Yugoslavia: The West’s Playbook for Global Domination |… — Transcript

Dr. George Szamuely discusses NATO's war on Yugoslavia, exposing Western legal hypocrisy and the war's lasting geopolitical impact.

Key Takeaways

Western powers violated international law to dismantle Yugoslavia.
Legal justifications like the Badinter Commission were biased and opportunistic.
The war had severe humanitarian and geopolitical consequences.
Western hostility towards Serbia shaped the conflict's narrative and outcomes.
The conflict set a dangerous precedent for international interventions.

Summary

The video features Dr. George Szamuely discussing NATO's humanitarian war on Yugoslavia and its devastating consequences.
Szamuely critiques the Western powers, especially Germany, the US, and the UK, for violating international and constitutional law during Yugoslavia's breakup.
The Western recognition of Croatian and Slovenian secessions ignored Yugoslavia's federal constitutional court rulings that secession was illegal.
The Badinter Arbitration Commission was used by the West to legally justify the dissolution of Yugoslavia despite flawed and biased rulings.
Szamuely highlights the hypocrisy and opportunism of Western states in disregarding legal norms and Yugoslav institutions.
The discussion covers the broader implications for transatlantic foreign policy and the precedent set for future conflicts.
The video touches on the ethnic and political complexities in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina post-war.
Szamuely points out the deep-rooted Western hostility towards Serbia influencing policy decisions.
The bombing of Serbia increased refugee flows and was celebrated prematurely by NATO and Western leaders.
The video concludes with a call to recognize Kosovo's independence and the geopolitical necessity of distancing from Russia.

Chapters

Full Transcript — Download SRT & Markdown

Speaker A

Hello everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. George Samueli, a senior fellow at the Global Policy Institute, the co-host with Peter Lavell of the podcast The Gaggle, and the author of the wonderful book Bombs for Peace.

Speaker A

NATO's humanitarian war on Yugoslavia. The horrible consequences of that war, not only for Yugoslavia, Serbia, and all the other successor states, but also the entire transatlantic foreign policy, is what we want to discuss today. So George welcome.

Speaker A

NATO's humanitarian war on Yugoslavia, the horrible consequences of that war, not only for Yugoslavia, Serbia, and all the other successor states, but also the entire transatlantic foreign policy, is what we want to discuss today. So George, welcome.

Speaker A

you point out in your book uh very importantly learned the the pivotal lessons for the postcold war era in Yugoslavia. Could you maybe lay that out for us?

Speaker A

Well, very good to be with you, Pascal. Wonderful having you because you wrote that book, and you have been very vocal online about calling out the hypocrisies of the West, but also this war-mongering DNA, which I think

Speaker A

Yugoslavia. They did that by violating every norm of international law, every norm of uh constitutional law. Um what what had happened uh in uh Yugoslavia is they had the first um uh elections took place 1990 and almost immediately these

Speaker A

you point out in your book very importantly. Learned the pivotal lessons for the post-Cold War era in Yugoslavia. Could you maybe lay that out for us?

Speaker A

Now in response to that you would have thought the western states which adhere to international laws say well okay you need to go through some kind of a legal constitutional procedure. You can't just simply say you know you have your first

Speaker A

Well, it's very important to see what was done to Yugoslavia. The Western powers, initially Germany and then the United States and the United Kingdom, set about destroying an established state, the Socialist Federal Republic of

Speaker A

That's what normally happens. Um but instead of that the as I say Germany began pushing right away for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and um given that there was no formal constitutional process within Yugoslavia for uh for secession because Yugoslavia

Speaker A

Yugoslavia. They did that by violating every norm of international law, every norm of constitutional law. What had happened in Yugoslavia is they had the first elections take place in 1990, and almost immediately these

Speaker A

laid down for how they would exit the USSR until Gorbachov in 1990 adopted legislation um what the procedure should be. But of course that that was completely ignored by the rather opportunistic republics in particular Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

Speaker A

various nationalist secessionist forces in Croatia and Slovenia in particular rushed to leave Yugoslavia.

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any sense like republics joining together to form a common state. There was a common state of six nations.

Speaker A

Now, in response to that, you would have thought the Western states, which adhere to international laws, say, "Well, okay, you need to go through some kind of a legal constitutional procedure. You can't just simply say, you know, you have your first

Speaker A

secessionists and we're going to ignore the decisions of Yugoslavia's federal uh legally established federal institutions in particular the federal constitutional court in Yugoslavia which had ruled unanimously that secession is illegal that the declarations of independence on on the part of Croatian and Slovenia

Speaker A

election and then you say, well, first order of business, we're going to leave a common state that existed for 70 years. You have to go through some common constitutional procedure.

Speaker A

We're just going to go ahead and uh recognize the secessions. And then they had to come up with some legal mumbo jumbo to justify what they did which which was the so-called um badint arbitration commission which was decided

Speaker A

That's what normally happens. But instead of that, Germany began pushing right away for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and given that there was no formal constitutional process within Yugoslavia for secession because Yugoslavia

Speaker A

were the ones who just simply, you know, made up absolutely ridiculous, one of the stupidest, worst set of rulings ever to justify what the western powers did, which was to uh recognize the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the the secession of their republics and

Speaker A

was unlike the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had been, you know, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 15 republics. And in theory, all of the republics had the right of secession, though no procedure had ever been

Speaker A

broken up Yugoslavia and anyone who doesn't like it, we're going to apply sanctions against them and then eventually armed force." Sorry, I just need to ask you about this because I'm not familiar with with this tribunal. Can you can you give me the

Speaker A

laid down for how they would exit the USSR until Gorbachev in 1990 adopted legislation on what the procedure should be. But of course, that was completely ignored by the rather opportunistic republics, in particular Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

Speaker A

that was June the 25th, 1991. And then um the European community was still called the EC at the time um stepped up and said okay what we'll do is we will hold uh something called an international conference on the former

Speaker A

So that procedure, what was legal and constitutional, was ignored. But Yugoslavia was a little different because Yugoslavia was the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which means that there was one state comprising six nations. So it wasn't in

Speaker A

what that said. They ignored the Yugoslav National Assembly. They ignored the Yugoslav Constitutional Court. They we will only listen to the um the presidents of the uh republics. Um but of course the presidents that they didn't want to pay any attention to was

Speaker A

any sense like republics joining together to form a common state. There was a common state of six nations.

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this international conference for the former Yugoslavia did was they said okay well this is all very vexing what we'll do is we will set up um an arbitration commission but it didn't really work as in any sense an arbitration commission

Speaker A

Self-determination inhered in the nations, not in the republics. So all of that was ignored by the Western powers, and the Western powers just said, "Well, okay, we are just going to go ahead and recognize these

Speaker A

usually how arbitration works if you do it in front of one of the arbitration courts is that one side appoints one judge, the other side's another judge, and the two judges then appoint a third judge and the ruling of that of that

Speaker A

secessionists, and we're going to ignore the decisions of Yugoslavia's federal legally established federal institutions, in particular the federal constitutional court in Yugoslavia, which had ruled unanimously that secession is illegal, that the declarations of independence on the part of Croatia and Slovenia

Speaker A

that they said, "Okay, we'll we'll have this um arbitration commission. We'll have five judges. um three of the judges we will um appoint ourselves the European community we will appoint those three judges and then they said we'll turn around and say to go to the uh the

Speaker A

were illegal. We're going to ignore all of that. We're going to ignore the fact that there had been no Yugoslav-wide referendum on independence and whether they wanted to maintain the continuity of the state.

