. People exercise physically , a place where they can also develop

Speaker A

physically, which has become very, very important for many people today. Okay, let's agree that we're in favor of this . I also completely agree with you. I think this idea of such gradual training, one that doesn't disrupt life

Speaker A

, is very reasonable. There are many versions of how this can be implemented . So let's talk about why this is so important today, because of the uncertainty we face, and everything we've managed to put together in recent

Speaker A

years—that we're in an alliance where Article 5 is in effect, that if you press a button, all the allies will surely move on command. Well, now I know it's much more complicated, right?

Speaker A

And it's hard to say how it will turn out. Certainly, certain elements are at work, I mean, those elements are at work, as I see them, which are written down, and if what we see today on the eastern Polish border—right, these

Speaker A

planes, the pilots who fly, are often not Polish pilots; these are people from, soldiers from various countries, because these are NATO planes. But when we ask ourselves how the governments of individual countries would react in the event of an attack on Latvia, Estonia,

Speaker A

or, God forbid, Poland, or, God forbid, Latvia and Estonia—well, no one is saying with certainty that the Italians , French, Italians, or Spaniards will definitely send their troops here in five minutes. Even when there's talk of sending Polish troops to Lithuania,

Speaker A

Latvia, or Estonia, we've recently heard that politicians have doubts, which to me is simply incredibly embarrassing and very harmful. I'm very sorry that we still hear this. Let's try to describe this reality. To what extent does the changing political situation

Speaker A

in Europe matter? I mean, you know, that's also a question of what I wrote about at the end of my book. Now I'm starting a new one, so I'm starting where I left off. So, precisely where we have Western Europe, with its

Speaker A

growing social problems, which even today, even 5, 10 years ago, one could have predicted what the social problems in the West would be like, given that these societies are increasingly composed of immigrants. And now the question is whether these countries

Speaker A

will succeed in assimilating these people or not, because large immigration doesn't mean it's impossible. The French managed to do it before. And they also had a very large immigration from North Africa. But the migration wave that came in the 20th

Speaker A

century was completely uncontrolled, they accepted completely untested people, no one knows what their origins were, right? And so on, and so on. So there was absolutely no control over it . There's a problem with finding them —in other words, there's a problem

Speaker A

with sometimes encouraging them to work for them. The social program is also distributed differently than it was in the 1960s, for example. And, well, I won't go into details here, but generally speaking, the conclusion is that we could wake up tomorrow in a

Speaker A

Europe where such a major social conflict could arise—whether in Germany, Italy, or even Spain (for slightly different reasons), but because of immigration, I'd highlight France, Great Britain, and Germany. So, in general, the most powerful countries in Europe, including those with the

Speaker A

greatest potential to help us and those closest to us, are growing because of this migration problem, which was poorly managed a decade or two ago. We have political growth, yes, the political growth of parties that are, firstly, skeptical about immigration,

Speaker A

but secondly, they are skeptical about the cohesion of the European Union. They are skeptical about aid to Ukraine , for example, although that may soon ...I know that the Lepen group has suddenly become a bit more anti-Russian than it was. Which is somewhat

Speaker A

reassuring, because I believe that nationalists in France will come to power sooner or later. If not in this upcoming election, then in the next one . I believe it's only a matter of time in France. In Germany, the AfD is also

Speaker A

gaining strength, although I still think it's still there. They are at a slightly earlier stage than France, so there is a bit more time, but their attitude towards Ukraine and Russia is developing extremely dynamically. It's very different from what we would like.

Speaker A

The AfD is making it clear that aid to Ukraine should be suspended, and it says that the AfD is a party whose interests are completely at odds with Polish interests. This needs to be clearly emphasized here. And the

Speaker A

National Front is similar in France. So , one way or another, we have a situation in which we could wake up tomorrow with Western Europe skeptical of NATO guarantees, of the fight against Russia, or even of a defensive

Speaker A

stance towards Russia. We have a situation in which the United States is currently uncertain, right? That they are supposedly anchored in Poland, but they intend to limit their presence in Europe. But it's not even about political will, because I believe it's

Speaker A

in their interest to anchor Europe, but it's also about a certain potential and a situation in which they have to shift this potential to another theater of operations, not Europe. So we must realize that a future is possible in

Speaker A

which we will have to cope on our own, or together with our closest neighbors, who are all weaker than us. So, essentially, we are the leader here, the one who should be the strongest and should guarantee others a little. We

Speaker A

should—this is the strategic thought that should guide us regarding that controversial statement you mentioned —that to prevent war on Polish soil, we must have the potential to deter the enemy on our own soil. So, it's crucial here to build a component of the armed

Speaker A

forces, returning to the first topic, that will be able to operate effectively and efficiently beyond our borders, be deployed to our allies, and be convincing enough in terms of military capabilities to deter the enemy from attacking our neighbors.

