Steel War BACKFIRES! Canada Humiliates Trump’s 90-Day U… — Transcript

87%. That is the share of every kilogram of potash fertilizer used by American farmers in 2025 that came from a single source. Not a single country, a single province: Saskatchewan, Canada. Six underground mines all digging the same Devonian era salt deposits laid down 900 million years ago when central North America was covered by a shallow inland sea. 87% of every bag of potash that fed every cornfield in Iowa, every soybean field in Illinois, every wheat field in Nebraska, every potato field in Idaho, every cotton field in Texas. The entire industrial-scale agriculture of the American Midwest, the American plains, and the American South depended on a single critical mineral that is mined in commercial volume in exactly one place on Earth. The United States Geological Survey published that number in March of this year. It was not breaking news. It was not a surprise to anyone in the fertilizer industry. It was not a surprise to the United States Department of Agriculture, which has tracked Canadian potash dependency since the 1960s. It was not a surprise to any of the major agricultural lobbying organizations that have testified before Congress on this exact subject in dozens of hearings over the past four decades. It was, however, a surprise to Donald Trump. In March of 2025, the Trump administration imposed a blanket 25% tariff on Canadian goods, including potash. The tariff was framed as part of a comprehensive trade war strategy. It was announced with maximum political fanfare, and within days it was met with the largest single-issue lobbying response from the American agricultural sector in modern history. Republican Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Republican Senator John Hoeven of North Dakota, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Corn Growers Association, the Soybean Association, the Wheat Growers Association, every major agricultural organization in the United States, every Republican senator from a corn belt or wheat belt state, every farm state governor, all simultaneously communicated to the White House that the potash tariff would, within a single planting season, cause measurable, calculable, politically catastrophic damage to the American farming economy that the Trump administration was claiming to defend. Within 72 hours, the Trump administration cut the potash tariff from 25% to 10%. Within 30 days, the Trump administration ruled that potash as a covered commodity was tariff exempt entirely. The tariff went from 25% to zero in less than five weeks. The Trump administration walked away from the most aggressive single tariff escalation it had attempted on any commodity faster than the news cycle could finish covering the original announcement. That moment in March and April of 2025 is the moment Donald Trump tried to replace Canada's potash. And it is the moment he found out in the most public way possible that there was no replacement. But Donald Trump did not stop trying. The five-week walkback was the first attempt. It was not the last. By November of 2025, the operational result had become so politically costly that the president of the United States, in a single Oval Office event on December 8th, simultaneously announced a 12 billion emergency aid package for American farmers and a renewed threat of, in his exact words, very severe tariffs on Canadian fertilizer if we have to. Twelve billion in emergency farm aid and a renewed threat of severe tariffs, both announced at the same press conference. The American agricultural press immediately understood the contradiction. You cannot announce a 12 billion bailout for farmers harmed by tariffs and simultaneously threaten the same farmers with new tariffs in the same press conference. The bailout exists because the tariffs already broke the supply chain. The threat exists because the supply chain has not been replaceable. The simultaneous announcement is the public admission that the strategy has failed and is being relaunched anyway. Now, let me show you why the replacement does not exist. Canada produces approximately 14 million tons of potash per year, almost all of it from Saskatchewan. The largest single producer is Nutrien, headquartered in Saskatoon. Nutrien sold 14.4 million tons in 2024. That is more than any other potash company in the world. More than Russian state-owned Uralkali, more than Belarusian state-owned Belaruskali, more than Israeli ICL Group, Brazilian Vale, German K+S, and every other major global producer combined. Saskatchewan holds approximately 1.1 billion tons of recoverable potash reserves. The United States, in comparison, holds approximately 200 million tons spread across five states: New Mexico, Utah, North Dakota, Arizona, and Michigan. None of those state reserves are at industrial scale production. None of them are competitive with Saskatchewan on cost per ton. None of them have the geological depth, the established mining infrastructure, the rail logistics, or the export terminal capacity to substitute for Canadian production at any scale that matters. The reserve ratio is approximately 5:1 in favor of Saskatchewan. The annual production ratio in 2024 numbers was approximately 36:1 in favor of Saskatchewan. Both numbers are documented in the United States Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summary published in January. A single Canadian province mines 36 times more potash annually than the entire United States. A single Canadian province holds five times more recoverable reserves than every American state combined. The geological reality is not a function of policy. It is a function of where the Devonian salt beds were laid down 900 million years ago. The United States cannot replace Canadian potash because the geology is not in the United States. Now, let me show you what the Trump administration tried to do about that. The first path was domestic mine acceleration. In 2024, the Biden administration's Department of Energy provided a loan guarantee of up to 1.26 billion dollars to Michigan Potash and Salt Company, a proposed solution mining operation in Otsego County, Michigan. The state of Michigan provided hundreds of millions in additional support. The Trump administration, upon taking office, fast-tracked federal permitting. The proposed mine, when operational, would produce approximately 800,000 tons of potash annually. The American agricultural economy uses approximately 12 million tons per year. The Michigan mine would supply about 7% of American demand, and that is years away. Construction timeline: five to seven years from final permit to first commercial output. The mine will not produce its first ton of commercial potash before the early 2030s at the earliest. Sage Potash, a Canadian company with proposed mining operations in Utah, received a $14 million grant from the United States Department of Agriculture in 2025 to assess feasibility of a 300,000 ton per year project. Three hundred thousand tons is approximately 2.5% of American annual demand. Construction, if approved, is multi-year on top of a multi-year feasibility study. Then came the Belarus path. In December of 2025, the Trump administration concluded a negotiation with the Belarusian government in which Washington agreed to lift sanctions on Belarusian potash exports in exchange for the release of 123 Belarusian political prisoners. The strategic logic was direct. By unfreezing Belarusian export channels, Washington sought to introduce a structural alternative supply into the global potash market. But Belarusian potash had been operating under sanctions since 2020. Export logistics had degraded. European port access through Lithuania had been closed since the sanctions package expanded after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Even with sanctions lifted, the operational ramp-up to restore Belarusian potash to global market relevance was, by industry estimates, three to five years. Three to five years. That is longer than the entire USMCA review window. Longer than the second Trump term, longer than any