Speaker A

you know they were all basically presidents of the constitutional courts in Western Europe You had Abadin himself who's the head of the commission. He was the president of the French constitutional court. You had the head of the German constitutional court, the

Speaker A

We're just going to go ahead and recognize the secessions. And then they had to come up with some legal mumbo jumbo to justify what they did, which was the so-called Badinter Arbitration Commission, which was decided

Speaker A

questions to the arbitrators. But then that was rewritten completely recast by the president of this international conference for the former Yugoslavia.

Speaker A

upon. There were five constitutional court judges, five, all of whom came from Western Europe. Not one person came from Yugoslavia, the Balkans, somebody who actually knew the territory. Obviously, no one came from Russia, and

Speaker A

why it's the desired answer? because Germany had already made clear this is this is December 1991 by then Germany had already cleared I don't care what this you you decision you come to we are going to recognize Croatia Slovenia I

Speaker A

they were the ones who just simply made up absolutely ridiculous, one of the stupidest, worst sets of rulings ever to justify what the Western powers did, which was to recognize the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the secession of their republics, and

Speaker A

to do because there was no legal justific ification for recognizing secession. I mean it's just simply against international law but Germany said he was going to do it. So Badinto had to come up with a convoluted nonsensical legal reasoning to justify

Speaker A

ignoring the wishes of all of the peoples of Yugoslavia, which was the majority that wanted to continue with the common state. And so they ignored all of those wishes, and then they said, "Okay, well now we've got our

Speaker A

that says if all of Spain says like yes, you can go, then you're then you're allowed to leave. You you you would have thought that's exactly what they decided. I I guess so that well Yugoslavia is kind of inferior peoples

Speaker A

broken-up Yugoslavia, and anyone who doesn't like it, we're going to apply sanctions against them and then eventually armed force." Sorry, I just need to ask you about this because I'm not familiar with this tribunal. Can you give me the

Speaker A

to Yugoslavia and so they then they they came up with these findings and they the most important finding was that well Yugoslavia is no longer a state in existence, it's a state in dissolution.

Speaker A

history of that tribunal? What it was and how it worked? Well, you see, what had happened was that, as I say, Croatia and Slovenia rushed out of the exit, and they said, you know, 1991, right? We in 1991. Exactly. So

Speaker A

wasn't a state in dissolution. I mean it was the state institutions all of which existed. He he was just going around in circles by saying well since Croatia and Slovenia want to exit therefore it must be a state in dissolution and therefore

Speaker A

that was June the 25th, 1991. And then the European Community, which was still called the EC at the time, stepped up and said, "Okay, what we'll do is we will hold something called an international conference on the former

Speaker A

administrative boundaries were to become international frontiers. is um this is of course very very uh ridiculous because in other words there was to be no negotiation at all uh among the peoples of Yugoslavia as you know that hey these

Speaker A

Yugoslavia to decide what to do." But then they, of course, cheated in how they went about doing this because, of course, they ignored all of the federal Yugoslav institutions like the Yugoslav presidency. They didn't care about

Speaker A

you know another nation across the administrative border now they become citizens of another state. And so you kind of basically you're stripping people of their their nationality, of their statethood. And so, but they said, "Oh, well, these would just simply recognize

Speaker A

what that said. They ignored the Yugoslav National Assembly. They ignored the Yugoslav Constitutional Court. They would only listen to the presidents of the republics. But of course, the presidents that they didn't want to pay any attention to was

Speaker A

they recognize that those are immutable. But they didn't recognize any of the uh institutions of of Yugoslavia. As I say, Yugoslavia's constitutional court had made very definitive rulings saying secession is illegal. There is no there's no procedure at all within uh

Speaker A

the president of Serbia because Serbia was the most populous republic of Yugoslavia. And so they had to ignore the wishes of the Serbs and the Serbs' allies, the Montenegrins, and pay attention largely to the secessionists. Now, what

Speaker A

the the hypocrisy on the one hand and also just the the the self-righteousness with which all of this happened and which then of course later on justifies intervention, right?

Speaker A

this international conference for the former Yugoslavia did was they said, "Okay, well, this is all very vexing. What we'll do is we will set up an arbitration commission," but it didn't really work as in any sense an arbitration commission,

Speaker A

Soviet Union it's it's happening at the same time it's the same time but you know the the the crucial steps for the dissolution of the Soviet Union for the secessionism of the Soviet Union happened the year prior right in in summer of 1990 and Gorba uh

Speaker A

and so we will—because it wasn't like one side presented its case, another side presented its case, and then an arbitrator tries to resolve the disputes. Major, just may I just interject that? May I just interject? Because

Speaker A

like we need to preemptively recognize anything that the CRS and the Slovians and so on say um where did that come from? Was it influenced by this process in the Soviet Union?

Speaker A

usually how arbitration works, if you do it in front of one of the arbitration courts, is that one side appoints one judge, the other side appoints another judge, and the two judges then appoint a third judge, and the ruling of that

Speaker A

Yugoslavia that they took to be a kind of a standin for the Soviet Union and there's like like it was like a mini Soviet Union um located uh in Europe. um that could possibly uh be a problem for

Speaker A

then holds as an arbitration if you have an arbitration agreement in the first place. So that was not what happened, was it? No, no, you're absolutely right. You're absolutely right in what you just pointed out because what happened was

Speaker A

mean obviously he come to power with the help of the Red Army in World War II but nonetheless you know they had a falling out the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had had a falling out and since that falling

Speaker A

that they said, "Okay, we'll have this arbitration commission. We'll have five judges. Three of the judges we will appoint ourselves, the European Community, we will appoint those three judges, and then they said we'll turn around and say to the

Speaker A

and and so so that's why Yugoslavia was seen as a potential problem for the the goal of sort of the NATOization of Europe. They thought, hey, this might be a kind of a a a model of socialism that

Speaker A

Yugoslavs, 'Well, you appoint two of the judges.'" They couldn't agree among themselves, so then the three judges said, "Okay, well, we will appoint the remaining two." And so what you got was five judges, all of whom came from,

Speaker A

And it was also a champion of the non-aligned movement. It was a champion of the precursor to today's like global south bricks and so on movement was the European and in this sense Yugoslavia was very successfully neutral in this entire cold

Speaker A

you know, they were all basically presidents of the constitutional courts in Western Europe. You had Badinter himself, who's the head of the commission. He was the president of the French Constitutional Court. You had the head of the German Constitutional Court, the

Speaker A

also the Americans approached the Yugoslavia. Yes. Absolutely. Because what they saw in Yugoslavia was uh the problem of Serbia. They saw Serbia as a real problem for us because they thought Serbia has this very close relationship with uh Russia. Uh they you know

Speaker A

Spanish Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court. They were the ones who ultimately made t—

Speaker A

up within the communist system as did the other uh leaders in Yugoslavia, but unlike them, he really wasn't willing to discard everything um of communism. And so he almost immediately became this demonized figure. He you see merges 1987

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and then you can see really how the western media were were apoplelectic you know that you know they liked all these kind of new new kinds of leaders that were emerging in the rest of Eastern Europe basically just wanted to throw in

Speaker A

their lot with the west and but Melvich was kind of saying well you know we will continue to chart our own independent non-aligned course just just as you said in other words yeah we will continue with that uh in in the future

Speaker A

Yugoslavia. And then he really became um this uh demonized figure in the western media. And then the secessionists in the other republics were very clever.