Speaker A

This is extremely important. And now, first of all, we need public awareness, because we constantly have these spin-offs of this slogan: This is not our war. Whether it's Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or any other country, this slogan is equally

Speaker A

harmful in all cases. We must stop the enemy somewhere, not here on our border . Or, say, receiving bombs in Warsaw or anywhere else. So, at the same time, it's a great tool for exerting political influence and building our influence on the

Speaker A

surrounding area. Yes. So we're giving up on countries like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, where we truly have a perception today, historically probably the best we can have, with great hopes and enormous respect, which we've built , whether consciously or not, but we

Speaker A

have built it. And now we can either maintain it or squander it through this kind of communication. Especially since on the eastern flank, people are saying that we have Finland, which has large reserves, but Finland has 1%of professional soldiers, the rest are

Speaker A

reserves, and this is a purely defensive army, an army dedicated to defending Finland. They won't be our competitor in leading the eastern flank . It's like this isn't this isn't this isn't this isn't a partner for us who

Speaker A

will make things easier for us, right? They can distract Russian forces if they say, "Well, we'll stick together here, and you'll have the entire Russian border in a war if you attack anyone." This is important in the context of deterrence, but

Speaker A

operationally, militarily, they won't help us, because it's a completely different theater, with completely different capabilities. The Baltic states are known to have a problem creating such systems to defend themselves against Russia. Despite the fact that we're essentially the last

Speaker A

ones who haven't implemented widespread military training on this flank. They've already done it, and good for them. But we should have this strong reserve, among other things, because the reserve serves defense, the defense of the state, but the professional

Speaker A

component is professionals. They are there to prevent war on our territory, and that's precisely why this professional component exists—to use it at times and in places that prevent the enemy from attacking our territory.

Speaker A

And this place is the Baltics, this place is Ukraine. This place could be in Belarus, and in the future, too. So, you know, if it's difficult today, someone might say, "Wcz, what are you talking about? Where are we going to

Speaker A

drive tanks somewhere so that the Russians can bomb us here in a moment?" But it may turn out—I think there's a good chance it will be like this in the future—that our deployment of forces in the region will have a stabilizing

Speaker A

factor and will be able to deter even the Russians. If the Russians weaken and lose—lose in Ukraine, well, they don't need a two-million-man army. Even three brigades with good deep-strike capabilities could deter them, right, and with some potential remaining in

Speaker A

Poland, which could also be used, right ? So, you need to have some imagination , you need to have a strategic plan for the future, you need to know what the geopolitical conditions are, which are uncertain in the future. Therefore, we

Speaker A

need a potentially very large army, which will not be professional, because we can't keep a million men under arms constantly. But we must have the training component of such an army, which, in an emergency, will be called up from the reserve, will constitute a

Speaker A

force and will serve as a defense force . But we must have this component, which, before that happens, will constitute our political tool, our spearhead, which will defend access to Poland even before our eastern borders.

Speaker A

Yes. The question is whether, in the situation you're talking about, and the approach of our neighbors—those who share a similar threat perception, right? That is, the Baltics in the north, the Finns, the Swedes, and the other Scandinavian countries, who also

Speaker A

perceive this threat in a very similar way to Poland, and different from Germany and France, not to mention Italy, Spain, or Portugal. Geography is simply the way it is for natural reasons. Shouldn't we, however, pursue a much more offensive policy, meaning a

Speaker A

proactive one, in the north? Shouldn't we be working more to strengthen cooperation with the northern countries , conduct more intensive joint training , develop joint capabilities, and maintain a mutual presence in various locations? Do you think this is crucial

Speaker A

, or do you agree that it's crucial? Yes, it is crucial, but on the other hand, it's also important to point out that, generally speaking, from a military perspective, we're doing the same. After all, our soldiers just landed on Gotland, right? Now the

Speaker A

Swedes are allocating air units to patrolling this eastern flank, mainly over Poland. So, I know this cooperation has been going on for many years. Our military goes to the Norwegians, the Finns, or the Swedes, preparing for what politicians don't

Speaker A

want to implement yet. That means all the models for building these reserves, and how these reserves are trained, and so on. I also know a few stories about our military going there and not being able to tell the difference because

Speaker A

they saw maneuvers and exercises, right ? And he couldn't tell the difference between a professional unit and a reserve unit, just by performing the task, and it was clear that the level was very high and equal in both cases,

Speaker A

so this also happened a few years ago, so in my opinion, a lot is being done here, it's just not visible. On the other hand, surely you're also thinking about something like some spectacular successes, like, I don't know, some

Speaker A

document signing, that Poland, Sweden, I don't know, Finland, here we're signing some defense pact on cooperation, and so on and so forth.