million years ago when central North America was covered by a shallow inland sea. 87% of every bag of potach that fed every corn field in Iowa, every soybean field in Illinois, every wheat field in Nebraska, every potato field in Idaho,

every cotton field in Texas. The entire industrialcale agriculture of the American Midwest, the American plains, and the American South depended on a single critical mineral that is mined in commercial volume in exactly one place on Earth. The United States Geological

Survey published that number in March of this year. It was not breaking news. It was not a surprise to anyone in the fertilizer industry. It was not a surprise to the United States Department of Agriculture, which has tracked

Canadian potach dependency since the 1960s. It was not a surprise to any of the major agricultural lobbying organizations that have testified before Congress on this exact subject in dozens of hearings over the past four decades.

It was however a surprise to Donald Trump. In March of 2025, the Trump administration imposed a blanket 25% tariff on Canadian goods, including potach. The tariff was framed as part of a comprehensive trade war strategy. It was announced with maximum political

fanfare and within days it was met with the largest singleisssue lobbying response from the American Agricultural Sector in modern history. Republican Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Republican Senator John Hovind of North Dakota, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Corn Growers

Association, the Soybean Association, the Wheat Growers Association, every major agricultural organization in the United States, every Republican senator from a corn belt or wheat belt state, every farm state governor, all simultaneously communicated to the White House that the potach tariff would

within a single planting season caused measurable calculable politically catastrophic damage to the American farming economy that the Trump administration was claiming to defend.