Speaker A

They said, "Hey, look, you know, the West really has come to hate me. They they don't like the Serbs. We don't like the Serbs. So, we'll make our pitch to the uh the Western powers and say we're we are oppressed. we are under the thumb

Speaker A

of the Serbs and they're all communists and we are trying to liberate ourselves from the communists and and that was a successful pitch and then you know they didn't you know the the western powers were not particularly interested in

Speaker A

looking into the background particularly of the Croatian leader uh Tutman who you know who had openly espoused fascist ideas and you know openly invited fascists to come to uh Croatia What they heard was, you know, this talk about how the Serbs are communist.

Speaker A

They're pro-s Soviet and they want to, you know, sub subjugate us to uh this communist yoke because you if you look through the med the media reporting the late 80s through 1991, it's all about how the Serbs, the communists, they want

Speaker A

to reimpose totalitarianism on the rest of the people of Yugoslavia. It's uh I I'm sorry to ask you this because like we have to jump so much because there there are so many details that need to be unpacked here, but um this this

Speaker A

approach of then also using individual leaders and completely ignoring where they're coming from. Rano Tuchman was by all means a communist. He was a communist apertic, right? and and ignoring all of that, ignoring the uh I mean we've we've seen that time and

Speaker A

again and we see it with Ukraine, right? We see with Ukraine the a sudden ignoring of something that was acknowledged all the way before which is that there is right-wing fascist nationalism in Ukraine and then suddenly that became like glorious glorious uh uh

Speaker A

heroes. Um I had though one more guest on my show, David Gibbs, who also pointed out that the entire Yugoslav affair while it was developing and it was was developing inside a very um uh uh very turbulent time the 1991 '92 and and so it did have

Speaker A

a precursor and he said Afghanistan the way the United States fermented and made the war in Afghan in Afghanistan all but inevitable um was something that later came to be implemented also in Yugoslavia in the way that you work with

Speaker A

these different uh uh rebel factions and thereby then weaken the adversary from your research. Would you support that that analysis? I I think so. I mean you have there's a certain timeline that you have to so we start with Croatia. This

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is 19 1919 1999. Now Tburn yes he had been a communist but he had he he had a falling out with a communist. He had been imprisoned by Tito in 1970 as part of the whole Croatian spring which was

Speaker A

the revival of Croatian nationalism. Now that's a serious business when you start reviving Croatian nationalism particularly everybody the Serbs in particular remember the horrors of the fascist uh state during World War II.

Speaker A

Torchman was very much associated with that and for instance the kind of veteran journalist um British journalist Norah Bellof real expert of the Balkans um she wrote I think around about 1991 when no one was really paying attention

Speaker A

to this says look I met Tjman in 1980 and the thing that struck me right away when I met him this is 1980 still communist era he hated the Serbs he had a pathological obsessive hatred of the Serbs so everything that we're seeing

Speaker A

Now in 1990 1999 in Croatia is a direct result of Tjman and the people around Tjman and their absolute loathing of the Serbs and their determination to basically get rid of the in the the sort of the Serb the Serbs of Croatia

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and anything that was distinctively Serb about uh uh Croatia. Um so remember I mean the the way it worked in Yugoslavia was Croatia according to its constitution they had a several constitution in each of its constitution said Croatia is uh the state of the

Speaker A

Croats and the Serbs said it wasn't just said oh it's a state of the Croats and they're the Serb minorities or whatever it is a joint state of the Croats and the Serbs. Dodgeman first thing he does he changes the constitution and says

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it's just the state of the crowats the serves have become a minority and uh and so by being the minority then essentially he can start making these decisions constitutional decisions such as uh you know holding a referendum on

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independence which the the Serbs had opposed by saying well we've now changed the constitution we don't need to pay any attention to uh what the Serb minority has to say so that's that's 1991 1992 we get the situation in

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Bosnian Herza governor where you have this kind of Islamist speaker also he had been imprisoned this Aliyah Isadovich he had been in prison um well he was imprisoned after World War II for collaborating w with the the Nazis but

Speaker A

then he was imprisoned during uh Yugoslav time uh over you know also for his Islamism um and then you have the sort of the the western propaganda system that goes and tell us well is Begovich he's very secular he's a secular Muslim he wasn't

Speaker A

anything of the sort I mean you just look through his writings he wrote prodigiously about Islamism and how Islam is incompatible with uh with the west and so on he was he was an Islamist but the western media just as with

Speaker A

Tutman he minimized you know all of Tutman's sort of uh fascist sympathies his so sophobia so they they presented is beovich as some kind of a secular Muslim. But I think what the the just in terms of the division of labor, Croatia

Speaker A

and Slovenia were kind of German projects. Basian governor was an American project. And so the Americans decided what we want to promote is that Beovich um as a kind of moderate secular Muslim the you know the kind of Muslim

Speaker A

we like you know these are the like the Muslims in Turkey that was still before this is before the Erdogan era so you know you kind of secular pro-western pro- NATO you know unlike the Muslims we don't like the ones in Iran or in Iraq

Speaker A

and so on this is the type that we like so the American Americans embraced the cause of uh is Begovich and so they were they were very eager to push for uh independence of Bosnian hoagina but which was was very problematic because

Speaker A

the Muslims really comprise some only 43% of the population uh the Serbs were about 33% uh the and then the rest were uh Croats. So they had to ignore this this the demography of Bosnian governor and still push for um independence

Speaker A

knowing and they knew this perfectly well that the Serbs would simply not accept it because they said we have national self-determination. We want to remain a part of Yugoslavia. Why should we push be pushed out of Yugoslavia on

Speaker A

account of is a begitch and we certainly don't want to be uh ruled by you know somebody who's you know an is an armist uh and so the Serbs in Bosnian said well we want out we want to remain a part of

Speaker A

Yugoslavia they were of course absolutely ferociously denounced uh by the western powers and were quickly put under sanction and eventually they were bombed in 1994 and 1995.