Speaker A

But I'm afraid that, well—well, I'm a bit skeptical. I mean, in this context, remembering the historical circumstances, for example, the Swedes —they take very good care of their buffer zone, Finland, which is a buffer zone against the Russians, but the

Speaker A

Swedes weren't willing to get involved, basically from that brief moment of superpower status, when they also defeated Nassin, right? We remember the Swedish Deluge, and then, when they were devastated, they didn't engage in the continent's affairs at all for

Speaker A

several hundred years. And I believe that if NATO's cohesion is undermined, I don't think there's any reason for that at the moment. Despite everything, I'm calm today, but as I said, things could be different in the future in 5,

Speaker A

10, or 15 years, and Poland must survive NATO and the European Union, and should continue to function if these organizations don't survive such a period. So, I believe that the Swedes , especially the Swedes, would be cautious about any bilateral agreements

Speaker A

in which, for example, we are attacked by Russia, and they would have to come to our aid. I mean, I don't see any political space for that at all. Maybe I'm wrong, but I think that from their perspective, they are an island and

Speaker A

wouldn't really want to be drawn into a major war in a situation where they themselves are not attacked, or their immediate buffer zone is not attacked.

Speaker A

But you yourself say that these actions are already underway. As we see with Airpol, it's all within NATO. It's all within NATO. Swede, I'm not talking about bilateral actions, I'm talking about actions. I mean, there are various groups interested within NATO,

Speaker A

right? Of course, I mean, I agreed with you on the principle that we need to take this direction, but I'm going a bit further, right? I mean, further in the sense that we shouldn't get our hopes up too high that the Swedes will

Speaker A

help us in the future, as if it were to fall apart, because within NATO, that's why they joined NATO. The Swedes joined NATO because, uh, they felt too weak and threatened by Russia, not because they are strong and, uh, and they are

Speaker A

so brilliant that they will help us and defend us. So, let's distinguish between those who joined and those who joined, who joined to pursue their own interests, right? The same, yea, the same with us, especially when we were a

Speaker A

much, much weaker country, which we are now. But in my opinion, there are very strong arguments for the Swedes, the Finns, and the countries in our region.

Speaker A

They understand these arguments perfectly well. Regarding what's happening within NATO right now, I think, I don't know, I don't have any major expectations that our government should bring in any additional resources. Why do we need additional resources at this point? We have that,

Speaker A

and within NATO, they actually help us, we help them, we conduct mutual operations, training, exchanges. In my opinion, there's a very high level of cooperation here. You'd have to give me an example of what else you'd expect specifically, because, as I say, it

Speaker A

means two things: increased industrial cooperation, when it comes to industries, the defense industry, and joint projects.

Speaker A

But it takes two, right? Because they're too concerned about it, you know, because we think about it, because they have superior technologies , and they think on the other hand, because we have superior technologies, so why should we share them? Because

Speaker A

we'd rather profit from them and sell them, right? It's, you know, it's all a matter of mutual negotiations. You know , we take these submarines from them, but again, they didn't want to give us the technology, right? So, you know, um

Speaker A

, it's like saying, okay, production, ammunition production. I mean, there are many different things that need to be done, we need them too, and we can do them together if we strategically tell ourselves that these are the partners with whom we're safest

Speaker A

to do it today for various reasons. In my opinion, it's in their interest as well.

Speaker A

In principle, I agree. Only when specific cases arise, you know, specific weapons or a specific model that we want to use together with them.

Speaker A

And now the question is whether this model is feasible or not, and whether they want it or not, because the Swedes , on the other hand, are much more inclined to cooperate with, for example , Germany than with us. Because Germany

Speaker A

isn't a state, not even historically; we're sort of a front-line or potentially front-line state. Germany is a rear-end state.

Speaker A

Germany has superior technology, they also have the industry, and so on. So the Swedes see a much better business in partnership with Germany than in partnership with Poland. You know, we don't operate in a vacuum; we operate in a competitive environment, where,

Speaker A

moreover, each has its own political interests. And we see the Swedes as a great ally, because we know we can't fully rely on the Germans, so we'd like to have those Swedes, because they share a sense of threat with us. But

Speaker A

the Swedes think, okay, we share some things, let's say, a perspective with the Poles, but some things we don't, some we'll implement with someone else.

Speaker A

And you know, that's part of the problem, too, so that—I mean, I think we simply have to be aware of the fact that there are certain objective limitations that we can't overcome, right? What you're saying is very important, because when approaching

Speaker A

each partner, whether from the north, south, east, or west, we have to be fully aware of their perception.