Within 72 hours, the Trump administration cut the potach tariff from 25% to 10%. Within 30 days, the Trump administration ruled that podash as a covered commodity was tariff exempt entirely. The tariff went from 25% to zero in less than 5 weeks. The Trump

administration walked away from the most aggressive single tariff escalation it had attempted on any commodity faster than the news cycle could finish covering the original announcement. That moment in March and April of 2025 is the moment Donald Trump tried to replace

Canada's pot ash. And it is the moment he found out in the most public way possible that there was no replacement.

But Donald Trump did not stop trying. The five-week walkback was the first attempt. It was not the last. By November of 2025, the operational result had become so politically costly that the president of the United States, in a

single Oval Office event on December 8th, simultaneously announced a 12 billion emergency aid package for American farmers and a renewed threat of, in his exact words, very severe tariffs on Canadian fertilizer if we have to. 12 billion in emergency farm

aid and a renewed threat of severe tariffs, both announced at the same press conference. The American agricultural press immediately understood the contradiction. You cannot announce a 12 billion bailout for farmers harmed by tariffs and simultaneously threatened the same

farmers with new tariffs in the same press conference. The bailout exists because the tariffs already broke the supply chain. The threat exists because the supply chain has not been replaceable. The simultaneous announcement is the public admission that the strategy has failed and is

being relaunched anyway. Now, let me show you why the replacement does not exist. Canada produces approximately 14 million tons of potach per year, almost all of it from Saskatchewan. The largest single producer is Nutrien, headquartered in Saskatoon.

Nutrients sold 14.4 million tons in 2024. That is more than any other potach company in the world. More than Russian state-owned Urali, more than Bellarian stateowned Bellaruskali, more than Israeli ICL group, Brazilian volley, German K+s and every other major global

producer combined. Saskatchewan holds approximately 1.1 billion tons of recoverable potach reserves. The United States, in comparison, holds approximately 200 million tons spread across five states, New Mexico, Utah, North Dakota, Arizona, and Michigan.

None of those state reserves are at industrial scale production. None of them are competitive with Saskatchewan on cost per ton. None of them have the geological depth, the established mining infrastructure, the rail logistics or the export terminal capacity to

substitute for Canadian production at any scale that matters. The reserve ratio is approximately 5:1 in favor of Saskatchewan. The annual production ratio in 2024 numbers was approximately 36:1 in favor of Saskatchewan. Both numbers are documented in the United

States Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Summary published in January. A single Canadian province mines 36 times more potachsh annually than the entire United States. A single Canadian province holds five times more recoverable reserves than every American state combined. The geological reality

is not a function of policy. It is a function of where the Deavonian salt beds were laid down 900 million years ago. The United States cannot replace Canadian pot hash because the geology is not in the United States. Now, let me

show you what the Trump administration tried to do about that. The first path was domestic mine acceleration. In 2024, the Biden administration's Department of Energy provided a loan guarantee of up to$1.26 26 billion dollars to Michigan Potach and Salt Company, a proposed

solution mining operation in Oyola County, Michigan. The state of Michigan provided hundreds of millions in additional support. The Trump administration upon taking office fasttracked federal permitting. The proposed mine, when operational, would produce approximately 800,000 tons of potach annually. The American

agricultural economy uses approximately 12 million tons per year. The Michigan mine would supply about 7% of American demand and that is years away.

Construction timeline 5 to 7 years from final permit to first commercial output. The mine will not produce its first ton of commercial potach before the early 2030 cess at the earliest. Sage Potach, a Canadian company with proposed mining

operations in Utah, received a $14 million grant from the United States Department of Agriculture in 2025 to assess feasibility of a 300 ton per year project. 300,000 tons is approximately 2.5% of American annual demand. Construction, if approved, is

multi-year on top of a multi-year feasibility study. Then came the Bellarus path. In December of 2025, the Trump administration concluded a negotiation with the Bellarusian government in which Washington agreed to lift sanctions on Bellarian Potash exports in exchange for the release of

123 Bellarusian political prisoners. The strategic logic was direct. By unfreezing Bellarusian export channels, Washington sought to introduce a structural alternative supply into the global podash market. But Bellarouchian Potash had been operating under sanctions since 2020. Export logistics had degraded. European port access

through Lithuania had been closed since the sanctions package expanded after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Even with sanctions lifted, the operational ramp up to restore Bellarusian potach to global market relevance was by industry estimates 3 to 5 years. 3 to 5 years.