Speaker A

Did anyone ever ask the crots in in Bosnia Herzgoina? Because I do remember visiting a crude friend in Herzuggoina and he showed me up up in the hill uh the little uh the little cave where for 150 years they were practicing hidden

Speaker A

Catholicism because it was forbidden under the Ottoman Empire and the and and the occupation. And so did anyone ask the crotz because at the end of the day would have been better to stick stick with Yugoslavia if they were if push

Speaker A

came to shove. It it would have been absolutely would have been the the but the problem was that Croatia had made its exit. Once Croatia had made its exit out of Yugoslavia the Croats of Bosian governor said okay we want to

Speaker A

join them. We want to be a part of this uh of the Croatian state. So they did support this the independence uh in um because they they held a referendum stipulated by uh Badin. So um that there'd be a referendum in Bosnian hot

Speaker A

governor. So Badin made very sure that there wouldn't be a nationwide Yugoslavide referendum but there'd be a referendums in the individual republics.

Speaker A

Now that referendum in Bosian government that was boycotted by the Serbs because they said this is violates the constitution of Bosnian governor which is you can't have any constitutional change that is opposed by one of the three constituent nations or three

Speaker A

constituent nations is a Bosnian governor. The Serves are opposed to it. It's one constituent nation. You can't have a constitution. It's a viol. You can't have a referendum. That's a violation of the constitution.

Speaker A

Nonetheless, they went ahead with the referendum. Bad inter nothing about the constitution. Now the the crowads did support this because they saw this as independence of Bosnia was step one. Uh step two they would secede from the independent state

Speaker A

of Bosnia and join with uh Croatia. Um but but even in in Badin's own terms the there wasn't a sufficient vote even with even with the Serb Serbs taking no part boycotting this referendum even with that they didn't get the twothirds vote

Speaker A

that was necessary for uh for the secession of Bosnia to be recognized but nonetheless they said okay that's it that's good enough for us we we recognize it but but then well this is another one But in's findings they

Speaker A

refuse to accept the core Yugoslavia as as the remaining state of Yugoslavia. In other words, you know, like you like when the Soviet Union dissolves, Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union. They said, "No, no, we're not

Speaker A

going to recognize this core Yugoslavia that wants to remain Yugoslavia, which was at that time Serbian Montenegro.

Speaker A

It's a brand new state. you're going to have to reapply for membership to the United Nations. And um and of course when you know the Serbian Montenegro what remained in Yugoslavia, we're not we're not going to reapply because we

Speaker A

are the continuation of Yugoslavia and they were promptly kicked out of the the United Nations. Um and uh so so they they made sure throughout all of those bad interings that they rewarded the secessionist. Yeah.

Speaker A

And all of the people and you know you would have to say at least 50% of Yugoslavia wanted the state to continue.

Speaker A

Those people those 50% plus who wanted the Yugoslavia to continue were absolutely resolutely ignored. They got nothing nothing from badint and of course it continued and it continues until today. this this this arbitrariness because if you look at

Speaker A

Kosovo today the the main grievance at the moment of the Serb minority in Kosovo is that they that they want out they want to re they want to join Serbia but they're not given the minority right to actually do that because within

Speaker A

Kosovo they're now told that no no you have to you have to comply with your own constitution secessionism is illegal in Kosovo although when it comes to Kosovo we don't recognize that Serbia says secessionism is illegal and They they

Speaker A

just do that and within the same breath they do it and so this is a 30-year history of just arbitrarily setting who we give power and who we don't and therefore swallow it and and be quiet.

Speaker A

And by the way, now Kosovo, you're going to have the largest NATO base uh in the in in the Balkans. Uh and this will continue. Thank you very much.

Speaker A

Exactly. And that's really very interesting because you have the bad findings. He said, "Okay, the the successor states to Yugoslavia are the republics." So that you know the the six republics here, Serbia, Montenegro, uh Bosnia, Herzgoina, um Croatia and uh Macedonia.

Speaker A

So those would be the successors and there and no changes in the those administrative borders. They're now international frontiers. But then they turned around and changed their position on Serbia and said, "Well, yeah, actually Kosovo, which at that time was

Speaker A

sort of accepted as part of Serbia." Oh, Kosovo can apparently secede from uh Serbia. So they suddenly said, "Oh, Kosovo can can do it." Kosovo was secede now.

Speaker A

But not the Serbs in Kosovo, not the Serbs because good secessionists, bad secessionists. That's right. So Kosovo, they can just take, you know, that that province of Kosovo, they can secede. But what about the Serbs, the Serb minority in Kosovo?

Speaker A

No, they don't have self-determination. But they the um the Kosovo, but what is the basis of that? Because the what they call Kosovo is just a province inhabited by Albanians. Now Albanians already have their own state. So what exactly is the

Speaker A

legal basis for another Albanian state? I mean, you know, there's no there's no such nation as the Kosovas. The media may say it repeats by Kosovas. There's no such people. So there already exists an Albanian state which is why under the

Speaker A

constitution of Yugoslavia the Albanians of Yugoslavia were deemed a national minority not a constituent nation because their national aspirations had already been fulfilled in the state of Albania. So they say, "Okay, well Kosovo exists as a state, so we're going to

Speaker A

give this to the Albanians. But what about the Serbs? Um, who after all are, you know, a were a constituent nation of Yugoslavia? You know, they have their state Serbia. Why are they unable to join this the state of uh Serbia? No,

Speaker A

you have to stay in this Albanian uh dominated uh now deemed a state. Do you have a do you have an answer for that? I mean an answer based upon the geostrategic thinking of the west. I mean wouldn't it be easier to get rid of

Speaker A

the Serbia problem by just letting them rejoin Serbia and therefore have a a a 100% uh lovely and western abiding uh um Kosovo left.

Speaker A

Well, I think they went out of their way to humiliate the Serbs uh as much as possible. And I think they would also think that if they were to do that then that would give ideas which is still and

Speaker A

that's a a problem for them at the moment that the the Serbs in the Republic of Surfska in Bosnian Herzgo they would want out and they obviously do want out they would want to join uh Serbia. So they they came up with all

Speaker A

these you know convoluted ways of trying to keep the Serbs down trying to humiliate them as much as possible. So the Serbs have to stay in uh uh Kosovo, you know, in in their essentially their enclaves in this Albanian dominated

Speaker A

province and the Serbs have, you know, in Republic of Servka, they have to remain within this the state of Bosnian Herz governor, which isn't really even any kind of a state. So they just went through all of these procedures just in

Speaker A

order to uh make sure that the Serbs are as humiliated as possible. But there's also another aspect of it which is obviously kind of divide and rule. I mean as long as everybody hates everybody else and everybody's permanently in conflict with everyone

Speaker A

else then the Balkans become quite an quite easy uh to manage. Um, I mean the Germans obviously blazed the trail in that during World War II, but then essentially the European Union, you know, under the influence of Germany

Speaker A

obviously has done exactly the same thing uh to the former Yugoslavia. You know, it's it's it's so ugly. It's so ugly because it also costs so many lives. It's also so ugly on a on on an international legal basis because it

Speaker A

messes up with all of these principles. And of course what one of the things that these people never keep in mind is that the precedents they set others will learn. So it is extremely ironic that it is Russia now that says like look we are