Speaker A

Their perception. What they need, what they don't. I have a full understanding of that. So it's incredibly important that we don't go blind and say that the Saints now have to love us and sign an agreement on the defense of Gdańsk. We

Speaker A

just have to make them offers that are in their best interest. In my opinion, there could be many such proposals, because they, well, are also—we agreed—aware of the threat from Russia, and they know that Poland can be a much better partner for them than,

Speaker A

than, than Germany. But in other matters, of course, they have a lot of common interests with Germany, and now that's clear. We can't rip them away, suddenly tell them: don't cooperate with us unless you cooperate with Berlin. Well, that's absurd, of course.

Speaker A

It will never happen, but it seems that today is a historic moment when we can win much more together, in the common interest of both sides, both at the level of security and economics. That cooperation is growing significantly,

Speaker A

and that's very good, and let it be. We need to play at different levels, be proactive, more active. It's not saying that nothing is happening, but in my opinion, we should do even more. You know, this is an interesting

Speaker A

conversation for me, too, because I devoted several hundred pages of " Poland to the Power of Power" at the end to the individual approach of Polish policy towards a given country, from the perspective of outlining the interests of a given country and where

Speaker A

those interests might align with Polish interests, right? And then you can, in other words, what can we give someone, what does someone need, so that we can take something from this person, what does this person, what does this person

Speaker A

have? And I'll tell you, I had a very big problem with Sweden, because from a technological perspective, they're higher, from the perspective of critical raw materials, they have them and will extract them, and it will be like during...it could be like during

Speaker A

World War II or World War I, that they will declare themselves neutral, they will sell—then they sold solid metals , and now they sell critical metals, right? Indeed, there is a hypothetical future situation where it would actually fall apart, but I believe they

Speaker A

would then go neutral. But within NATO, they have short-term interests. They don't think in terms of strategically tying themselves to Poland in case of danger, they think very short-term, because we can't really offer them anything—I mean, we simply don't have

Speaker A

anything to offer them. You know, if you look at the energy market, if you look at the raw materials market, if you look at technology, if you look at many other issues, we could give them one thing, but I mean give in the sense

Speaker A

that we could offer it to them when they weren't in NATO. I mean, if they felt a very significant threat, and they did feel it from Russia, then our advantage was that if Russia wanted to attack Sweden and Sweden were neutral,

Speaker A

the Russians could do it and return to the port of Baltiysk safely, right? But if we said, "We won't let the Russians into the port of Baltiysk because we're on the Gulf of Gdansk and we might not let them in, or we might not let them

Speaker A

out at all." Well, then discuss it with us, right? The only problem is that Sweden joined NATO, and we now have a duty to defend ourselves. If Sweden were attacked, we would practically be the first country to react. Furthermore

Speaker A

, it's no longer profitable for the Russians to attack Sweden, because before they sail into this game, this Gotland, they really need to consider what they have to do, what they'll do with the Tricity area, what they'll do

Speaker A

with Poland. So, in reality, we've now moved higher on the list of priorities or potential targets than the Swedes.

Speaker A

As a neutral country, the Swedes were higher, meaning they were at greater risk than we were in NATO. Even though we shared a border with Russia, and the Swedes didn't, the situation has now reversed. So, as part of their

Speaker A

cooperation with NATO, they have space in the Baltic Sea, a sort of buffer zone regarding the Baltic states, and in my opinion, they should be involved there as well, and they are. Where can we cooperate with them? Where can they

Speaker A

give us, for example, air power, because they have a strong one, but they don't have much of a navy anymore?

Speaker A

We have to fend for ourselves, right? And that's why it's very good that we're expanding our own navy. But anyway, you know, we've kind of run out of arguments at this point to build a long-term strategy with the Swedes for,

Speaker A

I don't know, building industry or anything else, because they—from their perspective—it's like, "Okay, if NATO is there and it works, if we defend ourselves against Russia, then we have to cooperate with Poland, we have to block the Russians in the

Speaker A

Baltic Sea because it's in our interest , because it's our buffer zone," but on the other hand, "If war breaks out, we prefer to have supply chains with Germany because Germany is in the rear.