That is longer than the entire USMCA review window. Longer than the second Trump term, longer than any plausible electoral cycle in which dependence on Canadian podash could be politically managed without major economic disruption. The replacement does not exist on any timeline that matters. That

is the operational truth that the United States Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy, the National Security Council, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative all communicated to the Trump administration in March and April of 2025. The

operational truth is that there is no alternative supply that can substitute for Canadian podash at the volumes American agriculture requires on the timeline American agriculture operates on at any price point that does not collapse the financial viability of the

corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton sectors. And those sectors are not abstractions. They are the political base of the Republican party in approximately a dozen American states.

Every state from Iowa to Texas, from Ohio to Mississippi with significant corn, soybean, wheat, or cotton production has a Republican leaning agricultural population that voted for Donald Trump in 2024 by margins that in some cases exceeded 20 points. Each of

them has at least one Republican senator whose primary political constituency includes the farm cooperatives that purchase pach directly from Canadian distributors. Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa was the first Republican senator to publicly call on the Trump administration to walk back the original

25% potachsh tariff. The entire Republican farm state caucus communicated to the White House within days that the political damage from sustaining a 25% potach tariff would, in the words of multiple senatorial offices, exceed any plausible bilateral negotiating gain with Canada. The Trump

administration backed down in five weeks because the political cost was uncontainable. That backdown was the moment Mark Carney's negotiating posture became operational, not because Carney had any direct involvement in the potash tariff sequence. He took office in March

2025 in the middle of the walkback. The structural reality that the walkback expressed was already in place when Carney arrived. The structural reality is this. The United States agricultural economy depends on Canadian pot hash.

The dependence is geological. The dependence is not policy reversible on any timeline shorter than approximately 10 to 15 years. The dependence makes potash as a commodity structurally exempt from sustained tariff escalation regardless of what the Trump administration announces in any single

press conference. Because the political cost of sustained potash tariffs paid by Republican senators in farm states exceeds the political benefit to the White House of using potash as a negotiating lever against Canada. That is the dependency hierarchy and it

hasn't changed since March of 2025. Now let me show you what happened in December because the December sequence is the cleanest documentation of the structural pattern. On December 8th, 2025, Donald Trump held the Oval Office event at which he announced the 12

billion dollar emergency tariff relief fund. In response to a reporter's question, he said he might impose, in his exact words, very severe tariffs on Canadian fertilizer if we have to. He did not address the question of whether domestic production could realistically

substitute for Canadian supply on any commercially relevant timeline. The same day, William Pellerin, partner at the international trade law firm McMillan, told BNN Bloomberg that any tariffs on Canada as the primary supplier of potach would directly increase costs on

American farmers. The next day, Matt Simpson, the chief executive officer of Brazil potach, told BNN Bloomberg that any tariffs on Canadian potach would result in prices being passed on to American farmers. Two industry experts on consecutive days on the same

financial news network told the audience the same thing. Tariffs on Canadian potach do not translate into pressure on Canada. They translate into pressure on American farmers. The cost is paid by the customer, not by the supplier. And the supplier in this case has no global

competitor that can substitute for Saskatchewan production at the volumes required. The reason this matters is that William Pellerin and Matt Simpson are not aligned with the Carney government. Pellerin is an international trade lawyer in Toronto. Simpson is the

CEO of a Brazilian potach company that competes directly with Canadian producers in the global fertilizer market. Both of them said the same thing because the operational reality of the global potach market made it impossible to say anything else. A Brazilian potach

CEO told the American business press that American tariffs on Canadian potach would harm American farmers. That is the moment the structural debate stopped being a debate. Even the competitors of Canadian potach producers acknowledged that substitution was not available on

any timeline that mattered. Three weeks later, the Trump administration concluded the Bellarusian sanctions deal. The political logic was direct. If American producers could not substitute for Saskatchewan on a meaningful timeline, then Bellarouchian producers with sanctions lifted could be marketed

as a structural alternative source. The deal would communicate to American farmers and to Republican farm state senators that the White House was actively building substitution capacity.