Speaker A

just repeating your approach in Ukraine. Can you draw a couple of the parallels that actually other states have learned from this way of implementing their will on others? Well, that that was it because in in the case of um Russia,

Speaker A

they in fact said at the time that the West rushed to recognized um Kosovo in 2008, well, you know, we we're going to uh learn from this and they went ahead, you know, in the case of Crimea in 2014,

Speaker A

they said, well, we'll have a referendum. I mean, they actually didn't have a referendum in Kosovo. They just recognized um a declaration by the Kosovo parliament but they had a referendum in in uh Crimea and and of course the west how oh this is illegal

Speaker A

this is illegal this is a part of uh Ukraine now what is the basis of their claim that it's a part of Ukraine well in 1991 at the time of the basically illegal unconstitutional dissolution of the USSR there was never any legal basis for what

Speaker A

happened um under under that in Bellish December 1991 um those were the borders of Ukraine and so that those now become the international frontiers and which we're obligated to uh recognize in perpetuity and and the Russians don't say well why

Speaker A

should we I mean you didn't when it came to Serbia you said you weren't going to recognize uh the borders of Serum having first said in 199192 that these were the b these are the international frontiers of Serbia and

Speaker A

then you turn around and say, "No, well, they're not the international fronties. We're just going to uh declare this uh province as an independent state. So, we're going to do the same thing. Why should we be obligated to recognize the

Speaker A

state of affairs in December 1991 as existing in perpetuity?" So the Russians did that in the case of Crimea and then of course they did that uh in the case of um uh the Donbass initially the Donetsk and Lugansk and then of course

Speaker A

they added um uh which is you know and Zaparosia this so they said okay this is now uh a part of the Russian Federation. Now the west screams, "Oh, international law, international law. You can't you can't change international frontiers." But you

Speaker A

did that in the case of Yugoslavia. You just went ahead and dissolved an existing state. You did it in violation not just of the the Helsinki final act of 1975, not just in, you know, all of the um United Nations declarations when

Speaker A

you're not you basically are not supposed to recognize any kind of secessions. you know that that's deemed to be part of the unfriendly acts towards um other states. The 1970 declaration about unfriendly acts uh towards other states. You went ahead and

Speaker A

did that broke it up. You didn't regard that as any in any way you that you that you were messing around with international frontiers. And now suddenly, oh the international frontiers of Ukraine, we can't do anything about it. It's nothing

Speaker A

but total hypocrisy and opportunism. There are no no principles of this. I mean as I say you go and read those declarations of bad interur sort of the most ridiculous legal findings by the top constitutional court lawyers in uh

Speaker A

in the western Europe this nonsense that they came up with and then uh and you know thought oh we'll accept that and then and then you say how suddenly the western powers are very solemnly proclaiming well we have to adhere to

Speaker A

international laws we can't just simply start changing uh international frontiers well that's what You did that.

Speaker A

You did that in Yugoslavia over and over again. Can you explain to me maybe also like what you what you know about the German rationale because the Germans just emerged in 1990 1991 as the greatest winners of the end of the cold war

Speaker A

because basically we we we we call it reunification but that's not what it was. It was like West Germany swallowing up East Germany. The East German state died. it died and it was gone and its institutions were were were kicked were

Speaker A

killed. Its elites were were were basically told to to leave and not come back and everything was replaced, right?

Speaker A

It was like West Germany swallowing East Germany and at the same time we then have the breakup of uh of of both like the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia and the broken up Yugoslavia really broken up with a with an axe. Um and and the

Speaker A

Czechoslovakia I mean we call it velvet divorce. I I have no fixed opinion on that one. But on but on Yugoslavia, like what is it that made the West Germans go so toxic on the on Yugoslavia? No, it

Speaker A

it's a very interesting uh question because um you know, you go to October the 3rd, 1990, which is the day of the uh German reunification. Helm Cole, the German chancellor, he sends a a telegram to every single head of state in the

Speaker A

world and uh and declares henceforth only peace will emanate from German soil. And this was this was you know word for word what was in that um uh 2 plus4 agreement that was rushed through on the 12th of September. So really just

Speaker A

a couple of weeks before the uh the reunification. Uh um so you know it says okay peace will remedy from a German within a few months the same helmet Cole the same Hans Dietri Genture the German foreign minister went ahead and essentially they

Speaker A

just pushed for this they just pushed you know the with extraordinary aggression that they would recognize Croatian Slovenia and they don't didn't care who would uh object to what they were doing. So what was really behind this? Well, it had I think Germany was

Speaker A

asserting itself in uh in Europe contrary to um to all of the uh the proclamations that they had made. And to be honest, I have to say this has been a pattern of Germany since the reunification. You know, I think they

Speaker A

they played nice. West Germany had kind of played nice for all these years. Oh, we're different. We're changed. You know, we're not interested in any kind of aggression. and you know where, you know, we want to work with our

Speaker A

neighbors, with our uh with with all our partners, you know, we're just not going to do any of the the things that we used to do. You know, look look at Germany now. I mean, Germany now openly says we

Speaker A

are in conflict, you know, with uh with Russia. That was, you know, that was Chancellor Mer the other day. Analina Burbach said we are at war with Russia.

Speaker A

Um it would be almost unthinkable for any German government to be saying that. So Germany has emerged that kind of is reasserting um itself. So you did it initially. Croatia and Slovenia were their allies. Their allies in uh in in World War II. So that

Speaker A

was you know that they were essentially they restoring their historical interest uh in the Balkans as well as their hatred their absolute loathing for the Serbs. It's a it's a deep pathological hatred for the Serbs. you know, going

Speaker A

back through to the uh the 19th century and um and then you know that you know, Helen and you could see some of that now with with with the the restoration of this hatred for Russia and that pervades

Speaker A

throughout the German media. You know, you know, you talk to Germans who say, you know, it is day and night within German media a absolute loathing for the Russians. you know, was re recalling, you know, the old days of uh the 1930s,

Speaker A

just the the the vehements uh of uh against Russia and the refusal to entertain even the slightest uh any perspective different from that any, you know, in to try to listen to Russia's case or anything like that. You you

Speaker A

don't get any of that in in German public discourse at all. Yeah. And let's not not forget all of these other hypocrisies and they need to be called out because they are kind of a national schizophrenia, right? Also the

Speaker A

good Muslims versus bad Muslims game of uh Germany when it said never again it meant never again against people who we like never I mean no genocide without Germany I mean that's one of the baselines of Europe right so currently the genocide

Speaker A

on the on the Muslim population on on the Gaza population the Palestinian population because they're not just Muslims they're also Christians and Jews and others uh um that's one of them and then of course like at the same time

Speaker A

while justifying the genocide down there you cry wolf about what China is doing to its Muslim minority in Shinjang. It's like it just it just blows you up. But it shows you that it's all actually all of these speech acts, all of these moral

Speaker A

speech acts are are purely purely uh geostrategic. Not geostrategic are purely like national interest based on who you want to hate and who not.