Speaker A

" We prefer to cooperate with them technologically because they're rich, they have capital, they can invest with us, we can share something. You know, it's on all other levels. I see nothing but problems here, problems from our perspective, right? That's why I don't

Speaker A

have such high expectations, right? If we don't try, we definitely won't achieve anything. And I think there's a lot—I'm not encouraging passivity, you know? I'm not encouraging it. We can achieve a lot, because all European armies, all countries need new things

Speaker A

that are just starting to emerge, which all these dual-use technologies, and of which Poland is also currently developing—a lot are being developed, and not much less than in Germany. And I don't know where the balance is right now; it's hard to gauge, isn't it? We

Speaker A

believe that the proportions have changed significantly here, too, and we're becoming an increasingly attractive partner. I'm not saying we're superior, but we have much greater potential than we thought. Well , I'm thinking primarily about the fact that we should engage them in various,

Speaker A

mutually engaging, yes, in various joint multi-country initiatives in this region, among those countries that share similar perceptions. And above all, we should jointly submit proposals to the United States, because Finland and Poland, in particular, are more attractive to the

Speaker A

current American administration than others. I mean, I'm still waiting and I deeply regret that there isn't a joint initiative, I don't know, between the presidents of Finland and Poland, who both happen to have good relations with the president

Speaker A

of the United States. He is what he is. As long as the Americans don't have one , we have nothing to complain about; there's one. If there's another one, we'll work on the next one. Our geographical location means we have a

Speaker A

higher tolerance for Trump's character compared to the rest of Europe. But Alex also has, I think, an excellent approach to him and has been able to forge these paths for himself, and he also has some arguments. So it seems to

Speaker A

me that our countries together can provide not only the arguments that you gentlemen have found the key to some of Trump's emotions, but also a strategic one, as if we could explain our strategic interests. I believe that here we could—I mean, there's room

Speaker A

for development, right? I kind of hope it will happen, because fortunately, we're not doing too badly in our relations with America. The Finns aren't doing too badly either, but this is the moment we should seize. You know , I would point out another dynamic

Speaker A

here. I mean, as long as NATO exists, and we want it to exist and stay that way, because it's the greatest guarantor of our security, but as long as it exists, it won't work to the advantage of, let's call it, Poland's

Speaker A

longitudinal relations; it's all east-west relations. I mean, the Finns will cooperate with Poland because it's a common front, but they need it just as much as we do. They're looking for someone from behind to support them on their front, because we won't, because

Speaker A

we're on the front line. So they're anchoring the United States. They're also trying to talk to France, to have good relations with Germany. Yes, they have their whole Scandinavian initiative, right? With Denmark, Norway , and Sweden. And we're doing exactly

Speaker A

the same. I mean, we obviously look at the Finns as partners, we train together here, and so on, but our priority is to have someone behind us, to come here, because if we're all attacked on the first front, everyone

Speaker A

will be thinking about themselves, about their own section of the front. And we need to have, as it were, what you said, this dynamic of looking west —it's shared, and we can actually act together here on this level as, let's

Speaker A

say, one voice on many, many, many topics, for example in this way. So, there's a format, and I have to admit, in this respect, if we're looking at building these East-West anchors, then, yes, indeed, I'd like to see a joint

Speaker A

delegation of Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania, flying to Washington or going to Paris. The problem with Europe is that each country within the European Union has its own interests, has bilateral agreements, and it's difficult to build

Speaker A

a common political bloc within the European Union. It's easier to do it within the European Union, but it's more difficult to build a common political bloc within the European Union. However, with regard to the United States, for example, this kind

Speaker A

of initiative would be interesting and I think it could even be effective in some way. And what do you think about the southern direction, namely Romania, which was politically problematic now.

Speaker A

Well, Bulgaria is even more complicated , but then there's Turkey, which is a powerhouse, a military powerhouse, an industrial powerhouse when it comes to the arms industry. Of course, it's a controversial country, pursuing controversial policies, especially domestically, but that should concern

Speaker A

us less and less. But it's still a very , very serious player, and I have the impression we still don't know how to approach it. The situation here is also even more complicated and difficult than in the case of Sweden, because it

Speaker A

certainly is, because the Turks have a completely different perspective. For them, Russia isn't a primary threat. It is, but not a primary one. They're essentially at war politically with Greece, with whom they're in alliance. They have pro-Russian Georgia in the northeast

Speaker A

right now. They have Iran in the east. They have the Middle East in the south, where they're constantly fighting with and against someone. They also have the Kurds. They're so involved in their region that this strategic partnership, you know, some extra piece of paper

Speaker A

than NATO, makes it even more difficult to see. And the fact that they support it is in their interest to block Russia in the Black Sea. After all, that's a body of water that's practically their northern border. But then again,

Speaker A

Ukraine is right on the Black Sea, and Poland is somewhere in the north, somewhere in the far north. And of course, we like to tell these legends about how this, this Lehistan, right?