But the timeline was 3 to 5 years to commercial relevance, longer than the USMCA review window, longer than the second Trump term, which brings us to the operational reality of the spring 2026 planting season. For this planting season, American farmers are paying the

highest fertilizer costs in approximately 3 years. The United States prices paid index tracked by the Department of Agriculture rose from 139.9 in mid 2024 to 149.9 in June 2025.

Fertilizer was the primary driver accounting for an 11% rise in input costs for crop farmers over that period.

The Federal Reserve Bank of St. The Louie import price index for chemical fertilizers rose from 164.5 in December 2024 to 186.5 in September 2025. The cost was passed through to farmers. The Republican farm state senators forced the walk back. The structural pattern

was established. Net farm income, according to the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri, is projected to fall by more than $30 billion in 2026.

Soybean farmers, according to the American Soybean Association, are facing their third consecutive year of losses, the American Agricultural Economy, even with $40 billion in government farm payments in 2025, is operating at structurally compressed margins. That is the economic backdrop against which the

Trump administration is preparing for the USMCA review on July 1st, 2026. The administration cannot use potach as a leverage tool. The previous attempt produced an immediate Republican Senate revolt and a five-week walk back. The administration's domestic substitution strategy is on a 5 to 15year timeline.

The Bellarian alternative is on a three to five-year ramp up. And on the Canadian side, Mark Carney is doing exactly nothing. That is not a casual observation. That is the strategic posture. Carney is not threatening Canadian export controls. Carney is not

endorsing Doug Ford's earlier suggestion that Canada should weaponize pot# exports as a US MCA negotiating lever.

Saskatchewan Premier Scott Mo, a conservative aligned with the Saskatchewan party rather than Carney's liberals, has explicitly opposed any politicization of potash exports.

Nutrien is pursuing commercial expansion through a new export terminal in Washington state, a decision that has irritated Canadian politicians who would prefer the terminal to be built in British Columbia, but which represents a long-term commercial commitment to American customers. Regardless of

bilateral political dynamics, Canada is letting the geological reality do the work. Saskatchewan is letting the geological reality do the work.

Nutrianne is letting the geological reality do the work. The Carne government, the Saskatchewan government, and the dominant private sector producer have all converged on the same operational posture. Continue normal commercial export flows. Refuse to escalate. Refuse to politicize. Let the

structural dependence on Canadian pot hash hold the negotiating line by itself. It is the cleanest version of a negotiating posture I have tracked across the entire 17-month trade war because it requires no public confrontation. It requires no retaliation. It requires no

announcement. It requires only that Canadian producers continue selling potach to American customers at commercial market prices and that the United States political system absorb the consequences of any attempt to disrupt that flow. This is the structural lock that Donald Trump tried

to break in March 2025 and discovered in 5 weeks was unbreakable. The trade war has many fronts. The Pesh front has since spring 2025 been quietly closed.

Not by Canadian retaliation, not by Carney's rhetoric, not by Moe's provincial leadership, not by nutrients commercial strategy, by the geology of Central North America, which placed the largest concentration of potach reserves in human history under one Canadian province, and which made every American

farmer who plants corn, soybeans, wheat, or cotton structurally dependent on that single source for the next 10 to 15 years. Donald Trump tried to replace Canada's podash. What he found out next stopped him cold. The decisions are being made. Please hit the bell icon and

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