Speaker A

Absolutely. Abs. Absolutely. Um they you know obviously you have the Palestinians that don't care at all. you know, they said, well, you know, we have a special relationship with Israel because of our history. So, that means you sign on to

Speaker A

every kind of horrific slaughter atrocity. You don't care about because you have a special relationship uh with Israel. So, they don't care about that.

Speaker A

But they do care about the Chchins. you know when the Chetchins the during the years of the Chetchin wars in um in Russia the Germans were in the forefront you know you know absolutely outraged by what was being done to the Chetchins so

Speaker A

those were the good Muslims you know there because they're against the Russians and then again you see this reinforces the pattern because it's kind of what Nazi Germany did that they also made all of these distinctions which are

Speaker A

the Muslims that we're going to support well we're going to support obviously the Muslim Muslims in Bosnian governor.

Speaker A

They're they're against because they're against the Serbs. So, they're good. We will support the Muslims within the Soviet Union. They they're going to be on our side. Uh um quite like the Muslims in Turkey. So, essentially, you just make these um you know, arbitrary

Speaker A

decisions entirely uh according to whatever geopolitical game that you're playing. you'll write them a geostrategic because you don't even see how exactly Germany does well out of this. But what Germany is doing now which is quite smart and what they which

Speaker A

is you know they've learned their lesson from history is don't get isolated. Always stick with the pack. Um that's the big mistake they thought we did in World War I, World War II, we were isolated. So this time you know you you

Speaker A

you stick with the pack. Above all make make sure that you've got the Jews on your side. Don't don't go against that.

Speaker A

that that's always a bad idea. Um, make sure you're with the uh the United States and uh the UK. So, as long as you're part of uh the majority, then you can pretty much, you know, do do whatever you want. And so that's why,

Speaker A

you know, Germany is perfectly happy to continue with the slaughter, funding the slaughter in Palestine, um, arming uh, Israel and basically it just gets away with it by saying, "Oh, we have this uh, special relationship, you know, we we you know, we have to

Speaker A

support Israel because of something or other." Totally made a totally madeup argument because that wasn't the view of Germany in the 1970s. you know, Helm Schmidt didn't think uh that oh, you know, we have to support Israel because

Speaker A

of what happened uh in the 1930s and 40s. This is just just as something today that Germany is just made up that the 1930s and 40s should guide our policy um towards Israel.

Speaker A

Yeah. A lot of these concepts are made up and conjured out of thin air and then and then you claim that it always was like that. And you especially the speech act the repeated speech acts the ones that drill it into the mind of the

Speaker A

people like let's say another example the the rules based international order they make it sound as if though that terminology had been around ever since 45 when in fact it was made up less than 10 years ago because before that called

Speaker A

it like that. This is just another way of like justifying arbitrary approaches to international law.

Speaker A

That's right. It it it's it is actually quite quite extraordinary that they do this. They make up this uh you know the rules-based order. And to the unsuspecting observer, he said, "Well, that's that sounds good." You know, well, you know, that somehow well, yeah,

Speaker A

that's how that's how we in the West like to think of ourselves. Yeah, we believe in rules. We believe in order.

Speaker A

We believe in a civilized um way of resolving disputes. Except when you start looking at uh at you know historical examples that's exactly the opposite of what you did in Yugoslavia.

Speaker A

You consistently or disobeyed all the rules. You broke all the rules uh and you just went ahead rushed through a totally destructive policy guaranteed to end in war. But but it somehow this is how the west um wants to think of

Speaker A

itself. Another interesting example I guess when we talk about Germany is like we have the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia you know to totally nonsensical entity that was created in 1993 by the UN security council. Russia unfortunately was kind

Speaker A

of absent without leave at the time and supported this. And then of course they basically been sending Serbs pretty much all the the entirety of the Serb leadership to prison life sentences. I mean, life sentences are the norm, you know, when you know

Speaker A

the Serb leaders, they're all serving life sentences. Um, you know, they serve 25 years, ask for clemency. Nope, no, no clemency. Um, and of course, it's this is a much harsher treatment than anything that was meed out to um to the

Speaker A

uh Germans after World War II. Now, leave aside the first Nuremberg trial and and the big the major Nazi leaders who um who were executed, they're not all of them. Some were acquitted. No one gets acquitted that the ICDI some um but

Speaker A

some were acquitted. And then you have somebody like say Albert who as armament's minister was definitely involved in war crimes. He got 20 years and then lived on another 20 years in retirement had a very comfortable life writing books giving interviews and and

Speaker A

so on and then not to mention you know you know lower level Nazis SS and so on couldn't do anything. I mean they nothing would ever happen to them in postal west Germany. But now the Germans they go around arresting Serbs. You know

Speaker A

they can go arrest a Serb shove the serve into prison for 40 years. You know 40 years you know for you know uh you know crimes that you know pale in comparison to anything that the Nazis did. So again so the Germans present

Speaker A

whoa we have to you know because of our special past you know we we feel very strongly about war crimes. We we we feel we have to really you know continue with this process of the war crimes of those who are not on

Speaker A

your side. Those are the bad ones. You see it at the moment how they care about one war crime when it when it comes from Russia, not about the other one. We we see how they care about every single

Speaker A

soul who died on 7th of October and not about a single one that's dying in the fire rates. So that's right. That that's it. That's that's exactly how you play the game.

Speaker A

Exactly that. But 7th of October, let's say, you know, you go you you and every time you know they make features, it's always 7th of October. 7th of October, 7th of October. But what about what happened since then? I mean, however

Speaker A

many died before or before. Or before. Yeah, exactly. Or before that that that's always the case that you never never bring up anything that happens uh before. So it's like whenever people to the extent that people talk about Yugoslavia today, they just pick

Speaker A

on one event. Oh, they said, "Okay, that's in um July 1995. So what about what happened before?" You know, when there was the the four years that preceded Stri. Well, no one wants to talk about that. Let's just pick one

Speaker A

event, take it completely out of context, and then of course give a very distorted uh idea of what actually happened. Um, but it's a way that you construct these stories and and then you know you that tells you who the good

Speaker A

guys are and who the bad guys are. So that we nothing happens before 7th of October, nothing happens after. So we can just simply talk about uh the 7th of October.

Speaker A

And we must just point out George I think that it is pure coincidence, historical coincidence that we ourselves are always on the good side of history.

Speaker A

That's pure coincidence. If we ever were not on the good side of history, we learn about that 200 years later and then we kind of atone by putting email footers, you know, recognizing the indigenous lands of these people and so

Speaker A

on. um 200 years later, may I just like switch one more moment and go to this what how the west works or how the mentality of this works by like just quoting you from your book because you have a beautiful like passage in the

Speaker A

conclusion where you quote Tony Blair where he said in uh 1999 NATO success in Kosovo will be the biggest deterrent to tyrants the world over and the biggest rallying call for democracy. That is why whatever it takes we must succeed and

Speaker A

the policy of brutal savage savagery that is ethic cleansing must fail and be seen to fail say says Blair in 1999. Uh it's so reminiscent to what we are hearing about Ukraine isn't it like the the ring to it the tone. Can you speak

Speaker A

to No that that's right and of course it what they did in 1999 was obviously completely illegal. Um it had the exact opposite effect of what they wanted. It was supposedly humanitarian but of course it was absolutely destructive and

Speaker A

and devastating. Supposedly they were trying to uh prevent uh war crimes. Then according to the ICTY that only uh increased uh war crimes and and then of course the the flood of refugees which supposedly provoked the bombing. Uh the

Speaker A

flood of refugees of course increased exponentially as a result of the bombing. But because Serbia was relatively easy to defeat, you know, NATO and Tony Blair, you know, they went in for a lot of self- congratulation.