Speaker A

They didn't, of course, not recognize the partitions and so on, but those are just legends. Meanwhile, the reality is that they base their potential, their geostrategic thinking, on their own region, of course, and so on, and so on

Speaker A

, and so forth, and so on, and so forth , and so forth, and so forth, and so forth, and so on...Um, maybe some joint technological initiative, I think even more so than with the Swedes, because because we're further away, we're not

Speaker A

as competitive with Turkey as we are. It's common knowledge that the closer we are to a country, the more divergent interests we have, contrary to appearances, not just convergent ones, right? Danger brings us closer, but everything else actually drives us

Speaker A

further apart. Well, we are competitors to Turkey. Turkey doesn't treat us as a competitor, whether in the Baltics or in the EU economy, because they're not members of the EU, and so on. But on the other hand, you also have to

Speaker A

remember that their perception of the Russian threat is much weaker than ours or the Swedes', right? So, Turkey's situation within NATO is uncertain in general. Trump has stabilized it now, but during Biden's term, and during Trump's first term, and even during

Speaker A

Obama's term, Erdogan was always lashing out at the Americans because he was absolutely convinced they were trying to overthrow him. So, you know, and generally, their conflicting interests, in a way, have severely damaged relations within NATO with the

Speaker A

Americans. The Americans have given up on this, but they're also leaving the Middle East, so this is more of an opportunity for Turkey. The Americans ' exit benefits Turkish interests because they have a free hand, and they will,

Speaker A

but I think the tensions within NATO... Even the Turks and the French were at odds, because the French took a pro-Greek stance here, and so on. So Turkey's situation is so complicated that we're really some kind of electron

Speaker A

, you know, somewhere in the north with whom they can cooperate, but they don't have to. If there is a good business, they will do it, they will sell us these bajraktars. And if we need something from them, or want something,

Speaker A

but they don't really see the benefit in it, they'll say: "Well, that's too bad, well, well, well, well, why bother with any visits, right?" So I think that, and again, going higher, because it's not just Turkey, but you mentioned

Speaker A

Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria is a bit beyond our reach, but Romania is a country that doesn't appreciate itself, I think. And it's a real shame, because if they did, they would see what a good opportunity strategic cooperation with

Speaker A

Poland would be, how forward-looking it is, even in the context of difficult relations with Ukraine. After all, the Ukrainians feel so powerful, today they're lecturing the South Koreans.

Speaker A

Yes, yesterday they were lecturing us, they were lecturing the Romanians too, and they wanted to lecture Trump, but that didn't work out in the Oval Office . In any case, it's a very difficult partner to manage, one that you have to

Speaker A

deal with somehow. And so it is. It happens that Poland and Romania are countries that border Ukraine and are gateways to the European Union, gateways to NATO, whatever you do, whatever calculations you make that Ukrainians care about, then Poland and

Speaker A

Romania. And now, if so, if if we know this—Romanians also have a problem with Ukrainians, after all—then together Warsaw and Bucharest could really manage their relations with Kyiv calmly from the position of a stronger partner, one that Kyiv must reckon with

Speaker A

, and not one that will lecture us about how we are still helping them, right, because they think it's due. So this is, I believe, a duo that in the future, if we build it, will shape our region, a partnership with Ukraine.

Speaker A

This will also allow us to have a stronger position south of the Carpathians. Romania is a country that needs to believe in itself. It also needs to build some potential, because they are much smaller, weaker than us.

Speaker A

But it is the only country, let's say, in our A region that shares threats with us, which is not our competitor.

Speaker A

We are not its competitor. And besides, we have many things in common precisely in the context of politics, whether it's mitigating Hungary, but especially Ukraine. You know, there's only one problem there. I analyzed all the countries in the regions, as if in the

Speaker A

context of these embedded states and their interests, and the problem, our problem and the problem of Romanians, is Slovakia, which divides our countries, but this doesn't have to be the case in the future, because politically, things could be different

Speaker A

in Slovakia. That's firstly. But secondly, if we manage to defend Ukraine and we have to manage relations with Ukraine as a country that aspires to NATO and the EU, and perhaps joins NATO and the EU—in both cases, we can

Speaker A

create a bypass through Ukraine, right, when it comes to economic connection, when it comes to even the mental thinking of managing Ukraine together in a bloc. And then, I really believe, this is the only real future direction that can be decided strategically, in

Speaker A

which we can invest heavily...And this is a partner to whom we can promise and give something. I mean, Poland has a lot to offer Romania.

Speaker A

Yes, we are the stronger partner, so it's easier for us today, right? And we should be able to make good use of this moment. And Romania is very oriented towards France, so that also bothers us , because again, it's not a meridianal

Speaker A

orientation, but only a horizontal one, right? But if we could convince Romanians that we need to think forward-lookingly, along the north-south line, then I believe they are the most important partner for us in the future.