Speaker A

Oh, fantastic. We did this, you know, we we won, you know, we defeated, you know, not not only did you win, you know, you were like like a boxer. You won the fight. Um, but you get to feel that

Speaker A

you're the good guy. Um and then that of course led, you know, that of course was the hubris that led to the the onslaught against um uh Afghanistan. But of course Iraq really just, you know, a little more than two years later because they

Speaker A

thought, well, we're obviously the good guys. It's going to be pretty easy uh to defeat a much weakened uh Iraq. you know, Iraq had already been, you know, after more than 10 years of uh sanctions and uh and then we'll get to have

Speaker A

another opportunity to congratulate ourselves. You know, we defeated the the tyrant uh Saddam Hussein and you know, and everything else. Um but then just as you say, what happens when this war goes wrong is you have, you know, within a

Speaker A

few years a quick revision. Yeah, that was a mistake. That was probably shouldn't have done that. And so you think, what's what's the consensus now?

Speaker A

Yeah, we probably probably should have given that one a miss, but nobody was saying it at the time. They said it because, hey, we we got to go in. We got to go into Iraq. The people who are

Speaker A

against the Iraq war, we're in a very small minority. Although these people are still proud of what they did, even if they say Iraq was was a mess. They still say it's good that Saddam Hussein is gone and we did,

Speaker A

you know, overall the the good outcome was achieved even though the the instruments were messy. And if I ask these people who say like, "You cannot attack us over a nation." And I tell them, "Well, you attacked Iraq, didn't

Speaker A

you?" And it's like, "That's not the same. You cannot compare it. One is a dictatorship. The other one is a blooming democracy." They don't I mean, and I tell them, look, but international law doesn't care about the the diplomat the political

Speaker A

system. Then they usually reply incomparable. He was about to kill millions in his own country of 5 million.

Speaker A

That's right. Well, that that's exactly right. And you know those were the justifications that were being made at the time you know during the arguments about the invasion of um Iraq and and and you say hey look you know I I I was

Speaker A

arguing well look this is a sovereign nation I mean you look at the UN charter there's nothing in the UN charter that says that um uh not democracies are you know it's open season on them you know you know you can attack a country that

Speaker A

uh you know if you don't like uh its form of government there's there's nothing in the UN chart that says all states irrespective of their domestic arrangements but um then these these people who make these fanciful extrapolations of international law you

Speaker A

know just as I was saying about the badint and then the international criminal tribunal for they make this thing yeah but the way international law has evolved is that certain states states don't really have legitimacy. So because they're not democratic, because

Speaker A

they don't really protect their own people, they don't h have immunity from attack by others. And that that was the kind of the the germ of this whole idea of the responsibility to protect that you know you can actually arbitrarily

Speaker A

decide that certain states don't protect their populations and so others can come in and um bomb and overthrow or do whatever they want to do. So they said that that was an argument made uh about Iraq and and you're right there are

Speaker A

people who still justify Iraq. Well at least we got rid of um Saddam Hussein.

Speaker A

Um but because so many Americans died and uh and it was clearly became very unpopular in the United States that it's still a kind of an embarrassment and it was based on lies. I mean you can't you can't get around the lies that were uh

Speaker A

that was spread about the weapons of mass destruction. So it's kind of become an embarrassment. So people just don't really want to uh talk about it very much. So that that's what you know same with Vietnam. Vietnam was extremely

Speaker A

popular in the early days. Um then when it became gradually unpopular and the war didn't seem to be coming to any kind of conclusion uh then you know America ended it and then it seems everybody was against it from the beginning you know

Speaker A

it's like it's your heart put to find anyone at all who who was for it you know oh yeah yeah of course I was against Vietnam. So that's always the way these things work. If if it succeeds uh or at least succeeds in in those

Speaker A

terms as as they think Yugoslavia succeeded because they they they kind of uh gave in and not on everything, but at least they they gave in after the 11 weeks of bombing. Then they congratulate themselves and go on talking about what

Speaker A

a fantastic intervention this was. If it doesn't, then they kind of say, "Yeah, yeah, it just didn't really work. wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time, you know, better luck next time.

Speaker A

So that that I think that's been the the uh the view of uh case of Iraq and and of course before that Vietnam and to sort of take Libya as well.

Speaker A

Yeah. And when and when it didn't end well and especially if you have to exit then you put bone crushing sanctions as well just to strangulate whatever is left of the mess that you created and Afghanistan is currently there right but

Speaker A

anyhow true true of Vietnam as well United States as part of the Paris peace accord United States was promised enormous amount of um aid to Vietnam to help rebuild the country not one penny United States didn't come up with a single

Speaker A

penny uh for to Vietnam after the Paris peace accord so you that always I mean what I mean there wasn't the sanctions was didn't apply but you're you're absolutely the sanctions remain in place uh until there's a regime change that uh

Speaker A

that the west desires and for some reason the west can understand how it is that these savage nations like Vietnam and India and so on do not side with them when it comes to approaching Russia and China like it's

Speaker A

it's unfathomable why why would that be but anyhow like as a very last question to wrap this up Would you say that Yugoslavia was the conclusion of the, you know, of the victory of the West in the Cold War or was it the beginning,

Speaker A

the new blueprint of how to how to implement hegemony for as long as you can?

Speaker A

I think it was um this a really good question. I I think it was the beginning of the kind of post um the uniolar moment.

Speaker A

Yeah. And and I think it's in a very interesting way that um with the with with the collapse of the the Soviet Union, this was the opportunity for the West to essentially ex you know express its dominance um particularly of the uh

Speaker A

the European continent but then obviously going on into uh Eurasia because for the West I think the outcome of World War II really wasn't very satisfying. factory because basically it was the Soviet Union that broke the back of the Vermachar and the West had to

Speaker A

accept this. The West had to accept that this outcome of this war in which Eastern Europe remained within the uh the Soviet sphere of influence and the Soviet Union was this formidable uh military power and the West really was

Speaker A

very unhappy about this. And so in a way it was once that uh power kind of disintegrated from 1899 then west so now now we can get the outcome we really wanted all along. Um and so this was this push against

Speaker A

Yugoslavia was really part of the push against uh Russia and that goes back a long way. I mean it goes you know it goes back to the 1930s. It goes even before that. an attempt to push Russia out of Europe altogether. And Yugoslavia

Speaker A

was seen as the standin for Russia. Russia had always been involved in the Balkans. The British had had problems with Russian involvement in the Balkans.