Speaker A

And what should we offer Romania? You know, it's much easier here, because firstly, we have more capital, we can also invest. Secondly, we can jointly develop technologies, especially modern technologies that are not expensive, and we are good at it.

Speaker A

Um, so you know, if it's not as attractive as it is for the Swedes, or maybe I don't know, or the Germans, who , after all, are also managing partnership deals and agreements with Ukrainians in exchange for assistance,

Speaker A

right? And that will also be in The future. Well, Germany or Sweden, maybe Sweden less so, but Germany, as a country with significant capital, will have significant influence, will have great opportunities to obtain various kinds of experience and technology from

Speaker A

Ukrainians. Ukrainians don't want to trade with this so much for now, obviously, because they're saving it for later. But we can, we can, in turn, work very strongly with Romanians on this at this level, on this plane. So

Speaker A

there's the issue of technology, there's the issue of a common policy towards Kyiv. I consider it the greatest, the greatest keystone of our interests, because if the Russian threat is eliminated, what will happen, what else will hold us against the

Speaker A

Swedes? Well, if the Russians lose in Ukraine, well, you know, the Swedes will say again: "Okay, now we are the core of Europe again, and you're on the trees." But I would really like the Romanians to share these problems with us.

Speaker A

There's no indication that the Russians will lose in Ukraine. They may not win this war, but it's true. I'm just pointing out, pointing out Just for an additional connection, for an additional business that works, besides the Russian threat.

Speaker A

So, I think we can do a lot of good with Romania in this context. Well, as I said, I think they simply need to believe in themselves a little, because they're not yet fully developed geopolitically, and you know, well,

Speaker A

there's no point in surprising them, really, because they don't have the potential either. But every weak country, let's remember us from many years ago, and today we're too inactive, we complain about it, right? When we do have the potential,

Speaker A

because we still have some, we share another characteristic. We share another characteristic. It's that we and Romanians are on the outskirts of the European Union, which doesn't need to continue sending in labor, meaning immigrants only those who would work. And both countries have

Speaker A

a source of these immigrants. I mean, we draw more from Ukraine, and it's true that Moldova is a very small country with a small population, but Romania is again a much smaller country than Poland. So it needs much less. So,

Speaker A

again, we have a situation in which both countries can hope, both now and in the future, for positive immigration , which will allow us to maintain, or at least at some point, an advantage in the economic sphere. In this respect,

Speaker A

we can also cooperate on immigration policy, share experiences, and exchange various competencies. So here we are, I believe that in all possible scenarios with Romania, we have a lot in common and have a lot to offer them, and they

Speaker A

can also offer us certain security issues, issues of building some kind of security here, because you know, for us , what we would dream of, right? And some people here have already created some Polish-Ukrainian confederations or federations. Well, for us, that's

Speaker A

attractive, right? Well, Ukraine as a large country, after all, with potential, despite the fact that the population there is now, really low compared to what it was 30 years ago.

Speaker A

But despite everything, we imagine that if we were partners with Ukraine, a Polish-Ukrainian partnership would give us really A significant force in Europe , and I think we all agree on that.

Speaker A

But it takes courage to think, this partnership. We won't achieve this partnership because it's impossible with the Ukrainians. They've already proven it many times. I'll tell you honestly, I've completely changed my perspective on our past history, on the

Speaker A

times of the Khmelnytsky Uprisings and later, because I've come to the conclusion that maybe they also tried to reach an agreement with them, but it simply wasn't possible. And you know, we need, I believe, that the key to

Speaker A

building some kind of partnership with the Ukrainians isn't that we have to convince them that this is beneficial, because we won't convince them that way . Even though it is beneficial, we won't convince them, because they will want to be overbearingly stronger here

Speaker A

and will look down on us, because they will be oriented towards Germany, so we have to force them to think this way or to go along with it. And to force this, we need more strength, and with Romania

Speaker A

, we can build this strength. Because Romanians will also care about that. So I believe Romania is the key to Ukraine . And with Romania and Ukraine, we can build the region. We can build security against Russia. We then feel much more

Speaker A

secure, even if NATO is unstable, right ? And then we can think of some kind of intermarium here, and so on and so forth. Romania is the key to Ukraine, and with Romania and Ukraine, Poland has a much better, more secure future

Speaker A

than without it. Let's try to summarize this. We are a country that, from what we're saying here and what you've said, we are a country that, yes, isn't a power. It's a medium-sized country, but with a country that has many possibilities,

Speaker A

many advantages, many. It's not that we don't have any, as our favorite Donald Trump says, cards to play, right? We have some of those cards, and we have more and more of them. Only I have the impression that today we are still too

Speaker A

weak, too weak, and we're playing them too weakly. This is your summary of what's happening today, what kind of thinking is crucial today when our security is threatened. We are in a state of war, whatever we call it,

Speaker A

every day we are attacked in various ways, even cybernetically by Russia. This will not stop. It will probably develop. Of course, we don't know if it will develop into something much bigger , but our surroundings are also at risk

Speaker A

. The entire world around us is changing, and very rapidly in every respect. And think, in summary, what is most important in what we should do.

Speaker A

Work, Igor, because today Poland is not a country that, with a snap of a button , you know, a politician with a great strategy, is the third Piłsudski and the fourth John Paul II, and he will simply lead us, and suddenly we will be

Speaker A

playing higher than where we are. We are already higher than we could play without the war, without the war in Ukraine. It is truly promoting us politically. And now we need to build the country's internal potential step by step, sector by sector. Investments

Speaker A

in energy, investments in education, investments in people and their training, in modern technologies, because that is very important. People and Modern technologies, right?

Speaker A

Investments in the armed forces, in the civil state, grassroots work. It's not attractive here, but we have to build potential for 15, 20 years from now, and today we have to do everything we can to anchor all the forces of

Speaker A

influence that are beneficial to us: the United States, NATO, the European Union, to stabilize our region so that we can continue to develop and use this groundwork optimally. Let's not focus on great geopolitics, because we alone won't defeat the Russian Federation. We

Speaker A

have a certain kind of agency, which we demonstrated along the way. You know, I'm not encouraging passivity, because it's not to be misunderstood. We can, of course, have to be very active, and this activity, for example, turned into

Speaker A

President Duda breaking down these tank coalitions, aircraft coalitions, you know, it was us who did it, it was like we were actually overcoming international barriers. We were playing in a very high league back then, to Ukraine's advantage, and that was in

Speaker A

our favor. Interest. But these were unique moments resulting from the fact that the course of events, the geopolitical situation, the need of the moment, and the sense of threat common to all of Europe gave us a mandate in

Speaker A

which we truly had the power of persuasion, right? But these are moments. These are moments that must be seized, but we must build security and the state for the future on solid foundations, and by working every day.

Speaker A

Working every day, every day, you know, just like us citizens, right? So, um, spend half an hour, an hour reading about some, you know, some, um, issue, I don't know, about Polish logistics, about rail transport, I don't know, or

Speaker A

even about the army. Educate yourself, educate yourself. Do your homework on state and social studies. Yes. And let's do this as citizens. Even at this lowest level, it's really necessary.

Speaker A

And with such small steps, we will really achieve, we will achieve a lot. Don't lie to me. And this is very close to my heart. This is what we do at the Freedom Institute's leadership school, so I have another opportunity to

Speaker A

encourage you. We're here to participate. We talk a lot about this there, but we also talk about the economy, business, and above all, about the development of Poland. Krzysztof, thank you very much. I recommend Krzysztof Wojczal's blog and book

Speaker A

channel, and I hope this isn't our last conversation on the open channel. Thank you very much.

Speaker A

Certainly not. Thank you too. Best regards. Thanks. That's all for today. As I said , I encourage you to participate in the leadership school. The recruitment process is ongoing. You'll find the link to the school under the recording.

Speaker A

Watch the open channel and be sure to visit our website kanalotwarty.pl. There you will find summaries of all our conversations, including this one, which, while you're watching, is already ready, because it was prepared for us by well-trained machines. This

Speaker A

isn't what humans do, but a machine trained by humans, and you can find all our historical conversations there.

Speaker A

Thank you very much. That's all for today. Goodbye. The sponsor of the episode is Oanda TMS Brokers, a brokerage house offering over 4,000 instruments, including ETFs and futures contracts. CFD. Click the link in the description. The program is

Speaker A

sponsored by the online store steki.pl. Polish beef, steaks, and burgers with safe delivery to your home. The program partner is siepomaga.pl.

Speaker A

Support the Siepomaga.pl fundraiser with the DMD slash. The program is sponsored by the Polish brand Helicontex. Proven tactical, outdoor, and survival clothing and equipment. Hey!

Topics:Polandmilitary servicedefense policyuniversal military traininggeopoliticsregional securityKrzysztof Wojczalcompulsory military servicemilitary preparednessstrategic uncertainty

Get More with the SozAI App

Transcribe recordings, audio files, and YouTube videos — with AI summaries and speaker detection. 30 minutes free.

App Store Google Play

Or transcribe another YouTube video here →

Free tools: TXT to SRT · SRT Validator · Merge SRT · Subtitle to Text · All tools