Speaker A

The Serbs um were seen as you know the Russia's allies. They had then worries about well maybe the some other will also look upon Russia's allies. You know, maybe the Bulgarians will look upon Russia as an allies. So the the

Speaker A

reason for that onslaught against Yugoslavia was to push Russia out of um uh Europe once and for all. You know, not not not unlike as I say uh the pre uh 1939 uh European projects. And in a way it it continues to this day because

Speaker A

the outcomes of the wars in Bosian governor and in Kosabo were not wholly satisfactory for the west. They had to put up with a divided Basin Hutzgo. The West goal was in a unitary state of Bosnia that would be a member of NATO

Speaker A

and would you know take take its orders from Brussels. They had to put up with this uh loose confederation comprising a Serb state of Bosnia. And that's what they're doing now that they've removed this leader Miller Dodic from power in

Speaker A

the Republic of Serbska. This is the west's opportunity to undo the uh you know what they had to put up what what they had to uh accept in 1995 at Dayton which is the creation of the Serb entity. They they could well now move

Speaker A

and try to dissolve the Serb entity um altogether in Bosnian. Same with with Serbia and Kosovo. They still have not been able to force Serbia to give up on Kosovo. So that's that's why the west continues with this this agenda because

Speaker A

as long as the the Serbs are there somehow Russia maintains its presence of some some kind of influence in Europe and you know that's why there's endless media stories about how Russians are making trouble in the Balkans. You know,

Speaker A

you know the Russian agents you know you know there's all these problems with VHI is clearly working with the Russians and Dodic is with the Russians. It's this it's a perpetual obsession that somehow we haven't got the whole thing the whole

Speaker A

pie which should be in the west but instead we still have to share it somehow with Russia. So that I think it was the first of the the the kinds of wars in which the west wants to express

Speaker A

its total geopolitical dominance ultimately you know and that goes back I guess to the Halford Mckinder thesis of the dominance of the Eurasian land mass.

Speaker A

Yeah. And it's it's just a a repetition of the stupidity of not not not accepting a yes for an answer because the Serbs want to join the EU. The Serbs just also say we're not going to join NATO. They are saying we are military

Speaker A

neutral. We are actually going to play with everybody. But that's not something those people can accept. It needs to be all for us and all against the other or nothing or you are yourself part of the problem.

Speaker A

Exactly. They tell the Serbs you want to join the EU and that's kind of that's not going to happen. But but the but they that's the condition. They said you have to do two things. You have to accept the loss of Kosovo completely.

Speaker A

Wash your hands of Kosovo once and for all. Accept that it's an independent state. And you have to cut yourself off from Russia. You know, impose sanctions on uh Russia. Um you know, cut off all uh trade uh with Russia. Those are the

Speaker A

conditions if you want to join our club. And the just, you know, they're not they're not willing to do that. and uh you know they'd like to be a part of the EU, but they're not willing to sacrifice

Speaker A

everything. But that's what the that's what the the Europeans and the Americans are demanding of them.

Speaker A

Yeah. And and and and of course naturally this causes exactly the opposite effect just like in Georgia.

Speaker A

Georgia learned its lessons. The Serbs they know that they they cannot throw their lot into one or the other or the other basket completely. You have to be play with everybody. Sorry. And I I know I said it's the last question, but very

Speaker A

last followup because you interestingly now said um that what the West wanted to achieve in the '90s was to completely push out Russia. This flies a little bit into in the face of the interpretation that the the West got drunk on its on

Speaker A

having won the the cold war and having having now uh you know having like destroyed the Soviet Union and and therefore not paying attention to Russia because what you're implying is that there was they were still paying enough

Speaker A

attention in order to try to take to to completely wrestle anything out of the orbit of of the successor state. How do you how do you see that? Well, no. What I mean is that um there there was a

Speaker A

concern that uh sooner or later uh Russia will um recover and and that that was they had to make sure that even if that happens, if Russia recovers and they were going to make sure Russia doesn't recover, they they they did as

Speaker A

much as they could to uh create as many problems inside Russia as possible, but that they wanted to make sure that you know that if Russia recovers, there'll be nothing for it. uh to come back to that all of the states of Eastern Europe

Speaker A

will have been scooped up into uh NATO and the EU and in particular the real problem um for the um uh for Europe and the United States was the Balkans. uh because that was the the one area where

Speaker A

there was a real sentimental attachment uh to Russia, you know, going back to the uh the 19th century, going back also to um World War I where Russia entered the war kind of destroyed itself on behalf of Serbia. Um so that that that

Speaker A

was when there was the fear. So on the one hand I think initially the the concern was that Yugoslavia the if it survived would form an attractive alternative a kind of a marketbased socialism and as attractive alternative to Eastern Europe that was very quickly

Speaker A

being scooped up into the neoliberal order. So they wanted to make sure that would destroy it. But after that, after you destroy that and that was that became clear that Yugoslavia wouldn't survive, then they had to deal with uh

Speaker A

Serbia because as long as Serbia was there, as long as the Serbs were there, you know, the the dominant people in the Balkans, then Russia would have some influence in Europe. And I think that that's why they they had to move push uh

Speaker A

NATO expansion and then continue to apply more and more pressure um against the Serbs. on make sure that you know we we never again have to have uh Russia uh in our continent.

Speaker A

That makes very good sense. And everybody listening don't mistake anything that George said for so for a grandmaster plan of the puppeteers. It is more the the forces of these of these of these neoliberal and neocon uh groupings that then lead down the path

Speaker A

of history. Um George Samueli, people want to follow you, they should go to your podcast first and foremost. first episode of the podcast. You'll find it on the gaggle.locals.com.

Speaker A

You can also find it on uh YouTube. Um you can also follow me on Substack. You can follow me on uh Twitter. And above all, you know, please try and buy my book. Um it's it's a little pricey

Speaker A

unfortunately. It was not my decision. Um Bumps of Peace, NATO's humanitarian war in Yugoslavia.

Speaker A

Everybody, the links will be down in the description below. George Zami, thank you very much for your time today. Thank you very much, Pascal.

Topics:YugoslaviaNATOBadinter Arbitration CommissionSerbiaKosovointernational lawWestern foreign policyBalkans conflictpost-Cold Warhumanitarian war

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the role of the Badinter Arbitration Commission in the Yugoslav breakup?

The Badinter Arbitration Commission was established by the European Community to provide legal opinions on Yugoslavia's dissolution. However, its rulings were biased, ignoring Yugoslavia's constitutional court and were used by Western powers to justify recognizing secessions prematurely.

Why does Dr. Szamuely criticize Western powers in the context of the Yugoslav war?

Dr. Szamuely criticizes Western powers for violating international and constitutional law, ignoring Yugoslav institutions, and pursuing opportunistic policies driven by hostility towards Serbia, which led to devastating consequences for the region.

What are the long-term consequences of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia according to the video?

The intervention resulted in severe humanitarian crises, increased refugee flows, destabilization of the Balkans, entrenched ethnic conflicts, and set a precedent for Western military interventions justified by dubious legal reasoning.

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